This paper takes up the recent epistemological turn in feminist theory and some of the problems thereby raised. The fundamental aim of feminist theories in general is to analyze (and change) gender relations. It may be argued that the term ‘epistemology’ in feminist discourse should not be defined too narrowly. For the most part it is a comprehensive concept that refers to various aspects of both know ledge claims and grounds for knowledge in not only scientific, but also ethical, moral, and political contexts. The discussion in this paper, however, will concentrate mainly on epistemological questions as they relate to science.

When feminist epistemologies are proposed, they not only set out to legitimize a new field of inquiry; often they also question the entire ‘scientific project’ and its underlying metaphysics. While feminist critical theory has a lot in common with other radical oppositions to traditional philosophy of science, it differs in its strong emphasis on epistemological concerns. The term ‘feminist epistemology’ calls upon us to replace a male-centred epistemology with a female/feminist-centred one. The point is that traditional science and philosophies of science are considered to be male-biased, while a science grounded in a feminist epistemology is regarded as potentially non-biased.

Feminist epistemologies have been usefully examined by proponents like Sandra Harding (Harding & Hintikka (eds.) 1983; Harding 1986, 1987). They have been presented as a basis for both a radical critique of traditional philosophy of science and as a logical and coherent alternative. I shall argue that both of these claims are beset with immense difficulties; they somehow create more problems than they solve. My point of departure in discussing these issues is the theory of science, especially that branch of it that focuses on the relationships and interaction between social and cognitive aspects (or factors) in science and research.

First of all I want to emphasize that, in my view, the recent epistemological turn in feminist theory tends to over-estimate metatheoretical aspects; it tends to do so both when criticizing existing science and in its proclamation of a science grounded in a feminist epistemology. On both counts there is a tendency to misconstrue science as an activity dominated by philosophical conflicts and obligations. Such one-sided epistemology-centred philosophy of science has been questioned by, among others, Richard Rorty (1980) and Rom Harre (1986). This development, though an unintended effect of feminist critiques of science, is nevertheless a possible outcome.

Although there are, of course, many important differences between traditional epistemological orientations and the feminist discussion, the exaggerated focus on epistemology may lead to untenable conclusions, particularly when it comes to the significance of metatheoretical aspects in science. One consequence is that important distinctions between cognitive and social factors tend to collapse.

My main concern in this paper is with feminist epistemologies. I have found that many female, and of course feminist, scientists and theorists discuss issues related to the theory of science. Many feminists have naturally been working as scientists or philosophers without reflecting on or criticizing the basic assumptions of their disciplines, and certainly there has always been theoretical discussion within feminism, sometimes leading to contradictions in the women’s movement. The recent philosophical turn, however, has to a certain extent introduced a new kind of interest in feminist philosophy, which is sometimes only rather distantly connected to political feminism.

Feminist epistemologies are constructed to justify feminist scientific and philosophical activity and to provide a new basis for the new kind of feminism; a process that is fraught with its own special difficulties. Some of the more obvious differences between women, regarding interests, positions, and tasks in society, which were the source of political contradictions within the women’s movement, now tend to collapse in women’s academic studies, under the notion of one overarching common knowledge-base, founded on gender.

In this paper I shall be concerned with some of the problems confronting the feminist epistemological project. They may be formulated in many different ways, but there are at least three main tensions and oppositions that appear to be most influential and relevant to the present discussion. These are:

1. The tension between objectivism and relativism.

2. The problem with the social dimension in men’s and women’s thinking.

3. The opposition between different interpretations of the concept of ‘difference’ .

These three related issues are difficult to settle in feminist discourse, and each of them tends to create new problems. In what follows I shall deal with each of the issues under a separate heading.

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