

## Footnotes

- 1 Philosophische Hefte
- 2 See bibliography
- 3 The rushed completion is apparent in the text. The last two chapters are full of unfinished discussions, postponements, and at one point four pages of barely digested quotation (pp451-54).
- 4 Unattributed page references are to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of 'Being and Time', published by Blackwell.
- 5 I put the term 'Spirit' in brackets, not because Heidegger overtly equates Being with Spirit, but because the Hegelian undertone is always there. See, for example, B&T, p480ff; IM, p37, etc.
- 6 The English translation has a misprint here.
- 7 It is clear that most of the material Heidegger had intended for the other sections was eventually published (e.g. KPM, ER, ET, WM, IM). What he never pursued was any systematic further study.
- 8 The rot set in with the Romans, who simply could not understand the subtlety of Greek thought and debased it by their translations into Latin (OWA, p23).
- 9 See IM, p47.
- 10 Heidegger exploits the German: my existence is necessarily my

- 'own' (eigen); if I recognise it as such I become 'authentic' (eigentlich).
- 11 He in fact uses the expression very loosely. It is extremely unclear how existentials are to be identified, how they are interrelated, and how they combine into some structural whole.
  - 12 Ironically, he is taking Husserl's concept of a 'founded mode' (see the 'Logical Investigations') and turning it against him.
  - 13 It should be clear by now that what Heidegger means by 'world' is essentially 'lived-world' - the 'Lebenswelt' of Dilthey and latterly Husserl.
  - 14 Heidegger is not envisaging reciprocal relationships. See my article in RP21.
  - 15 Macquarrie and Robinson use the word 'they' to translate Heidegger's 'man' - the impersonal form of the verb. The deficiency of this translation is that 'they' specifically excludes me, while 'man' specifically includes me. Hence I have preferred to translate it as 'one'.
  - 16 A reference to the then newly popular psycho-analysis, amongst other things.
  - 17 Nichtigkeit. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as 'nullity'
  - 18 Cf. Sartre, 'Being and Nothingness', I, Ch.1; also Husserl, 'Ideas', p109.
  - 19 Note that Heidegger does not specify how this 'rapture' enables us to recognize possibilities.

# REVIEWS

## Male Fantasies : Capitalism - Sexism - Fascism

Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, Vol.1, Frankfurt-a-M., 1977, Vol.2, ibid. 1978.

NOT: he made the earth subject to him because he could not have his mother (as Freud says), BUT: he returned to his mother because he was not allowed to use the earth productively. (Klaus Theweleit)

Both parts of a new book on Fascism have been out in West Germany for over a year now and have been the subject of enthusiastic discussion second only to the response given to Rudolf Bahro's work. It is something we should know about in Britain. Klaus Theweleit, the author, belongs to the student movement generation of the late sixties and became known almost overnight when he published his thesis on male fantasies, on the psychology and sexual imagery of fascism.

'We have been asking those who say they understood all about Fascism (but who did not have the ability to defeat it) too many questions, and asking the Fascists themselves too few', says Theweleit. Unlike many a tome from the German Left, his ideas are guided less by programmatic theory than by pointed aphorisms, of which he has invented many, providing quotable quotes for his reviewers. The lack of theorising is very refreshing. Theweleit's thoughts have an urgency which has made people feel the need to come to terms with them. They have made a personal, and not just an intellectual, impact on those in Germany who, like Theweleit himself, need to understand their own fathers - all the little nazis of their parents' generation. He wants to understand Fascism through the Fascists. Perhaps he makes one common but questionable assumption right from the beginning, namely that they were all men.

The book consists of two volumes. They grew out of an essay on the white terror of anti-republican forces during the revolu-

tionary struggles which took place in Germany between 1918 and 1920, the year of the Kapp Putsch. These were the German equivalent to the Black and Tans, being volunteer brigades formed from the remnants of the Wilhemian army. For the political destiny of the Weimar Republic it was crucial that these men were professional soldiers who were literally unemployed and looking for work, not just revenge, at a time when the Treaty of Versailles restricted the size of the German Army. What Theweleit is interested in is that their social position as professional soldiers was also their psycho-sexual character. They had been bred to live in an archetypally male world. Looking at the psyches of a number of officers from these brigades (the Freikorps) through biographies and novels they wrote themselves or which were written about them, Theweleit traces how completely they were blocked off from the reality of women, how they had to imagine women in one or another stereotype in order to perceive them at all. The figures he takes from the Freikorps include two men who later went entirely different ways: Rudolf Höss joined the SA after his brigade was disbanded by law and his career ended with him running Auschwitz; at the other extreme, Martin Niemöller abandoned the military life to study theology and spent the years between 1937 and 1945 in concentration camps. Theweleit found clues for these careers in the archetypes of women which appear in their writings. His terms for them have entered the language of the Left in Germany to signify ways of viewing women. On the side of the Whites women appear as nurses, mothers and sisters devoid of sexual identity and personality; on the side of the Reds they are seen as castrating amazons and whores, whose sexual independence is synonymous with the political aggression of the enemy.

Männerphantasien has been welcomed first and foremost as fresh ground in understanding the genesis of National Socialism. It is also full of new directions about sexual oppression, the oppression of women and in men. The psychological shapes of history and their political functions, the kind of feelings and fantasies people had - these are his subject. The sexism of Fascism is nothing new to us. But Fascism seen as an historical case of sexist culture and psychology does bring fresh material not only on the hold which National Socialism exercised over minds and feelings, but also on phenomenal forms of the male personality in patriarchal society through the example of Nazi acolytes and progenitors. It is the coupling of the investigation which makes Theweleit's work so original.

A nation which oppresses another cannot itself be free, and the sex which oppresses the other is itself ill. Theweleit looks not at women, but rather at the men whom the oppression of women produces. He asks what forms and shapes the sickness takes in men of the extreme Right, exploring as a literary detective how such men wrote about the terror they perpetrated. From the way they expressed themselves he deduces the common denominator which lies in the psychological structure of each of his cases. To describe this he uses the concept from radical psycho-analytical theory, namely from Deleuze' and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, of an incompletely formed ego which never achieves a sense of the autonomous self and is dependent on authority outside itself. Never certain of feeling himself, physically and mentally, as a separate, individual human form, such a man is so tightly bound in within his body that he can only rid it of anxiety and tension when he abandons himself in the mental black-out of slaughter.

Theweleit calls this type the 'armoured-body' (Panzerkörper). This is another term of his which has entered the language in West Germany to talk about the symptoms of male aggression. What produced this soldier-type in the early 20th century? To answer this question, Theweleit tries to interpret the entire history of men and women's dehumanised relations with each other, which lies behind his specific case of the soldier-males produced by Wilhemian Germany. The premise of his historical summary is that women are enslaved in order to stifle the will to freedom of all subject classes. The force of production which we all nakedly possess - thinking in psycho-analytical language - that of the unconscious, has been suppressed throughout history. The period of the rise of Capitalism in Western Europe brought particular forms of this suppression which produced the extreme alienation of women. Theweleit's argument is that the disintegrating feudal world released the human capacity to learn and explore the world freely, spiritually and geographically, from its medieval bounds. But Capitalism required that this exploration take place in the interests of profit, and the creative, productive force of the unconscious had to be reincarcerated. Women were the victims of the form this took, perverted into sexualised creatures who no

longer had bodies for working and mothering, but ones which were projections of the minds of men, who should have been getting on with the business of ridding themselves of the aristocracy!

In other words, Theweleit uses the idea that women were the material of the patriarchal pact between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, in Germany in particular, draining the middle-class of its strength as a revolutionary social force. Summarised, this sounds trite. I certainly think some work needs to be done here. Is it not equally plausible to reverse the cause and effect of this argument? If the bourgeois class had been strong enough as a social force, it would not have needed to make use of women this way. Theweleit depicts how with changing fashion and the removal of bourgeois women from production, women's bodies were sexualised for men. But there are cases where early Capitalism did not need the aristocratic pact, where men's and women's bodies were emptied of images for one another, as in Quakerism and American radical and puritan communities.

I think we stumble over Theweleit's ideas at this point because it is essential to his approach that he allows metaphor to have real social meaning. He looks through images of women as water, rivers and dams from the arts and literature to try and grasp an ideological process. These images make women into that which absorbs and flows, unreal and non-corporeal; Theweleit takes this literally as an expression of the historical part women were made to play, turned into fantasies to absorb and deflect the advancing class from its own emancipation.

Such are the ideological motions of the Capitalist era, the logic of which governs the particular phenomena Theweleit wants to look at when he returns to his Wilhemian militarised men. Capitalism has advanced and women are by now tightly trussed up in ribbons and lace, sops for the freedom mislaid at the beginning of the age. The argument causally links the political requirements of the Imperial State with educational ideology and child-rearing amongst the classes which served that state. The age in which mothers were not motherly, when babies were not loved and caressed, produced the armoured-body type of the unformed ego. Theweleit thinks that Freud was wrong and that the Oedipal triangle was historically untypical in this era. Far from desiring their mothers, middle-class and aristocratic boys never knew the warmth of their mothers' bodies. For the Reich needed soldiers, not sons, and these Prussian boys were reared in cadet-schools, not in the family. The men they grew up to be were psychologically so constituted that they were bound to react to the collapse of the Reich and the rise of revolution from its ashes with the hysteria of the Freikorps, whose psychoses culminated in National Socialism.

Theweleit's stress on the physical moment of their reactions, on choking libido, is the most pressing of his premises. Like Reich, he sees political behaviour in its psycho-sensory roots. What did all the little nazis feel when they assembled for

Hitler, what sensations did they experience in their bodies? Theweleit is convinced that it was a physical sensation. The sexual meanings of some Nazi concepts and rituals - Führer and Volk, the centrality of rallies, the importance of rhetoric - are increasingly exposed as a critique of phallus-centred sexuality altogether, where the male is excited only by his own power of erection. This he counterposes to what free and exploratory sexual experience could be, thinking aloud about its possibilities. And Theweleit wants us to think about them too. Analysing the ideology and psychology of Fascism can only progress hand in hand with a radical understanding of our own sexuality. His methodological challenge is synonymous with a political one.

This book is deliberately full of questions. We are bound to ask some more, further to its own terms of reference, which explore mechanisms of the proto-fascist psyche but do not aim to answer questions such as: what happened to those revolutionary masses of 1918-19 who gave the Wilhemian officer such a fright; and how did National Socialism tighten its grip over all strata of German society, not just the remnants of the Imperial State? As Theweleit is dealing with the sexes as his subject, he leaves it unclear where class comes in. Whilst he uses historical materialist tenets on the role of the bourgeoisie, thereafter he describes the relations between ruling classes and ruled ontologically rather than socially. This itself arises from the necessarily subjective nature of his material. He is talking about the body, and as it is very difficult to talk about how a whole group of men perceived their bodies, he uses a method-mix to find what he can designate the soldier-male. He takes a literary-critical interpretative approach to writings by and about these men and then uses psycho-analytical terms to reconstruct the psychic biography of his subjects on the basis of his interpretations of their literature. It is really a suggestive method, producing analyses which are pregnant with possibilities of explanation, showing us patterns through which we can begin to discern how the psychology of these men was formed.

What Theweleit's book is not about is the political character of the National Socialist state. What it is about is how a core of males were psychologically ripe for that political form at that time because it offered them a sensory fulfilment they were starved of, quite apart from a means of earning their living again. Because he understands these individuals as points in the history of sexual oppression, Theweleit's work gives us a new tradition for the historical conception of our psychology and our sexuality.

Penny Franks

St. Elmo Nauman, Jr. Dictionary of Asian Philosophies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, 372pp, £7.50 hc, £4.25 pb

There have been many beneficial consequences of the enormously increased interest in

Asian thought over the last thirty years, but attempts to rectify misleading stereotypes remain a Sisyphean struggle in which scholarly expertise has as often as not perpetuated and recreated ancient mythologies. St. Elmo Nauman Jr. is a compiler of dictionaries, his previous efforts having been directed towards American philosophy and existentialism. For this new book his courage, ambition, and fortitude may be cited in consideration of the difficulty of the topic. But these qualities do not invariably produce good results, and in this case an otherwise potentially useful collection is often marred by crude and dilettantish generalisations and an unnecessary tendency towards flippancy.

The rock mainly rolls backwards over Nauman through his handling of some of the most basic issues in the interpretation of Asian philosophy. Working from what appear to be very limited sources, and despite self-conscious attempts at objectivity (e.g. ten mostly biographical pages on Mao Zedong), he often succumbs to an obvious idealist bias in presentations of individuals and schools of thought. Various attempts at proto-scientific thinking in early Indian materialism (Cārvāka) and Chinese Taoism are wholly ignored, and both of these philosophies resultingly misunderstood. Indeed, he does not even seem to have consulted Joseph Needham's Science and Civilisation in China, incomparably the greatest historical work on early Chinese thought in any western language. Nor does he seem familiar with Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's Lokayata, or K.K. Mittal's more recent Materialism in Indian Thought, both of which argue against the dominant dogma (represented in the works of Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta) of a uniform and proponderant idealist spiritualism in pre-Buddhistic Indian thinking.

Deficiencies such as these seriously underscore the illusory character of the enhanced authority and objectivity often presumed in the title of 'dictionary'. There are other glaring inadequacies as well. Dharma, one of the central concepts in Indian thought, is given only eight lines of definition, although there are almost four pages on John Dewey in China. Fifteen lines define 'Consciousness' in all Asian thought. Eight lines discuss 'Epistemology', and this is only in reference to India, though Nauman's scope is ostensibly Chinese, Indian Islamic, and Judaic philosophy.

In addition various redundancies (e.g. two statements each of the 'Four Noble Truths' and the 'Eightfold Path' of Buddhism and distracting additions (there are many underemployed graduates in modern Burma) reveal poor editing and the generally haphazard nature of the author's approach.

There are some redeeming qualities, though. The section on 'Hinduism' does recognise the contradictory nature of the polyglot assembled under this name. Japanese thinkers are given greater coverage than has often been the case. There is some mention of political philosophy (Han Fei Tzu and the Chinese Legalists, but no discussion of the enormously influential Indian statesman Kautilya). A great deal of information is contained in the book.

But most of this is readily accessible elsewhere in English, albeit in a less condensed but also in a less misleading form. In the face of great adversity - for the task is a nightmare to any exacting scholar Nauman's attempt is admirable. But the final product leaves a great deal to be desired.

Gregory Claeys

J Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, Hutchinson, 1979, £7.05 hc

This is a really useful book. Larrain has written what is undoubtedly the best and clearest account to date of the history of the concepts of ideology. Better by far than Plekcnatz's 'Key Concepts', for example. Much more intelligible than the Birmingham Centre's 'On Ideology'. Beginning with Bacon's theory of 'idols' that interfere with rational enquiry, he moves through a series of insightful studies of major theorists and traditions which have tried to theorise ideology.

My main regret about it - it is not a criticism, since the book is valuable enough in its own terms - is that, for all Bottomore's prefatory claims, Larrain does not really progress beyond a critical history of ideas. At no point does he draw general criteria out from his critique of individuals that would help us build an adequate account. Each theorist is by and large tested for the internal adequacy of his/her own project.

He does start, it is true, with four general parameters within which he sees theories moving: 'false consciousness' vs. world-view; psychologically vs. objectively generated; restrictive vs. all-embracing views of ideology; and the science-ideology relation. But the book seems to keep returning to these, rather than developing them. The result is that each study remains relatively concrete.

The consequence for a reviewer is that it is only possible to comment via individual case-studies. Except that it does raise questions about inclusions and exclusions. Why, for example, does Comte get extended treatment, with his funny ideas about the 'three stages' of human development? Why, by contrast, does Kant - whose philosophy of the construction of knowledge was a major precursor of modern theories of ideology - get only negative mention? Larrain does a standard job on Kant, leaving a distinct impression that Kant is not much use because of things like the 'ding-an-sich'. This is standard sociological wisdom, and may be true. But I would want to ask: given Kant's direct influence on important thinkers like Durkheim and Weber, and given the strength of his alternative to empiricism, is it right to be so quickly dismissive of him?

Larrain also chooses to miss out the continuing empiricist tradition of discussing ideology, in Naess, Bell, Popper and Feuer: the modern Baconians. His criteria for selection reveal, I think, the extent of the influence of the Birmingham Centre for

Contemporary Cultural Studies who have filtered sociology, and recently linguistics for the insights they felt they needed politically.

The irony is that I find his most useful discussions are of people that this tradition has not much talked about. Not the Barthes, or Kristeves, but Durkheim and Pareto for example. His discussion of Mannheim is the best that I have read, managing for once to place the 'free-floating intelligentsia' argument in a whole context. It is a pity, then, that he does not use his sharp understanding of these theorists to test his own tradition. Pareto for example, with his view of the relation between residues and derivations, is a serious challenge to the Marxist tradition, because of his emphasis on the post-factum justification of interests. Why must a Marxist disagree with Pareto? It would have been useful to ask.

In the same way, his brilliant analysis of Mannheim really brings together the theory of ideology and utopia with the actual analyses of conservatism, for example. Rightly he shows how, as a consequence, ideologies and utopias can only be identified retrospectively. But his attempt to state why this must be so reveals a problem: 'According to Mannheim, both ideology and utopia distort reality in so far as their ideas do not fit into reality. Both kinds of thought are not adequate or "situationally congruous"; ideology because it conceals reality, utopia because it exceeds its limits' (p114). These ideas of 'reality' being 'concealed' are not explored or explained. They keep cropping up throughout the book. But had Larrain gone on to reuse the Mannheim example he himself had earlier worked in so well, I think he could have opened up this whole problematic area: in what senses could late feudal 'opposition to interest on loans' either 'conceal reality' or 'exceed its limits'?

The recurrence of such themes of 'being' and 'consciousness', terms which lefty sociologists have been prone to use but which should embarrass philosophers, shows where Larrain stops short. He has no epistemology of ideology. In the end, he uses epistemological notions because he finds them useful to reach general political conclusions that he favours. The notions themselves are not scrutinised. This shows, for example, in his discussion of Lukacs:

'Lukacs does not realise that for Marx the ideological inversion corresponds to a real inversion of the social relations, not only to the inversion of their appearances. One can find in Lukacs an overemphasis on the role which the subject plays through its consciousness in the origin of ideology.' (p80)

This comment retains a 'we all know' flavour because the concept of the 'subject', no matter how often it reappears, is never explored. (In the same way, I'm very tempted to use as a seminar-started his unexplained statement (p44) that 'reality is a result of human historical action'.)

All these critical points do not, for me, detract from the usefulness of the book.

This lies, first, in the clarity of his presentation of the various approaches to ideology, and his critical discussion of each. Secondly, it lies in the question-opening form of many of his comments. For example, he criticises (p120) Goldmann's attempt in the critique of literature to distinguish that which is expressive of a worldview of a class, from non-significant literature. He objects that there are no

criteria for making such a distinction in practice, and therefore Goldmann has to do it arbitrarily. That may well be true, but may we not need the distinction anyway? Or are all works of literature equally and in the same way ideological? If I disagree with Larrain's conclusion, I shall have to think about how criteria might be developed.

Once again, an enormously useful book.  
Martin Barker

## NEWS

### THE CUTS AT NELP

'Is it coincidental that the management of North East London Polytechnic wants to bury the humanities and social science departments, which have traditionally produced some of the poly's more meddlesome members of staff, and is at the same time courting NATO for financial support and backing for a new course in war studies?'

This pertinent question was asked by Time Out (February 29 - March 6 1980) which goes on to quote NELP assistant director, and former wing-commander, Colin Milner, as saying he would like to see counter-insurgency and the use of the military to aid the civil powers being studied in the proposed course.

As many of our readers will by now know, a working party of the board of governors of NELP produced a report early this year which advocated by far the most sweeping and draconian cuts in staffing and services yet seen in the higher education sector since the Tories came to office. The cuts are to include dissolution of the facilities of Humanities and Environmental Studies, and the closure of the Departments of Sociology, Applied Economics, and Mathematics, and of the Humanities part of the School of Education and Humanities. Services concerned with student counselling, services for disabled students, and the Poly's only two autonomous research centres are also for the chop. Finally, higher student/staff ratios are to be imposed in the remaining departments.

These cuts if fully implemented would cost more than 280 teaching staff jobs, over 200 non-teaching staff jobs, and up to 300 job-losses in the local areas due to reduced Poly spending. The working party justifies the proposed cuts primarily in terms of an estimated shortfall of over £3 million on estimates for 1980-81, because of Government cash limits. Although some of this shortfall may be met by the three local authorities involved, an estimated deficit of some £2.45 million remains.

The recognised unions have been fighting a united, vigorous, and well-argued campaign against the cuts. They explicitly reject the necessity for cuts of any kind, but go on to point out that the Governors' working party, having accepted the need for cuts, imposes a massive change in the whole aca-

demic and educational shape of the institution without further rationale. Where are the alternative plans? Where are the reasons for selecting this rather than some other pattern of cuts? The THES quotes Poly Director Dr Brosan as arguing that 'If any courses must be closed they must surely be those for which there is national over-provision, for which the quantity and quality of recruitment is declining, or which do not suit the needs of the new decade'. As the Unions point out, comparison of these criteria, on any reasonable interpretation, with the actual pattern of proposed cuts, makes a nonsense out of the whole exercise. Among the closures and departments and courses which are among the most popular in recruitment terms, and the most innovative. Many are also highly vocational, and/or offer indispensable service and back-up to other vocational courses.

The unions have also criticised the almost complete lack of clear costing of the proposals in relation to the financial situation of the Poly. On the analysis provided by the unions, any 'economies' achieved by the cuts in the Poly will have adverse economic effects for the local community, as well as for the funding local authorities themselves, as rent and rate income, jobs and services which are directly or indirectly dependent upon the activities of the Poly are lost. Finally, the unions have pointed to the complete lack of prior consultation, not only with the unions, but also with the Academic Board of the Poly.

The events at NELP illustrate several important features of our situation in higher education as well as providing valuable lessons in resisting the cuts. First, the unity achieved by the unions is exemplary, as is the quality of their analyses and written responses. There is a vital need, now, to coordinate support for all those under threat at NELP.

Second, we can see quite clearly in the lack of any plausible publicly expressed rationale for these cuts, beyond an assumed financial necessity, that the financial crisis of higher education is being used as a cover for a radical restructuring which has quite other motivations. The general climate of uncertainty, division, and pessimism among students and staff is the condition of possibility for this restructuring to be imposed with minimal resistance from below. Fortunately, the strategy seems not