Heidegger’s influence on some important strands of modern East Asian, and particularly Japanese, philosophy is well known. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s a number of scholars who would become major figures in Japanese philosophy (such as Miki Kiyoshi and Nishitani Keiji) visited Heidegger and attended his lectures. Heidegger’s work was embraced, disseminated and even canonized in some Japanese schools of thought long before it made a significant mark on European philosophy. Tanabe Hajime’s 1924 Japanese-language essay ‘A New Turn in Phenomenology: Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life’ is widely thought to be the first substantial commentary on Heidegger in any language. Kuki Shuzo’s 1933 The Philosophy of Heidegger (again, in Japanese) was the first book-length study in any language.1 Being and Time was translated into Japanese in 1939, twenty-three years before the first English translation, and five further Japanese translations of the work appeared in the following thirty years.2 Of these Japanese philosophers Miki Kiyoshi was the only one seriously to criticize Heidegger after 1933; he was also the only Marxist. The most influential reception of Heidegger’s work fed into the philosophical justification of fascism in Japan, as Tanabe’s writings in particular show.3 It is interesting, therefore, that most of the now voluminous literature on the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and East Asian thought centres on what Reinhard May calls the ‘correspondences’ between Heidegger’s work and ancient Chinese and ancient Indian thought,4 ‘correspondences’ which perhaps explain, to some degree, the ease with which Heidegger was read in twentieth-century China and Japan. (Heidegger’s Japanese interlocutors and students often expressed amazement at the tendency of Heidegger’s German contemporaries to find his work obscure and difficult.) In his early work on Heidegger, Graham Parkes even spoke of ‘congruencies’ between Heidegger’s work and these ancient sources being ‘patterned by something, event, or process’.5 More recent work suggests the rethinking of these congruencies in terms of the disavowed influence of ancient East Asian sources on Heidegger’s philosophy, bringing them into even closer relation.

This article comprises a critical examination of some aspects of the English-language comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought. It questions both its transcendental conceptual ground – the conditions of possibility for the comparative exercise – and its account of Heidegger’s philosophy itself. For the comparative literature, I will argue, can only make its specific claims, sympathetic to the Heideggerian philosophical project, with a reading of that project that represses most of what is fundamental to Heidegger’s conception of philosophy and almost everything that we know about his politics. Furthermore, in its emphasis on the ancient it facilitates the repression of the history of Heideggerian fascism in modern East Asian, and particularly Japanese, thought. The point of this critical examination of the comparative literature is not, however, to expose a mis-reading of Heidegger. It is to reveal what is at stake in the mobilization of the imaginary geopolitical and geophilosophical unities of ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ in relation to Heidegger’s political-philosophical thinking of ‘the West’. Accordingly, I will look first at the claims typical in the advocacy comparative literature and then at the problematic conceptual ground of the comparison, both in terms of its immanent logic and its relation to Heidegger’s conception of the history of philosophy.

The claims

The comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought is surprisingly large. The basic motivation and the substantial content of its main strand is well represented by Joan Stambaugh (translator of many of Heidegger’s works, including Being and Time),
who finds ‘a basic compatibility’ between Daoism and Heidegger’s attempt to think beyond metaphysics. Central to this, as to many of the compatibilist claims, is Heidegger’s 1929 lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’, where the nothing is thought beyond its traditional metaphysical definition, that is, beyond its definition as ‘the complete negation of the totality of beings’. ‘The nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings.’ For many commentators, Heidegger’s attempt to think ‘Nothing’ outside of the Western history of nihilism (nihilism, that is, as Heidegger understands it: ‘The essence of nihilism is the history in which there is nothing to being itself’) is most easily understood in terms of the non-dualism of Daoist thought and the basic Daoist insight, as Reinhard May puts it, of the ‘correspondence between being and nothing’. Other ‘resonances’ (to use Graham Parkes’s word) between Heidegger’s philosophy and ancient East Asian sources are not difficult to find. Translations of the ‘the dao’ as ‘the way’ give rise to obvious comparisons between this ‘way’ and Heidegger’s ‘ways’ (Wege) of thought, between this ‘way’ and Heidegger’s ‘Saying’, and even to an identification of the dao with what Heidegger calls Being itself. The prominent place of death in Daoist thought may also be compared to the place of death in Being and Time, the role of silence in Zen may be compared with the place of silence in Heidegger’s later work, and this by no means exhausts the comparative field.

It is often implied, almost by way of justification of the comparative project, that the discovery and explication of these parallels may help us to better understand or appreciate the significance of Heidegger’s thought. This claim is in turn justified by reference to Heidegger’s well-documented interest in ancient East Asian thought. In many of the published reminiscences of friends and students of Heidegger, and in other records of conversations and letters between Heidegger and others, it is clear that Heidegger was familiar with much ancient Chinese and Indian philosophy as it has survived in the form of the texts we know today. Heidegger had already been introduced to some of these texts by the early 1920s, it seems, and often discussed them, particularly with his Japanese interlocutors. From the standpoint of the current relative ignorance in the Western philosophical academy concerning ancient Chinese and Indian sources, Heidegger’s knowledge may seem remarkable. But Heidegger and his contemporaries lived, institutionally, in the wake of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German Romantic traditions in which knowledge of these texts – both originals and translations – was not uncommon. (Martin Buber, Rudolf Otto, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers and Karl Löwith all had interests in Asian thought.) Reinhard May, Graham Parkes and others cite Heidegger’s familiarity with Buber’s Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse, a German translation of the Zhuangzi (or Chuanz-tzu) anthology, one of the two major works of Daoism. To find this tradition upheld by an old-fashioned scholar of Heidegger’s ilk is not surprising, and there is no doubt, May says, that although Heidegger could not read Chinese, he ‘valued and appreciated East Asian thought, and Daoist ideas above all’. In most of the comparative literature, then, the congruencies between Heidegger’s philosophy and East Asian thought are not explained as cosmic parallels, but justified – to a greater or lesser extent – with reference to Heidegger’s ‘clearly stated interest in Eastern thinking’. Heidegger, that is, is presented as having led the way in East–West comparative philosophical studies, and the extension of the comparison to his own work is therefore natural.

However, even limiting the discussion here to a consideration of the English-language literature on Heidegger’s relationship to ancient Chinese (specifically Daoist) sources, it is immediately obvious that there is more to the comparative literature than the mere noting of congruencies. Studies in comparative philosophy, as in comparative religion, literature, anthropology and so on, are always in part ideological enterprises. And the context of the comparative literature on Heidegger reveals, in a particularly explicit manner, a major ideological issue in the field of comparative philosophy more generally: the geopolitical contestation of the definition of philosophy itself.

The history of modern Western philosophy includes – and not just as an interlude – the oft-repeated claim that, as one of the West’s ‘others’, China not only in fact never produced an indigenous properly ‘philosophical’ tradition, but was necessarily incapable of doing so; either because of the various alleged conceptual and grammatical inadequacies of Chinese or because of the regrettable absence of Western political forms in China. To an extent, the comparative literature in English is based on the presumption that this claim is wrong and on the desire to open ‘the West’ up to dialogue with the philosophical traditions of ‘the East’. (Thus Elisabeth Feist Hirsch writes: ‘In an age of constantly narrowing distances between nations it is most important that East and West not only come to a deeper appreciation of their respective intellectual commitments, but that they communicate with each other in the true sense of the word.’) This
essentially well-meaning urge is often true of Euro-American comparative studies more generally, but it has a peculiar twist in the case of comparisons with Heidegger: what, for the history of modern Western philosophy, constitutes the inadequacies of Chinese language and thought, constitutes, for the comparative literature, its precise superiority and its point of contact with Heidegger.

China, it is said, did not ever have, nor did its peoples ever feel the need for, ‘metaphysics’. For sinologists like Joseph Needham, unacquainted with the philosophy of Heidegger, this refers to the absence of those distinctions, which, for many, are the sine qua non of Western philosophy. In the second volume of the massive multi-volume *Science and Civilization in China*, edited by Needham until his death, he writes:

> we believe that the Chinese mind throughout the ages did not, on the whole, feel the need for metaphysics; physical Nature (with all that implied at the highest levels) sufficed. The Chinese were extremely loath to separate the One from the many or the ‘spiritual’ from the ‘material’. Organic naturalism was their *philosophia perennis*.\(^1\)

While Needham means these remarks to be complimentary, others descriptions are less sympathetic. One chapter of Hajime Nakamura’s *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, entitled ‘Non-Development of Abstract Thought’, claims that the ‘Lack of Consciousness of Universals’ (a section title) is ‘symptomatic of the general lack of consciousness of genus and differentia in the abstract among the Chinese’. The ‘Lack of Conscious Use of General Laws’ and the ‘Grammatical Ambiguity of Chinese Language and Thought’ (more section titles) means that ‘[w]e should not expect … the Chinese language would be as suitable as the Greek for philosophizing’. The Japanese (which ‘has had, at least in the past, a structure unfit for expressing logical conceptions’, and other ‘defects’) is likewise considered inferior in comparison with the Sanskrit, Greek and German.\(^1\) Nakamura, himself Japanese, clearly adduces these conceptual and linguistic differences as evidence of the superiority of Western models of philosophical thinking. These same differences, however, read through another optic, are the basis for the claim that Heidegger’s project of the overcoming of metaphysics finds ‘resonances’ in the ancient sources, which – with their non-dualistic logic and this-worldly emphasis – had, as Needham says, ‘persistently eluded all metaphysics’.\(^2\) That is to say, the characteristics Nakamura finds lacking in Chinese thought – preponderantly, the characteristics of a philosophical practice founded on Aristotelian logical categories – are easily identified with the categories of Western metaphysics, as Heidegger understands it. For Graham Parkes, finding these parallels with ‘a non- and anti-metaphysical philosophy from a totally different historical and cultural situation lend[s] considerable weight to Heidegger’s claim to have succeeded in overcoming the western metaphysical tradition’.\(^3\)

The discussion of these correspondences, congruencies and compatibilities took a different turn, however, with the publication in 1989 of Reinhard May’s *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources* (translated into English in 1996). May refers his readers to Nakamura’s section on ‘Non-development of Metaphysics’, as well as to Needham’s comments, for authoritative support for his claims about Chinese philosophy, claims that are the basis of the ensuing comparison with what he sees as the most fundamental philosophical commitments of Heidegger’s work.\(^4\) To this extent, May’s book is not at odds with what we could call the mainstream of the comparative literature. However, his central claim is considerably stronger than anything previously found in it. His claim is that Heidegger’s work from the mid-1920s, if not before, was influenced by these East Asian sources to ‘a hitherto unrecognized extent’, and that ‘it seems probable that Heidegger, without stating his sources, in a number of cases of central importance appropriated ideas germane to his work from German translations primarily of Daoist classics but presumably of Zen Buddhist texts as well’.\(^5\)
claims, explicitly, that Heidegger sought and found his new beginning in philosophy from these East Asian sources, although Heidegger would never openly acknowledge this. Interpreting some of Heidegger’s retrospective marginal notes in *Being and Time*, May implies that Heidegger’s indebtedness to these sources extends even to the thinking of Being itself. Documenting the various ancient Eastern Chinese texts and thinkers with which Heidegger was undoubtedly familiar and comparing these—with many of the major themes in Heidegger’s work leads May to the following conclusion:

Where [Heidegger’s] thinking has from early on received its (‘silent’) directive from is now not difficult to surmise. From ancient Chinese thought—for metaphysics, so conceived, was never developed there. Being neither indebted to Aristotelian logic nor receptive to an ontology involving a subject–object dichotomy, nor, above all, being conditioned by any theology, ancient Chinese thought was completely remote from the assertion of ‘eternal truths’, which belong according to Heidegger ‘to the residue of Christian theology that has still not been properly eradicated from philosophical problematic’. 

Graham Parkes, May’s English translator, is thoroughly convinced by May’s evidence and has pursued these claims further.

**The comparison**

There thus seem to be two different types of claims in the comparative literature on Heidegger and Eastern Asian thought: claims about ‘resonances’ and claims about Heidegger’s secret indebtedness. However, in so far as they are both dependent on an untheorized logic of comparison, the basis and the specific content of both types of claims are, I will suggest, dubious on several counts.

First, a comparison, if it is to retain its status as comparative, generally requires a context including—crucially—some mediating third term, distinct from either of the comparanda (here, Heidegger’s philosophy and ancient Chinese thought) according to which the comparanda are compared. In the English-language literature under discussion here that third term is most often defined negatively as the absence (in Chinese thought) or the overcoming (in Heidegger) of ‘Western metaphysics’. As noted, both the traditional and the specifically Heideggerian senses of the history of Western philosophy as metaphysics seem to exclude consideration of Chinese thought as philosophy in a certain sense, albeit with a different understanding of what is implied in this exclusion. However, the same thing that, from the traditional Western philosophical perspective, writes China *out* of the history of philosophy, assures its entry *into* that same history, from the *equally but differently* Western Heideggerian perspective of the overcoming of Western metaphysics. This structure of internality besets the comparative literature: that is, its alleged East–West dialogue, conducted from the point of view, and according to the preoccupations, of the West (here, the overcoming of Western metaphysics), is primarily a dialogue of the West with itself. Accordingly, the epitome of the comparative literature on Heidegger is an essay written by Heidegger himself, translated into English as ‘A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Enquirer’, a text which, according to Heidegger, ‘originated in 1953/54, on the occasion of a visit by Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University, Tokyo’, but one in which the parts of both the ‘Japanese’ and the ‘Enquirer’ are in fact played by Heidegger.

May treats this essay as something of a scandal, as if Heidegger was trying to pretend that the words spoken by ‘a Japanese’ should be directly attributable to Tezuka. Although there is something a little creepy about the dialogue (Heidegger is unlimsting in his praise for his own work through the mouth of ‘the Japanese’), it is not misleading in the way May suggests: most readers would probably presume that Heidegger plays both parts in this dialogue, just as most readers assume that Plato wrote all the parts in his. This kind of one-sided exchange, in which the position of only one of the interlocutors is properly developed, is also a recognizable genre, ‘standard practice in traditional dialogues in both East and West’, of which Malebranche’s 1708 dialogue between a Christian and a Chinese philosopher is a notable example. If Heidegger’s ‘Dialogue’ is only a ‘dialogue’ in the sense that word names a particular genre of writing, its content is preoccupied with the issue of the possibility or impossibility of an East–West dialogue in a deeper sense. While May reads it as proof both of Heidegger’s indebtedness to East Asian sources and his attempts to cover this over, it is equally plausibly read as a statement of Heidegger’s belief in the fundamental and incommensurable *differences* between philosophical traditions, and of the extraordinary difficulty, if not the impossibility, of a true dialogue, despite the best intentions of the interlocutors.

Even where the comparative literature acknowledges in some way the problem of internality it does not manage to avoid it. Michael Heim, for example, begins his essay ‘A Philosophy of Comparison: Heidegger and Lao Tzu’ with the claim that the notion of ‘comparison’ animating such studies needs articulation in a philosophy of comparison (not just comparative...
philosophy), and that the ‘place’ of such a philosophy is not outside or above the comparandae but somehow between them. The empirical fact of ‘the interpretation of East and West’ means that comparative philosophy can no longer orient itself ‘on a simple geographical or cultural duality’, and as the reality of ‘international communication’ is really the homogenization of communication ‘in a planetary culture [that] is the triumph of Western technology coupled with the culmination of the logos tradition’ (by which he means the hegemony of ‘the ideological public statement’ as distinct from ‘personal human truth’), the category of the ‘unspeakable’ is deployed as the ‘free opening’ or ‘negative space’ in which comparative philosophy might operate. However, this ‘negative space’ (between, for example, Heidegger and Lao Tzu) ‘can be characterized in any set of philosophies by showing in what way the comparandae contribute to the culmination of the logos tradition in the unspeakable or in what way the comparandae contribute to the cultivation of the unsayable’.29 That is, the negative space between Heidegger and Lao Tzu is characterized, ultimately, in wholly Heideggerian terms. (It may be, of course, that the discourse of Heideggerianism is constitutively incapable of reflection in non-Heideggerian terms, but that is another story.)

These sorts of criticism apply, most obviously, to the comparative literature that sets out to uncover resonances between Heidegger’s philosophy and East Asian thought across the millennia. And, at first sight, it looks like the stronger claims made by May and Parkes avoid them, both in the historical location of a series of appropriations, and in the privileging of the ancient Chinese sources in the comparison – Heidegger’s philosophical categories being, in some sense, a ‘translation’ of these sources. In fact, I will argue, these stronger claims are subject to the same logic of comparison, and thus suffer from the same internality.

Stepping back, briefly, into Heidegger’s history of philosophy, how should we understand its conception of the overcoming of Western metaphysics, the success of which is crucial to many of the claims in the comparative literature? The answer to this is complex, but one thing seems clear. There is no question of a clean break, no question of two separate histories of metaphysical and post-metaphysical thinking or of a leaping outside of the history of Western metaphysics. This is evident in Heidegger’s incessant return to the texts that comprise that history, not only empirically (in the fact of the return) but also more fundamentally, in the animating belief in the necessity of that return and in what is thereby to be achieved. The project of the overcoming of Western metaphysics, where ‘Western metaphysics’ means, above all, the understanding of the Being of beings as constant presence, is not achieved through the dismissal of its history, but by paying attention to its own hints at another concealingly-unconcealed understanding of Being. Of course, the word ‘Being’ itself belongs to what Heidegger calls ‘the patrimony of the language of metaphysics’,30 which would lead, among other experiments, to its being crossed through and to the restoration of its archaic German spelling (Seym),31 but never to its abandonment.

It is remarkable, then, that one subject rarely broached in the comparative literature on Heidegger is the absence in Chinese of the verb ‘to be’ and of the abstract noun ‘Being’.32 In the exclusion of Chinese thought from the realm of the philosophical in the traditional history of Western philosophy and its others, this ‘lack’ was often considered decisive. That is, for many, this was the mark of the Chinese incapacity for metaphysical thought, a presumption in which the linguistic and the anthropological were inseparably entwined, hence the tendency (unbelievably, still not yet dead) to speak of ‘the Chinese mind’ (a truly astonishing construction of the unity of China).33 If the claim in the comparative literature is that it is the non-metaphysical aspects of Chinese thought that bear comparison with Heidegger’s philosophy, then this, perhaps the most un-metaphysical aspect of all, ought surely to be foregrounded.

That it is not foregrounded may at first sight appear as the passing over of an embarrassing lack of resonance devastating for the comparative case. This is not actually quite so, but it is intriguing. Heidegger, as is well known, repeatedly refers to the importance for him of Aristotle’s posing the question of the meaning of being, more particularly his observation that being is said in many ways.34 In separating out the different senses of being, Aristotle distinguishes what we now call the copulative and the existential senses of being, although confusion of these two senses continued to cause problems in philosophy for many centuries. For some, however, it is the illusion of an overarching unity of the sense of being – an effect of the inherent ambiguity of the verb and of the capacity for Indo-European languages to derive from it an abstract noun – that is the mistake in Western philosophy. In the eyes of at least one prominent sinologist, the absence of the verb ‘to be’ and of a unifying concept of being is one of the main features recommending ancient Chinese philosophy. According to A.C. Graham, ‘Classical
Chinese deals with the various functions covered by our verb "to be" by means of at least six different sets of words and constructions, several of which have other functions outside the scope of "to be". In particular, Classical Chinese has different and specific words for the copulative and the existential senses of the word 'being', thus avoiding the kind of confusion germane, for example, to Anselm's ontological argument. In translating Anselm's argument without the benefit of an ambiguous verb 'to be', Chinese translators have, according to Graham, coined a new word with the syntax of the English 'exist' (a syntax otherwise foreign to Chinese), a word that has no function in the language except in the translation of Western texts. One may thus, he says, 'introduce into Chinese thought the error of treating existence as a predicate, which it took the West 2000 years to expose'.

Graham did not, unfortunately, ever discuss the Chinese translations of *Being and Time*. However, his philosophical position on fundamental ontology may be extrapolated from his various remarks about 'the oddity of the Western tradition ... in which the concept of Being covers the whole range of the Indo-European verb "to be"'. For Graham, the fact that symbolic logic has no symbol for being in this sense and that everyday use of the verb 'to be' is almost exclusively copulative (the existential functions having been taken over by phrases such as 'there is', 'il y a', 'es gibt') suggests that philosophers should abandon 'being' as an incurably ambiguous. The ghost of the old concept still walks, he says, 'but one may well ask in what sense Western thinkers, however confidently they may talk of Being, may be said to retain a concept which no longer has a place in either their natural or their artificial languages.'

For Graham, one of the virtues of ancient Chinese philosophy is that in 'lacking' the concept of Being it is non-metaphysical, in the sense that logical positivists demand that philosophy be non-metaphysical (that is, anti-metaphysical). Graham's objection is that 'being' is ambiguous, and that we should therefore drop it in philosophy, but this is the kind of objection on which Heidegger pours scorn in the opening pages of *Being and Time*. It is not an objection that the authors of the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought are therefore likely to countenance. This is a complex linguistic issue, but if a concept of Being is peculiar to Indo-European languages and absent in Chinese, and if Heidegger continues to speak of Being as differentiated from all ontic determinations of beings, it is difficult to see how this does not mark a decisive dissimilarity with ancient Chinese philosophy, and it would make more sense to say that Heidegger failed to learn from it, than that it was his inspiration.

However, as Heidegger was reading German translations of Classical Chinese that imposed categories from Western philosophy (as a necessity of translation) there would still be grounds to claim, as May does, that these texts were influential. A large part of May's case against Heidegger is the argument that the (silent) appropriation of one basic insight forms the basis of Heidegger's discussion of the nothing in 'What is Metaphysics?' and An Introduction to Metaphysics, specifically: 'The East Asian way of thinking distinguishes itself in Daoism through the ancient insight, embodied in chapter 2 of the *Laozi*, to the effect that *yu* (being) and *wu* (nothing) mutually produce one another.' This looks like a translation of the Chinese characters into English (German in May's original), but, according to Graham's argument above, it must be equally, if not more so, a translation of the German/English concept back into the Chinese. In that case, however, the alleged affinity is between Heidegger's philosophy and Western renderings of 'East Asian thought' which, once again, are really a dialogue of the West with itself, having 'discovered' its own categories in the thought of another tradition. This is certainly how much of the comparative literature – albeit unwittingly – expresses the relation. Feist Hirsch, for example, writes that 'Zen Buddhism ... arrives at the conclusion

---

1. "存在" 是 “最普遍的”的概念:  "to 有 之 为 不 冠是 现

2. "Ontologie"一词，传统的中文译法为 “本体论”。这个词的原意实际

3. "Ontologie"一词的原意实际为 "本体论", 一个词的原意实际为 "本体论", 一个词的原意实际为 "本体论", 一个词的原意实际为 "本体论", 一个词的原意实际为 "本体论"。
that the world man lives in points to Buddhahood. Thus Zen agrees with Heidgger’s view to the effect that Being-there transcends toward Being.41 May’s reversal, despite appearances to the contrary, cannot but fall under the same suspicion. In this case the mediating third term of the comparison, here an understanding of Being in some way ‘beyond’ Western metaphysics, is really internal to one of the comparandae and imposed on the other, as is most clear in Feist Hirsch’s claim.

‘The West’

Exposing this structure of internality is not intended as a criticism of the motivation of the comparative literature so much as an argument for the necessity for critical reflection on its immanent logic and its founding categories, ‘the East’ and the ‘West’. The need is particularly acute in comparative studies on Heidegger and ‘the East’ not because Heidegger fails to address the function of these categories, but, on the contrary, precisely because of the way in which he makes an articulation of the category of ‘the West’ central to his philosophical concerns. Any attempt to compare the specificity of Heidegger’s philosophy and any ‘Eastern’ source must surely take this articulation into account. That the comparative literature does not do this further undermines the viability of the comparison between Heidegger’s philosophy and East Asian thought, on grounds immanent to Heidegger’s philosophy itself. For important aspects of the comparative case can in fact only be made when Heidegger is rendered un-Heideggerian with respect to some of his fundamental philosophical commitments regarding ‘the West’. This argument needs to be made against the comparative literature. I will argue, not as a defence of Heidegger against May et al., but in order to remove an obstacle to criticism of Heidegger, criticism that the comparative literature neutralizes and in so neutralizing obviates its own best impulse.

This is clearest in the elaboration and justification of May’s and Parkes’s stronger claim about the East Asian influence on Heidegger: the idea that these similarities are not coincidental (as Parkes previously believed) but evidence of Heidegger’s ‘clandestine’ indebtedness, more fundamental to his thought than any indebtedness to the Western tradition. In pursuing these claims further Parkes concludes, too, that Heidegger not only kept silent about the debt he owed to these sources, but disavowed them; more bluntly, he lied.

To anyone familiar with certain of Heidegger’s silences and his revisionist memories of relations and allegiances, this is all too easy to believe. Still, neither May nor Parkes actually give a reason for Heidegger’s reticence or dishonesty here. May quotes Heidegger referring more or less obliquely to his ‘hidden sources’ (Heidegger’s own phrase45), and of a ‘deeply hidden kinship’ between his thinking and aspects of Japanese thought: ‘In other words, he speaks of a connection based on his adoption of some essential traits of East Asian thinking which, for reasons easy to understand, he declined to reveal.44 May contrasts the details of his comparison between Heidegger’s philosophy and the ancient East Asian sources with the very few published references to East Asian thought in Heidegger’s work and with his explicit denials of their influence or of the current importance of these texts for Western thinkers, but concludes that Heidegger left behind ‘well-encoded signs of a confession’.45 He ends his book, not with a criticism of Heidegger, but with the idea that Heidegger ‘has paid tribute in a unique way’ to the West’s task to devote itself to non-Western thinking: ‘Heidegger has, in his own special way, demonstrated the necessity of transcultural thinking.46 Similarly, despite Heidegger’s ‘reticence’ in acknowledging his debts, Parkes concludes that to the extent that May’s demonstration is successful, ‘rather than diminish Heidegger’s significance as a thinker it makes him in many ways even more interesting’.47 Further, Parkes suggests that in bringing these hidden sources to light May operates in accord with Heidegger’s own method, thinking what is unthought in Heidegger’s texts, following Heidegger’s own maxim in his lecture course on Plato’s Sophist: ‘It is in any case a dubious thing to rely on what an author himself has brought to the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence.48 What, however, remains shrouded in silence in the comparative literature itself?

Remarking that ‘the Eurocentrism of so much Heidegger scholarship in the West has rendered it oblivious to the long and interesting history of the reception of Heidegger’s ideas in the non-Western intellectual world’,49 Parkes’s implication seems to be that Heidegger’s work is not itself Eurocentric. Heidegger’s frequent remarks about Europe, and especially about the historic role of the ancient Greeks and the destiny of the German people, are left uncriticized and unexamined. What is in fact obvious in Heidegger’s reluctance to ‘admit’ the East Asian influence on his work – namely, the profoundly, almost paradoxically, Eurocentric commitment at the heart of his philosophy – simply vanishes. That is, it is vanished in and by the comparisons with ‘Eastern’ sources. This is not only because these aspects of Heidegger’s work must be among the most embarrassing paragraphs for his
sympathetic readers, second only – but intimately related to – his enthusiasm for German ‘National Socialism’. It is also because the philosophical position expressed in them is profoundly at odds with the comparative project.

It would be easy enough to pick one’s way through Heidegger’s work and find numerous references to the essentially Greek nature of Western philosophy and to the necessity to return to the Greek origin. I shall quote just one example. In the interview with Der Spiegel (conducted in 1966) Heidegger says of the ‘reversal’ – that is, the overcoming – of the technification of the modern world, which is the ‘completion’ or result of Western metaphysics:

it is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated, and that it cannot happen because of any takeover by Zen Buddhism or any other Eastern experiences of the world. There is a need for a rethinking which is to be carried out with the help of the European tradition and of a new appropriation of that tradition. Thinking itself can be transformed only by a thinking which has the same origin and calling.\(^30\)

May says we must understand this passage as ‘a tactically necessary “cover-up” manoeuvre that turned out to be necessary for the preservation of his secret’. Parkes says Heidegger’s denial, in a letter to Jaspers, of any ‘resonances with Eastern thinking’ in his work ‘speaks volumes’, by which he seems to want to suggest that the denial is itself a covert admission.\(^31\) The major presumption of the comparative literature – both in extremis in May and less combatively in Parkes and elsewhere – is thus that remarks and denials such as these must either be taken to be extra-philosophical opinions that say something about the man but not about the philosophy (as many would read Heidegger’s political ‘opinions’ too), or they must be taken to represent a philosophical position that somehow contradicts the true Heidegger or the true Heideggerian philosophy. This is a familiar tactic in many apologetic discussions of the racist or sexist or misogynistic ‘opinions’ of various philosophers; a tactic recently and persuasively criticized by Robert Bernasconi.\(^52\) According to this way of reading, Heidegger’s remarks must be taken to be reprehensible, as lies or mistruths, but may be dismissed.

In fact, Heidegger’s remarks are perfectly consonant with, perhaps even exemplary of, philosophical commitments that were evident in his work before the 1920s and which endured to the end – turns and new beginnings notwithstanding. The peculiar form of Heidegger’s basic insistence on the historicality of Dasein means that we are supposedly indebted to the Greek origin ‘which goes to the essence of our Dasein, i.e., its total existence’. In The Essence of Truth, for example (the lecture course from 1931/2), we are said to ‘remain bonded and obligated to that beginning whether we know it or not … our Dasein stands in the history of the beginning of Western philosophy’ and contemporary life, even the fact that today we ‘travel by tram … means nothing else but that the beginning of Western philosophy, albeit without our recognizing it, is immediately effective’.\(^53\) For ‘us’, then, going back to the Greek origin, trying to grasp the Greek understanding of being, is ‘not a matter of acquiring external historical knowledge’, but of investigating its ‘constant (albeit hidden) influence on our contemporary existence’.\(^54\)

If, as Heidegger claims, ‘man finds the proper abode of his existence in language’,\(^55\) it seems that we must assume a difference in the nature of what he calls ‘European existence’ and ‘East Asian existence’, ‘since the nature of language remains something altogether different for the Eastasian and the European peoples’. If language is the house of being, ‘then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man’, he says in ‘A Dialogue on Language’.\(^56\) Despite the fact that Heidegger talks, in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, about perished worlds, world-withdrawal and world-decay,\(^57\) he assumes some continuity of existence, in some sense, between ancient Greece and modern Europe because of the linguistic family relation. (Why the Indic branch of the Indo-European family is excluded is not explained.) Further, this linguistic affinity supposedly ensures that we can return to the Greek origin and that we can, according to Heidegger, experience aletheia in the Greek sense,\(^58\) or actually think ‘in Greek terms’.\(^59\) It is this imaginary, purely cultural-linguistic continuity that, for Heidegger, unifies ‘the West’.

Everything suggests that for Heidegger the task of the overcoming of Western metaphysics is, for essential reasons, a ‘European’ task for ‘European’ peoples: a task which could only be a task for European existence and which only European existence could undertake, even after what he calls the Europeanization of the world.\(^60\) To the extent that this argument is based on linguistic affinity, it turns out that for Heidegger ‘Europe’ means ‘Germany’. The Germans, Heidegger says in the interview with Der Spiegel, have a special role in the task because of the inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today again by the French. When they begin to think, they speak Ger-
man, being sure that they could not make it with
their own language.61

Heidegger stuck to this view for more than 35
years. In The Essence of Human Freedom (a lecture
course from 1930) he says that the extent to which all
genuine languages are philosophical like the Greek
(‘it philosophizes in its basic structure and forma-
tion’) ‘depends on the depth and power of the people
who speak the language and exist within it. Only
our German language has a deep and creative philo-
sophical character to compare with the Greek.’62 In this
bizarre, arbitrary linguistic nationalism it is impossible
not to see a relationship between Heidegger’s concep-
tion of Western philosophy and his politics. If the
comparative literature on Heidegger tends to leave this
out of account, preferring instead an abstract concep-
tion of ‘Heidegger’s thought’ detached not just from
its historical and political context but from its own
(even its own-most) being-historical and being-politi-
cal, its concomitant silence on the fascist reception
of Heidegger in Japan becomes comprehensible. The
two are, simply, too closely connected. The ideal-
ist ground of the comparison facilitates this silence:
the ideas in two sets of texts are interpreted and
compared without consideration of their historical
situations and meanings. This is more obvious with the
first type of comparative claim about congruencies,63
but it applies equally to the stronger claims about
the East Asian influences on Heidegger, in so far as
they neglect Heidegger’s historico-political situation.
Radically dehistoricized, uprooting thought from the
factic basis on which Heidegger himself insisted, these
comparisons are alien to any sense of the necessity of
social-cultural or political context in the understanding
of any given philosophical position or project. This
is not to say, of course, that resonances cannot still
be found, especially if one is looking for them. The
idealism of comparative philosophy does not refute its
own findings; on the contrary, it is one of its conditions
of possibility.

The choice of Greece

None of this necessarily constitutes a refutation of any
of the specific claims of influence in the comparative
literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought. But
in failing to address the extent to which Heidegger
locates the problem and the task of philosophy, and the
form of existence adequate to it, in a radically reduced
German nationalist idea of Europe, the comparative
literature overlooks what is actually foundational to its
own project: the construction of a history of Western
philosophy in a determining opposition to the East.
Heidegger was not the first to imagine ancient Greece
as the birthplace of Western philosophy, but his work
– especially as mediated by Levinas and Derrida – is
largely responsible for the status that this idea con-
tinues to enjoy in continental philosophy. To the extent
that the self-conception of continental philosophy as
an engaged relation with the history of philosophy
presumes just this history of philosophy – so often pre-
sumes, as one may read over and over, that philosophy
is Greek64 – the very idea of continental philosophy
appears to be mortgaged to it. Until the middle of the
eighteenth century, it was presumed in Europe that the
wisdom of the Greeks was derived from non-European
sources, specifically (but not exclusively) Egypt, Persia
and India. Towards the end of the eighteenth century,
this was supplanted by the completely different – and
now hegemonic – story of the exclusively Greek origin
of what began to be called ‘Western philosophy’. As
Robert Bernasconi points out, the narrowing of the
history of philosophy to its origins in Greece needs
to be understood in relation to a certain narrowing
of the conception of philosophy itself, making it pos-
sible for us to speak now of the exclusion of certain
traditions of thought, including the Chinese, from the
Western conception of philosophy.65 (On this much, at
least, the continental and the Anglo-American analytic
philosophical traditions of the twentieth century have
been in agreement.) Only after this exclusion can com-
parisons be made, because only after this exclusion are
there two distinct traditions to be compared.

Despite the best intentions of the comparative lit-
erature on Heidegger, it cannot avoid a paradoxical
 collusion with this kind of history of Western phil-
osophy, a history which has, indeed, been the condition
of possibility for the field of East–West comparative
studies in philosophy. ‘Western philosophy’ and ‘Asian
thought’ (the latter internally subdivided into the
imaginary unities of East Asian and Indian thought)
are themselves ‘Western’ categories. The categories
both provide the conceptual ground for comparative
studies, as that which is to be compared, and throw
the ground of that comparison into doubt in so far as
they are internal to the Western problematic, just as the
categories metaphysical/non-metaphysical are internal
to the Western problematic. The obvious deconstruc-
tive fillip – the ‘East’ is, of course, therefore internal
to the definition of the ‘West’ – does not refute, but
rather confirms this, rendering the critical investiga-
tion of the categories all the more compelling.

The problems with the East–West comparative
model are quite general, but, as I have argued, the
use of the model in relation to Heidegger’s work poses
its own unique difficulty. For Heidegger the question
of the Greek ‘origin’ of philosophy and of Western
civilization was not a question of any historiographic or factual beginning; it was, quite emphatically, not an empirical question. The positing of the Greek origin constituted, for Heidegger, the resolute repetition of a tradition, a resolute philosophical choice that not only sanctioned but also necessitated a disregard for the historical ‘facts’ about the empirical origins of philosophy.66 But it is precisely this conception of the origin as resolute repetition that stymies the comparative project of the literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought, at least in so far as it claims to be Heideggerian. In Heidegger’s resolute repetition of the Western tradition a choice has been made – the choice of Greece, the choice of the West, the choice of Europe and the choice of Germany. This is, moreover, a necessary choice for Heidegger (‘it is my conviction that a reversal can only be prepared in the same place…’) and it is a choice that excludes ‘the East’, constitutively. Once again, this does not refute the claim that Heidegger was influenced by Daoist texts, but it does suggest that the comparative literature ought to include a critical reflection on Heidegger’s political-philosophical position on ‘the West’, which is in so many ways anathema to the ideological presuppositions of the comparative project.

Though Heidegger was obviously gratified by the interest in his work in East Asia, one consequence of his relation to the ‘original’ texts of his own tradition was his apparent belief that East Asians should go back to the ‘original’ texts of theirs.67 In so far as the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought constitutes such a ‘going back’ the mediating third term in the comparison – something beyond Western metaphysics – is also inflected in it as this idea of ‘going back’ (inseparable, in this context, from the idea of ‘ancientness’). This both rules out the possibility of a comparison with modern East Asian philosophy and sails dangerously close to that orientalism for which ‘the East’ signified the ancient in distinction from the modernity of ‘the West’.68 Furthermore, on the back of Heidegger’s return to ancient sources, it seems to enable the metonymic construction of Heidegger as himself a timeless source, thus, once again, avoiding the historically and culturally located specificity of his philosophical-political position, and sidestepping the necessity for critique.

Notes

15. May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, p. 4.
17. Ibid., p. 263.
19. Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India – China – Tibet – Japan, revised edition by Philip P. Weiner, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1964, pp. 186, 187, 532, 533–5. The editor’s Preface (p. xi) quotes ‘renowned sinologue’ Professor P. Demiéville on Nakamura’s work: ‘I was particularly struck by the part on Japan which occupies nearly half of the work, for it constitutes a national self-criticism, wholesome and sharp, such as you would not have thought written by a Japanese.’ Demiéville is clearly pleased – if a little taken aback – at Nakamura’s mastery of the ideology and vocabulary of the sinology and Japanology of the period.
22. May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, p. 56.
23. Ibid., pp. 4, 51.
25. Ibid., p. 56. The quotation from Heidegger can be found...
Contri

Vittorio


Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII 1028a, trans. Hugh Treden


A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Arguments in Ancient China, Open Court, LaSalle IL, 1989, Appendix 2, “The Relation of Chinese Thought to the Chinese Language”, p. 413; see also p. 414. For a critique of Graham’s general approach to this question, see Rob
tardy, Aristotle in China: Language, Categories and Translation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 3. In Translation and Subjectivity (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1997, p. 86) Naoki Sakai discusses Watsuji Tetsuro’s treatment of the same issue in Japanese: Watsuji ‘points out the difference between the term sonzai (being), an equivalent of ningen, and German Sein, so as to exemplify the grammatical limitation of European languages that Western ontology has taken for granted.”


“In symbolic logic the verb “to be” dissolves into the sign of existence (∈), which is not a predicate but a quantifier, and three separate copulae, the signs of identi
ty (=), class membership (∈) and class inclusion (⊆).” Graham, ‘Being in Linguistics and Philosophy’, in Unreason Within Reason, p. 93.

Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p. 408. In this book Graham addresses the issue of the allegedly unphilosophical nature of Chinese philosophy directly. On ‘Being’ in Indo-European languages and philosophy, see also Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese’, p. 87.


May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, p. xviii.

To be found, according to Parkes (in May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, n. a. p. 65) in Heidegger’s ‘Winke’, Gesamtausgabe, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, Volume 13, p. 33.


May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, p. 45. May’s chapter 5 is titled ‘A Kind of Confession’.

Ibid., p. 57.


Cited by Parkes, ibid., p. x.

Ibid., p. ix.


Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, trans. Ted Sa


Heidegger, “‘Only a God Can Save Us”’, p. 113. See also Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 57.


See, for example, Stambaugh, ‘Heidegger, Taoism,
and the Question of Metaphysics’, p. 90: ‘the tao has been described … as "the rhythm of the space–time structure," as “an uncircumscribed power ruling the totality of perceptible givens, itself remaining accessible to any specific actualization.” This is not exactly Heidegger’s language, but surely the true spirit of his thought.’ Stambaugh is quoting from Marcel Granet, *La Pensée chinoise*, La Renaissance du Livre, Paris, 1934. Similarly, Feist Hirsch: ‘Although there are wide areas of disagreement between Samkara [a Hindu philosopher of the eighth and ninth centuries, Christian calendar], it is surprising to note that they share some basic thoughts’ (*Martin Heidegger and the East*, p. 256).


67. See, for example, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, p. 37, in which the ‘Japanese’ says: ‘Professor Tanabe often came back to a question you once put to him: why it was that we Japanese did not call back to mind the venerable beginnings of our own thinking, instead of chasing ever more greedily after the latest news in European philosophy.’