Deleuze and cosmopolitanism

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The status of the political within the work of Gilles Deleuze has recently become a topic of contention. Two recent books argue the case for two extremes among a range of possible interpretations. At one end of the spectrum, Peter Hallward has argued that Deleuze’s personal ethic of deterritorialization and self-destruction is so disengaged with the actuality of social relations that it is unable to offer any serious political philosophy. At the other end of the spectrum, Manuel De Landa outlines in his most recent book an entire social and political theory modelled upon Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology of machinic assemblages. In what follows I offer a contribution to this literature on Deleuze’s political philosophy. To be more precise I should say Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, for Deleuze’s most explicit comments on politics appear in the co-authored Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. If Anti-Oedipus is the critical and destructive polemic, then A Thousand Plateaus is the creative and constructive manifesto, and so my focus shall be on the latter. In particular I shall focus upon the ‘plateau’ entitled ‘1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine’, but I shall also draw upon material from Deleuze’s solo work Difference and Repetition that prefigures the central theme of that section. I shall argue that the political philosophy developed by Deleuze and Guattari shares much in common with, and should be seen as part of, the cosmopolitan tradition within political thinking. This broad tradition holds that all human beings belong to a single global community and that this universal community is more fundamental than the local political states into which individuals are born. As we shall see, this tradition has its origins with the ancient Cynics and Stoics.

The claim that Deleuze stands within a cosmopolitan tradition stretching back to the Stoics is a striking one, especially when one bears in mind Deleuze’s explicit interest in Stoicism in The Logic of Sense, where he engages with it on a number of fronts. Drawing upon the Stoic theory of incorporeals, Deleuze outlines an ontological surface populated by bodies on one side and incorporeal effects or events on the other. He also draws upon what he calls the Stoic theory of aiôn and chronos, a dual reading of time each part of which corresponds to one of the two sides of his ontological surface (the extended present of chronos is the time of bodies, while the durationless limit of aiôn separating past and future is the time of the incorporeal transformation or event). As it happens, none of this bears much relation to what we know about the ancient Stoics’ ontology and theory of time, and in the latter case Deleuze’s confusion reflects that of his source. His briefer remarks about Stoic ethics come closer to what we find in ancient Stoicism – especially the later Stoics – and the very positive tone suggests that he felt a real affinity with the ancient Stoa. It is in the light of his claim that Stoic ethics offers us the only meaningful form of ethics left, namely ‘not to be unworthy of what happens to us’, that I argue here that Deleuze also proposes a Stoic politics, even if he never explicitly conceived it as such.

Before turning to Deleuze and Guattari directly, I shall begin by introducing ancient cosmopolitanism. I shall then focus in on one particularly important ancient text relating to the Republic of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, analysing it alongside an equally important passage from Difference and Repetition. Then I shall turn to A Thousand Plateaus, and suggest the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy may be read as a contemporary version of ancient Stoic cosmopolitanism.

Ancient cosmopolitanism

The origins of ancient cosmopolitanism are traditionally attributed to Diogenes the Cynic. Asked where he came from, Diogenes is reported to have replied ‘I am a citizen of the cosmos.’ This is the earliest attributed use of the word cosmopolités, ‘citizen of the cosmos’, although it is interesting to note that a number of other Socratic philosophers roughly contemporary with Diogenes are recorded as having expressed a
similar thought, and that this thought is also attributed to Socrates himself.9

What did Diogenes mean by this claim? His Cynicism has often been presented as a primarily nihilistic philosophy, and so one might assume that he simply meant to reject any tie to a traditional state and to reject the responsibilities of being a citizen. Yet elsewhere Diogenes is reported to have used the word apolis when wanting to assert that he was without a city in the conventional sense.10 So Diogenes’ use of cosmopolitéis suggests something more than mere indifference to existing political institutions, namely a positive allegiance to the cosmos.11 Unfortunately the evidence for Diogenes is thin and his Republic – which presumably outlined his political thoughts – is lost.12 Nevertheless, his modest contribution would bear significant fruit.

Cynicism continued after the death of Diogenes under the stewardship of his pupil Crates, accompanied by his Cynic wife Hipparchia. According to tradition, when Zeno of Citium first arrived in Athens he became a student of Crates, and so it is reasonable to assume that Zeno was familiar with the Cynic idea of being a citizen of the cosmos. Zeno too wrote a Republic and it is reported that it was written when he was still a pupil of Crates.13 Thus ancient sources joke that it was written ‘on the tail of the dog’.14 The surviving evidence for Zeno’s Republic is greater than that for Diogenes’ Republic, but it is still thin enough to make reconstruction of its doctrines difficult. Among the many attempts at reconstruction, two broad approaches stand out; I shall call these the ‘Platonic’ and the ‘Cynic’ interpretations.

The Platonic interpretation of Zeno’s Republic places particular weight on the claim that it was written as a response to Plato’s Republic, and takes Zeno’s choice of title as a deliberate reference to Plato’s work of the same name.15 It also notes a number of fragments of Zeno’s Republic that appear to echo material in Plato’s Republic, such as the rejection of traditional education. It also draws attention to an extended fragment in which Zeno is mentioned alongside Plato as fellow admirers of the Spartan king Lycurgus.16 Thus the Platonic interpretation suggests that in his Republic Zeno outlined an ideal state – an isolated political community modelled on Sparta – which differed from Plato’s ideal state by only admitting the wise as citizens,17 thereby avoiding the problem of how to ensure harmony between the social classes. Zeno’s ideal state, this interpretation suggests, is an egalitarian community of sages, uninterested in the outside world.18

The Cynic interpretation offers a quite different reconstruction. It notes that Zeno is reported to have written his Republic under the influence of Crates and so it suggests that Crates’ influence would have left its mark. It argues – contra the Platonic interpretation – that the choice of title might just as well refer to Diogenes’ Republic as it might to Plato’s, and so the title alone is not enough to warrant the claim of a Platonic influence. It also argues that the fragment connecting Zeno, Plato and Lycurgus does not say what the Platonic interpretation supposes. It notes that many of the other fragments report ideas that might just as well suggest a Cynic ancestry as they might an echo of Plato’s utopia, such as the rejection of traditional education, temples, law courts and currency, and the advocacy of open sexual relationships.19 More importantly, the Cynic interpretation draws attention to an extended fragment that appears to call into question the claim that Zeno proposed an isolated community limited to just the wise:

The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common nomos. Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream or image of a philosopher’s well-regulated society.20

The word nomos has been left untranslated and we shall return to this in the next section. In the meantime we can note that this passage implies that all human beings (pantas anthrôpous) will be citizens in Zeno’s ideal community, not just the wise. In the light of the claim that Zeno wrote his Republic under the influence of Crates, the Cynic interpretation suggests that this image of all humankind sharing one way of life is an expression of the cosmopolitanism first articulated by Diogenes. Zeno’s ideal, this interpretation argues, is one in which all human beings are citizens of the cosmos, sharing a common way of life, indifferent to the geographical divisions embodied by traditional states. This may be reconciled with the claim that only the wise will be citizens by placing this universal community in a utopian future in which everyone has become a sage, and it is reported that the Stoic sage will follow the Cynic (and thus cosmopolitan) way of life.21 It is to this interpretation that Kropotkin ascribed when he proclaimed Zeno the finest ancient exponent of anarchism.22
Although the evidence is thin and both interpretations involve a considerable amount of conjecture, the Cynic interpretation seems the more plausible of the two. It gains further weight when one places Zeno’s Republic alongside the works of subsequent Stoics, such as the following passage from Seneca:

Let us grasp the idea that there are two commonwealths (duas res publicas) – the one, a vast and truly common State (vere publicam), embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of birth.\(^\text{23}\)

Seneca’s unbounded common state – measured by the path of the sun – embraces the entire cosmos and is clearly no isolated community. Like Diogenes and Zeno, his ideal is in contrast to traditional political states. Epictetus takes up the same theme:

What other course remains for men than that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never saying ‘I am an Athenian’, or ‘I am a Corinthian’, but ‘I am of the cosmos’? For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning merely that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth?\(^\text{24}\)

The same thought reappears throughout the Meditations of the emperor-turned-philosopher Marcus Aurelius, from which the following is just one example:

The cosmos is as it were a State (polis) – for of what other single polity can the whole race of humankind be said to be fellow citizens?\(^\text{25}\)

This broad Cynic–Stoic tradition of cosmopolitanism is not without its tensions, however. It is one thing for Diogenes to proclaim that he is a citizen of the cosmos; it is quite another for Marcus to declare that the cosmos is a state of which everyone is a citizen. What these thoughts do have in common is a rejection of one’s membership of the traditional state. Diogenes of Babylon (head of the Stoa in the second century BC) provocatively claimed while on a trip to Rome that, given that a city should be defined as a group of virtuous people living together under a common law, Rome itself was not a true city.\(^\text{26}\) Only the cosmos – running according to its own immanent cosmic law – should be called a city, for it alone fulfils the requirements of this definition. Moreover, only the wise can claim citizenship of that city, for ‘among the foolish (aphronôn) there exists no city nor any law’.\(^\text{27}\) Here we are back to Zeno’s claim that only the wise will be citizens in his utopia, suggesting a limited community.

In order to overcome these tensions it may be helpful to think of cosmopolitanism as a political model with three distinct phases.\(^\text{28}\) The first phase would be the lone individual who claims to be a citizen of the cosmos. This first phase is in itself Diogenes’ apparent political ideal. However, in a world with more than one cosmopolitan sage, such individuals would acknowledge one another as equals and fellow-citizens of the cosmos, following a shared way of life. Thus they would constitute a community of sages, regardless of their individual geographical locations. This community of sages – whether dispersed or gathered together in one place – would form a second phase. The third phase would be a hypothetical future in which everyone has attained the wisdom of a sage and thus everyone has become a fellow-citizen of the cosmos. In such an ideal situation all existing traditional states and laws would become irrelevant and there would be what might best be described as an anarchist utopia. In this third phase, all humankind would share one way of life, ‘like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common nomos’.

Nomos

Plutarch’s account of Zeno’s Republic in On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander is arguably the most important fragment that survives. It is worth citing again in full:

The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common nomos. Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream or image of a philosopher’s well-regulated society.\(^\text{29}\)

As before, the word nomos has been left untranslated. We are perhaps most familiar with the Greek word nomos from discussions associated with the political theory of the ancient Sophists. In that context, nomos is usually understood to refer to custom or convention, and, later on, law. Thus some readers of Plutarch take Zeno to be saying that all human beings should follow one common law, rather than different legal systems in different states. However, nomos has a much wider range of meanings than just custom or law, and altogether a total of thirteen distinct senses of nomos have been isolated.\(^\text{30}\) Before nomos took on the meaning of custom or law it was also used to refer to the pasture, the unregulated space outside the
The word *nomos* also features in the philosophy of Deleuze. In particular it appears in *Difference and Repetition* during a discussion of Duns Scotus’ univocal ontology (see *DR* 53–4/36). Deleuze is concerned with outlining a concept of distribution appropriate to a univocal or immanent conception of being. In order to do so he draws a contrast between two types of distribution: distribution according to *logos* and distribution according to *nomos*. A distribution according to *logos* is a distribution in which that which is distributed is divided up; the distribution of parcels of land to different sedentary farmers, for instance. Such a distribution requires a *logos* in the form of a judgement or a principle; it is a proportional determination. A distribution according to *nomos*, in contrast, is a distribution in which this relationship is reversed. Rather than individuals dividing up a territory and distributing it to themselves, instead individuals distribute themselves across an open and undivided territory; nomadic shepherds scattered across an undivided plain, for instance. This is a distribution according to *nomos*, a nomadic distribution:

We must first of all distinguish a type of distribution which implies a dividing up of that which is distributed. A distribution of this type proceeds by fixed and proportional determinations. Then there is a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad *nomos*, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space – a space which is unlimited, or at least without precise limits. To fill a space, to be distributed within it, is very different from distributing the space. (*DR* 53–4/36)

Drawing upon the work of Emmanuel Laroche, Deleuze uses *nomos* in its earlier sense of pasture and stresses the meaning of its root *nemó*, to distribute. A nomadic distribution is one in which, for instance, shepherds distribute themselves and their livestock over an undivided and unregulated territory, namely the pasture (*nomos*) beyond the borders of the city-state (*polis*). For Deleuze a nomad is simply one who operates according to this model of distribution, just as in Greek a nomad (*nomados*) is simply someone who lives on the pasture (*nomos*). It is worth stressing that his references to nomads – both here and elsewhere – should not be taken either too literally or as mere metaphors. Deleuze presents us with a functional definition of what it means to be nomadic, namely to relate to a space in a specific way. This functional definition should in theory apply to traditional nomads, such as those who wander the steppes of central Asia, but it is by no means limited to them. Nor is it merely metaphorical, for it contains within it a precise meaning against which particular cases may be assessed.

Returning to Zeno, let us note two key points in Plutarch’s important testimony. The first is the thought that human beings should share ‘one way of life and order’, following a single common *nomos*, understood as custom or law. The second is that this common way of life should transcend the traditional boundaries that demarcate cities or parishes, like that of ‘a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common pasture’. Zeno’s ideal, according to this testimony at least, is a way of life in which individuals do not divide up territory into distinct states (distributing the territory to themselves) but rather live together in one undivided territory (distributing themselves across the territory). It is of course impossible to attribute to Zeno a theory of different models of distribution along the lines that Deleuze provides, and there is no evidence to suggest that Deleuze was familiar with this fragment from Zeno’s *Republic*, but nevertheless the resonance is striking.

**Nomadology**

Deleuze’s concept of a nomadic distribution forms the foundation for what is arguably the nearest thing to a political philosophy within his *oeuvre*, namely his analysis with Guattari of the ‘state apparatus’ and ‘nomad war machine’ in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In *Difference and Repetition* we have seen that Deleuze draws a distinction between distributions according to *logos* and those according to *nomos*. Yet *nomos* was also presented as that which is beyond the boundaries...
or control of the polis – it is the occupied space without precise limits, the expanse around the town. The polis is by contrast the place in which everything is ordered according to a logos. There is thus a natural shift from a contrast between logos and nomos (in DR) to one between polis and nomos (in MP). Deleuze and Guattari flesh out this abstract distinction between polis and nomos by casting it as a distinction between the ‘state apparatus’ and the ‘nomad war machine’. These are not merely two alternative modes of political operation; they are diametrically opposed to one another: ‘nomos against polis’ (MP 437/353).

Building upon Deleuze’s analysis in Difference and Repetition, the state apparatus is a principle of organization that distributes territory to individuals, marking out borders, erecting boundaries, and creating spaces of interiority. It is a principle of sovereignty and control. In contrast, the nomad war machine is a principle of movement and becoming, a principle of exteriority indifferent to the boundaries laid down by the state apparatus. From the perspective of the state, the war machine is violent and destructive, but on its own terms it is simply in a process of continual movement. It is nomadic because its natural habitat is on nomos, operating according to a nomadic distribution. The nomads distribute themselves across the open undivided steppe while the state allocates portions of land to individuals.

An important source for Deleuze and Guattari here is the work of Jean-Pierre Vernant, who has dealt with the close relationship between these varying modes of spatial distribution and the rise of the polis. In his analysis, the reforms of the Athenian Cleisthenes overturned the previous tribal political organization that was qualitative and mobile, replacing it with a homogeneous and geometrical allocation of plots; the social organization of the clan was replaced by one of the soil. Vernant emphasizes that this was primarily a shift in categories of thinking about space and suggests that Plato, in his use of a similar mode of spatial distribution, can be seen to express this form of allocation raised to the status of an ideal model. For Vernant, Plato is the archetypal theorist of distribution according to logos. In contrast to this geometrical allocation of land undertaken by the polis, nomos refers to the unallocated common land outside the boundaries of the polis. A nomad is simply one who traverses this open space without dividing it.

This contrast between nomos and polis is, however, a formal one. In concrete situations both traits may be found together in varying measures; smooth spaces may be found in the centre of the polis while striations can divide the smoothest of spaces (shipping lanes across the open sea, for instance). But rather than conceive these as two antithetical types of place, it may be more accurate to present them as two distinct political modes of operation, based upon differing models of distribution. Deleuze’s nomadic distribution forms the foundation for a nomadic ethic, a certain way of relating to any particular space or situation. What we are offered is a political ethic in which individuals distribute themselves across a territory rather than distribute territory to themselves. It is, fundamentally, a cosmopolitan ethic, a rejection of political ties to particular locations, and a reorientation of the way in which one relates to social and political space: ‘it is possible to live striated on the deserts, steppes, or seas; it is possible to live smooth even in the cities, to be an urban nomad’ (MP 601/482).

This antithesis between polis and nomos – state apparatus and nomad war machine – is developed further. The former uses the ‘royal’ or ‘major’ science of geometry to distribute territory and demarcate an interiority that forms its zone of control. The latter uses the ‘nomad’ or ‘minor’ science of the numbering number, allocating ordinals to individuals, in order to assist their movement across an open space (MP 484–5/389). This distinction between major and minor science is presented in terms of Lucretius contra Plato; becoming and heterogeneity opposed to ‘the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant’ (MP 447/361). Deleuze and Guattari outline four differentiating characteristics – hydraulic versus solid, vortical versus linear, becoming versus eternal, problematic versus theorematic – all of which have ancient origins. In
fact, the distinction itself comes from two ancient sources: Proclus and Plato. Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Proclus’ account of the theoretic problematic argument between Speusippus and Menaechmus.\(^{53}\) Speusippus (Plato’s nephew and his successor as the head of the Academy) is reported to have made the clearly Platonic claim that ‘there is no coming to be among eternals’\(^{44}\). Consequently nothing needs to be created or solved; instead there is only contemplative understanding of the already perfect forms and abstract theoretical speculation. Menaechmus (a pupil of the mathematician Eudoxus), on the other hand, begins with the empiricist proposition that ‘the discovery of theorems does not occur without recourse to matter'.\(^{48}\) For him, science is the art of solving concrete problems that originate in specific situations; it is always a question of engineering and pragmatics. Deleuze and Guattari also cite Plato as a source for this distinction. In the *Timaeus* Plato proposes becoming as a counter-model that could rival identity, only to reject it as a serious possibility.\(^{48}\) Both of these sources make it clear that major science is simply another phrase for Platonism. Consequently minor science refers to everything that escapes from the Platonic model. Platonic major science is, in the words of Michel Serres, ‘a science of dead things’,\(^{47}\) whereas minor science is a science of becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari the difference between these two scientific models also reflects the difference between an ontology of transcendence and an ontology of immanence – in other words, the difference between Platonism and Stoicism.

This distinction between two modes of distribution and two models for science is also reflected in a distinction between two types of space: the smooth and the striated. The undivided *nomos* is a smooth space; the divided and bounded territory of the *polis* is a striated space. The former is two-dimensional vectorial space that can be explored ‘only by legwork’ (*MP 460/371*). The latter is a three-dimensional metric grid in which locations can be determined in an absolute space. We might characterize these as Leibnizian and Newtonian conceptions of space respectively, the merits of which were famously debated in the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke, and the challenge to reconcile them was later taken up by Kant. Nomads occupy a smooth vectorial space, following a trajectory without a predetermined endpoint. They distribute themselves in smooth space and this is more important than physical movement; indeed, nomads need not move at all (*MP 472/381*). Migrants by contrast travel from A to B, from one fixed point to another within a predetermined grid (*MP 471/380*). The latter requires an additional dimension in order to make a representation of the grid as a whole.

Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of the state apparatus as primarily a principle of order and organization and the nomad war machine as a principle of movement and becoming looks at first glance as if it is simply an expression of the wider ontology developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Difference and Repetition*, and elsewhere. In Deleuze’s process philosophy of Nietzschean forces, movements of becoming or deterritorialization have an ontological priority over moments of stability, sedimentation or reterritorialization. Or, to be more precise, such stability is only ever apparent: in reality everything is in a continual state of flux at various levels of speed and slowness. This might lead us to assume that for Deleuze and Guattari the apparent order and stability of the state apparatus is merely a slowing down of the processes that constitute the nomad war machine, but in fact they insist that in this case there is an irreducible opposition: ‘in every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the state apparatus’ (*MP 436/352*). They are thus not two aspects of their ontology but rather two modes of distribution that imply two quite different modes of existence. The distinction is not a correlate of Deleuze’s ontology; it is a part of his ethics.

**Deleuze’s cosmopolitanism**

Deleuze’s conception of a nomadic distribution across an undivided *nomos* has much in common with Stoic expressions of cosmopolitanism in which the wise conceive themselves as citizens distributed across an undivided cosmos. The intriguing connection between these two models of spatial distribution is Zeno’s utopian image of all humankind living on a common *nomos*. There are some important terminological differences, however, reflecting differences in ontology. For the Stoics, the cosmos is conceived as a *polis*, the only true *polis*, for the cosmos is the only entity governed by a common rational law (*logos*). The Stoics contrast this rationally ordered cosmic *polis* with actual cities that fail to meet their standards of rationality. In Deleuze and Guattari’s *nomos–polis* dichotomy, the undivided *nomos* functions as the Stoics’ ideal cosmic *polis*, while the striated *polis* fulfils the role of the actual cities criticized by the Stoics. Both the Stoics and Deleuze and Guattari aspire to the undivided territory of a cosmic *polis* and *nomos* respectively, but Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of the concept of a rationally ordered cosmos and its replacement
by their concept of a ‘chaosmos’ means they would never attempt to conceive their cosmic nomos as an idealized polis.\(^{48}\)

Notwithstanding the inevitable ontological differences between the ancient Stoics and Deleuze and Guattari, their shared concern with how individuals relate to spaces is striking. In the light of this I would suggest that Deleuze and Guattari stand within a tradition of cosmopolitan political thought that begins with the ancient Cynics and Stoics, a tradition in which indifference to traditional political boundaries is combined with a positive allegiance to an undivided space in which everyone can move without restriction. This affirmation of a broadly Stoic politics stands alongside Deleuze’s explicit affirmation in The Logic of Sense of a Stoic ethics.

Thus, Deleuze’s politics is ultimately utopian.\(^{39}\) It does not offer a model for collective political action but rather outlines a personal ethical project of self-transformation in which each individual alters their own relation to space and to traditional political states. The preferred relation is ultimately one of indifference to traditional politics and to traditional conceptions of political revolution.\(^{50}\) The political transformation that the cosmopolitan tradition envisages can only be brought about one person at a time. This is both its strength and its weakness.

Notes
5. The Stoics in fact posit four types of incorporeal, of which linguistic meaning or sense (lektos, that which is said, often translated as ‘sayable’) is just one (the other three are time, place, and void). Deleuze’s supposedly Stoic ‘incorporeal effects’ are merely examples of these incorporeal linguistic predicates. There is no Stoic concept of an ‘incorporeal event’ along the lines that Deleuze suggests. Nor is there any conception of parallel series of bodies—causes and incorporeal—all of which inhabit a single surface. Deleuze’s account of aiôn and chronos does not correspond to what we know about Stoic thoughts about time either, and is the result of Victor Goldschmidt, on whom Deleuze draws (see J. Sellars, ‘An Ethics of the Event: Deleuze’s Stoicism’, Angelaki, vol. 11, no. 3, 2006, pp. 157–71, at p. 169 n35).
6. On Deleuze and Stoic ethics, see ibid.
7. See LS 174/149.
10. See Diogenes Laertius 6.38.
17. See Diogenes Laertius 7.33.
18. Chroust, ‘The Ideal Polity of the Early Stoics’, pp. 179–90, argues that all foreign travel would be banned in Zeno’s ideal state and so this small community of sages would be totally isolated from the outside world.
20. Plutarch, De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute 329a–b.
21. See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.121.
25. Marcus Aurelius 4.4; see also 2.16, 3.11, 4.3, 10.15.
26. See Cicero, Academica 2.137, where it is reported that, according to Diogenes, Rome was not a real ‘city’ (nece urbs nec in ea civitas) at all.
27. See D. Obbink and P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools’, Greek,


29. Plutarch, De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute 329a–b.


33. See Laroche, Histoire de la racine nem- en grec ancien, cited in both DR and MP.


37. Deleuze’s principal source, Laroche, Histoire de la racine nem- en grec ancien, refers to an enormous number of ancient textual examples, including many in Plutarch’s Moralia, but I have not found a reference to this particular passage.

38. See DR 54/309.


40. See ibid., pp. 212–34; note also Vernant’s The Origins of Greek Thought, Methuen, London, 1982, p. 99: ‘The city was thus no longer organized according to … blood ties. Tribes and demes were established on a purely geographical basis; they brought together dwellers on the same soil rather than blood relatives’.

41. See ibid., pp. 230–31, where he writes that Plato ‘specifies how to organize the space of the state-city to conform with his laws’, and Plato himself offers the following example: ‘twelve regions … [divided] into five thousand and forty allotments … [then] bisected’ (Laws 745c). Vernant goes on to suggest that this model of ‘political space treated geometrically’ (ibid., p. 233) finds its most complete expression with Plato despite his other divergences from the model of the classical city.


43. See Proclus, in Primum Euclidis Elementorum Librum Proli. 8; Morrow, Proclus, pp. 62–7. For Deleuze and Guattari see MP 447–8/362 with 448 n16/554 n21. Deleuze also draws upon this text by Proclus in DR 211/163 and LS 69/54.

44. Proclus, ibid.; Morrow, Proclus, p. 64.

45. Ibid.

46. See Plato, Timaeus 28–9 and MP 457–8/369 with 457 n29/555 n34. Deleuze also discusses this in DR 167/128 where he describes this ‘terrifying’ counter-model as ‘the anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism’.

47. Serres, La naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce, p. 136.

48. In MP Deleuze and Guattari have no problem with the word Cosmos (see e.g. MP 402–3/326–7) but they supplement it with ‘chaosmos’ in order to stress that their cosmos is not rationally ordered in the way that the Greeks understood kosmos.

49. Of course, following the example of De Landa, one might be able to develop a quite different social and political philosophy using other parts of Deleuze’s philosophy, but this will not necessarily be consistent with Deleuze’s explicit comments on politics discussed here.

50. Although I do not subscribe to all of the details of Peter Hallward’s complex and sophisticated interpretation of Deleuze’s ontology, I would agree with him that Deleuze’s political attitude is utopian and ultimately indifferent to traditional politics (Out of this World, p. 162).