Empiricism and Racism

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A story has been told about the first case when slavery was tested in a law court. It happened in New Amsterdam, one of the Dutch colonies in America, in the seventeenth century. An indentured servant at the end of his period of indenture was kept as a slave by his master. He applied to the local court, demanding that the court require the master to free him. The court disagreed, and declared him to be the property of the master for life. A typical piece of injustice, with only one point to distinguish it. The master was black, and the slave was white.

It is a good point to begin with, reminding us that slavery was originally pretty colour-blind. Whites, Indians, anyone who was available could be put into effective or total slavery. The question, then, that needs answering is this: what components went together to produce the racist philosophies that were later used to justify black slavery? For when the supply of whites proved inadequate, and when the Indians kept inconveniently dying in servitude, then black slavery became the norm. And gradually, a series of 'justifications' of that slavery became current, consolidating by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In the last few years, a dispute has broken out among academics, concerning one possible component that, it has been argued, may have contributed to the development of these racist ideologies. Those who have made the positive claim have really had in mind a number of questions: how did it come about that mass enslavement of blacks took place with so little in the way of moral qualms? Were there no sources of resistance to the process? Did some traditions of thought aid and abet the process, where others were inconsistent with such practices? What did the available general views of humankind offer in the way of help or resistance to the gradual emergence of distinctively racist ideologies? Following the recalcitrance of Indians in dying off, and the emergence of systematic black slavery, did any views make it easier to find a justification for distinguishing blacks as suitable for slavery? These are legitimate questions. The reason why the dispute has been heated, and interesting, is that the charge has been brought against the philosophical tradition, founded by Bacon and Locke, of empiricism.

The starting point for the debate was an article by Harry Bracken, a Canadian philosopher who is close in views to Noam Chomsky [1]. This, and a subsequent article [2], were supported by Chomsky in a volume of interviews [3]. Bracken and Chomsky were heavily criticised, first by the American philosopher, John Searle [4], and more recently by Geoffrey Sampson [5] who has included a blistering reply in the course of a general critique of Chomsky. Oddly, to me, Russell Keat's review of this book in Radical Philosophy [6] accepts this reply without reservations - although the context of the reply is a hard rightwing 'liberalism' which directly informs Sampson's critique of Bracken and Chomsky.

I wish to review the debate, and clarify the assumptions and weaknesses in both sides. Because it is somewhat open to misunderstanding, I want to be very clear about my purposes in doing this. I am not trying to say whether particular individuals were personally racist. Nor am I intending to provide a refutation of those ideas which I identify as giving comfort to racism. Rather, I am interested in what forms of ideas will do the job of giving such comfort. Therefore I am not trying to give a new history of racism. For that seems to me to be just the problem. I want to ask the question: what will count as a history of racism? [7] It is not enough to know which ideas about blacks, for example, have been the most commonly held over time; we need criteria for understanding which were the most significant and powerful beliefs in justifying racist practices. One way to do this, for example, is to look at the forms those beliefs took at times when racist practices were under attack' for it is then that they seem to take the most chiselled, worked-out forms. It is therefore a question of looking at the kinds of logical relations there are between such ideas and racist practices.

In saying this, I am aware that I am setting myself against several traditions that are quite influential. One would see racism in terms of prejudices, essentially non-rational attitudes. A second would regard the history of racism as predominantly one of economic and social power-relations, only eclectically and opportunistically borrowing ideas when they suited. The third tradition would see racism as a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, a product of a crude biologism of that period. Lastly, there is what I would call the UNESCO tradition, which assumes that racism necessarily means a belief in racial superiority. This tradition (and indeed, elements of the others) was very much set by the post Second World War studies sponsored by UNESCO into the nature of racism. Valuable though they are,
they pose considerable problems.

In the first place, a great deal of work has been done in recent years on the nature and role of scientific racism [8]. Among other things, such work shows that, very often, ideas that have been around and active for a long time can later be given a scientific guise - and then use the appeal of science as part of their public image, making dangerous ideas respectable. The historiography of the nineteenth century had such a history, which needs to be traced. The very power, though, of scientific racism should be enough to cast doubt on the adequacy of views of racism as simply non-rational or eclectic. The evidence, for example, of Chorover and Kamin may be taken from the present century [9], but the lessons of their discoveries go much wider. And my own work on the new racism of post-War Britain must undermine the tabula rasa conception about the form of racism [10]. This was not intended as a proper appraisal of these alternative traditions. I only hoped to indicate that there is properly a space for an argument about what ideas could act as resources for racism, even when laid down in apparently innocent materials. My aim is to use the debate about empiricism as a determining what to include; and the 'blank tablet' concept of these characters: what will count as a history of racism? and what ideas are of a form that they can be effective in providing support for racist practices?

The Case for the Prosecution

Bracken's case is aimed centrally at John Locke's way of ideas. He identifies four elements in Locke's epistemological revolution that could play a role in enabling a justification of black slavery. These are: Locke's anti-essentialism; a tally-model for determining the nature of entities; choice-preference in determining what to include; and the 'blank tablet' conception of mind. All these are set against the alternative Cartesian tradition in which, crucially, mind is seen as an essential discriminating characteristic of humans. We are 'thinking things'; this is our essence, according to Descartes. Locke on the other hand denies that we can ever know the essence of objects. We know only what is presented to us through our senses; and all perceptual aspects of an object can be equally essential to it. 'Gold' is Locke's favourite example. The colour, weight, malleability and so on are all equally part of it. We only know what gold is through our perception of these characteristics. Learning a concept 'gold' is making a tally of the characters we find present together.

Because we cannot know essences, we can choose to identify gold by one character rather than another. This is choice-preference. We can treat colour, for example, as a defining character of gold; this is logically permissible within Locke's scheme. And we can treat the same colour as being the basis for distinguishing between people. Bracken quotes Locke, to show that this is not a hypothetical possibility only. It is one of which Locke was well conscious:

'A child having framed the Idea of a Man, it is probable, that his Idea is just like that picture, which in the passage of his visible Appearances jointed together; and such a representation of Ideas together in his Understanding, makes up the single complex Idea which he calls Man, whereof White or Flesh Colour in England being one, the Child can demonstrate to you, that a Negro is not a Man, because White-colour was one of the constant simple Ideas of the complex Idea he calls Man: And therefore he can demonstrate by

the Principle, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be ... that a Negro is not a Man.' [11]

A further consequence is that, because people can be defined by visible characters, it is possible to show gradients of humanity. Bracken quotes Locke to the effect that nature reveals a continuum without 'chasms or gaps', with 'descent by easy steps' from us to everything else [12]. The fourth book of the tabula rasa conception, has an apparent egalitarianism, Bracken concedes. But he argues that it carries the logical possibility of manipulation 'because the model carries with it the need for a group which will be charged with "writing" on the blank tablets' [13].

The chief difference between Bracken's two articles is that the second is, in a sense, more forthright and confident than the first. In the earlier one he concluded that the connection is historical, rather than logical or conceptual. The later article, however, states, the relationship more strongly: 'To be specific, I contend that Locke provided us with a model of man in terms of which racism could be readily stated' [14]. Bracken proceeds to quote important historical evidence that various opponents of Locke (including Leibniz, Morgan Godwyn and some Scottish philosophers) explicitly attacked racist doctrines and slavery on the grounds of common humanity, demonstrated by all equally having minds. On the other hand, an associate of Locke's, Francois Bernier, in 1684 published a book which sorted humankind into 'four or five different species', using blackness of the African as a distinguishing mark. This book was in Locke's library.

Two last remarks in presenting Bracken's case. He argues that David Hume's comment on Negroes, contained in his essay 'Of National Character', comes from the same stable. Hume wrote:

'I am apt to suspect that negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilised nation of any other complex than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences. ... Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between the species of men.' [15]

Certainly justification of such an opinion by referring to 'a uniform and constant difference' would seem fairly to bracket Hume with Locke (quite apart from the obvious reference to Bernier's work). For Hume altered Locke's doctrine of essences by his account of customs and habits as the source of all reliable knowledge. And this connects with Bracken's last claim, that the empiricist approach to knowledge underpins the search for correlations between, for example, colour and brain-weight, colour and facial angle, colour and IQ, and so on. Such bogus correlations have clearly been one important source of racist encouragement.

Chomsky adds little except his personal support to Bracken's arguments and evidence. He insists that Cartesian dualism offers a modest conceptual barrier to racism, because it will not support 'black minds' or 'white minds'. This embodies, however, an important clarification. Chomsky distinguishes sharply between 'theories that assign a determinate social status to individuals or groups by virtue of their alleged intrinsic nature, and theories that hold that there are some biological constants characteristic of the species' [16]. This is important because it under-
mines the countercriticism of both Searle and Sampson, that a Chomsky-style rationalism has more to offer a racist than does empiricism. They claim it is a 'short step' from admitting that there are biological bases to human mental structures, to admitting different bases in different races. This is to misunderstand the nature of Chomsky's neo-Cartesianism. His procedure is strictly Kantian; it is to ask what are the necessary preconditions of the general human capacity of language; and his conclusion is that these must be biological. This form of argument does not admit the possibility of distinctions in the nature of the biological base between different peoples, according to which one could be graded superior/inferior to the other.

Despite this clarification, the case against empiricism is primarily Bracken's, as Chomsky himself says. The replies of Searle and Sampson do not always recognise this.

The Case for the Defence

Searle makes his criticism in the course of a brilliant review of the differences between himself and Chomsky over the nature of language. His first and major claim is that Chomsky and Bracken have misunderstood what empiricism is. They appear to treat it as a theory of the sources of knowledge, whereas it is in fact a theory of 'how knowledge claims are validated', and only 'derivatively of how they are acquired'. It is not a 'learning theory' which their reading of the quotation about the child learning what a 'Man' is, might suggest. Locke does not have a 'learning theory' which their criteria as "strangers" was one of the instinctive prejudices which is common to all men, and which we must all strive to overcome."

But let us take his critique seriously. He claims that Bracken and Chomsky have 'done nothing to suggest why an empiricist should be more inclined than a rationalist towards racism' [19].

In part he builds on semi-factual claims. For example, he queries how sure the evidence is of Locke's personal involvement in the development of slavery. He argues that if Bracken and Chomsky were right there ought to be visible difference in national tendencies to racism, according to the strength of empiricism or rationalism. But Germany, with its strong rationalist tradition (and virtually no empiricist tradition until the twentieth century) has hardly been free of racism.

Sampson points to a very large gap between admitting that empiricism focuses attention on external influences on behaviour (which is true) and deducting that members of one race are justified in manipulating those of another (which, of course, he denies). Indeed, insofar as manipulation involves claims to special expertise, what of the traditional empiricist denial that anyone is without reservation an 'expert'? As Sampson says, there is a longstanding view that wants experts 'on tap, not on top'. For everyone has limited experience, circumscribed understanding; and no one has a direct access to perfect truth.

Sampson takes a position towards Locke's personal racism very like that of sociologist Michael Banton [20]. In Locke's time, he argues, it was common to see separate biological species, of which negroes might well be one. If Locke's political attitudes reveal an inconsistency with his political theory, in seeming to deny to negroes the rights his political theory ascribes to humans generally, that is just the result of his times. 'It seems merely anachronistic to accuse Locke of failing to acknowledge their right to be counted as fellow human beings' [21]. This enables him to excuse Locke's philosophical principles, seeing the sources of Locke's personal racism in his 'factual ignorance' [22].

It would be possible to dispute Sampson's further discussions of racism on a whole series of issues. He mythologises the British Empire scandalously, and also the process of the abolition of slavery. And he falls, hook, line, and sinker, for Jensen's argument, doing a neat disparaging job on Jensen's opponents on the way. But my purpose here is to discuss only the Bracken/Chomsky thesis. So, in retrospect, what are the main countercritics that he and Searle have made? Bracken and Chomsky are confused over the nature of the philosophical doctrine known as empiricism:

2. Empiricism is not incompatible with theories of human nature which would regard us as resistant to manipulation;

3. There is too large a gap between the general principles of empiricism, and the justification of racist practices, and on the way any number of
illegal moves would have to be made, including jumping the fact/value fence, in order to make the connection;

4. There is no evidence that empiricists individually, or nations influenced by empiricism, were more racist than rationalists:

5. Locke's personal racism was a function of his time, not of his doctrines.

I want to disagree with Searle and Sampson on all counts.

A Consideration of the Debate

1. It is part of the current mythology of much Western philosophy that epistemology has to do with the conditions of valid knowledge, not with the psychological origins of ideas. The distinction Searle offers, between the sources and validation of knowledge-claims, is in direct line of descent here. I want to suggest it is absurd.

I think it is doubtful, first of all, that Locke ever held to such a distinction. Indeed, if he had, I wonder what would have been the point of all the invective against the doctrine of innate ideas? Presumably, it was because Locke saw a danger that, so long as the doctrine survived, there would be those claims, because of their origins, to the privileged status of certain ideas as regards truth. Of course, his method of attack was to show that, in fact, it was not possible to identify any ideas which had the intuitive obviousness which the doctrine of innate ideas seemed to require. (Actually, that is doubtful, but never mind.) But in arguing this, he revealed an acceptance that there is an interconnection between theories of the origin of ideas and theories of their possible validation. I do not particularly want to make a biographical case about Locke since the point at issue is a logical one. But before proceeding to make the logical case in any further detail, let us get clear what Bracken and Chomsky need to establish.

Contrary to the bowdlerised version regularly presented by empiricists in dealing with this matter, those who oppose a distinction between sources and validation of ideas are not arguing that to know whether something is true, you must first look at how someone got the idea. Opposition to this distinction can come from a number of distinct propositions, not all of which are relevant to the Bracken/Chomsky hypothesis.

The first of these nicely points up the fact that the whole formulation of the issue and its discussion has taken place from within the empiricist problematic. For implicitly, and without recognising what they were doing, many empiricists have acknowledged that a watertight distinction cannot be maintained. Many sceptical arguments have taken the form of arguing that, for X to count as valid knowledge, it must pass tests T. However, we are so constructed and our sources of information are such that we can never satisfy T. Therefore all - or much - that passes for knowledge must be put in doubt. This form of argument implicitly accepts that there is a significant connection between what we can validly claim to know, and the sorts of access to the world we, as a matter of fact, have. Ever so many empiricist epistemologists have felt it necessary to combat such arguments, precisely because it becomes such a problem of doctrine survived. Because empiricism has placed such a value on the concept of experience, and the reducibility of all knowledge-claims to experience while at the same time acknowledging that in reality no one ever comes to make knowledge-claims like that, there is a permanent tendency in empiricism towards scepticism.

The first form of connection between sources and validation of ideas I am asserting, therefore, is that an epistemology asserts what, among the sources available to us, will be usable as warranties of knowledge. And it actually seems to me that this is all that Bracken and Chomsky need to assert for their argument to hold water. If it be objected that this is not what is at issue about the relation of source and validity of ideas, then let us look at the example from again. Is Locke bound to claim that the child who thinks that 'a Negro is not a Man' has concluded properly, on the basis of what evidence could be available to him/her? I think there is a strong case to be made that Locke must. On Locke's epistemology, all that could confirm or disconfirm the child's ideas is more of the same. But since all experiences are equal according to Locke, there is no particular reason why the child should accept what a critic says. After all, his/her experience to date has all confirmed that colour is a distinguishing mark between humans and non-humans. And, especially given that colour is a primary quality for Locke, the name 'human' can be withheld with full logic.

Bracken's point seems to me to be precisely this; Locke's epistemology has made the child's logic irresistible. But for all that I think this is all Bracken has to claim, the point at issue is of sufficient importance to be worth taking further. It might be replied, for example, to the above case that while experience is our only source of evidence, we have an independent source of evaluation of evidence in logic. And Locke's epistemology includes this: otherwise what was he doing in propounding an epistemology which is, after all, a logical investigation of knowledge?

The problem is the kind of role that logic can play in the evaluation of experiences and beliefs, in Locke's account. If logic can be reduced to a series of a priori principles, against which all knowledge-claims must be tested, then the principles themselves must be empty of significant content, as far as the construction of truth is concerned. This allows us to draw a distinction between the determination and the regulation of truth by logic. Analogously, we can say that the construction of a car is regulated by, but not determined by, the laws of stress of materials. Even an epistemology that admits logic as an independent element (with all the attendant problems of how we are supposed to know it, and what on earth has happened when we make a mistake) has not done enough to avoid the possibility that the knowledge people have may be totally independent of ideological elements. And this is what is at issue.

For Bracken's case is as follows. What would a person who follows a Lockean epistemology see as the valid way of discovering the essential differences or similarities between human beings? And how would that person evaluate a belief that colour is a distinguishing mark between humans and non-humans? Because empiricism places its focus of attention on these-experience, it is systematically loaded in favour of some answers to that question, as against others.

2. It might seem that Searle is on strong ground in his second criticism. After all, 'all blank slates are equal', says Sampson, we might add 'by definition'. Emptiness is a great leveller. But I am not so certain that the ground is unassailable. It is difficult not to be reminded by Bracken's argument of Marx's fourth thesis

'The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and therefore that changed men are the result of altered circumstances and different upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must be educated. Hence this doctrine arrives at dividing society into two
parts, one of which is superior to society'. [23]

Whether or not this is a standard interpretation of this quote, the following seems to make much sense. I take Marx to mean that the living out of such a mechanical materialist doctrine must force adherents to view others as passive. As a political doctrine (in the hands, for example, of Skinner), it becomes a recipe for manipulation in order to get the best from them. Of course, it is inconsistent with the doctrine, since the manipulators themselves must be the outcome of conditioning experiences. But the logical inconsistency does not alter the fact that someone who accepts the doctrine and tries to live it out will tend to see others' environments and experiences, and therefore responses, as moveable feasts. Indeed, the inconsistency is one of the very grounds for criticising such views. And it is precisely with the logic of living out empiricism that Bracken and Chomsky are concerned.

That is not the whole answer to Searle on this point. Part has already been dealt with in attacking the sources/validity distinction. The final part will have to wait. For up to a point I think that Searle and Sampson are right here. But their rightness is the exception that proves the rule. Even if the empiricism/racism connection is not less, I shall return to this after reviewing their other replies to Bracken and Chomsky.

3. This is a complicated claim. Among the senses which could be given to it, is the feeling that philosophy is too abstract and removed a discipline to be either for or against so specific a phenomenon as racism. This might especially seem to be the case with epistemology, whose purpose apparently is to consider the nature of human knowledge. Or it could be that an implicit claim is being made about the nature of racism - that it is, typically, a set of non-rational prejudices which could have little to do with philosophy which, even at its most empiricist, is an exercise in rationality. Then again it could be read as entailing a theory/practice distinction. This last would seem then to have some overlap with the assertion that a fact/value distinction has been illegitimately breached.

I feel forced to insist on such clarification because the reply in each case would be different. In each case, the detailed version of my comments can wait until I develop my own case towards the end. Here I only hint at the nature of the replies in a preparatory way. The notion of philosophy as essentially abstracted from human affairs depends in part on the ability to compartmentalise areas of philosophy. I shall try to show on the contrary that, at least in the case of Hume, the epistemology is tightly interconnected with a coherent and dangerous politics. The second claim, concerning the nature of racism, is subject to many criticisms which I cannot here go into. I would only say that there is a form of connection between the two, in which philosophy concerning the nature of human feelings and thoughts so describes them that they implicitly warrant or approve them. So, even if - which I don't accept - racism were primarily a matter of individual prejudices, there can be a significant relation between a philosophy and such unpleasant attitudes [24]. An extension of this case will show the inadequacy of a distinction based on the fact/value or nature/practice distinction. For the philosophy I shall show at work is one involving concepts that must bridge such distinctions: concepts not unlike biologistic concepts of 'instinct', 'natural tendency' and 'human nature'.

4. This criticism misses the mark. It was not the intention of Bracken to offer a causal explanation of racism. He carefully stresses that empiricism would at worst have been an enabling contributor to the development of racism. Nor does he suggest - as Searle seems to imply - that there had to be some doctrine of empiricism to do the dirty work of validating racism. Among other things, as I shall show shortly, it is not the only or even the best theory for doing such a job.

The fact that Germany has had a native racism without English-style empiricism is nothing against Social Darwinists' theories [25]. Indeed, it is consistent with the doctrine, since the manipulators, given the right conditions, are prepared to theorise those practices. Under what conditions do observers of such practices produce theories that, whether intended or not, tend to authorise or 'naturalise' them? These are important questions. The fact that Bracken does not try to answer them is no criticism, since his intention was to show that Lockean empiricism enabled a conceptual warranty to be placed on racism. That is an important argument in itself, since if successful it breaches the arguments for the neutrality of philosophy - something in which I have an interest.

As to the personal attitudes of empiricists and rationalists, Bracken has made at least a preliminary case, when he cites for example Beattie and Ramsay criticising Hume's comment (cited above). Ramsay for example attacks Hume's denial that 'the soul is a simple substance, not to be distinguished by squat or tall, black, brown or fair' [25]. I await counter-evidence.

5. The peculiar near-relativism of Sampson's excuse for Locke is not good enough. Given the failure of other criticisms, Bracken's case stands that Locke's racism was not an aberration from his doctrines, but could well have been an expression of his philosophical doctrine of knowledge. Not an inevitable one, but an enabled one.

But I cannot pass the suggestion that division of humanity into races was accepted unquestioningly at the time. This is simply untrue. In the first place, it makes it sound as if it were a matter of later scientific knowledge overthrowing a first stab at a factual investigation. That is not true. English people knew of the debate in Papal circles about the status of American Indians which ended (after Las Casas' arguments) with the judgement that we are all one race under God. The whole point of this argument was, not to conclude some neutral scientific point, but about how to treat the Indians. If it is argued that such a Catholic view would be likely to be discarded, then so much the worse for Protestantism as well as empiricism. But in fact race theorising was not really underway to any great extent until a hundred years later (a point of significance when we compute the relative importance of Locke and Hume in this connection). It was Thomas Jefferson who gave one of the earliest systematic attempts to discriminate bases for asserting black inferiority. Hardly had he done so, than Samuel Stanhope Smith (1788) delivered a powerful counterblast to both him and another early systematic racist, Lord Kames. Why should we excuse John Locke when the theory was undeveloped, if at a time of growing popularity and use others could so effectively demolish its pretensions? [26]

Bracken's Weaknesses

Having said all this, I do find Bracken's thesis not a very strong one, on other grounds. The first is in fact expressed in passing by Sampson: 'The fact is
that neither Locke nor his contemporaries appear to have seriously considered the philosophical implications of negro slavery' [27]. Despite the incipient democracy of the Army debates and the movements of Diggers, Levellers and Ranters, Locke was not particularly bothered by questions of the underclasses. Laslett's careful work [28] on the dating of the theory of politics shows its clear links with the bourgeois democrats of the time. And since his theory stemmed from precisely the place that he spent much time disputing it did not easily arise. There is plenty of reason to suppose that both the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and the *Second Treatise on Government* were addressed to particular audiences of 'liberals'. They were focussed on British problems, and would be only marginally interested in an issue such as slavery. Therefore it does seem to me that the pessimistic predictions of a mild justification of colour-prejudice were much more a useful (still, thoroughly unpleasant) by-product of a theory produced for other purposes.

Apart from this, for all that Bracken's chief quotation from Locke does show the latter's awareness of the race issue, Bracken has been somewhat unfaithful to the source of the quote. It occurs in Locke's discussion of 'maxims' or self-evident propositions. Locke makes a twofold case about these: first, that in themselves they can add nothing to the proof or disproof of substantive propositions; and second, that they are positively dangerous when treated as additional tests of assertions made on other grounds. In a Baconian sense, words can fool us. Suppose we argue to the effect that gold is not soluble, but then find a 'sample' dissolved in acid. If we apply the maxim that 'the same thing cannot both be and not be', we might say that we have proved that the latter is not gold. Of course, we have not, says Locke; we have been gulled merely by the power of words.

It is here that he uses the example of the child affirming that 'a Negro is not a Man'. It is an example of the inclusion of a truism neither adding to nor subtracting from the original assertion. Locke proceeds to contrast the child's case with 'Another' who has 'gone further in framing and collecting the Idea he calls Man, and to the natural shape adds Laughter, and Rational Discourse' [29]. This person will naturally arrive at other boundaries to the concept of the 'human'. And s/he could apply the same maxim with an equal apparent gain but real absence of effect on the effectiveness of the argument.

 Locke's purpose, then, is to eliminate appeals to abstract reasoning beyond substantive evidence. To this extent, Bracken has done a disservice by snatchng the quotation out of context. And insofar as Locke would be justified in saying that the second person had 'gone further' by adding other aspects to the concept 'man', it would weigh against Bracken's case altogether. For that would seem to show that it was inadequate to build the concept on a use of colour as chief discriminant, and that a better theory will embrace more characteristics.

The case made by Bracken for treating Hume in the same regard is equally thin. The quotation is nasty, it is true. But again its context is significant. It occurs as a footnote, probably added to the second edition, in his essay 'Of National Character'. But the essay precisely spends much time disputing that it is right to see different national characters as the result of different inherited natures. Hume insists that these can only really be read as differences in customary life and traditions. The footnote has all the appearance of an aside. It is in fact difficult to reconcile with the main tenets of the essay. It is a nasty observation rather than a theory warranting racism.

Furthermore there is a general reason for thinking that Hume could not consistently adopt a racism of this sort. Let us suppose that we could be certain that Hume believed in a major way in the inferiority of other 'races'. On the basis of his own main philosophical assertions, that would not be enough to warrant any behaviour towards them on our part. For Hume is insistent that reason should guide its discoveries, cannot motivate action. Only the 'passions' can do that. The function of reason is, and ought only to be, to guide our motives appropriately onto their objects. Discrimination and other forms of racism are modes of action, and need the prompting of a motive; only then could a presumed inferiority come into play.

Empiricism and Racism — a different case

On the other hand, I think that there is a theory warranting racism in Hume. And it arises precisely in connection with his theory of motives. Overconcentration on that quotation has led us to miss it. (Indeed, studies of what constitutes racism have, I want to argue, overconcentrated on discussions of colour-difference, inequalities of intelligence, etc.) There has been a somewhat hidden history of theories of motivation that I believe we should clarify. These do not always become explicit, as they are very often expressed as conceptualisations of the relations between 'races' (as opposed to the [intellectualist] emphasis on the differences between races). They are expressed, for example, in fears about 'degeneration', and in discussions of the 'natural' tendencies of 'races' towards each other. But these implicit notions of race-motivation are best understood in the light of seeing the explicit ones.

It is important to see that 'scientific' evidence and general images of black inferiority were not considered in their own time to warrant clearly one definable relation between the races. Frederickson [30] has made very clear, for example, that in the 1850s there were several available images of the nature of blacks as compared to whites. Each of these images (for example, of blacks as 'slave of his emotions, incapable of progressive development and self-government because he lacked the white man's enterprise and intellect', or as 'singularly child-like, affectionate, docile and patient' [31]) was widely held. But each could be used in connection with different political programmes. The emotional, tropical view was used both to defend slavery and to warrant separation; while the 'benign' view was used both to warrant slavery and to defend a romantic anti-slavery. As Frederickson notes, there were general beliefs among whites about the differences between blacks and whites. The argument was over which way of treating blacks was justified by their differences.
As a sample of a modern version of this, I think it fair to mention IQism, where Jensen and Eysenck seem to see it as some sort of virtue that no precise policy-proposals flow out of their attempt to prove a difference between black and white intelligence. They insist that their 'results' are compatible with either segregation, separate education, massive investment in black education, or the designing of special education programmes for black children, or the 'creamling off of the top blacks, while the (below) average are treated according to one of the above. What would securely justify one way of treating them was a thesis about differences in motivational patterns, or about incompatibility in motivational patterns, or incompatibility of relations because of common motivational patterns. Arguments of the first sort were made quite explicit in Rehn-Huyghe's (1881) 'Our Brother in Black'. There he built a theory justifying segregation on a thesis about 'race instincts'. The race instinct, he argued, 'will never be satisfied till it realises itself in complete separation. Whether we of the white race approve or disapprove matters little' [32]. Much the same case was put by Henry Grady (1885) who argued that both 'races' desired to preserve their purity and essential character; this was a thesis about 'racial instinct'.

A related case was made in the 1890s by Frederick Hoffman, who argued that blacks were doomed by 'inherent racial tendencies' to decline and disappearance (an interesting counterpoint to modern threats of teeming black multiplication). All philanthropic work was therefore bound to fail. Hoffman's social Darwinist case was premised on a 'struggle for survival' view of the relations between the races. (Hoffman's case was powerful enough that virtually all American insurance companies were convinced to deny coverage to all negroes 'on the grounds that membership in the race by itself constituted an unacceptable actuarial risk' [33].)

Of course it can easily appear to our eyes that reference to such 'instincts' is an arbitrary addition to the arguments. One of the strengths of social Darwinism in this respect was in permitting the 'deduction' of racial instincts from evolutionary processes. This took the forms indicated above. A belief that seeking to preserve the 'unfit' was unnatural informed John D. Rockefeller's remark that: 'Man was not created with an instinct for his own degradation, but from the lower he had risen to the higher forms' [34]. Therefore it was natural to allow the weak to go to the wall, and that meant weak burghers, the poor and the blacks. It was correspondingly unnatural to do anything to help to preserve them.

It also took the form of a straightforward thesis of incompatibility. This was particularly evident in the writings of the early sociologists who asserted unreservedly that there were inherited instincts prevailing against intermarriage and other forms of racial mixing [35]. For Hoffman this form of thinking often occurred as the racial instinct expressing itself through traditions of cultural mores. Thus the 'loyalty we feel to our nation, group, customs and traditions' was an outcrop of our racial tendencies. This was an important, if now somewhat forgotten, strand of eugenicism.

It is significant that the use of a theory of motivation this way becomes explicit when slavery becomes problematic. Before that, because of the largely shared assumptions about how blacks should relate to whites (they should obey, or be whipped), there was not the necessity for overt argument. Nonetheless, for a long time there had been implicit arguments of various sorts about the motivational patterns that set the relations between groups. Often, these came coupled with the emergence, gradually, of the concept of the nation as a defensible unit. One such argument was Hume's. It is worth untangling it because its relevance is not so much to the older forms of pre- or post-slavery racism, as to the 'new racism' that has developed since the Second World War.

In arguing that there is a form of motivational racism in Hume, I know the risks. Academic heroes are untouchables. Especially they do not commit sins like racism, and especially not in their theories. But for reasons of space I cannot spend the necessary time to deal with alternative approaches [37]. I will offer my case for consideration, and leave it at that.

There is an ignored aspect of Hume's writings from which I have to begin; this is his emphasis on the innateness of the tendency to associate ideas together. Thus he talks of association of ideas as a 'kind of attraction' which 'must be traced into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain' [38]. He does not need to explain them - leaving that, he says, to the natural sciences because he thinks he can demonstrate on logical grounds the necessity of their presence. For how else can we explain the way we link experiences which have nothing in common with one another under a necessary connection, causation? Since causes are never seen, it must be in our Nature to make links of this sort.

The important thing for Hume is that the principle of association of ideas is the basis, not only of our knowledge, but of our actions. Early in Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature he remarks that it is 'the source of all the relations of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and are placed in ties of government and subordination' [39]. This is of critical importance. Hume sees the same 'principles of human nature' underpinning and making possible both knowledge and morality. And indeed, his primary interest is in the latter. There is a very strong case to be made that the function of the entire first book of the Treatise is negative and ground-clearing, ridding philosophy of the spectre of rationalistic epistemology, in order to make way for the positive view of the nature of human understanding. That is why the first book ends with an odd self-immolation of reason, in which, having demonstrated that reason that outrifts its own place becomes self-destructive, Hume sinks back to the ground and says, in effect, that it is all right really, since we can do by a mixture of instinct and common sense what reason cannot do. And thereafter he turns his attention to the nature of the instinct and common sense in his theory of morality.

His moral argument proceeds from an examination of motives, or 'passions'. They must all share, he says, a common feature which is reference to self. Hume carefully distinguishes this view from egoism. Egoism would make the mistake of seeing responses as wholly innate, whereas all motives have a double aspect. They relate to self and to an external object. And this double aspect, which admits the possibility of my enjoying things that are not of immediate benefit to me, prescribes the limits of human nature: '... from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by their very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner a pleasure' [40]. And: 'No action can be
required of us as a duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action’ [41]. The link between these facts and motivational racism is provided precisely by the theory of knowledge, in which firm ideas are based upon custom or habit: ‘...habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin’ [42]. The point to make in general about this link is that, were it not for habit, we would be egoists. But settled experience, and behaviour guided by the accumulated habits of such settled experience, is capable of moving beyond egoism. This leads in several ways to the necessity of an anti-democratic nationalism.

(A) The first is sympathy, a semi-technical term in Hume’s writings for the processes whereby people who live together, who share language and a culture, come to care about each other:

‘Accordingly we find that where, besides the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates our sympathy’ [43].

Sympathy becomes the mechanism whereby others can come to have a relationship to the self. It provides, in other words, the link between egoism and altruism. The minds of people become 'mirrors to each other' through living a common life.

Because of this, Hume’s conclusion seems to follow logically enough: ‘It appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strongest affection is confined to ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and acquaintances; and it is only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons’ [44].

And the basis of this is exactly what we would call 'culture': shared opinions, agreed because of a shared way of life, where 'judgements are always attended with passion' [45].

(B) ‘... while each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintances, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions and a consequent opposition of actions which cannot but be dangerous to the newly-established union’. [46]

If each person sought only the good of those for whom he or she felt immediate sympathy, chaos would soon reign, and humans would find the seeking of their own good somewhat self-defeating. Because of the perpetual opposition and conflict this would create, Hume uses this argument, which follows again from his premises, to establish the functions of government.

It is the function of good government, and of the nation as a field of operation of a government, to spread and even out altruism so that all can, within a government's boundaries, fit in with their fellow men, a reflection that it is a theory linking race and nation through biology. It makes us motivated towards our own people and against outsiders who disturb us.

What are the key elements in Hume’s philosophy that make this possible?

(1) The empiricist claim that we can only be certain of those things that have been regularly experienced. Thus does tradition become god. To envision a future in which people live internationally, liking cultural variation and the mixing of people, is to indulge in dangerous, rationalistic fantasising. It is contrary to sound practice and to human nature.

(2) The doctrine of sympathy - a doctrine remarkably close to the racist concept of sympathy used by William MacDougall [53] and to sociobiology's picture of tribal extension of genetic selfishness and altruism [54] - which deems our caring for those from whom we cannot expect reciprocal returns, 'pity' - a pale poor reflection of real sympathy which comes from sharing a whole way of life. And only sympathy can really motivate us. Therefore 'dark strangers' have everything going against our caring.

(3) But above all, the split between reason and most men never make any enquiry about its origin or cause’ [47]. Stable government enables us to overcome the most dangerous tendency in ourselves: 'There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote.' [48]

It is a problem of creating the conditions in which, crudely, human self-interest sees it to be in its own interest to be altruistic 'since itself alone restrains it!' [49]:

'Here then is a proposition, which, I think, may be regarded as certain, that it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origins.' [50]

With security, property, proper hierarchy and justice can appear. Too big and impersonal a society, or a weakening of the bonds of sympathy therefore will both lead to disturbance and disruption; and, if we are lucky, to some people identifying the cause, and leading politically the defence of the nation:

'But when society has become numerous, and has increased to a tribe or a nation, this interest [in restraining ourselves for the benefit of stability] is more remote; nor does it so readily perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon any breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society.' [51]

Out of these three elements - limited sympathy, primacy of government in enabling social cooperation, and the need for stable ways of life in order that the first two can operate - a racism can be constructed that sees strangers with 'alien' ways as a disruptive threat. They need not intend to be. Merely by being here, they are. They disrupt the 'homogeneous us', to borrow a phrase of Enoch Powell's. Hume gave first expression at a philosophical level to what Ivor Stanbrook MP expressed at a dirty political level in 1976:

'Let there be no beating about the bush. The average coloured immigrant has a different culture, a different religion and a different language. This is what creates the problem. It is not just because of race. The people in our cities feel strongly about immigrants. I believe that a preference for one's own race is as natural as a preference for one's own family. Therefore it is not racialism, if by that one means as I do, an active hostility to another race. It is simply human nature.' [52]

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(3) But above all, the split between reason and
passion, which Hume inscribes at the heart of his philosophy, is the lynchpin. The passions are innate; they are instincts without the vocabulary of biology, but understood in a surprisingly modern way as tendencies to behave which require environmental completion and direction. For all that, they remain instincts. To attempt to thwart them by ignoring their demands is to pave the way to chaos. This is the point of the double statement by Hume of their relation: 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' [55]. The instincts cannot be defeated by thinking. They will operate whatever the context. But we can use our reason to direct the instincts to their goals successfully. And here, it means simply, that while we have the chance we must use our reason - based on our traditions etc. - to create a political context in which national homogeneity and a shared way of life will make the expression of our instincts harmless and peaceable. And that means keeping out the blacks.

The case I am making about Hume, and through him about empiricism, is that the chief connection between empiricism and racism resides not in any accentuation of the significance of colour, but in the acceptance of a reason/motivation split. Motivation is already a protosociological concept in Hume, and it easily becomes fully sociological in the hands of later thinkers. And the resultant social Darwinism has regularly been racist.

A sample of a later use of such a distinction for racist purposes can be seen in the following:

'Non-rational judgements, being the product of suggestion, will have the quality of instinctive opinion, or, as we may call it, belief in the strict sense.... When therefore we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded on inadequate evidence.

Opinions, on the other hand, which are acquired as the result of experience alone do not possess this quality of primary certitude. They are true in the sense of being verifiable, and they are accompanied by that profound sense of truth which belief possesses, and therefore we have no sense of reluctance in admitting inquiry into them.' [56]

Thus did William Trotter distinguish two brands of opinion, one of which is biologically aroused. From such a basis, he constructs an account of the nature of group aggression, militant nationalism and racism which makes them biologically inevitable. His book

Footnotes

7. For an article which begins in a significant way to explore this question, see Hannah Arendt, 'Racism, thinking before Racism', Review of Politics, 1954, pp.35-35. Arendt distinguishes usefully, for example, between theories of race and status which are premised on a declining aristocracy (for example, Gobineau) and other racist conceptions of such thinking.
19. Ibid.
20. Michael Banton, "What do we mean by "racism"?", New Society, 10 April 1968.
24. I have tried to explore such a relationship in my The Raw Racism, p.4-5.

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