

the context of an entrepreneurial ethos, the implication is that those who have proved their individual merit and social worth by attaining positions of leadership in industry and elsewhere are best equipped to maintain a civilized and integrated society. Their tutelage should extend to those who, having failed to make a success of their lives, are intent on disrupting good social order and on subverting the natural justice of the free economy: left-wing militants, 'loungers' and 'scroungers' on social welfare, truculent strikers, and so forth. The overall effect is to portray the beneficiaries of market forces as guardians of the public interest.

So, despite its strident rhetoric, the ideology of the so-called New Right is a variation on the age-worn and familiar conservative defence of class inequality. Whether it continues to succeed in marshalling a consensus around a set of highly sectional and exploitative policies remains to be seen. Perhaps an alternative consensus, organized around a social image which truly embodies majority interests, can only be mobilized by a reformed Labour party prepared to raise fundamental questions about capitalist institutions. This is why the outcome of the current left/right struggle in the Labour Movement may be instrumental in determining whether conservatism is finally unmasked in the eyes of ordinary people as the antithesis of common sense.

- 1 George Gale, 'The Popular Communication of a Conservative Message', in *Conservative Essays*, ed. Maurice Cowling, London, Cassell, 1978, pp181, 190.
- 2 I am, of course, drawing upon the debate triggered by Anderson and Nairn regarding the outlines of English cultural development. The principal articles relevant to the debate are: Perry Anderson, 'Origins of the Present Crisis', in *Towards Socialism*, ed. Anderson and R. Blackburn (London, Fontana, 1965), pp11-52; idem, 'Components of the National Culture', in *Student Power*, ed. Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969), pp214-84; idem, 'Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism', *New Left Review* 35 (1966), 2-42; Tom Nairn, 'The British Political Elite', *New Left Review* 23 (1964), pp19-25; idem, 'The English Working Class', in *Ideology in Social Science*, ed. R. Blackburn (London, Fontana, 1972), pp187-206; Nicos Poulantzas, 'Marxist Political Theory in Great Britain', *New Left Review* 43 (1967), pp 57-74; E. P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English', in *The Socialist Register*, 1965, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London, Merlin Press, 1965), pp311-62. My quarrel with Anderson and Nairn is that, stressing the traditional flavour of the dominant ideology, they underplay the significance of bourgeois ingredients. Bourgeois ideas have been more instrumental than they acknowledge in shaping an alternative liberal ethos to the aristocratic legacy; and also in nourishing the peculiar, resilient amalgam that constitutes conservatism. See my 'The Identity of English Liberalism', *Politics & Society*, 9 (1979), pp1-32; and Richard Johnson, 'Barrington Moore, Perry Anderson and English Social Development', *Cultural Studies* 9 (Spring 1976), pp7-28.
- 3 Peter Walker, *The Ascent of Britain*, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1977, pp20, 22.
- 4 Sir Keith Joseph, 'The Class War', *The Guardian*, 18 July 1979, p7.
- 5 Sir Geoffrey Howe, 'Urgent need to create wealth', *The Guardian*, 3 July 1978, p14.
- 6 Margaret Thatcher, 'A Speech on Christianity and Politics', London, Conservative Central Office, 30 March 1978, p10.

# HEIDEGGER'S EARLY DEVELOPMENT

ROGER WATERHOUSE

This is the first of three short articles on Heidegger. The second will deal with the argument of *Being and Time*. The third will be a critical evaluation of Heidegger's whole philosophy.

Heidegger gets mentioned more and more in the English-speaking world. He even gets read more than he used to. His works, however, partake of what Lovejoy called 'the pathos of sheer obscurity, the loveliness of the incomprehensible'.

The reader doesn't know exactly what they mean, but they have all the more on that account an air of sublimity; an agreeable feeling at once of awe and of exaltation comes over him as he contemplates thoughts of so immeasurable a profundity - their profundity being convincingly evidenced by him by the fact that he can see no bottom to them (1).

Heidegger's thoughts do have a basis. For the ordinary English reader that basis is obscured however not only by Heidegger's mind-bending style, but by his own ignorance of the cultural background from which Heidegger's thinking sprang. In these articles I want to make Heidegger's thinking intelligible as a development out of certain intellectual trends. His popularity is something else - to be explained not merely as intellectual fashion but as answering some clearly felt need. The truth of what he has to say is a different ques-

tion again: one which can only be addressed after we have really understood what he is getting at.

My aims, then, are threefold: to express as simply as possible the main outlines of Heidegger's thought; to consider his philosophy as a cultural phenomenon; and to evaluate the truth of what he has to say. I shall centre my discussion on his only major work, *Being and Time*, because this is the only systematic exposition of his doctrines. I also believe that it anticipates all the themes of his later works.

Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 at a small town in the Black Forest, near Freiburg-im-Breisgau. Virtually the whole of his life was spent in this area of south-west Germany. He was a man with roots, which he never forgot and from which he was never tempted to separate himself. His upbringing was catholic and provincial: his father was sexton of the local church. His gymnasium education was of the conventional humanistic kind: large doses of the classics, history and Germany literature - almost total neglect of natural science. Heidegger was a wizard at Greek and Latin, retaining throughout his life the ability to quote large chunks at the drop of a hat. When he left school in 1909 he went to the seminary at Freiburg university and began training for the priesthood. Two years later he switched his major from theology to philo-

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sophy, partly under the influence of Carl Braig, a theologian who had written a book on ontology. The other major influence he recognized from this period of his life was Wilhelm Vöge, a well-known art historian.

These strands - the classics, theology, literature and history of art - outcrop repeatedly in all his mature work. But a word needs to be said about Heidegger's switch out of theology. He did not lose faith. Indeed throughout his life he retained a theistic belief, and it was no mere formality that he was buried a Catholic. What did happen was that he came to the conclusion that theology was theoretically ill-founded and that only philosophy could provide a more adequate foundation. He read Luther and Kierkegaard; he read Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. He ceased to talk about 'God' as personal, though he was prepared to speak metaphorically of 'the gods'.

## Hermeneutics

The philosophy department into which Heidegger transferred was dominated (after the fashion of the time) by the professor, Heinrich Rickert. To stick a label on him, Rickert was a neo-Kantian hermeneuticist - but let me explain. Between about 1890 and the first world war there was an identifiable 'school' of philosophy predominant in south-west Germany, centred on Heidelberg. Its leading light was Wilhelm Dilthey; other big names were Windelband and Rickert. The school was neo-Kantian in that its members generally held that Kant had got it right so far as he went i. e. his account of the natural world and our knowledge of it were correct. Where Kant had failed, they believed, was in not giving an adequate account of man in his noumenal or spiritual being - which was not subject to the same causal determination as his physical being. The failure was not trivial, for it meant that the nature of man, and all the sciences which took man and his artefacts as their objects, were without philosophical basis. Dilthey, then, was simultaneously seeking a philosophical account of man in his spiritual or mental being (Geiste) and a methodological underpinning of the humane sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). He found it in hermeneutics.

'Hermeneutics' was a loose but very broad intellectual movement which ranged far beyond the confines of academic philosophy. It had its roots in the tradition of textual exegesis which stemmed

from the practice of the mediaeval universities, and which gained a new lease of life in the 18th century. The romantic kickback against 'scientific' enlightenment rationalism came together with the new awareness of historical process in the person of one Schleiermacher. He argued that reason is in history, as human individuals, who already have an understanding of the world (based on language) prior to the rationalistic search for knowledge. Hermeneutics, as the science of understanding the meaning of texts, was not the professional preserve of academic pedants, but a general capacity of the human spirit, by which the individual understood his own humanity and that of others. Schleiermacher was best remembered as a theologian, but his ideas spilled over into all the Geisteswissenschaften and became firmly embodied both in the departments of the reformed German universities, and in the values of the gymnasium curriculum (which Heidegger experienced).

Early in his career Dilthey (who also, incidentally, had an initial orientation to theology) seized upon Schleiermacher's long-neglected work, and came to see it as the missing link. Hermeneutics, as the positive cultivation of human understanding, could not only provide the missing Kantian critique - that of historical reason; it would also, by an elucidation of how we grasp meanings in historical artefacts, articulate with rigour the methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften, and so justify them vis-a-vis the Naturwissenschaften. From psychology to sociology, from theology to art history, all could (and did) draw upon the hermeneutic tradition both for their method and their justification.

This tradition provided Heidegger with a number of concepts and attitudes crucial throughout his work. First, the notion of 'discourse' - language as a closed circle of meanings which cannot be known from the outside but which we must get into by an imaginative leap. Second, the notion of the 'Lebenswelt' or lived-world - the world as the (essentially) meaningful place in which we live which provides the basis for all thought and action, including scientific study of any kind. Third, the notion of a cultural tradition associated with a people (Volk), and embodying values transmitted through certain exceptional artefacts (works of art) produced by exceptional individuals of 'great spirit'. Fourth, the devaluation of natural scientific knowledge and the rationalist epistemologies based on it. And finally a (theoretical) rejection of modern technology and all its works as distinctive of what is essentially human.

## The Question of Being

Heidegger was never uncritical of the hermeneutic tradition. From the first he objected to its neo-Kantianism. Kant (and by implication his followers) had been so busy worrying about knowledge that he never got to grips with the prior question of what exists: 'the problem of reality simply had no place in his epistemology' he wrote in his first published article (PR, 1912)(1). Here speaks the influence of Braig, of Brentano, and even of Aristotle(3); for before he ever joined the philosophy department he had become convinced from his reading that what exists, so far from being self-evident, was extremely problematical. Indeed, it was the most important problem which philosophy had to face.

This theme, which is utterly central in Heidegger's philosophy from his first works to his

last (a span of 64 years), is not to be understood in purely intellectual terms. As Heidegger himself made clear, the problem as articulated in language is based upon a felt experience - of Being.

'Why are there beings rather than nothing?' Many men never encounter this question, if by encounter we mean ... to feel its inevitability. And yet each of us is grazed at least once ... by the hidden power of this question (which) looms in moments of great despair ... when all meaning becomes obscured ... (and) is present in moments of rejoicing, when all the things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first time(4) (IM, p1).

The feelings are powerful, but the experience so difficult to articulate in language:

You can, as it were, smell the Being of this building in your nostrils. The smell communicates the Being of this thing (seiende) far more immediately and truly than any description or inspection could ever do ... (IM, p27)

This focussing upon the 'Question of Being' takes place with the switch from theology to philosophy. Heidegger is a man who has felt the presence of God in all things, but can no longer say 'God'. Instead he says 'Being', but can't say anything about it. He embarked on a life work of attempting to articulate the experience of Being - or of letting Being say itself through him - only to conclude that this simply could not be achieved. He consoled himself with the thought that the attempt must be enough (DSI).

## Early Works

But whatever his private reservations about the hermeneuticists, in 1911 Heidegger was a humble apprentice, and Rickert put him through a rigorous routine of epistemology, logic and theory of Geisteswissenschaft. This was reflected in his early publications: a survey of contemporary work in logic, an essay on 'psychologism', a dissertation on the concept of time in historical science. But his major graduate dissertation was on 'Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning'. Significantly, he found in the mediaeval thinker a doctrine of meaning superior to any neo-Kantian variant: thought and reality are unified through expression. In linguistic expression the intellect articulates the truth of being. The structure of language mirrors the structure of the world. The 'speculative grammars' of the mediaevals were therefore not only getting at the structure of the intellect, but at the structure of the world(5).

By the time this dissertation was finished in 1915 Heidegger was already doing some teaching. Although a very junior member of the department he was clearly very promising, and had a phenomenal capacity for hard work. Many of his contemporaries were, of course, being shot to bits. After volunteering for the army in 1914 he himself had been discharged after two months on grounds of ill-health. Intellectually, he had by now established his basic problematic, and had gained a great deal from hermeneutics. But the work with Rickert was at an end. Fortunately for Heidegger, Rickert left to take up the chair at Heidelberg. He recommended as his successor Edmund Husserl.



## Phenomenology

Husserl was 57 when he arrived in Freiburg in 1916. Always a loner, he had self-consciously tried to found a new philosophical school (6). Now, after years of gruelling hard work out in the wilderness, success was at last beginning to come his way. He had been trained as a mathematician, and had come to philosophy by way of logic, in a search for adequate foundations. The core of philosophy as far as he was concerned was epistemology: how to establish absolutely certain knowledge on which the sciences could be based. Throughout his life he retained a high regard for scientific rationality and its technical achievements. He was quite out of sympathy with the 'soft' 'Lebensphilosophie' of the hermeneuticists (though prepared to concede some interest in Dilthey's psychology): what was needed in philosophy was a good dose of scientific rigour(7).

Husserl had found his certain knowledge in the realm of ideas. Basing himself on a theory of Brentano's, he started from the claim that consciousness was 'intentional' - i. e. it always took ('intended') some object. The object of consciousness ('intentional object') might be real or not real, present or absent, perceived or imagined - but it was always an idea. Thus consciousness had direct access to a realm of ideas. The essential relationships between these ideas could be established with absolute certainty by direct inspection: truth was founded upon such inner seeing. Since we all partake of a common human rationality, each of us can establish on the basis of his own ideas philosophical knowledge which is universal.

The relation of these ideas to some supposed transcendent reality could, indeed should, be left till later. The Kantians were far too eager to rush into speculations about the relationship between phenomena and noumena - speculations, which were idle if not based upon a prior knowledge of the fundamental ideas (such as 'truth', 'meaning', etc) which we are bringing to bear. Patient analysis of the internal structure of the realm of ideas was needed instead - a sort of a priori psychology. The method should imitate science by basing itself on experience: not common sense, which was no more than the residue of ancient theories, but the raw uninterpreted data which came to consciousness - the pure phenomena. Examination of these phenomena, without any preconceptions, would reveal how we are able to apply (correctly) any idea to them - how consciousness organizes phenomena by the application of an idea. In this way the essence of the idea could come to be known. We could then proceed to a related idea, and gradually accumulate a body of certain knowledge about ideas - which would also be knowledge about the structure of consciousness.

Heidegger had heard of Husserl soon after getting to university; he had taken his only published work, the two-volume Logical Investigations, out of the library, but hadn't been able to get into it. He knew that in 1913 Husserl had published a second book, Ideas, but probably made no serious effort to read it until Husserl appeared on the horizon as professor designate - the new boss (8). At that stage Husserl's phenomenology looked interesting, certainly was being talked about as a genuine innovation, and seemed highly relevant to some concerns of his own - psychologism, meaning, truth, grammatical structure etc. Moreover, when he

read Ideas, Heidegger found statements about 'reality' and 'being' which were exciting. Husserl was now saying that consciousness 'constitutes' an idea of the real, and in that sense transcends itself towards objects. But it does not 'create' reality - which in any case as natural reality is not to be identified with the totality of Being (9). There was ambiguity here, even confusion: but to Heidegger it seemed exciting.

But what really converted Heidegger to phenomenology was Husserl's way of philosophizing.

Husserl's teaching took place in the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenological 'seeing' which at the same time demanded that one relinquishes the untested use of philosophical knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation.

So Heidegger described it (MW, p78). So the scholastically inclined hermeneuticist was made to evaluate his classics against the experience of the here-and-now.

Heidegger's work with Husserl was interrupted towards the end of the war - he was called up and sent to a meteorological station in the Western Front. By 1919 he was back working as Husserl's assistant with free access to his voluminous unpublished manuscripts, and the job of preparing some for publication. After a couple of years Husserl was to say confidently, 'phenomenology, that is I and Heidegger, and no one else'(10). In teaching terms they were complementary: Heidegger took the historical courses from Aristotle to Nietzsche, working carefully from the texts; while Husserl took 'topics' for his courses, working from his own notes, or thinking aloud. Differences were always there, even in their teaching styles. But what they shared at this period was the rejection of Kantian dualism, the appeal to the phenomena of experience as a way of evaluating received ideas, the search for essential meanings within these phenomena, and the discovering of necessary structures in the transcendental subject. This last, which was how Husserl had come to conceive of consciousness, was proceeding by their joint efforts in a particularly fruitful direction - the exploration of parallel structures in consciousness and in the lived world, particularly with respect to time.

It was the manuscripts on time which Heidegger chose to edit (11). Husserl had concluded, as far back as 1905, that the perceptual process is rooted in the phenomenon of time. Our very ability to recognize an object as real depends upon our ability to synthesize its different phenomenal appearances through time. Put another way, to establish the reality of an object I must be able to walk round it, reach out and touch it etc. - processes which are necessarily extended in time, and which presuppose my ability to initiate action and to synthesize phenomena across the different senses. So phenomenological method reveals that our primitive encounter with reality is temporal, active and multi-sensory. The philosophical model of a passive observer confronting static visual reality is thus a travesty of our actual encounter with the world.

Partly under Heidegger's influence, Husserl had by now come to recognize some valuable notions in the hermeneutic tradition: that of the lived-world was crucial (12). His early analyses had concentrated upon isolated 'acts of consciousness', grasping

individual ideas which could slowly be built into structural relationships. By now however he was coming to see that the individual act of meaning always had a context, always occurred against a background, and that the background itself was structured. At its broadest the background was the world as we live in it with its structures of time and space. What's more, there was a structural relationship between 'I' as the subject of consciousness, and 'world' as its object. Instead of 'consciousness taking an object', Husserl began to talk of a 'transcendental ego confronting a transcendental world'.

Heidegger thought that this was getting somewhere. Instead of suspending the question of reality, leaving aside the nature of Being, Husserl now seemed to be addressing it head on. Husserl could not have disagreed more. The very essence of phenomenology was reduction to the phenomena of consciousness in order to discover its ideas. Therefore what they were analyzing was the idea of 'reality', the idea of the 'world' and so on. The operation was totally within consciousness, within the realm of ideas, and it was difficult to see how it could be otherwise. Eventually Husserl was to conclude that 'real' could have no meaning except that conferred by consciousness. We do not create the world, but we do constitute it in thought.

The difference between their two positions was subtle, and certainly in the early twenties did not seem irreconcilable. In any case Heidegger did not press it: Husserl was his boss and thirty years his senior. Husserl was not a good listener, had only got where he was by being pig-headed and having faith in the rightness of his own ideas (13): in any case he was convinced that Heidegger would see sense in the end. The matter only came to a head in their attempt to collaborate in an article on phenomenology for the Encyclopedia Britannica - but that was some years away and water was to flow under the bridge before then.

## Jaspers' Existenzphilosophie

The post-war years were no less unsettled and disoriented for intellectuals than for other groups in German society. With defeat and revolution in the air, paramilitary groups on the streets and reactionary student societies blossoming, most fixed points seemed to have dissolved. Husserl had lost his elder son in the war, Heidegger at least one good friend (4) - the world could no longer be the same. On this world burst Spengler's prophetic Decline of the West, blaming the 'decay of civilization' squarely on scientific rationality and the technological society it had produced. The trouble was too much 'intellect' and not enough 'religiousness' (15). A hundred thousand copies of the book were sold between 1918 and 1926 (16).

It was another, though less popular, best seller which had the greater impact on Heidegger. In 1919 Karl Jaspers published a book called Psychology of Worldviews. In it he proclaimed a passionate faith in the individual, in the best tradition of Lebensphilosophie. War, death, extreme anxiety could bring out the best in man: such 'limit situations' reveal to the suffering individual the truth of his existence. This 'Existenzphilosophie' grabbed Heidegger at a gut level. 'Existence', as the specifically human way of being, was what it was all about. The 'life's striving' of a concrete human individual should be

the heart of philosophy, not Husserl's desiccated consciousness, grubbing about for 'certain knowledge' at the roots of natural science. But Jaspers' work was sloppy - small wonder for a man just working himself into philosophy from psychotherapy. It lacked that 'historical self-criticism' which should expose the discrepancy between 'who we are and who we think we are'. Between 1919 and 1921 Heidegger worked on a review of Jaspers' book(17). Eventually he abandoned the project, but sent a copy of what he had done to Jaspers, in the hope he would take account of the criticisms in any future edition. Thus began a friendship which was only terminated by Heidegger's espousal of Nazism in 1933.

## Marburg

The slack and sketchy nature of Jaspers' account gave Heidegger a definite project: a rigorous, phenomenological account, not of 'consciousness', but of 'human existence'. The project was to be realized in the writing of Being and Time, but only after he had left Freiburg and Husserl. In 1922 he was offered an associate professorship at Marburg. He got it on the strength of a manuscript on the relevance of Aristotle to the situation of contemporary man, a hermeneutic exercise which had grown out of his teaching - and an example of what he meant by 'historical self-criticism'. He was attempting to clarify an idea that the Decline of the West was due to the centring of philosophy on problems of knowledge, rather than on the question of Being and its relation to individual human existence. At least since Aristotle our thinking, and even our language, had been corrupt. The relevance of Aristotle today was not that he had been right where others had gone wrong. Rather, his works contained both some truth and also the sources of subsequent error. To destroy by exegesis the errors which had been transmitted in our intellectual history was the only way of transcending them. Both Husserl and Jaspers had failed because they neglected the history of the philosophical tradition.

Marburg was especially attractive to Heidegger because it had long been a centre of neo-Kantian theology, and exciting developments were now occurring there. To Heidegger, by far the most interesting was the thinking of Rudolph Bultmann, with whom he soon struck up a life-long friendship. Bultmann was in process of attacking the Marburg liberal tradition by a critique of Christian mythology. The historical Jesus had been so mythologized by primitive Christianity that it was no longer possible to recapture the historical reality. But nor was it necessary, for the myth contains theological truth: it is a message addressed by God to man, a divine call (kerygma). The problem was to attune oneself to the call, to be receptive to the word of God, and not to get bogged down in literal interpretation of scripture.

The purpose of hermeneutics was thus a preparation for hearing. The protestant Bultmann was pulling the emphasis back to a Kierkegaardian location: that of the individual's direct relationship to God. Scheler, who had followed a 'phenomenological' course parallel to, but separate from, that of Husserl, had broken new ground in philosophical discussion of the inter-personal relations of individuals. Not only was Bultmann drawing on this, but within Judaism too Martin Buber was using it to describe the individual's experience of God(18).

And for his part Heidegger appraised Scheler's work as second only to Husserl's in phenomenology (MW, pp80-81).

The post-war resurgence of individualism, anti-scientism and religiosity amongst German intellectuals was now ripe for philosophical synthesis. It was that synthesis which Heidegger so brilliantly provided in Being and Time.

- 1 Lovejoy, p11.
- 2 I have abbreviated references to Heidegger's works: key at the end.
- 3 In old age, Heidegger recalled being turned on to philosophy at the age of 17 by reading a work of Brentano's: 'On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle'. (MW).
- 4 I have substituted 'thing' and 'being' for the clumsy 'essent' in this and the subsequent quotation, as translations of 'Seiende'. Heidegger opposes to beings (Seiende), 'Being' in general (Sein), of which things in some sense partake. He thus comes to talk about the 'Being of beings'.
- 5 Caputo.
- 6 For more detail on Husserl, see my article 'Husserl & Phenomenology' in RP16.
- 7 See his Logis article of 1910.
- 8 In old age Heidegger implied that he came to terms with Husserl's Ideas as soon as it appeared (MW, p77). This is belied by what he published in those years.
- 9 Husserl, Ideas, p168.
- 10 Quoted by Gadamer, p143.
- 11 These appeared in 1928 as The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.
- 12 This development is clearly evidenced in his positive appreciations of Dilthey in the 'Phenomenological Psychology' of 1923.
- 13 See, for instance, Spiegelberg, Vol. I, pp88-89.
- 14 Emil Lask, killed in Galicia.
- 15 Spengler, Vol. I, p424.
- 16 Forman, p30.
- 17 Krell (1).
- 18 Buber's 'I and Thou' was published in 1923.

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JBSP = Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.