Remembering Adorno

John Abromeit

In his sociology of religion, but also in his analyses of bureaucracy in modern societies, Max Weber analysed the process by which ideas that aim for qualitative change, for a transvaluation of values, are worn down in the historical process, codified and routinized by interpreters, gradually brought back into line with the status quo. Building upon Georg Lukács’s early analyses of reification, which reinterpreted Weber’s theory of rationalization in terms of Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism, Theodor Adorno would prove himself to be one of the most astute analysts of such processes of ‘adjustment’, which would expand and intensify in the twentieth century. Adorno’s own theory was driven in large part by the increasingly difficult task of escaping the levelling tendencies of a society dominated by the logic of the commodity, but he also clearly recognized that his own efforts would be only partially successful: ‘No theory’, not even his own, ‘escapes the market any longer’.1 The adjustment of the dialectically transcendent ideas of Adorno and his colleagues has been described as the transformation of Critical Theory into the Frankfurt School.2 While the concept of Critical Theory has become practically meaningless – particularly in the Anglo-American world – the concept of the Frankfurt School has become a convenient label to designate one of the many theoretical tendencies competing on the market today. It is not entirely clear who belongs to the ‘school’ or what exactly it stands for. In the past decades many have taken a trip to the city of Frankfurt itself in hopes of clarifying this question. But upon arriving in the mini-metropolis on the Main, asking a taxi driver to be taken to the ‘Frankfurt School’, as some bewildered visitors have done recently, will lead only to a wild goose chase. Theodor Adorno Platz, on the other hand, really does exist. But prior to this year, one would have discovered there only a large war memorial from 1925, a concrete ping-pong table, and several benches — often littered with empty cans of beer — all surrounded by some overgrown hedges. Just a few days before what would have been his hundredth birthday in 2003, the city of Frankfurt finally decided to improve the miserable state of Adorno’s official site. Beer cans were picked up, hedges trimmed, ping-pong table removed and the war monument was replaced by an artistic memorial by the Russian artist Vadim Zakharov in the form of a large desk with several of Adorno’s principal works on top of it.

The city of Frankfurt and the federal state of Hesse have been reluctant to support nonconformist cultural causes in the past. The budget of the Frankfurt Film Museum was slashed several years ago, which prompted Adorno’s friend and well-known representative of the New German Cinema, Alexander Kluge, to write several letters in protest. More recently, the city government has threatened to cut the funding for what is without doubt the most innovative cultural undertaking in Frankfurt today, namely William Forsythe’s avant-garde ballet.3 Such continuing conspicuous neglect of Adorno would not, however, have been possible during his centenary year, for the city has realized that the ‘Frankfurt School’ has become an internationally recognized label, one that they literally cannot afford to ignore. In fact, the city has in the meantime charged full-steam ahead. The face-lift of Theodor Adorno Platz has been just one part of a much larger ‘Jubiläum’ the city has dedicated to its exiled son this past year. For example, the Institute for Social Research, which has since come to represent the ideas of the so-called second and third generations of the Frankfurt School, organized a three-day international conference on Adorno’s work. Considering what the ‘second and third generation’ members of the ‘Frankfurt School’ have written about Adorno in the past two decades, it is difficult to imagine that this conference was motivated by anything more than Pflichtbewusstsein (consciousness of duty).4 The conference thematized Adorno’s not so surprising disappearance from academic discussions in Germany in the past decades. But far from merely confirming that Adorno’s thought belongs to the past, this academic neglect of Adorno and the other Critical Theorists also confirms their own deeply ambivalent attitude towards academic specialization, with its affirmative tendency towards insularity and insufficient self-reflexivity. But not all of the centenary events were driven by a concern with the city’s image and/or performed reluctantly out of a mere sense of duty. Several other conferences and talks were
organized that called into question the numbing effects of ritualized memory and made an attempt not merely to think about Adorno, but to think with him about contemporary issues. Furthermore, several new studies of Adorno’s life and work were published last year, including two new intellectual biographies that take seriously the task of working through Adorno’s impressive and manifold legacies.” These two biographies will be the subject of the following remarks.

**A Künstlerroman**

Detlev Claussen begins *Theodor Adorno: Ein Letztes Genie* (*Theodor Adorno: A Last Genius*) with a discussion of two potential problems that leap immediately to the attention of anyone familiar with Adorno’s thought. Is the genre of biography really an appropriate way to approach Adorno’s work? How can one justify using the concept of genius to describe Adorno, when he was so critical of this typically bourgeois fetishization of art, the individual and production? Claussen explicitly mentions Adorno’s objections to biography, but justifies his own undertaking in terms of letting Adorno’s work speak for itself. He claims to eschew any attempt to interpret Adorno’s work merely in terms of biographical details, thereby observing Adorno’s own lifelong rejection of psychologism and sociologism. Claussen invokes Goethe as the quintessential *bildungsburgerliche* model of the genius and integrated subjectivity, and his portrayal of Adorno’s life contains elements of a *Bildungsroman*. While Claussen insists that the concept of the genius ‘really does apply to Adorno’, he also stresses throughout the book the ‘non-identical’ character of Adorno’s development, even the negative consequences of certain instances when Adorno succumbed to identity thinking, such as his rigid rejection of jazz. Claussen stresses certain transformative phases in Adorno’s life, but its different periods never coalesce into a meaningful whole. In other words, Adorno’s life is portrayed more in terms of a tragic *Künstlerroman*, such as *Anton Reiser* or *The Green Henry*, in which the artist never fully succeeds in reconciling himself with society, than as an edifying *Bildungsroman*, such as *Wilhelm Meister*, in which the protagonist achieves peace with himself and his world at the end.⁶

The metaphor of the *Künstlerroman* also proves apt in relation to Adorno’s childhood, which is the topic of Claussen’s first chapter. In contrast to many of his future friends and colleagues, Adorno’s family origins did not lie in the sphere of production but were instead a mixture of an increasingly threatened existence in the sphere of circulation, on his father’s side, and lower-middle-class artistic, even bohemian, existence on his mother’s side. As Claussen shows, Adorno’s childhood was by no means typically bourgeois, in so far as art – music, to be precise – was not reduced in his unorthodox family to mere cultural capital or a pedagogical tool; it was instead the daily nourishment of the young Teddie, which sustained the remarkable development of this ‘hothouse plant’, as he would later describe himself.⁷ Claussen also makes some interesting observations in his first chapter on the history of Frankfurt and the history of the Jewish community in Frankfurt and the surrounding area, and how it influenced Adorno’s childhood. He shows, for example, how the rising incidence of anti-Semitic violence in the Hessian countryside in the mid-nineteenth century probably led Adorno’s grandfather to relocate their wine business from the provincial Dettelbach to the burgeoning trading centre of Frankfurt, which had by far the highest percentage of Jews of any city in Germany at the time. It was the only city in which it was possible at the turn of the century to erect a memorial to Heinrich Heine. Heine continues to play a minor, yet important, role in the remainder of Claussen’s narrative, particularly in his emphasis on the impossibility of explaining Adorno’s – or Heine’s – work solely in terms of its ‘Jewish origins’. It was in fact the anti-Semites who insisted upon classifying Heine’s work as ‘Jewish’. As Adorno would point out later in a trenchant essay on Heine, the increasingly chauvinistic versions of ethnic and nationalist ‘identity’ that developed in Europe and elsewhere in the nineteenth century – which relied upon the exclusion of putative ‘foreigners’, such as Jews – had fateful ignoring one of Heine’s central insights, namely that ‘transcendental homelessness’ had become universal in the modern world.⁸

In the second chapter, Claussen examines the various contexts of Adorno’s development in the 1920s. His re-examination of the circumstances that led to the founding of the Institute for Social Research will be familiar to most, and his lengthy panegyric to Hermann Weil seems gratuitous and one-sided.⁹ But his description of both the betrayal felt by many young intellectuals at the capitulation of their older counterparts in the face of World War I, and the

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ongoing restrictively conservative state of the German universities in the 1920s, provides an important and often overlooked key to understanding the origins of Critical Theory. Despite his meteoric rise from student to lecturer to professor and director of the Institute for Social Research, Horkheimer never abandoned his deep suspicion of the academic conformism that dominated even relatively liberal universities in Germany at this time, such as Frankfurt. It was this same conformism that made academic careers extremely difficult or impossible for Adorno, Benjamin and Kracauer. In this sense, Claussen is correct to stress the vital importance of an extra-academic 'peer group' for Adorno’s development at this time. But his sociological acumen verges on sociologism when he views Adorno's work in this period as driven primarily by a desire for community, his theory as an ersatz religion. While Adorno was unquestionably drawn to the theologically inspired work of Bloch and Benjamin, his commitment to radical Enlightenment was also strong, as even a cursory reading of his first *Habilitationsschrift* on 'The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Theory of the Soul' (1927) reveals. Like Horkheimer, Adorno was interested in using psychoanalysis as a weapon against the uncritical and irrationalist apologists of the unconscious. The de facto rejection of this study by Hans Cornelius, who was on the left-liberal fringe of the German university system at this time, certainly contributed to Adorno’s subsequent theoretical turn away from Horkheimer towards Benjamin.

Chapter 3 leaps over the 1930s to a series of short ‘Übergänge’ (transitions) which examine some of Adorno’s key relationships while he was in exile in the USA. It focuses mainly on Adorno’s complex relationship to Thomas Mann. Claussen succeeds – where others have failed – in providing a balanced portrayal of Adorno’s admiration for Mann and his contributions to *Doktor Faustus*. There is no question that Mann respected Adorno’s formidable artistic and intellectual powers, but this respect was – as was so often the case among those who came to know him personally – tempered by reservations about Adorno’s extreme narcissism, which was inseparable from his genius, but was frequently overbearing at the same time. As Horkheimer’s wife, Rosa Riekhcr, once put it, ‘[Teddie was the] most immense narcissist to be found in both the Old and the New World’ (372). But Claussen’s discussion of the charged relationship between the two men moves beyond the merely personal to reflect upon the displaced position of art at a time when both German and bourgeois cultural continuity had been called deeply into question. This situation led to many paradoxical expressions of ‘the non-identical’ – the title of the chapter – in the work of both Mann and Adorno. Adorno saw in Mann a living embodiment of ‘that German tradition … from which I received everything, including the strength to resist tradition’ (149). Claussen characterizes Mann as a ‘Bourgeois artist [who] experienced the present as an epoch of debourgeoisification [Entbürgerlichung]’ (169). Adorno viewed the role of critical intellectuals such as himself as ‘the last enemies of the bourgeois … and the last bourgeois at the same time’ (169). As Claussen convincingly argues, these reflections upon the status of tradition in their own work became particularly acute for exiles like Adorno and Mann in the United States, a country Adorno perceived as the embodiment of ‘a completely pure form of capitalism … without any remnants of feudalism’ (258), and a ‘radically bourgeois country’ (167).

These reflections on both the central significance of his ‘American experience’ for his work, and the contradictory ‘nature’ of Bürgerlichkeit, continue throughout the remainder of Claussen’s book. His examinations of Adorno’s friendships with Hanns Eisler and Fritz Lang also centre on these themes. Like Adorno, Eisler studied music in Vienna in the 1920s, but unlike him he succeeded in winning the recognition of Schoenberg and was not forced to relinquish his career as a composer. Thus Claussen portrays Eisler as Adorno’s unidentical Doppelgänger, an embodiment of the ‘artist, who is no longer supported by the bourgeois. The artist as critic of the bourgeois society, from and in which he nonetheless must live’ (185).
Claussen uses the discussion of Fritz Lang to criticize the misconception that Adorno was a rigid defender of Kultur against the blandishments of popular entertainment. He shows that Lang served as Adorno’s inside man in Hollywood, and provided him with the insights he needed to criticize the instrumental attitudes of the studio bosses and their lackeys, not the entire film genre or the very notion of entertainment. While Claussen’s demonstration that Adorno was not the Spassverderber (spoilsport) that he is usually taken to be — that he criticized the culture industry as an ‘intellectualization of amusement’ (201) — hits the mark, his characterization of Adorno as a ‘passionate movie-goer’ (199) overshoots even Adorno’s legendary penchant for hyperbole.

The next chapter examines Adorno’s ‘Frankfurt Transfer’, but largely in terms of its preconditions in the USA. In other words, Claussen returns here in greater depth to Adorno’s ‘American experience’ in order to explain Adorno’s ambivalent attitude to returning to Germany after the war. Adorno’s aversions to the United States came out more clearly in this section. Claussen discusses Adorno’s stubborn resistance to jazz, explaining and criticizing it in terms of a compensation for his own thwarted musical ambitions and an excessive desire for continuity and identity in his damaged life in exile. On the other hand, Claussen also criticizes those who cite Adorno’s overwrought critique of jazz as a convenient excuse to dismiss his critical social theory as a whole. Claussen points out, correctly, that Adorno’s critique — however one judges it — viewed jazz merely as a symptom of much deeper social-psychological phenomena, and this is what Adorno demanded be taken seriously, not just the musical merits of jazz from a purely aesthetic standpoint. He also reflects at length in this chapter upon a figure who might be considered a second, more distant, ‘unidentical brother’ of Adorno, namely Paul Lazarsfeld. Lazarsfeld is used mainly as a foil, to illustrate those aspects of the ‘American experience’ which Adorno refused to assimilate. While Claussen does stress the crucial importance of Adorno’s exposure to professional, empirical social science in the USA, he is also careful to highlight Adorno’s obstinate refusal to remake himself completely in the American melting pot. From Adorno’s perspective, Lazarsfeld’s American re-education worked a bit too well; thus, rather than emulate his example of ‘entrepreneurial initiative’ (217), Adorno chose to return to Frankfurt after the war, in no small part because he preferred ‘the security of an existence as a civil servant’ to the ‘freedom of a market organized as a culture industry’ (246).

The identical and non-identical moments in Adorno’s friendship with and intellectual development vis-à-vis Horkheimer provide one of the unifying themes of Chapter 5. Unlike Müller-Doohm, who portrays Adorno’s relationship to Horkheimer as one of gradual, but continual confluence (sealed by a ‘double liaison’ with Gretel Karplus and Max Horkheimer on 8 September 1937, when Horkheimer served as best man at Adorno’s wedding to Karplus), Claussen clearly recognizes the ‘ups and downs’ in the prehistory of this remarkable friendship. After the de facto refusal by Hans Cornelius of Adorno’s first Habilitationsschrift in 1927, Adorno drifted away from Horkheimer in order to pursue passionately his theoretical elective affinity with Walter Benjamin. Horkheimer reacted sceptically to Adorno’s inaugural lecture as a Privatdozent on ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, and did not extend an explicit invitation to Adorno to join the Institute in exile after the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933. The two of them did not speak for a year and a half, and, even though Horkheimer soon renewed his efforts to bring Adorno back into the Institute’s orbit, he continued to remain sceptical of several of his projects, refusing to publish essays by Adorno on Husserl and Karl Mannheim, even after the ‘double liaison’ in 1937. Horkheimer did, of course, ultimately choose Adorno, rather than Marcuse, to co-write the Dialectic of Enlightenment, but Claussen shows how Adorno, nonetheless, ‘struggled his entire life for the
... recognition of the older man’ (265). Claussen recognizes that Horkheimer had already reached his theoretical apogee in the 1930s, while Adorno still suffered from a certain political naïveté that went hand in hand with his ‘aesthetic Left-radicalism’ from the 1920s. Claussen gives Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘American experience’ credit for curing Adorno of these last remnants of naïveté, which did not, however, diminish his theoretical radicalism. Adorno returned to Frankfurt also because it was where he spent his childhood, which remained an important source of the negatively formulated allusions to utopia in his writings. Whereas Horkheimer ‘was looking for a possibility to retreat’ (308) after the war, Adorno first came into his own in the Federal Republic in the 1950s.

The 1920s and the 1950s were separated by the civilizational rupture of Auschwitz. In his final chapter Claussen demonstrates how – virtually alone among his peers – Adorno fully registered this unfathomable shock and how it moved to the very centre of his Critical Theory. He does this by creating another ‘palimpsest’ of Adorno’s life, reconstructing in detail the development of Adorno’s most important intellectual relationships. In what can be seen as significant contribution to the history of the Frankfurt intellectual milieu in the 1920s, Claussen reconstructs the dynamic force field within which Adorno’s Critical Theory took shape, among the attraction and repulsion to the ideas of Kracauer, Lukács, Rosenzweig, Buber, Horkheimer, Bloch, Benjamin and Brecht. He then shows how this intellectual force field developed in the 1930s and 1940s and how Adorno’s mature Critical Theory emerged from it in the 1950s. His most significant contribution is his finely sketched portrait of Adorno’s relationship to Bloch, which has often been overlooked in the secondary literature.

It was with Bloch, not Benjamin or Horkheimer, that Adorno shared the intimate Du in the 1920s and 1930s. Adorno moved away from Kracauer and Horkheimer towards Benjamin in the late 1920s, ‘but also in this friendship Adorno seemed to miss something that he could share only with Bloch – music’ (328). Benjamin reacted allergically in the early 1930s to Adorno’s operetta about Mark Twain, whereas Bloch was able to understand the utopia of a ‘non-bourgeois notion of maturity’ (331) that it expressed. But Bloch’s reduction of utopia to a principle remained too abstract to accommodate the catastrophic historical experiences of the twentieth century. Brecht’s, Eisler’s and Lukács’s positions in the 1950s also led to a ‘disappearance of Auschwitz behind a rationalistically constructed Marxism’ (388), according to Claussen. Apart from Horkheimer, who had already passed his theoretical prime by this time, Adorno turned to poets such as Samuel Beckett and Paul Celan to find an adequate expression of the traumatic historical situation. Claussen concludes the final chapter with some reflections on Adorno’s relationship to the protest movements of the 1960s, which represent a working through of Claussen’s own past, since he was, like his friend Hans-Jürgen Krahle, one of Adorno’s students who was active in the SDS at the time. Claussen criticizes the radicalized students’ unmediated appropriation of the Critical Theorists’ positions from the 1930s and the spread of a ‘Left-radical attitude as conformist fashion’ (44). On the other hand, he also demonstrates that Adorno stood solidly, if cautiously, behind the protesting students – until they began disrupting his own lectures. As elsewhere in his study, Claussen approaches this crucial and complex subject as an Aufklärer [Enlightener], criticizing widespread pre- and misconceptions and offering new insights with engaged and serious scholarship.

The Composer as Critical Theorist

Stephan Müller-Doohm’s Adorno: Eine Biographie is nearly twice as long as Claussen’s book, which has advantages and disadvantages. It enables Müller-Doohm to examine certain aspects of Adorno’s life and work in greater detail. He devotes more space, for example, to exploring Adorno’s personal life. If you want to learn about the less than egalitarian domestic arrangements Adorno had with his wife, Gretel Horkheimer, or about Adorno’s various lovers, Müller-Doohm’s study is the place to go. Müller-Doohm also devotes more space to short synopses of Adorno’s work. One could debate the usefulness of any three-page summary of Negative Dialectics, but you won’t find one in Claussen’s study. In this and his linearly structured, more or less comprehensive narrative of Adorno’s life and work, Müller-Doohm’s study is a more traditional intellectual biography than Claussen’s. And, despite its greater length, Müller-Doohm’s study reads more quickly than Claussen’s. Müller-Doohm’s polished prose usually draws the reader along quickly, whereas Claussen’s mimetic approach often captures and conveys the intellectual and emotional density of Adorno’s own prose, which presupposes a high level of previous knowledge and constantly demands that the reader stop, reflect and reread. Müller-Doohm’s book will be more appropriate for those less familiar with Adorno’s work, which is not to say that this thoroughly researched study does not break any new scholarly ground.
Müller-Doohm’s study is structured chronologically and divided into four main sections. The first addresses Adorno’s family background, his childhood and youth. Müller-Doohm begins with a detailed portrait of Adorno’s Corsican grandfather, Jean-François Francesco, who settled in the Frankfurt suburb of Bockenheim without speaking German and struggled to make a living as a fencing instructor. Thus his daughters, Louise and Agathe, who would become Adorno’s ‘two mothers’, grew up in very modest surroundings. After Francesco died in 1879, his musically gifted wife attempted to improve her family’s financial situation by organizing public concerts with her daughters, which soon earned them the reputation in the local press of ‘musikalische Wunderkinder’. But despite Müller-Doohm’s more detailed examination of the humble background of Adorno’s family – particularly on the maternal side – he still describes it as typically bourgeois. Müller-Doohm cites the Institute’s later Studies on Authority and Family to support this claim. Whereas bourgeois society is dominated by the principle of competitive self-interest, the family supposedly provides ‘a haven in a heartless world’, a separate sphere in which everyone is committed to the happiness of the other, which leads ‘to a premonition of better human condition’.20 Adorno did indeed benefit from the extraordinary solicitude of not just one but two ‘mothers’ and the unwavering beneficence of his father, but the artistic – even bohemian – tendencies in his family, and its social standing, leave no doubt that it was not typically bourgeois in many respects. Claussen is more attentive to these fine, but significant differences from the more solidly bourgeois backgrounds of Horkheimer, Pollock and Felix Weil. Thus it comes as perhaps no surprise that Siegfried Kracauer, whose origins were more humble than Adorno’s, became Adorno’s first extra-familial mentor. Müller-Doohm devotes much attention to this crucial relationship. But because significant portions of the Adorno–Kracauer correspondence are still off limits to publication – Müller-Doohm was forced at the last minute by Reemtsma foundation, who owns the rights to the Adorno–Kracauer correspondence, to retract several quotations – neither he nor Claussen was able to move substantially beyond what readers of Kracauer’s fictionalized account of his relationship with Adorno in Georg have known since the belated publication of that novel in 1973.21

In the second part, Müller-Doohm examines Adorno’s years as a student and lecturer. Apart from a relatively short but influential stay in Vienna in 1925 and frequent trips to Berlin in the late 1920s, he spent these years in Frankfurt. The discussion of the vicissitudes of Adorno’s musical apprenticeship in Vienna is the highlight of this section. He provides a finely sketched portrait of Adorno’s relationship to one of Schoenberg’s most respected composition students, Alban Berg. He explains why Adorno was unable to win the recognition of the greatly admired pioneer of atonal and twelve-tone music,22 but his ‘unconditional recognition’ of Berg was handsomely rewarded; Adorno began a friendship with him that ‘intensified continually over the following months and years’ (126–7), documented by 136 letters from 1925 to 1936, from which Müller-Doohm draws extensively and profitably in the further course of his study.23 Whereas Claussen uses Adorno’s father’s wine business to introduce the pronounced sensualist dimension of his temperament, Müller-Doohm argues that it was Berg’s sophisticated hedonism, and the ‘sensuality of Vienna life’ more generally, which taught Adorno how to enjoy himself. Müller-Doohm also includes detailed discussions of Adorno’s own compositions and musical writings during this period. For example, Müller-Doohm illustrates concretely how Adorno ‘took the step from a concert and composition critic to a musical theorist with his texts from the early 1930s’ (176). He emphasizes repeatedly and convincingly that composition was every bit as important as philosophy for Adorno at this time (182). This also helps explain Adorno’s increasing distance from Horkheimer in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Like his philosophical mentors, Kracauer, Bloch, Benjamin and the young Lukács, Adorno’s concept of philosophy was more closely related to his aesthetic concerns than to Horkheimer’s model of empirically founded interdisciplinary social research. Müller-Doohm makes this point with a comprehensive, if occasionally sloppy, discussion not only of Adorno’s philosophical writings from this period but also the seminars he offered as a lecturer in Frankfurt in the early 1930s.24

The third part of Müller-Doohm’s study examines Adorno’s years in exile: in England from 1934 to 1938 and in the USA from 1938 to 1949. The strengths
and weaknesses of the more traditional intellectual biographical approach can be seen clearly in his treatment of Adorno’s development in the 1930s. His continuous and comprehensive narrative occasionally gets bogged down in excessively detailed descriptions of Adorno’s quotidian life, or repeats material that will be familiar to anyone who is not a newcomer to Adorno’s work. But the more personal approach pays rewards at other times. The description of the disastrous effects Kristallnacht had for Adorno’s father – he was wounded and thrown in jail for several weeks, his business was largely destroyed, and the endowment for his business was confiscated (399) – illustrates the direct and personal threat that the Nazi terror posed even to those like Adorno who had escaped; it also drives home Müller-Doohm’s larger argument about Adorno’s gradual loss of political naïveté in the 1930s. Müller-Doohm also conveys Adorno’s devastation at the death of Walter Benjamin, who – despite his increasing proximity to Horkheimer – was still Adorno’s most important interlocutor at this time. Adorno’s immediate reaction to Benjamin’s death speaks volumes about his own appropriation of his work: ‘With this death, philosophy has been robbed of the best that it could possibly hope for’ (402).25 Müller-Doohm also highlights the strong presence of Benjamin in the subsequent period of intense work with Horkheimer on Dialectic of Enlightenment in order to develop an original, if flawed, interpretation of its conception (411f. and 429ff.). He argues that there were two competing tendencies at work during the crucial, formative phase of Dialectic of Enlightenment. On the one hand, Adorno wanted to develop a critique of some of the most basic concepts of Western rationality, which was deeply influenced by Benjamin’s ideas of the entanglement of myth and modernity and his negative philosophy of history. On the other hand, Horkheimer wanted to work out the universal and transcendental norms implicit in language use in order to reformulate a concept of reason that could provide a new foundation for Critical Theory (409–13). In the end Adorno’s interests prevailed over Horkheimer’s. While Müller-Doohm is correct to emphasize that Dialectic of Enlightenment is more representative of Adorno’s work as a whole than Horkheimer’s, his attempt to read Habermas’s efforts to develop a linguistically based normative foundation for Critical Theory back onto Horkheimer fail to do justice to the complexities of his position at the time.26 This part concludes with a penetrating examination of Adorno’s relationship to Thomas Mann, in which Adorno appears in an even more positive light than in Claussen’s study.

In the final and lengthiest part of the book, Müller-Doohm provides a comprehensive examination of Adorno’s life and work after his return to Frankfurt in 1949 until his death in 1969. His assiduous attention to little-known sources often enables him to place Adorno’s work in a new light. For example, he reveals the special importance that Adorno accorded to his essay on Kafka within his work as whole, by drawing on an obscure letter that Adorno wrote to the editor of a German newspaper in which the essay was first published (538). Müller-Doohm’s discussion of Adorno’s Jargon of Authenticity is also illuminating. He explains clearly why Adorno refused to engage Heidegger’s philosophy directly, ‘on his own terms’ as it were, and chose instead to attack the leere Tiefe (pseudo-profundity) of the Heideggerian jargon that formed an integral part of the sanctimonious religion of Kultur that arose in Germany in the 1950s.27 Müller-Doohm patiently documents Adorno’s professional life in the postwar period. His innumerable public lectures and radio appearances, his willingness to work with other leading German scholars, and his professional activities all demonstrate that Adorno was by no means an outsider in the Federal Republic. As elsewhere, Müller-Doohm does not neglect Adorno’s personal life. He illustrates not only Adorno’s numerous friendships with artists and other intellectuals – such as Samuel Beckett, Alexander Kluge and Ingeborg Bachmann – but also the numerous places to which he was drawn intellectually and/or emotionally bound, such as Paris, Rome, Sills Maria and a small town in the Bavarian Odenwald by the name of Amorbach, where Adorno had been going on vacation since he was a child.28 There is even a short chapter near the end that attempts once again to dispel the stubborn stereotype of Adorno as an elitist curmudgeon by examining his love of hosting dinner guests, playing the piano together with a partner, going to the zoo – a passion he shared with Marcuse – and his general ‘weakness for the ironically playful’ (711).

**Bourgeois or civil society?**

Müller-Doohm’s and Claussen’s discussions of Adorno’s development in the postwar period parallel and complement each other in many respects, but on two important and related subjects they diverge significantly: in their portrayal of Adorno’s attitude towards democracy and his relationship to Jürgen Habermas’s work. Even on these subjects the differences are a matter of degree, but one that reveals a significantly different approach to Adorno’s work and to the tradition
of Critical Theory as a whole. Müller-Doohm portrays Adorno consistently as an ardent defender of democracy in postwar Germany. As a result of the war, the rise of an authoritarian state socialism in the Eastern bloc and his ‘American experience’, Adorno came to a greater appreciation of parliamentary democracy. Although Müller-Doohm does not completely overlook Adorno’s analysis of the ‘objective violence’ (586) of ‘social relations’, his emphasis lies more on the putative normative underpinnings of Adorno’s critique, which allows him to emphasize Adorno’s proximity to Habermas, and to portray Habermas as a – if not the – legitimate heir of his Critical Theory (586). In several places, Müller-Doohm argues that Habermas is an important – if not the only – inheritor of Adorno’s Critical Theory; in fact, he even hints that Habermas’s theory may have rendered Adorno’s theory obsolete in certain key respects.29 He also affirms the recent thesis that Adorno and the other members of the ‘Frankfurt School’ were part of a belated ‘intellectual found- ing’ of the Federal Republic in the postwar period.30 Müller-Doohm does discuss Adorno’s famous statement from 1959, ‘I view the continued existence of National Socialism within democracy as potentially more dangerous than the continued existence of fascist tendencies against democracy’ (584), but he downplays its importance and broader implications by linking it to a specific discussion about the state of democracy in Germany at that time. Furthermore, in the few places where the concept of ‘bourgeois society’ (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) shows up in his discussions of Adorno’s work, it is used in a positive, normative sense (587). In all of these respects, Müller-Doohm’s study could be seen as a routinization and normalization of Adorno’s Critical Theory, in the Weberian sense, mentioned above.

While Claussen also heavily emphasizes Adorno’s presence in the German public sphere in the postwar period, and – like Müller-Doohm – stresses his uncompromising critique of actually existing socialism, one does not find in his study a discussion of a normative concept of democracy in relation to Adorno’s work. One does, however, find a complex – even contradictory – discussion of the concepts of bourgeois and bourgeois society in relation to Adorno’s life and work. In this respect, Claussen remains closer to the materialist underpinnings of Adorno’s own thought, by not losing sight of the socio-historical and social-psychological conditions which play such an important role in determining the parameters of abstract or proceduralist ‘democracy’ in any given society.

But in Claussen’s study there seems to be a contradiction between two different determinations of the concept of bourgeois society. On the one hand, he makes use of a historical concept of bourgeois society as a phenomenon that was limited to the long nineteenth century31 and characterized by conspicuous class differences that manifested themselves in both material and cultural terms. On the other hand, a philosophical concept of bourgeois society also appears in Claussen’s work, to describe a larger, epochal phenomenon that was by no means limited to the long nineteenth century.32 It is clearly this philosophical concept of bourgeois society to which Adorno refers when he speaks of the United States in the twentieth century as a ‘radically bourgeois country’. Like Hegel, Adorno is convinced that bourgeois society has been responsible for the introduction into world history of certain progressive principles – subjective freedom being perhaps the most important – which have become necessary conditions of any further attempts to bring about a more just and emancipated society.33 Nevertheless, as Claussen sees more clearly than Müller-Doohm, Adorno also refused to turn a blind eye to the unbroken dynamic inherent in bourgeois society and the fateful consequences of which it had already proven itself capable.34

Yet it is precisely this critical, philosophical dimension that has been lost in recent discussions of the concept of bürgerliche Gesellschaft. In the wake of the collapse of state socialism in the East, many commentators rediscovered the concept of civil society as a way of describing the emancipatory transformations in these societies.35 The English version of the term – civil society – lent itself well to an interpretation which drew more on a Kantian than a Hegelian or Marxist determination of the concept – that is, one more or less untouched by any systematic reflections on political economy.36 Civil society was read in undialectical terms as that which lay outside the state – the public sphere, voluntary associations, free market economy. This position often went hand in hand with an explicit refusal – what Adorno might call a Denkverbot (prohibition on thinking) – to reflect upon the political-economic dimensions of the concept, under the pretext that theories such as Hegel’s or Adorno’s which rely heavily upon a concept of social totality are no longer possible. Habermas’s work contributed to this trend, in so far as he too distanced himself from Adorno’s critical concept of bourgeois society, and drew instead upon Kant, Weber and Luhmann to develop a conception of modern society as a system of pluralistically differentiated value spheres, not one
of systematic domination. Habermas’s early criticisms of the welfare state as a form of ‘power’ that colonized the ‘lifeworld’, and his interpretation of the new social movements in terms of anti-statist outgrowths of civil society, reinforced this tendency. Even though Habermas has modified his position substantially in the past decade, the ongoing influence of his early work and the retranslation of Anglo-American discussion of civil society into the German context have led to the virtual disappearance of the critical concept of bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Habermas’s work was indeed important as a philosophische Westanbindung in the postwar period, which contributed to burying once and for all – let us hope – the reactionary anti-Western and anti-democratic traditions that had been so important for the German Right. But since it has become clear that German democracy no longer stands on shaky ground and that since 1989 the form of ‘radical bourgeois’ society represented by the United States has become the dominant force in the contemporary world, might a reconsideration of Critical Theory be more timely than a historicizing approach to the so-called ‘Frankfurt School’? It would go beyond the parameters of this article to examine the contentious relationship of Habermas’s theory to the older tradition of Critical Theory, but some of his own more recent positions seem to indicate that he too is aware of the shortcomings in his earlier work for an appraisal of contemporary conditions. In this respect, Claussen’s argument that Adorno’s and Habermas’s theoretical differences are greater than their similarities, and that Adorno’s work has yet to receive the hearing it deserves (e.g. 379 and 400) may prove to be more prescient than Müller-Doohm’s stress on their commonalities and his insinuations that Habermas’s work may have supplanted Adorno’s in most important respects.

Developments in the United States and around the globe since Adorno’s death appear to have confirmed Adorno’s more critical view of bürgerliche Gesellschaft. In a talk he delivered in Rome in 1966 on the concept of ‘Society’, for example, he argued that:

All society is still class society as it was at the time when this concept appeared; the excessive pressure in the Eastern bloc countries makes clear that it is no different there. Although Marx’s prognosis of pauperization over a long period of time has not been proven true, the disappearance of classes is an epiphenomenon…. Subjectively concealed, class differences grow objectively due to the constant progression of the concentration of capital.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that these tendencies have accelerated since Adorno’s death. But, as Claussen points out, a purely rationalist Marxism, à la Brecht or Lukács, is not adequate to the task of grasping the irrational rationality of bourgeois society. The psychoanalytic and social-psychological dimensions of Critical Theory – which have also been largely emasculated by Habermas – also remain as relevant as ever. The steady drift of democrats and social democrats to the Right in the past few decades and their unwillingness to thematize the negative moments inherent in the global ‘civil society’ have created a vast reservoir of voters susceptible to the irrational paroles of right-wing populism. Arnold Schwarzenegger’s recent election as the governor of California can be seen as the most recent manifestation of this increasingly widespread trend, one which cannot be fully understood without the social-psychological categories developed by the Critical Theorists. If Schwarzenegger’s election in California can be seen as symptomatic of the persistence of sadomasochist character structures in American society, as one recent commentator has argued, then one could make a case, based on arguments put forth by the Critical Theorists in the 1930s, that we are still living in the bourgeois epoch. As Claussen points out, Adorno and Horkheimer often spoke of the twentieth century as an epoch of transition, but perhaps both of their arguments were premature. Schwarzenegger’s election and the broader phenomenon of right-wing populism bring to mind Walter Benjamin’s eighth thesis on the philosophy of history:

The current amazement that the things we are experiencing in the twentieth century [and now the twenty-first!] is not philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge – unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.

Benjamin’s words were written in a more ominous period, the irrationalist and populist dimensions of Schwarzenegger’s victory warrant renewed reflection on the political-economic and social-psychological dimensions of bourgeois society which have been neglected in recent debates. Are we still living in the bourgeois epoch? How can we conceptualize the identity and non-identity of bourgeois society? Without Critical Theory, to whose collective development Adorno contributed so much, we will not be able to answer these questions.
Notes


2. See, for example, Alex Demirovic, *Der Non-Konformistische Intellektuelle: Die Entwicklung der Kritischen Theorie zur Frankfurter Schule*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1999.

3. On Forsythe’s ballet, see the website of the Frankfurt Ballet (www.frankfurt-ballett.de), in particular the section marked ‘articles’, which contains several essays on and interviews with Forsythe.


5. The term Bildungsbürger arose in nineteenth-century Germany to describe those portions of the middle class that defined themselves in terms of education, usually based on the humanistic model of classical education. The Bildungsroman – novel of development or education – evolved as a genre in nineteenth-century German literature. It usually focused on the stages of maturation of a central figure, often ending with his reconciliation with himself and/or society at the end. Bildung more generally refers to typically nineteenth-century humanistic ideal of education as ennobling of the character, and contrasted to education as more utilitarian training.

6. The Künstlerroman was a subtype of the Bildungsroman, which focused on alienated artists who usually did not succeed in coming to terms with themselves and/or society in the course of the novel. On the genre of the Künstlerroman and its relation to the Bildungsroman, see Herbert Marcuse, ‘Der Deutsche Künstlerroman’, in *Schriften*, vol. 1, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1978.


9. If ‘political reaction was not an option for Hermann Weil’ (102), as Claussen claims, then why did he serve as a military adviser to the Kaiser during the war? Is parvenu conformism really enough to explain this? Felix Weil, not his father, was the decisive person in securing the funding not only for the Institute of Social Research, but also for a number of other progressive artistic and intellectual projects in Weimar Germany, such as the Mailik publishing house and the Piscator Theater. To finance these projects Felix Weil drew upon not only his inheritance from his father but also a substantial inheritance from his mother’s family. In addition, Felix Weil would not forget later in his life one of the most important sources of the surplus value that was used to finance the Institute for Social Research and other projects. His father dealt primarily in Argentinian grain, and Felix became one of the leading experts on the Argentinian economy and workers’ movement, a lengthy study of which he published in 1944 as *The Argentine Riddle*. Very little work has been done on Felix Weil; his fascinating unfinished memoirs lie unpublished in the Frankfurt city archive. It seems that he, not his father, is in need of more scholarly attention.

10. The *Habilitationsschrift* is a second dissertation required in order to gain permission to teach at a German university. It is too simple to dismiss this writing as an empty academic exercise, as Claussen does. For even though Adorno would soon reject its main argument, its fundamental impulse – to place psychoanalysis in the service of radical Enlightenment – would remain powerful for the rest of his life.


15. Claussen places himself here in the company of the other leading intellectual historians of this period, such as Wolfgang Schivelbusch (see, e.g., his *Intellectuellen endämmerung: Zur Lage der Frankfurter Intelligenz in den Zwanziger Jahren*, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1982) and Martin Jay (see, e.g., his *Permanent Exiles*).

16. See, for example, Claussen’s interpretation of *Minima Moralia* in terms of this dynamic force field (p. 342).

17. In this regard, Adorno did indeed remain indebted to Walter Benjamin, particularly his early study of *The Origins of German Tragic Drama* (trans. J. Osborne, Verso, London, 1998), from which Adorno drew the inspiration for the following words at the end of *Minima Moralia*, ‘consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite’ (p. 247).

18. For a more detailed description of Claussen’s understanding of the Frankfurt SDS, and their relationship to the Critical Theorists and their role within protest movement as a whole in Germany, see ‘Der kurze Sommer der Theorie’, in Detlev Claussen, *Aspekte der
19. Müller-Doohm states, for example, that after their marriage in 1937, Karplus had to learn how to clean the house, because Adorno refused to do any housework (348 and 356). She also often served as a secretary for Adorno, recording discussions between him and his colleagues or transcribing his letters or other written work. Müller-Doohm also mentions some of the lovers Adorno had, particularly later in his life. A slightly different picture of Adorno’s relationship to Karplus emerges in a recent documentary film, Theodor Adorno: Papst der Linken, made by the German radio station Südwestrundfunk. In it, Regina Becker-Schmidt, a professor of sociology at the University of Hanover and former assistant of Adorno, stresses the fact that Adorno was never explicitly sexist and that Karplus, too, had other lovers. These amorous adventures, which they did not conceal from each other, did not affect their profound emotional loyalty to one another, according to Becker-Schmidt. Here, once again, it seems that Adorno (and Karplus) did not feel overly obliged to uphold rigidly the conventions of bourgeois ‘normality’. Becker-Schmidt also stresses Adorno’s recognition of his own deep intellectual debt to Karplus. Without her help, not merely as his secretary, but also as an invaluable critic and interlocutor, much of his work would not have been possible.

20. Studies on Authority and Family, quoted by Müller-Doohm, p. 44.

21. Kracauer’s novel Georg, which is set in Frankfurt in the period immediately after World War I, describes the homoerotically charged relationship between the sheltered and precocious fourteen-year-old Fred and his twenty-four-year-old tutor Georg. As was the case with Adorno and Kracauer in real life, the relationship between Fred and Georg gradually evolves beyond the initial regular mentoring sessions to a close friendship, such that, for example, the two of them go on vacation together. As appreciative as Fred is of Georg’s friendship, it is clear from the beginning that Georg is more invested, both emotionally and erotically, in the relationship than Fred. Thus the relationship in the novel remains essentially Platonic, despite Georg’s occasional overtures to Fred. On the further development of the relationship between the two of them, see Martin Jay, ‘Adorno and Kracauer: Notes on a Troubled Friendship’, in Permanent Exiles, pp. 217–36.

22. Schoenberg was critical of Adorno’s compositions and particularly his writings on music from the very beginning. He was concerned that Adorno would scare people away from atonal and twelve-tone music with his heavily philosophical conceptual apparatus. Schoenberg’s antipathy to Adorno ended up costing him his position as the co-editor of the Viennese musical journal Anbruch.


24. Among the latter was a daring seminar on Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book, which had been rejected just a few years before by the very department in which Adorno was now teaching. The student protocols from this seminar, and others Adorno offered during this time, have since been published by the Theodor Adorno Archive. See Frankfurt Adorno Blätter, vols I and IV, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt am Main, 1992.

25. Adorno’s insistence upon the philosophical import of Benjamin’s work – especially the epistemo-critical prologue to the Trauerspiel book – is evident from his early lectures on ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’ and ‘The Idea of Natural History’ and his study of Kierkegaard all the way through to the methodological reflections in the Introduction and the Meditations on Metaphysics in Negative Dialectics. For an examination of Walter Benjamin’s work from a philosophical perspective that was heavily influenced by Adorno himself, see Rolf Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1973.

26. While it is true that Horkheimer was devoting himself more to reflections on language at this time, the reflections upon the universal and ‘transcendental’ implications of language use, upon which Müller-Doohm focuses, represent only one tendency within his thought as a whole and cannot, in any case, be separated from his materialist theory of history and society. For Horkheimer’s understanding of language during this time, see Gunzelm Schmid-Noerr, ‘Wahrheit, Macht und die Sprache der Philosophie: Zu Horkheimers sprachphilosophischen Reflexionen in seinen nachgelassenen Schriften 1939 bis 1946’, in A. Schmidt and N. Altwicker, eds, Max Horkheimer Heute: Werk und Wirkung, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, pp. 349–70. See also Hermann Schweppenhäuser’s essay in the same volume, ‘Sprachbegriff und sprachliche Darstellung bei Horkheimer und Adorno’, pp. 328–48.

27. Müller-Doohm and Claussen both argue that Adorno’s ‘American experience’ resulted in a further disenchantment in his eyes of the emphatic concept of Kultur. As Müller-Doohm writes, in the early 1930s the politically naive Adorno still ‘entertained the hope that the traditional elites of the aristocracy and educated middle class would oppose inhumane political tendencies based on their appreciation of art. He believed, for example, that the music of someone like Gustav Mahler was so moving that anyone capable of grasping its substance would be safe from the influences of anti-Semitic propaganda’ (p. 263). But in the post-war German context, Adorno viewed this revival of the concept of Kultur as an ‘alibi for a lack of political consciousness’ (Müller-Doohm, p. 502). It was this phenomenon that provoked such sweeping statements from Adorno as ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’, and ‘All culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent critique, is garbage.’ See also Claussen, pp. 228ff. and 244ff.

28. As part of the Adorno centenary, there has even been a book published just on Adorno’s emotionally charged relationship to this small town, which had roughly the same meaning for Adorno as Cabourg (alias Balbec) for Marcel Proust: Reinhard Pabst, ed., Theodor W. Adorno, Kindheit in Amorbach: Bilder und Erinnerungen, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2003.

29. Habermas’s central objection to Adorno’s Critical Theory, particularly in its mature form, as articulated in Negative Dialectics, is that Adorno remained trapped within the obsolescent paradigm of consciousness philosophy. Müller-Doohm alludes unambiguously to Habermas’
arguments: ‘Thus if epistemology and not social theory were primary, did Adorno view Negative Dialectics as the last effort of a venerable subject–object philosophy? Or did he believe he had succeeded in overcoming the aporias of consciousness philosophy?’ (666). See also his remarks on p. 739.


32. Already at the beginning of the long nineteenth century, Hegel recognized the rise of bourgeois society as the defining characteristic of modern society. But he also recognized the contradictions – prior to Marx’s much more detailed elaboration of the mechanisms behind them – inherent in bourgeois society, which he described as a ‘system of ethical [sittliche] order split into its extremes and lost’. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 123.

33. In relation to the United States, for example, Adorno once wrote: ‘any contemporary consciousness that has not appropriated the American experience, even in opposition, has something reactionary about it.’ Quoted by Martin Jay in ‘Adorno in America’, p. 123.

34. As Claussen aptly puts it, ‘Nothing negative remains external to Adorno’s theory’ (p. 293).

35. See, for example, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1992.

36. One of the most important ways in which Hegel’s objective idealism differed from Kant and Fichte’s subjective idealism, was in the former’s conscious appropriation and critique of the literature on classical political economy that emerged in England and Scotland in the eighteenth century. In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx recognized that Hegel ‘stands upon the basis of the modern economy, i.e. upon the political economy of his time’, but modern interpreters have recovered this key insight into Hegel’s work only in the past few decades. See, for example, Birger Priddat, Hegel als Ökonom, Duncker und Humboldt, Berlin, 1990.

37. The emergence in German in the past decade of terms such as Zivilgesellschaft and Zivilcourage clearly reflects this tendency.

38. Literally, a ‘Philosophical attachment to the West’, Westanbindung was the term used in the postwar period to signify the anchoring of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western Atlantic community of ‘democratic’ nations.

39. For example, Habermas has retreated from his earlier criticisms of the welfare state. In a recent article, which was co-signed by Jacques Derrida, Habermas names the welfare state as one of the most important historical achievements of the twentieth century and one that should define European ‘identity’ in contrast to the neoliberal American model. See Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 125, 31 May 2003, pp. 53–4. Habermas has also emerged as a critic of the excesses of neoliberal globalization. See, for example, ‘The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy’, in The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, pp. 58–112. Habermas has also distanced himself recently from some of the more extreme implications of the linguistic turn. He has developed a critique of ‘Sprachidealismus’ and, with the introduction of a concept of ‘weak naturalism’, has revised his earlier reduction of Wahrheit (truth) to Wahrheitsbegründetheit (being well-justified or well-grounded), at least in relation to theoretical (if not practical) reason. See his Truth and Justification: Philosophical Essays, trans. Barbara Fultner, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2003, pp. 1–51 and 237–76. Habermas has even reintroduced a positive concept of human nature, which pushes him closer to the position of the older Critical Theorists of ‘mindfulness of nature in the subject’. Habermas recognizes that human beings too are a part of nature and that, in this case in particular, nature can and should not – as he maintained in his earlier work – be approached from a purely instrumental standpoint. Habermas insists that the nature all humans share – the foundations of their ‘species being’ – serves as the ethical prerequisite for any further forms of moral reflection. See his The Future of Human Nature, trans. Hella Beister, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003, esp. pp. 16–22 and 37–44.


43. In his pathbreaking social-psychological contribution to the Institute’s collective Studies on Authority and Family (1936), Erich Fromm argued that the sado-masochistic personality – one who identifies with the strong and holds the weak in contempt – was the dominant character structure brought forth by modern, bourgeois societies. Horkheimer works out the historical foundations of this argument in his important essay, ‘Egoism and Freedom Movements: On the Anthropology of the Bourgeois Epoch’, in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, trans. G.F. Hunter et al., MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1993, pp. 49–110.

44. Horkheimer even gave a collection of his essays from the postwar period the title: Gesellschaft im Übergang, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1972.