Here, then, is a rundown of the argument:

1. The emergence of image-specificity through Western art is indirectly linked (but not directly until the present) with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the values of individualism in their wake. Its technical qualitative change comes with the invention of photography and with the technological developments in specificity since then (as the technical rendition of specificity became no longer an artistic problem).

2. In a society whose governing contradiction remains that between productive forces and the social relations of production, the development of the image towards ever greater realism exacerbates the discrepancy between what is witnessed and what can be actively decided upon.

3. The old 'nonrealistic' image did not exist as isolated from the processes of social communication and their artefacts. The increasingly 'realistic' image becomes itself a substitute for social cohesion as it defines itself as an isolatable concept. However, it is not imaginable as a thing. It can only be conceived in terms of function, relationship and effects - the stronger its influence is.

4. Socialization is internalized by means of the realistic image. This recreates narcissism in a mature form, for narcissism is the stunted attempt at sociality in a society of isolated individuals given to living and perception passively through images.

5. As image-specificity brings external images closer to what we are actually like (a development taken over from art as, indeed, art reverted to opposition to social images - indeed, the struggle of the modern artist can be seen as the penetration beyond them) the potential arises for destroying the whole process of image-making. But as the last qualitative change was technical, the next one required is political. However, in the absence of political event, cognition of images and the gradual deterioration of communal life make narcissism an ever more pervasive possibility.

6. The image, instead of being destroyed in favour of the real, takes its place. It bursts out of its confines and is projected upon other living persons.

The image loses richness as it descends into reality, and reality is drained dry of richness as it is usurped by images. The imagination loses a depth of projection as it becomes the sole mediation with real life.

7. By the same token, image-specificity awakens consciousness through forcible confrontation with the detail of the real world. Given disturbing situations, image-specificity is a poor substitute either for action or for an ideology, because its ascendancy was born of an inherently unstable process of technical refinement and shallow positivism. In the end, it will produce not awe but disillusionment in its viewers, without being able to withhold from them the visible facts of a deteriorating world situation. What has been seen as the strongest image-binding possible turns out also to be, and simultaneously, the inadequate means for preventing social change. The revolution itself will be the dissolution of images into reality: that in itself is one aspect of the revolutionary act. Revolution and social image as function are antithetical, and with revolution, with the development of socialism, transparent social experience becomes possible. This experience in itself requires the mediation of art, though not perhaps the art we know it today with its coteries and critics, salerooms, galleries and high prices. Rather, a socialist art will be one in which transparent social (i.e. individual) experience is mediated and transcended - which, indeed, makes it no different in quality from that of all great art of the past. In V.G. Kiernan's words, art had a hand in the invention of socialism, and socialism itself, without a central place for art in its development, will simply re-create another version of a one-dimensional society. There is more to socialism than democracy: there is interpretation of experience, the kind of experience that can only be achieved under socialism. Interpretation must take the 'facts' of social life, under whatever system, and develop and extend the richness of the potential kernel of all experience. The 'images' of socialism will lie in a wider development of artistic interpretation of the greater transparency of social life under socialism, an interpretation which will be necessary in the making of men as individuals.

**HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY**

Roger Waterhouse

I began to study phenomenology seriously about ten years ago. I came to it by way of Sartre, Laing, and the Swiss analyst Ludwig Binswanger. At the time it rekindled an interest in philosophy which had been all but extinguished by a surfeit of Oxford academicism. The phenomenologists not only took seriously those very serious questions about the nature of man and his place in the world that I had been taught to play games with - but they seemed to have new perspectives, and new insights to offer.

It took me a long time and quite a lot of perserverance before I felt that I had 'got inside' the phenomenological tradition, and could not only read and understand, but also evaluate and criticize phenomenological writings. With my Oxford training it was sometimes too easy to dismiss as confused and wrong-headed the formulation of an argument, without appreciating the insight it was striving to express.

The effort was worthwhile. The phenomenologists have not merely been doing philosophy in a different way: they have said some very positive and significant things. And they have evolved a way of thinking which is not only grounded in the problems of our day-to-day existence, but has powerful implications for a whole range of theoretical studies.

Such is my opinion, and, apparently, that of an increasing number of people in the English-speaking world. But the problem for the would-be student (perhaps arriving at phenomenology from some other discipline than philosophy) is where to begin - what to read, and how to disentangle the jargon, the often turgid prose, the widely different stances adopted by writers all of whom call themselves phenomenologists.

This article is an attempt to give some guidance. It deals primarily with Husserl. I shall stress the way in which his thinking changed during the course of his life, because that evolution was responsible for the major trends which subsequently developed within the phenomenological movement.
The undisputed founder of the phenomenological movement was Edmund Husserl, a German of Jewish descent (converted to Lutheranism in his twenties) who lived from 1859 to 1938. He was very much the German professor: almost his whole adult life was bounded by the walls (and the attitudes) of ancient universities. Only the rampant anti-Semitism of the Nazis in his later years forced him reluctantly out of his political naivety. Like Russell, and roughly at the same time, he came to philosophy out of mathematics by way of logic, and was similarly engrossed by problems of truth, meaning and knowledge. Like Freud, and at roughly the same time, he self-consciously founded a school, and gathered around himself an ever-expanding band of disciples. Like Freud also he was betrayed by his chosen Peter: for Heidegger retained his master's support not only for succession to his chair, but for publication of a work theoretically devastating Husserl's position, and he eventually joined the Nazi Party.

Beginnings

Although Husserl was on the whole ill-acquainted with the western philosophical tradition, he was influenced by the British Empiricists, impressed by J. S. Mill's logic, and interested in American pragmatism (particularly William James). Inevitably he was affected by the prevalent neo-Kantianism emanating from Heidelberg, though it was only later that he seriously studied Kant (or even Descartes).

Husserl attributed his own commitment to philosophy to Brentano, whose influence on him, although direct and indisputable, is usually over-emphasized by secondary writers. I shall pass over the early work on logic that brought Husserl into contact with Frege, and turn to his initial conception of phenomenology.

In the 1890s Husserl first became preoccupied with a question which was to remain central throughout his work: 'How is it possible to establish true knowledge, i.e. that which is absolutely certain, beyond all doubt or prospect of revision?' For Husserl, this had to be possible: without it human rationality was a mockery, the whole edifice of science was built on sand, and the triumphal process of European culture from the Greeks to the 19th century would disintegrate.

The theory of ideas

Husserl's first two steps are generally taken to be first his espoiusal, and then his rejection of 'psychologism', understood as the doctrine that the truths of logic are empirical generalisations about the way the human mind functions. Husserl's chief ground for rejecting this was that ideas like 'truth', 'reality', 'time'. Higher up, at the nodal points of great branches, are ideas like 'self', 'society', 'nature'. Higher still are ideas like 'weight', 'price', 'justice', which fit together with other ideas in their special areas. The whole tree is a single, complex, logically interrelated system of ideas to be investigated by philosophy: what the investigation will yield is a priori knowledge about ideas.

The unity of knowledge

This much Husserl stuck to throughout his life. But wait before you categorize him as a straightforward idealist. Husserl has been all things to all men: there is hardly a sentence he wrote which is not qualified by a dozen others, ten of which are still unpublished and eight not yet transcribed out of his shorthand notes. Although he believed there were universal ideas, with essences that could be known a priori with apodictic certainty, he denied they had any platonic existence outside the human mind. Rather, human consciousness, by its very nature, had a certain 'necessity' structure, expressible in terms of the relationships between its fundamental ideas. His descriptive investigations into such concepts as that of 'number' convinced him that this was so. But the direct inference which he drew was that all thinking, and all knowledge, as the product of human thought, was an interconnected system with an a priori structure. At the roots are ideas like 'truth', 'reality', 'time'. Higher up, at the nodal points of great branches, are ideas like 'self', 'society', 'nature'. Higher still are ideas like 'weight', 'price', 'justice', which fit together with other ideas in their special areas. The whole tree is a single, complex, logically interrelated system of ideas to be investigated by philosophy: what the investigation will yield is a priori knowledge about ideas.

The intentionality of consciousness

But what is it about consciousness that makes such an investigation possible? And how does 'eidetic' (philosophical) science relate to empirical science? The answer came to Husserl while he was studying graduate students, but sent them back as disciples, e.g. D. C. Carnap, Marvin Farber. It also provided an escape route for German emigres (Gurwitsch & Schutz). Unlike Heidegger or Sartre, Husserl had a tremendous respect for (intellectual) science, which even his later doubts could not destroy. See e.g. Husserl (10) pp3-4.

See Pivcevic (1) or Lyotard (1).

Husserl (4).

Husserl (9) pp404-27; compare, e.g. Sartre (1) pp14-31.

See van Breda (1). At his death Husserl left 45,000 pages of manuscript and 12,000 pages of transcriptions, on which four research assistants were working (including Landgrebe and Funk). These archives were smuggled out of Germany and are now housed at Louvain in Belgium.

See Husserl (5), paras. 147-149.
Consciousness is said to be 'intentional': the thing of which Brentano taught that consciousness always 'intends' (or is directed towards) some object. This doctrine, which Brentano used to distinguish between the physical and the psychical, Husserl transformed into a metaphysical principle. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. This is a self-evident, apodictic truth. In it are implied two existential assertions: consciousness exists, and objects of consciousness exist. Moreover, in asserting it I assert that I exist as a consciousness of objects, and the 'intentional' objects exist as objects for my consciousness.

The realm of ideas, the proper field of philosophical science, was none other than consciousness itself and all its objects. The doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness shows that we can have a priori, apodictic knowledge of some things which exist - namely, ideas.

Suspension of the Natural Attitude

At this point Husserl entered a caveat. Suppose we undertake a philosophical investigation into the idea 'space'. That is quite different from actually investigating space - which is what the physicist properly does. Philosophy cannot yield knowledge about the empirical world: that is the job of science. It is because philosophy is only about ideas that it can be true a priori, irrespective of whether the empirical world exists or not. As philosophers then, said Husserl, we must suspend our 'natural attitude' of naive belief in the real existence of the world and its objects; in order to get at the realm of pure ideas, we must put the question of reality 'in brackets'.

The phenomenological reduction

If this theory of ideas had been Husserl's chief contribution to philosophy he would have been largely (and rightly) forgotten by now. It was what came next that was to have a wider and more powerful impact than any other aspect of his thinking: the phenomenological method. So far Husserl had only a project - to investigate the essence of ideas - but no means of realizing it.

Like many of his contemporaries (including William James) Husserl thought of consciousness as a stream. What appears in this stream, its simplest elements, we can describe as 'phenomena'. But the phenomena do not appear as a chaotic welter - they are organized into patterns of (intentional) objects. Consciousness in fact is actively striving to make sense of the phenomena, to constitute (or synthesize) them into objects of thought. And the means which it has at its disposal is the stock of ideas available to it.

The implication of this is that we can use the phenomenological stream as a means of getting at the ideas. If we can simply describe the phenomena as they become constituted into a particular object of thought, and compare with other cases where this object appears, then we can discover the essential criteria which are being applied in order for this object to be recognized as what it is. In short, we will get at the essential idea (or meaning) of this object. And we can apply this process to any object of thought whatsoever - real or not.

The first step in this method must be the 'reduction' of the object of consciousness to the phenomena out of which it is constituted: the phenomenological reduction. It is essential to the success of this that I suspend the Natural Attitude, and 'bracket out' the question of reality. The second step is to compare this appearance of the object with others, in order to get at the essence of the idea which is being applied. I must imagine the phenomena as different and ask 'Would the idea still apply?'. In this way I can penetrate not only actual, but possible variations, and so establish with certainty the essence of the idea. This step, then, 'reduces' the phenomena to the idea. We call it the 'eidetic reduction' and perform it by a process of 'imaginative variation'.

The method

The phenomenological method which Husserl evolved between about 1901 and 1907 thus consists of the following. Take any object of thought, abandon all presuppositions about it, suspend the Natural Attitude, bracket the question of reality. Next perform the phenomenological reduction: describe the pure phenomena which appear in the stream of consciousness as constituting that object. Next perform the eidetic reduction: by a process of imaginative variation consider all possible sets of phenomena which could constitute the object and so isolate its essential features; this reveals what Husserl calls the 'essence' of the idea which is being applied. We have now established a priori apodictically certain knowledge about the essence of that idea. Repeat the procedure with object after object and gradually we will build up a map of the essential relations and structures within our whole system of ideas. The method can in principle be performed by any rational human being and if rigorously applied will give the same results - which are universally true. The whole process is possible because consciousness is, and always knows itself to be, intentional.

Pure consciousness

There is, however, much more to the intentionality of consciousness than this. So far we have attended only to the (intentional) object which is given in the conscious act. But each act reveals with equal certainty a consciousness in action, an active subject which is grasping the object in a particular way (perceiving, remembering, imagining it, etc.) And just as we can investigate the object phenomenologically, so we can investigate the subject and its activity. Just as before, we perform the phenomenological reduction upon a particular act of consciousness; but now, instead of asking 'What makes this
object what it is?’, we ask ‘What makes this act an act of (say) memory?’. And by a process of imaginative variation we can come to discover the essence of remembering, imagining, perceiving etc. This type of investigation into the subject side of a unitary act of consciousness, Husserl calls 'neotic'; as opposed to the 'noematic' investigation of the object side.

This investigation into the subject of consciousness is distinctly philosophical and not psychological says Husserl, though inevitably it has implications for empirical work. We have suspended all our beliefs about reality and are merely investigating the idea of (say) memory. In empirical psychology one investigates how memory functions, how it relates to other conscious acts etc. Such investigations are possible only because we already know what it is to remember. It is the essence of the prior idea of 'remembering' that philosophy investigates. The investigation will yield a priori apodictic knowledge about the 'pure' subject, just as it can about the 'pure' object, 29 because the intentionality of consciousness reveals both subject and object given together in every act.

The influence of the early phenomenology

This was the early conception of phenomenology, expounded and expanded in the lectures at Göttingen that began to exert an influence both within philosophy and beyond it. This was phenomenology as Heidegger 30 first knew it, the phenomenology which attracted Alexander Koyre 31 and Roman Ingarden 32 to Göttingen, and drew even the independent Scheler 33 to its fringes; the phenomenology which, by the early twenties had begun to exert an influence on psychiatrists like Minkowski and Straus. 34 Notions of cutting through a dualist epistemology by suspending the question of reality, of reasserting the place of the subjective within the dominant objectivism of science, of claiming for philosophy a central and constructive place in the field of knowledge, of applying a rigorous method by returning to everyday things and describing them as they clearly were, 35 of uncovering fundamental structures of ideas and even of consciousness itself - all these were heady stuff to Husserl's young followers.

Husserl's development

But Husserl himself had hardly begun. In 1908, when 'The Idea of Phenomenology' was completed, 36 he had still over 30 years of work before him - years during which he daily added to the corpus of his notes, jottings, drafts and redrafts of projected publications - years during which his own ideas changed continuously and profoundly. 37 This evolution is often difficult to trace, not just because of the mass

of material, but because of his whole style of writing and even thinking. Husserl rarely rejected a previous analysis or idea; but he repeatedly reworked analyses he felt to be 'inadequate'. The ideas had to be researched further to uncover their deeper, more 'radical' layers of meaning. The result was a continual re-interpretation of his ever-expanding and never-defined jargon. Manuscripts were written and re-written, publication delayed or postponed indefinitely; so the works published in his lifetime were few, and often referred implicitly to what was unpublished. The dimensions of possible confusion, misunderstanding, and variant interpretation were immense. 38

The later conception of phenomenology

There is, then, no fixed conception at which we can grasp and say 'That is how Husserl finally thought of phenomenology'. What follows is by way of a rational reconstruction of how Husserl's thinking developed between 1908 and 1929 (when the Paris Lectures were given and the Cartesian Meditations written).

The most fundamental change was ontological. In the early work the real was 'bracketed' as a way of 'postponing' (but actually avoiding) the question of ontology. At the same time, however, the doctrine of Intentionality clearly asserted the existence of consciousness and its contents. It seems that Husserl failed to realize that he was assuming an ontological dualism by using the term 'consciousness'. And if he overlooked this, it was because he was in fact (naively) committed to the existence of the objects whose reality he was pretending to suspend. 39 To his way of thinking, this suspension was a device for postponing the difficult question of the relationship between the intentional object and the real object - the idea and the thing. But it had another effect: the realm of consciousness was claimed as the proper sphere of philosophy; the world was left to the trustworthy men of science. 40 But this left Husserl with the job of (eventually) providing a metaphysic to account for the dualism. His reluctance to do this explains his sometimes mystifying contortions about the status of the intentional object. But by 1918 the men of science were no longer trustworthy. A 19th-century dream had died; and so had one of Husserl's sons. 41

The analysis of perception

Husserl's ontological shift is most intelligible as a development of his analysis of perception. Since consciousness is intentional and has the capacity for reflection, 42 phenomenology can investigate with equal validity the conscious subject (or ego), any act of consciousness (noesis), or any object of consciousness (noema). 43 Primary amongst the acts

of phenomenology.

Spiegelberg (1) Vol. I pp75-88 attempts to characterize the constants in his development.

28 The history of philosophy, of course, always involves this tension between historical accuracy, and interpretation which gives current relevance to an analysis of historical development, some students of Husserl became mere antiquarians expounding the 'aeternitas' truths in the works of the master. Others, who were creatively interpreting and extending his ideas, nevertheless felt obliged to claim that theirs was the true Husserl. Still others took Husserl's ideas and unashamedly transformed them. Ironically, Husserl himself had no way of accounting for his own consciousness. There is, then, no fixed conception at which we can grasp and say 'That is how Husserl finally thought of phenomenology'. What follows is by way of a rational reconstruction of how Husserl's thinking developed between 1908 and 1929 (when the Paris Lectures were given and the Cartesian Meditations written).

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of phenomenology.
of consciousness are acts of perception, and the idea of perception as it arises out of the phenomena of experience is as susceptible of investigation as any other. Now, a phenomenological analysis of what it means to perceive (rather than imagine, remember, etc.) an object, reveals some interesting things. The perception of an object as object involves a synthesis of phenomena through time. Since the object is typically three dimensional (e.g. a cube) it can never reveal more than one face squarely and two others 'perspectively' at the same instant. Therefore my idea of the solid object can only be built up by synthesis out of a temporal series. This synthesis will not only involve retention (immediate presence, and 'protention' (immediate expectation), but will necessarily include within the synthesis not only an actual but also possible perceptions. That is, to perceive this as a (real) cube, is to perceive it as something I could stretch out my hand to touch, whether or not I actually do this. Moreover, on the subject side, even the most primitive act of perception reveals the ego as having not only the capacity for synthesis, but also the possibility of action. It is in the nature of the ego to have the world as a space for action, and it is in the nature of the world to be a space in which I act.

But weren't we supposed to have suspended the question of reality? Weren't we supposed to be confining ourselves to the description of consciousness and its contents? Yes, indeed, says Husserl, and this is precisely what we have been doing. This was no empirical investigation into perception or perceptual objects; we were asking, 'What does it mean to perceive?' As phenomenologists we were only investigating the idea of perception. Of course we discovered that perception necessarily refers to the real; but we have carried out no empirical investigation into reality, and we have made no existential assertions except that of consciousness. We have merely investigated the idea (or concept) 'real' - and why not, since that idea can be an object for consciousness like any other.

Somehow Husserl seems to have maintained this contradiction in his thinking for a long time; but eventually he caved in. When he did so he was accused of collapsing into utter idealism - a tag which he accepted with the qualification that his was 'transcendental' idealism. The logic of this collapse seems to have been as follows. When I distinguish between the real and the unreal, what could I possibly be doing except applying my idea of 'real' to the phenomenon which appears? But, excepting the notion of some suprahuman consciousness (which is itself only an idea), there is no possible meaning which 'real' could have, except that which it has for (human) consciousness. The idea of a reality inaccessible to human consciousness is simply self-contradictory. Ergo, reality can be nothing other than the idea which human consciousness has of it.

**Constitution v. creation**

If Husserl drew this conclusion with reluctance, it was because he was convinced that the real, objects, physical things, are: and the way in which they are is different from the way of being of consciousness. The proof is in the touching. When I encounter an object I do not create it - it is already there. It appears, phenomenally, as something already there. And yet there is this undoubted creative activity on my part involved in the simple act of recognition.

There is, he believed, a way through this paradox: and it rests on the distinction between creation of the existent thing, and constitution of the object in consciousness. What happens is this. Before I come along something is already there. I can in no way say what is there - simply because I haven't yet met it - but there is something. When I arrive I encounter what is there; the something is (generally) revealed to me in phenomena. It is now up to me to organize these phenomena by the creative activity of my consciousness, in accordance with the ideas I have (and some of these ideas are so universal and fundamental that they must be innate). In doing this I 'constitute' an object out of the given phenomena. I did not create the something, but I did constitute the object. And in constituting the object I gave it meaning, made of it an object for thought, and located it within the total framework of my world.

All we can say about the something which was there before I happened upon it, is that it is 'hyle'48 or stuff. It was there, but nothing could be said about it merely because it had not yet been encountered by consciousness. Hyle is not a substance, a category of things, nor a property: there is nothing which is in principle inaccessible. 'Hyle' is merely a negative term by which we can refer to that which has not yet been organised by consciousness. Like every other idea, it has meaning only in relation to consciousness.

Husserl interpreted his ontological shift not as a volte-face, but as a deepening, a 'radicalization' of his earlier thought. It had been there all along, he now realized, in the doctrine of intentional consciousness. This self-evident truth reveals both the reciprocal relationship between, and the mutual interdependence of, subject and object. Consciousness, the knowing subject or ego, is just that which takes an object. The object is nothing else but what appears to consciousness - real objects can only be a sub-category of imaginative-conceptual general. So bracketing, the phenomenological epocho, no longer suspends the question of reality: what it does is suspend the natural attitude, the naive ontology which only credits objects with reality status, without realizing their dependence upon consciousness. Only consciousness can constitute objects as real, or as anything else for that matter.

In a sense, then, the real is subsumed within the ideal, and the world is swallowed up in consciousness, without consciousness either creating or being in any way responsible for the existence of the bare stuff (hyle) of the world. But in a different sense, it is equally true that the ideal is located in the midst of the real, for consciousness is surrounded by the world and absorbed in acting (creatively) upon it.

44 For Merleau-Ponty this was a fundamental insight. See Merleau-Ponty (2) and (4).
45 See Husserl (3).
46 It is the nature of the ego to exist in the form of real and possible awareness. Its possibilities depend upon the various patterns of the "I can". Husserl (7) p.25.
47 See Husserl (5) para. 55, where he makes but does not develop a distinction between Reality (humanly constituted) and Being (absolute).
48 Husserl's coinage, from the Greek (Aristotle's) word for matter. The term 'Hyletic data' is introduced in Husserl (5) para. 85 for the 'formless materials' upon which the 'immaterial forms' of ideas are imposed. It corresponds, after the phenomenological reduction, to what in the 'Naturalistic Attitude' are called 'sensory materials'. Husserl is often interpreted as having only subsumed 'real' under 'ideal'. He certainly stressed this side, since the brunt of his attack was directed against a realism which objectified (and thereby dehumanized) consciousness, making it impossible to account for science as a human creation, and leading ultimately to irrationalism. But the force of the 'transcendental' in his characterization of his idealism, is precisely to assert that consciousness is in the midst of the world. See Husserl (10) passim.
Transcendental phenomenology

Husserl's later work can be seen as an attempt to work out the different senses of this relationship between consciousness and the world. The ontological shift (or 'Transcendental Turn') occasioned a new terminology, some new concepts, a distinct change of emphasis, and the emergence of new themes. Husserl now talks about consciousness, or more specifically the ego, as transcendental: it transcends itself towards objects, all of which are intentional, and some of which are real. Intentional objects are now said to be transcendental, insofar as they are necessarily other for consciousness. But the objects constituted by a consciousness, particularly real objects, are not therefore private to that consciousness but accessible to other conscious nesses. Rather than talking about the 'objective' world we should investigate the 'intersubjective constitution of reality', and we can use the term 'monad' to refer to the perspective of the individual on that common reality. The common reality is a world - the world, in fact - but not as conceived in the false ontology of 'objective' science. The real world is the world as we live it - the 'Lebenswelt' (the lived- or life-world). But the Lebenswelt is theoretically obscure and needs to be articulated, because the phenomena of our experience are systematically distorted by the false ontology (a sort of estrangement, or alienation of man from his own experience). The 'reduction' to the pheno mena of experience thus takes on a new meaning, the awareness of which Husserl calls the 'trans cendental reduction'.

Contradictions

What we find emerging in Husserl's later work are a number of themes which he found increasingly difficult to reconcile with his earlier theory of ideas. How to account for the undeniable historical develop ment of a false ontology within a theory of ideas as atemporal universal truths? (The problem of historicity, tackled in 'The Crisis'). How, starting from the isolated consciousness as the only given, to reach the social world and establish the au tomous existence of other people? (The problem of solipsism, in the 'Cartesian Meditations'). And how, starting from pre-linguistic experience of atomized phenomena, to constitute an object, and ultimately the whole world of objects? (The problem of constitution, in 'Experience and Judgment'). And throughout his work runs the tension of a desire to appeal to reason, and the need to appeal to experience, as the ground of philosophy, without any coherent theory of the relationship between the two.

The transcendental ego

So, let us return to the transcendental reduction; let us acknowledge within the intentionality of consciousness that there is an ego which transcends itself towards objects that are 'other' for it. And let us assume with Husserl what he states but rarely - the universality of the argument from his own individual consciousness. Thus a concept of public discourse is always implied; and when Husserl says: I cannot doubt the existence of my own consciousness, then like Derrida, he is speaking for everyone. In each case consciousness is my own. But we saw in the analysis of perception that the constitution even of simple objects implicitly refers to a constituting ego. The same must be true for every conscious act. The ego which transcends itself towards the object appears in any and every act of consciousness. Moreover, perception revealed the ego, or constituting subject, as more than just transcendental. It was temporal: it had in a sense both memory and anticipation, without which no synthesis of the object would have been possible. The ego could entertain not only that which was no longer present, but that which was not yet, and might never be, present - in the synthesis of actual and possible perceptions. The synthesis was also trans-sensory, in that the object appeared not merely as visual, but as touchable, having weight, feeling cold, able to cause a noise if dropped etc. all of which tells us something of the pre given capacities of the transcendental ego. And perception also revealed the ego as having the possibility of action - since possible awareness depended upon the 'various patterns of the "I can"'. The synthesis of the three-dimensional object revealed it as having space, and the ego as having the possibility of action (including movement) in the same space. And so we could go on, considering more complex perceptions, judgments, phantasies, memories - of real physical objects, of social (i.e. intersubjective) non-physical objects, of 'ideal' objects (such as abstract concepts). For what we have discovered here, claimed Husserl, is a whole realm of transcendentally reduced pheno mena waiting to be investigated. And that investiga tion can be oriented towards building up a picture of the necessary structures either of the transcend ental ego (on the subject side), or of the Lived World (on the object side) - since the two are co relative.

There are, however, some important conceptual difficulties which need to be clarified. In reflecting upon the transcendental ego (and making it thereby an object of consciousness) we must recognise that it can never be just another object, even in thought: it is the inalienable subject. Other objects are synthesised out of the phenomenal stream: a particular pattern is plucked out of the ongoing flow, which thus forms a background for it. But there is no pattern to be plucked out of the 'vividly streaming present' which will give us the idea of 'I': since every act and all patterns of phenomena both belong to and reveal the transcendental 'I'. There are, however, distinctions we can make. We are not, as philosophers, concerned with my actual empirical ego which is in some sense comprised by the totality of my experiences as they happen to have occurred. We are, however, concerned with how my ego must necessarily be in order to have a totality of experiences: what is it that makes all my experiences mine i.e. synthesizes a 'subject-pole' in relation to which every synthetic 'object-pole' stands. And even prior to that, we must be concerned with the minimum experience of 'I', the utterly pure ego, which is given in each individual act of consciousness, whatever it be. For this investigation we do not have to consider every act of this consciousness - any act will do. Nor, when
considering the synthesis of a subject between acts, need we be concerned with every act, but merely some. The sphere of own-ness, and 'the other'

When we turn to our experience, when, instead of talking about it, we actually begin to do phenomenological analysis, a striking fact is borne upon us. Although in one sense all my experiences are mine, I do not experience all the intentional objects which appear to my consciousness as mine. In fact, in perception, most of what I perceive is not mine. There is, then, a sphere of 'own-ness' to be investigated. Clearly an important part, but only a part, of this sphere of own-ness, is my body. My experience of my body must be investigated so that we can answer the questions 'How is it that I experience my body as my own?', and 'What necessary structures can we discover in my bodily experience?' But the sphere of own-ness is more extensive than the sphere of body, and lurking within it are necessary structures waiting to be uncovered. Clearly it is opposed to a sphere of 'otherness'; and in the sphere of otherness we find an indisputable formation of ideas surrounding that of 'the other' consciousness. It is beyond doubt that I experience other consciousnesses as consciousnesses like my own, and that I must constitute the idea of the other from the phenomena of my own experience. Yet this seems paradoxical, for in constituting the idea of the other I constitute it as essentially other to my consciousness, having an existence totally independent of my own. So how, on the basis of the phenomena which appear, am I able to do this? We must carry the phenomenological analysis deeper to find the answer. (Husserl of course is using not so much the royal 'we' as the divine 'I'. As I pointed out above, he discusses his individuality as the universal type.)

The lived world

At the level of the individual act of consciousness the transcendental reduction gives us a transcendental ego and a transcendent object. But at the level of the totality of acts of a particular consciousness it gives us the synthesized 'self' (on the subject side), and the synthesized 'Lebenswelt' (on the object side). The individual act of perception constitutes an object out of a background of phenomena: the object does not appear in isolation, but in relation to that background. Successive acts of perception constitute a series of objects which appear as related. In each case, that of the single act and of the series, there is a 'horizon' within which the appearance occurs. At its broadest, the horizon for perceived objects is the horizon of the lived world. The spheres of own-ness and otherness, of reality and ideality, of the public and of the private, are all structures of the lived world. The lived world, Husserl concludes, is one of the richest spheres for phenomenological investigation. There are undoubtedly necessary structures to be uncovered - structures which must form the foundations of a new natural science, one located within a more adequate ontology which recognises the lived world as the necessary co-relate of the transcendental ego.

Pre-predicative experience and the foundation of self-evidence

From the individual act of consciousness we can work outwards to the horizon of the lived world and explore the realms of intersubjectively constituted reality. But in the other direction we can dig down, and explore the foundations of all judgment in the immediate experience of the individual. What is the basis of self-evidence? How is it that I can ever simply see that something is so? - see that a straight line is straight or that the colour before me is red? This is not a question within empirical psychology (logically it must precede it), but a question about the nature of experience. It is also at the basis of any 'genealogy' of logic, since its scope includes the self-evidence with which logical truths present themselves to us.

A second question is, 'How is it that I can ever know that a judgment is adequate to my experience? - that a description, for example, accurately expresses my perception?' Rigorous phenomenological description can begin to disentangle the complex knottings of experience and language at the roots of all thinking. We can, for example, distinguish the level of pre-predicative experience (prior to any 'objective' judgment) which itself involves the synthesis of passively given data through time: this is the direct access we have to the lived-world before it is 'veiled' by the idealizations of science. These primitive syntheses we can locate in a realm of pre-predicative judgment, before it is distorted by language.

But what is the necessary relationship between pre-predicative experience (and the judgments it involves) and our formulations of it in thought - the realm of predicative judgment and experience? As soon as we enter this realm we must take account of the intersubjective constitution of the real, and the part that language plays in that.

'The Crisis'

All these themes - the transcendental ego, its relationship to the lived world and to others, the intersubjective constitution of reality, the foundation of rationality in the pre-predicative experience of the individual - all these continued to occupy Husserl during the last decade of his life. But the theme which came to predominate and draw all the others together was the theme of crisis. It was not something new in Husserl's work, but it took on new meaning - historical and political meaning.

In 1934 Husserl was asked by the organizers of the International Congress of Philosophy at Prague to comment on 'the mission of philosophy in our time'. The Nazis were already in power in Germany and beginning to flex their muscles. Husserl shared the revulsion of many bourgeois intellectuals to the new regime and the irrationalism it seemed to stand for: on top of which antisemitism was really beginning to bite. Husserl wrote a letter to the congress, and a long essay (never sent) which 'led to deep problems in the philosophy of history which truly disturb me'.

56Husserl has difficulties with bodily existence (Leib). It is Merleau-Ponty with the concept of the 'body-subject', who has developed the best account of it. For a critique of Husserl's account informed by Merleau-Ponty's see R. Schmitt (1).
57There is an obvious connection here with the contemporary Gestalt psychology. The gestalt of figure and ground impressed both Sartre (5) and Merleau-Ponty (2). For further psychological work on this see Gurwitsch (1).
58See Husserl (1) p355; Kockelmanns (4); and Alhoff passim, particularly Vol. II.
59The theme of the posthumously published 'Experience and Judgment'.
60'Experience and Judgment' is subtitled 'towards a Genealogy of Logic'. Husserl's conception of Logic was always very broad.
61Husserl (9) para. 10.
62For anyone interested I have a brief, unpublished paper criticizing Husserl's cock-eyed analysis. For good work on these themes stimulated by Husserl see: Eley's 'Afterword' in Husserl (9); M. DuFrenne 'Language and Metaphysics' in Lawrence & O'Connor (1); Gusdorf (1), Kwant (1), and much of the latter work of Merleau-Ponty - particularly (3) and (4). The real enthusiast there are several unpublished and more or less unintelligible papers of my own.
64Husserl (10) p. xvii.
On Kant's definition of marriage in
The Metaphysic of Ethics

That pact for reciprocity in use
Of sexual organs and worldly possessions
Which marriage meant for him, in my submission
Urgently needs securing from abuse.

I gather certain partners have defaulted.
Allegedly the organs acting for them
Vanished when they decided to withdraw them.
Loopholes were found: something that must be halted.

Recourse to law would seem the only way
To get those organs duly confiscated.
Maybe the partners ought to be persuaded
To check again on what the contracts say.
If they won't do so, someone's sure to send
The bailiffs in - a most unhappy end.

Bertolt Brecht
translated by John Willett from
Bertolt Brecht Poems 1913-1956
Part Two 1929-1938
London, Eyre Methuen, 1976, 154pp, £1.95

Now that RP has joined the radical publications' distribution co-operative (see Open Meeting report), the magazine is being sold in many more bookshops than before. But this has meant that our bookshops sales now return less than the cost of printing each copy - the magazine's financial survival depends on increasing direct sales through subscriptions. Help RP to break even - take out a subscription. Details inside front cover.
In 1935 he gave two lectures, one in Vienna and one in Prague, out of which grew his last, and unfinished, major work: 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology'.

The book, one of Husserl's clearest and least technical, well repays careful study. It is his attempt to understand what had gone wrong, why civilization as he knew it was threatened with destruction.

The meaning of man

Science, says Husserl, has forgotten its meaning for life, and has thereby lost its humanity. There has been a 'positivist reduction' of the very idea of science to mere factuality. It has been forgotten that science is essentially a human project, and that the knowledge it acquires is always relative to human consciousness. Scientists have misunderstood both the nature of science and the nature of (scientific) knowledge, with the result that they have suppressed what it means to be human, both in themselves and in others.

But this is no mere local difficulty amongst academics. We are talking here about a whole tradition, a tradition stemming from the Greeks, which is utterly central in European civilization. It is a tradition which embodies the ideals of truth and rationality; which establishes the values by which people live in a community. The tradition is itself inter-subjectively constituted by the consciousnesses participating in it. It is a teleological process, formulated and reformulated, passed on from one generation to the next.

The mathematization of nature

Something went wrong in the tradition, which divorced knowledge and its acquisition from human values, and from human purpose in acquiring it. The Renaissance revived and breathed new life into the Greek ideals, but shortly afterwards Galileo took the first step which set modern science on course both for its spectacular successes, and for its terrible distortion of man. What Galileo did was 'mathematize' Nature. Whatever could be measured, quantified, and reduced to mathematical form was girt to the mill of science, but all else ceased to be. The result was the idealization and objectification of Nature, and the identification of the real with this abstract idea. Being was reduced to the being of the object, and the subject (including the thinking scientist himself) disappeared below the horizon of recognition.

The failure of philosophers

Now this, thinks Husserl, is very remarkable, because the abstract theory which has gained total acceptance within our culture is one which is totally at odds with the experience of each and everyone of us. Each of us, including the scientist, knows himself to be a subject, a thinking conscious being. In the 'Crisis' Husserl frequently uses the word 'Dassein' (human existence). This is probably due to the influence of Heidegger for whom the term is central. In the '30s the Existentialphilosophie (which should not be translated "existentialism") since Sartre appropriated the term) of Jaspers and Heidegger was enjoying a tremendous vogue in Germany, both in academic circles and beyond. Husserl, who regarded it (with some bitterness) as totally wrong-headed irrationalism, nevertheless recognized that it spoke directly to the individual about his situation in a world that was becoming increasingly difficult to cope with. Amongst other things, the 'Crisis' is Husserl's counterpart to the Existentialphilosophie and the idea of history. We must perform the transcendental reduction, suspend the false abstractions which the tradition has passed down to us, and lay bare the foundations of the objective in subjectivity. We must recognise the inter-subjective constitution of reality by the community of consciousnesses. And if we do all these things we will transform consciousness and rediscover the meaning of man.

Perhaps I can now assess the sense of Husserl's idealism. His last work had virtually broken his dearly held theory of ideas, pushed to infinity (as a subject is denied the ontological status that is readily assigned to the object. Virtually the whole of modern philosophy can be seen as an attempt to explain this paradox: Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, were all of course aware of what it meant to be human, and were therefore driven to try and bridge the gap between their lived experience (in the Lebenswelt) and their theoretical beliefs (the Naturalistic Attitude). But none of them were radical enough in suspending their pre-conceptions and successes were therefore only partial, locked within the Naturalistic Attitude and failing to comprehend the true nature of subjectivity.

The fundamental contradiction of positivist psychology

But the crisis of understanding reached its peak in the 'science' of psychology: it was no accident that psychology was both the last and the least successful of the sciences, for the very conception of positivist psychology was founded upon a contradiction. The attempt to turn back the methods and the beliefs of the natural sciences upon the human psyche was the ultimate paradox, for it was an attempt to objectify the subject. But the subject is precisely that which stands over against and in opposition to the object; and the only meaning which object can have is that which derives from the subject.

The end result of these failures - the failure to comprehend the meaning of man as subjectivity, the failure to understand science as a human project with a human meaning, the failure to reconcile theoretical abstraction with practical experience, and above all the failure of philosophy to fulfill its task of upholding the ideal of truth by the application of human rationality to the lived world of human experience - the result is Crisis. A crisis in science, which has lost all foundation; a crisis in our culture and therefore our society, which has lost all standards of truth and reason; and a crisis in the individual, whose system of beliefs has collapsed because they are totally at odds with his experience.

The answer for Husserl, of course, lies in transcendental phenomenology. We must return to the world of naive experience (the Lebenswelt), the world of praxis, of (universal) pre-predictive experience. We must, in the spirit of truth and rationality, rigorously investigate the sources of tradition and the idea of history. We must perform the transcendental reduction, suspend the false abstractions which the tradition has passed down to us, and lay bare the foundations of the objective in subjectivity. We must recognize the inter-subjective constitution of reality by the community of consciousnesses. And if we do all these things we will transform consciousness and rediscover the meaning of man.

The book, one of Husserl's clearest and least technical, well repays careful study. It is his attempt to understand what had gone wrong, why civilization as he knew it was threatened with destruction.
teleological ideal) the discovery of atemporal truth, and confronted the problem of history head on. He had worked through the philosophical tradition as far as Kant, but never got to grips with the Hegelian dialectic. He was certainly not a materialist, and therefore could give no rational answer to the question of why the history of ideas had developed as it had: 'Galileo made a mistake; that is the best he could do. It was left to philosophers who knew their Hegel and Marx to carry further this development in Husserl's thinking.

The influence of the later Husserl

Husserl threw out sparks like a catherine wheel, and started fires in all directions. 'Major phenomenologists' - like Ingarden, Heidegger, Binswanger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, Pacci - all share a common debt to Husserl, but not a great deal else. Not only do they differ in their conceptions of phenomenology, but even in the methods they employ and call 'phenomenological'. There is, however, a clear philosophical tradition which develops from Husserl, through the early Heidegger to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and beyond. It runs together with Hegelianism, and subsequently Marxism - and there are good reasons why this should be so. But Husserl's phenomenology, particularly in its later form, has exercised a large influence beyond the academic discipline of philosophy, and it is to those developments that I shall now turn.

Phenomenological psychology/psychiatry

Already in the 20s 'phenomenological' influence was beginning to be felt in psychiatry and psychology. It acquired considerable momentum in the 30s, drawing inspiration not only from Husserl, but also from Scheler, Jaspers, and particularly Heidegger. A central figure in this development was the psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger, since it was he who made the philosophical shift most articulately and cashed it out in some brilliant casework.

The informing idea of this whole development was the notion of the Lebenswelt as a structured whole which could be uncovered by painstaking phenomenological description. But this structure could only be discovered by treating the patient as a fellow-subject, and not objectifying him as Freudian analysis did. The philosophical shift came with the realization that this undercut the status of psychiatry and psychology as 'objective' sciences and required their refoundation within a philosophy which could give an adequate account both of the subjective and of the intersubjective constitution of reality. Readers may recognise here themes which Sartre took up in his 'existential psychoanalysis' and which operated in Britain through the work of Laing and Cooper. Binswanger himself found in Heidegger's analysis of human existence (Daseinsanalyse) (1) the philosophical framework for his own theoretical analyses of actual patients (Daseinsanalyse). American psychiatry, which had been softened up by the 'existentialist' writings of Erich Fromm, discovered this European school in the late 50s - notably with the publication of Rollo May's excellent anthology 'Existence'. In psychology (unfortunately as it is distinguishable), phenomenology has been rather less filtered through the 'existential' philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre. Husserl's transcendental ego with its essential structures of temporality, spatiality, directionality etc, stimulated researches such as those of Strauss (1), who, as an emigre to America, persisted in raising his voice against the dominant behaviourism. His repeated theme is the inability of psychology to account for the psychologist: again 'objective' psychology has no place for a subject. Gurwtisch, another emigre and student of Husserl's, was simultaneously extending his researches into the field of consciousness, and Plessner's work on human expression was also stimulating interest. These influences ran together with the post-existentialist writings of Rogers and Maslow on the 'person' and interpersonal relations to become by the early '60s what could loosely be called a phenomenological current in American psychology. But the greatest philosophical influence on psychology has probably been that of Merleau-Ponty, who with his extensive knowledge of the subject, could speak directly to psychologists desperately looking for a way out of a crumbling behaviourism.

Phenomenology since Husserl

Returning to the development of the central philosophical tradition in phenomenology, the publication of Heidegger's 'Being and Time' in 1927, inaugurated an 'existential' phase which re-cast Husserl's transcendental ego/transcendent world distinction into human existence/world (Heidegger) or pour soi/en-soi (Sartre) and concerned itself with analysing the essential structures of the individual human being. Heidegger, after his penetrating and very influential first work, ran himself into a blind alley the logical end of which had only to be kept his philosophical mouth shut. But neither Sartre, nor Merleau-Ponty, were able to avoid for long the problems left by Husserl - problems of the relationship between individuals, of the intersubjective constitution of reality, of the subjective to the objective, of the individual to the collective, and the overwhelming problem of history. Both of them drew inspiration from Hegel (as did Heidegger), both of them sought answers in Marxism. Of the different conclusions they drew I shall say nothing here, but instead will turn to what I see as a more promising development towards the solution of these troubles which is potentially mystifying as the non-objectivity which they attack. The direct philosophical influence on these writers was, of course, Sartre, see Laing & Cooper (3).

Binswanger (1) goes far beyond Heidegger in developing an account of authentic interpersonal relationships based on love and friendship. See also Boss (1) and Carusco (1).

Sartre's later works (4), (5) and (6) are concerned with the development of the phenomenological and existential movements in psychiatry up to 1958.

Plessner's work (1) and (2), particularly his later writings on merism (7), seems a Swiss some of whose work has been available in English since 1964, see Plessner (1) and (2).

See articles by MacLeod and Rogers in Wann (1); also Rogers (1) and Maslow (2). Anyone interested in the transmission of ideas might like to note the influence of Polanyi on this school. On a different tack, see Zaner (1).

Merleau-Ponty (1) and (2). See also Sartre's early psychological works (3) and (2) (1).

For an excellent and critical exposition of the logic of Heidegger's development see A. Koyre (1).
Phenomenological Marxism

The central thesis of this school is roughly as follows. What phenomenology lacks is an adequate account of historical development, and of why social reality is constituted as it is. What Marxism lacks is an adequate account of consciousness and the role of ideas in mediating the historical process. Within Marxism Lukacs (1) had attacked the problem before relapsing into dogmatism, and Marcuse (1) had (briefly) realized the possible complementarity of phenomenology and Marxism. But there are good objective (political) reasons why Marxists shelved the problem until the late '50s. When it was re-opened, the fact had to be faced that orthodox Marxism had become a dogma divorced from the social reality it was supposed to explain, and Marxism as a living and developing body of theory had all but perished. Karl Korsch (1), Lukacs and others had to be exhume firstly to explain why this had happened, and secondly to start a new theoretical advance. And central to any explanation was the whole problem of historical process - of how social reality generates ideas, ideas generate social reality. Thus at the very heart of the malaise of Marxism was the problem of the intersubjective constitution of ideas (including those of Marxism) on the basis of the experienced world - i.e. precisely what the phenomenologists were on about.

But phenomenology and Marxism could not simply be put together in some neat and complementary synthesis, phenomenology supplying the account of the individual and Marxism that of the social. Each of them claimed to be total philosophies - a fundamental contradiction which could be resolved only on the one side or the other. But phenomenology had failed, and would necessarily continue to fail, to generate the social and historical out of its starting point in the individual consciousness as absolute. The individual cannot possibly generate reality but only ideas about it, and those ideas themselves must essentially have social and historical location. The historical development of ideas within a tradition would be fundamentally unintelligible if considered as an independent realm (Husserl's inability to explain the course of the scientific revolution): it could only be understood in relation to the (changing) reality which it attempted to explain.

An undogmatic marxism, however, starting from the reality as experienced by its participants, would be large enough to comprehend within itself an account of both the individual and the historical genesis of ideas. As opposed to Husserl's pure consciousness, which is now to be a theoretical abstraction divorced from the phenomena of human experience (as therefore to be condemned on purely phenomenological grounds), the historical individual can never be absolute: he is born and raised into a situation, a language, and a system of ideas which is pre-given for him. But what he can do is use the phenomenological method for evaluating and revising the adequacy of his received ideas.

Philosophy as praxis

What the individual can do, so can a group of philosophers, and a group of Marxists. The role of the philosopher in society is precisely that of the mediator - the critic and author of the ideas by which society comprehends reality, and by means of which the possibilities of action are determined. As Husserl realized of the scientific tradition, and Marx of his own life-work, the production of ideas is itself a form of which which plays an essential role in the historical process. Where bourgeois intellectuals like Husserl and Heidegger come adrift is in failing to see work as an essential part of being human and their own work as comprehended in the society which supports them. Theoretical innovation by intellectuals is a specialized form of work which should properly be oriented towards praxis. Under capitalism the products of intellectuals will be appropriated, objectified, bought and sold as commodities, made into something alien to their producers, and apparently put beyond human control. What Husserl rightly recognizes as having occurred in the development of scientific thought is no more than a special case of what has happened to the products of all workers under capitalism. Only by means of a proper appreciation of this fact can philosophy - and indeed all scientific thinking - incorporate within itself the critical awareness of its own status which will prevent its appropriation, and reserve to it the power of effective action towards change (i.e. revolutionary praxis).

The main centre of phenomenological Marxism as I have outlined it is Italy, and in particular the University of Milan. The emergence of the magazine Telos (in the wake of the '68 student revolts) as the official publication of the graduate school at Buffalo96 marked an important bridgehead in the States for this brand of phenomenological Marxism. Rather than attempting to trace the various interactions between these usually separate philosophies, or the progress of the Italian synthesis, I refer readers to the bibliography.

In place of a conclusion

I shall make no attempt to sum up what I have said either about Husserl or the phenomenological movement. If I have managed to impress upon readers that here is a whole alternative philosophical tradition, at least as rich, and varied and as alive as anything the English-speaking world can lay claim to, I shall have achieved my main purpose. If you have read (or skipped) this far, I hope you will have found something en route interesting enough to go into further. The (over?) abundance of footnotes should have given you some indication of where to look. The bibliography which follows is intended to aid you further.

Abbreviations:

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