

# REVIEWS

## Assessing Marcuse

B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography, Verso, 1982, £4.50 pb

M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, Free Press, 1980, \$19.95 hc

More Marcuse literature. The process of recovery and critical reassessment continues. Both these books contribute in some way to the development of a more informed and theoretically sophisticated account and critique of Marcuse's life-work, by presenting it as a whole, in its development. But they are very different; with sharply contrasting strengths and weaknesses.

The less critical, but in many ways more interesting of the two, is Barry Katz's intellectual biography. Drawing upon unpublished writings, personal interviews, and even declassified US government documents, as well as published texts, Katz offers an overall philosophical interpretation of Marcuse's thought in conjunction with an account of the 'historical contours' of his life. He views the evolution of Marcuse's thought not only in its totality but more or less as a totality, and so emphasises its continuity, and the contextual backgrounds from which the individual works emerged.

He sums up Marcuse's life-work as "an attempt to articulate a dimension of life and a corresponding domain of consciousness in which a frankly transcendent standard is operative" (Katz, p.11). And he argues that it is the area of aesthetics that is of primary importance in this attempt, as that realm in which such a standard is most clearly accessible, and through which Marcuse believed suppressed needs, faculties and desires can be most easily (if contradictorily) liberated (Katz, p.121).

The main interest of Katz's book lies in this emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of Marcuse's thought, and in the new material he introduces; most of which is to do with Marcuse's interest in art. This material is basically of two kinds. First, there is a fairly detailed account (about 25 pages) of Marcuse's work during the war and immediately after in the Research and Analysis Branch of the US Office for Strategic Services. He was engaged there, in the main, in the analysis of the political tendencies of various groups and individuals in war-time Germany, processing intelligence material for the denazification programme; working with such noted future academic colleagues as Paul Baran, Norman O. Brown, Stuart Hughes, Leonard Kreiger, and Barrington Moore. Marcuse's nine year term in this kind of work (1942-1951), Katz argues, was not, as has been suggested by H. Stuart Hughes, a period of 'intellectual latency', but rather one of 'the development of advanced theoretical formulations' (Katz, p.113). 'An alternative philosophy of history, one that measured the factual world by aesthetic norms and technological potentialities', was, he argues, by autumn

1945, 'coming tentatively into focus' (Katz, p.120).

Katz supports this contention by reference to an unpublished work Marcuse composed at the very end of the war on the avante-garde writers of the French Resistance: 'Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era'. This is the second kind of new material Katz uses. Throughout his exposition he refers to generally little-known or unpublished texts on art like this one, to elucidate and explicate Marcuse's new theoretical departures. In this way, he provides historical evidence to support his theoretical argument about the primacy of aesthetics in Marcuse's thought. Other unpublished works to which he makes reference are an unfinished manuscript on Proust, written at the beginning of the war, and a series of 'Letters on Surrealism', written in autumn 1972.

However, while Katz's description of Marcuse's work in the OSS, and of his war-time manuscript, is interesting, it doesn't really seem sufficient to bear the theoretical weight he wants it to carry, since the alternative philosophy of history he sees emerging at this time doesn't yet look to be qualitatively different from that which Marcuse espoused in his 'Frankfurt' essays from the thirties. The treatise on Aragon seems to contain some concise formulations of themes which run throughout Marcuse's work from 1932 onwards, but not to represent any particularly new departure. For example, the theme of memory as a repository of repressed critical impulses (a theme shared with other members of the Frankfurt School) is explicitly stated there in its relation to the critical function of art: 'the political function of art is the reawakening of memory, the remembrance of things past' (quoted by Katz, p.125). But this isn't really a new position. What it does point to, though, and Schoolman also makes this point, is the way in which Marcuse's turn to Freud is less a new departure in his thought than a point at which its major themes are synthesised and given an explicit anthropological foundation (Katz, p.146; Schoolman, p.88). Though, as Schoolman persuasively goes on to argue, it is a foundation that ultimately betrays the critical moment it was elaborated to ground.

Despite its failure to link up Marcuse's later thought in any concrete way to his 'Frankfurt' period, or to explore the extent of the continued influence of his colleagues of that period on his work, the main contribution of Katz's book is its historical perspective. Of particular note is the account of Marcuse's D.Phil. thesis on 'The Artist-Novel' (Kunstler-roman), and of his subsequent immersion in Weimar cultural life in Berlin in the twenties, and also the emphasis placed on this period of Marcuse's life generally for an understanding of the recurrent themes of his thought.

In this respect, Katz's book is a useful historical counter-weight to the more detailed, analytical textual exegesis in Schoolman's long The Imaginary Witness. For, despite his intention to provide 'the first systematic and

comprehensive exposition and interpretation of Marcuse's entire life-work' (Schoolman, p.xii/xiii), Schoolman effectively ignores this period of Marcuse's life, when he was in his twenties. (The thesis is very briefly dealt with, on pages 327-328 (!), but by this time a distinctive, and fairly contentious interpretation of the evolution of Marcuse's thought has already been established.)

Schoolman emphasises the 'humanism' of Marcuse's essays of the late twenties and early thirties which attempted to formulate a form of Heideggerian marxism as 'concrete philosophy'; arguing that 'from the standpoint of our own time' these are Marcuse's most important works. In relation to these pieces, the 'Frankfurt' essays of the thirties are presented as the result of 'a sudden, sweeping, and brutal purge of Marcuse's intellectual history' (Schoolman, p.43). The basis of this dramatic and undoubtedly overstated claim is the idea that, in the face of fascism, Marcuse 'abandons the individual' as a possible source of political opposition, and thereby himself becomes, in one sense, 'as much a victim (of fascism) as the victims left behind' (Schoolman, p.81, parentheses added). The rationalistic framework of Critical Theory to which Marcuse turns, Schoolman argues, denies all theoretical validity to the 'individual liberal subject' - which Schoolman calls 'the true subject of politics' (Schoolman, p.81, p.208).

Now, while it is undoubtedly true that the advent of fascism was a decisive element in the formation of Critical Theory, and that the latter tends to reduce individual subjectivity to its objective determinations, though not, I would argue, to the extent Schoolman believes (his approach to it is itself reductive), it doesn't seem to me that the earlier essays exhibit anything like the political potentiality that Schoolman ascribes to them. His own summary of them both weakens the strength of his general argument and points to the contradiction within it. 'Ultimately', he writes, they offer 'no more than an abstract theoretical outline of the individual's capacities for radical thought and action and the barest proposals for engaging such a person in the affairs of politics' (Schoolman, p.35, my emphasis).

As the phrase 'such a person' concedes, the 'individual liberal subject', who misleadingly appears in this statement simply as 'the individual', is a specific historical social type, not an ontological given. Critical theory was concerned with the historical threat to this social type; it didn't exclude it from consideration, a priori, by virtue of its philosophical framework.

Schoolman's attachment to the early essays derives from his understanding of them as implicitly concerned with the practice of political discourse, and as implying that 'a liberal politics ... serves as a stepping-stone towards radical action' (Schoolman, p.13), (a position Schoolman himself endorses, but which, I would have thought, has little historical justification). Within this perspective, Marcuse's book on Hegel's ontology (1932) is seen less as movement away from the individualistic standpoint of Heideggerian ontology towards a more materialist, because more genuinely historical, conception of subjectivity - a transitional text - as it usually is, and more as an attempt to chart historically the progress of the individual liberal subject.

The Artist-Novel thesis is of interest here because it involves a prior encounter with Hegel (mediated by the Hegelianism of Lukács' Theory of the Novel), and because it shows an early concern both with art, as opposed to liberal politics, as a repository of transcendent ideals and a potentially liberating medium, and with the social specificity of critical tendencies - the artist as a specific social type (Katz, p.43). Katz's biographical approach provides the real historical context of the 'phenomenological' essays. Schoolman reads into them a political rationale which, while perhaps not completely absent as a latent tendency within their theoretical form, certainly distorts their meaning. This is a pity, because their explicit con-

cern with historical ontology gives them a contemporary relevance quite different from that which Schoolman attributes to them.

Schoolman's analysis generally is, as Martin Jay says on the dust-jacket, 'thorough and painstaking' - so painstaking in fact that at times it reminded me of Walter Benjamin's advice on 'How to Write Fat Books' - but its general argument, as I have indicated, is highly questionable. The problem is that Schoolman takes an independent set of concerns to Marcuse's writings. And he identifies any two-dimensional theory of subjectivity with a liberal politics. Through this identification, a sustained immanent critique of Marcuse's main works is magically presented as an argument for the radical credentials of liberal politics. The genuinely dialectical aspects of Marcuse's thought are completely lost. And the theoretical inheritor of Marcuse's project is taken to be an interpretative social theory (for which Charles Taylor is cited as the authority (Schoolman, p.352)!), rather than either a form of dialectical analysis of social formations capable of providing theoretical resources for radical movements, or any form of historical hermeneutics capable of 'recalling and preserving historical possibilities' (Katz, p.171).

With regard to Marcuse's transition from a phenomenological marxism, via Hegel, to Critical Theory, Geoghagan's brief but incisive account in Reason and Eros (reviewed by Steve Cook in RP33) is far more illuminating than Schoolman's forced contrast. There, the sense in which Marcuse's Critical Theory might represent a real philosophical transcendence of the idea of concrete philosophy is at least given due consideration. In contrast to Geoghagan's emphasis on the centrality of the dialectical concept of essence to Marcuse's understanding of the idea of critical rationality, Schoolman's focus on the (mysterious) Hegelian universal as the 'philosophical foundation' of Critical Theory cuts it off from both Marcuse's earlier and later works. For Schoolman the Frankfurt Essays of the thirties are not seminal but 'transitional'.

It is in its critical analysis of Marcuse's two best known books, Eros and Civilisation and One-Dimensional Man that The Imaginary Witness comes into its own. It contains lengthy, detailed and clear expositions and critiques of both books. And while its criticisms have been voiced before, they are given a systematic presentation that makes Schoolman's Chapters 3, 4 and 5 a useful summary of objections scattered around elsewhere. The treatment of Marcuse's reading of Freud is particularly incisive and convincing.

The gist of Schoolman's analysis is that in his desire to bring out the socio-historical significance of Freud's metapsychology, Marcuse badly misunderstood Freud on the question of the relationship between repression and sublimation, and the nature of infantile sexuality; in such a way that he unwittingly turned the metapsychology into a form of behaviourist psychology. Against Marcuse, Schoolman argues that 'the freedom that Marcuse infers from his account of primary narcissism could only be won at the expense of an inhibited mental development' (Schoolman, p.114); and that, in any case, sublimated activities offer potentially the highest source of gratification (Schoolman, p.105). And he locates the origin of Marcuse's errors in the framework of Critical Theory: 'he had first grasped the metapsychology through the categories of technical reason' (Schoolman, p.258).

With respect to One-Dimensional Man, Schoolman takes the well-established line that it is one-dimensional theory of human nature that underlies the theory of a completely one-dimensional society. And he produces counter-arguments against the one-sidedness of each of Marcuse's individual analyses. Because of his overall interpretation of the evolution of Marcuse's thought, however, and its overstatement of first the break with Heideggerian perspectives, and then the break between the idea of concrete philosophy and that of Critical Theory, Schoolman makes no connection between the one-sidedness and ab-

tractness of Marcuse's treatment of technological domination and the possibility of residual Heideggerian tendencies in his thought, just as he fails to note the existentialist aspects of his reading of Freud. He also overstates, to some extent, the one-sidedness of Marcuse's position, through a tendency to disregard his more dialectical qualifications of his position.

Regarding Marcuse's late works, of the two books Schoolman's is once more the most contentious, at the same time as being the most detailed; again, because of its tendency to overstate discontinuities. While Schoolman argues that Counter-Revolution and Revolt represents a temporary return to the framework of the very early essays, simply because it embodies a relatively complex

conception of subjectivity; Katz, more convincingly, finds there Marcuse's final formulation of Marx's early conception of human species-being, 'an ontology from which Marcuse never departed' (Katz, p.197).

In sum: Katz's book is a good introduction to Marcuse, as well as a useful source for more interested enquirers; Schoolman's more exhaustive (and exhausting) tome will be of interest to those most explicitly concerned with Marcuse's politics, and his relation to liberalism. But it too is a useful resource. It is clearly written and carefully, if at times oddly, argued. Both books offer a full Marcuse bibliography, and Schoolman gives 19 pages worth of secondary literature.

**Peter Osborne**

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## Reclaiming Rights

Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of Socialist Rights, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, £5.95 pm

There is a tendency on the left to treat rights as congenitally flawed: products of an alienated culture, and so destined to become redundant in a society which secures the 'all-round' development of its members. But there are reasons, largely practical, why socialists should not dismiss rights as inherently bourgeois. When confronted with a woolly ideal of a socialist future, even people not enamoured with capitalism are likely to settle for the tangible rights they already enjoy. And, should they waver, others will soon remind them that the record of so-called socialist societies is ground enough to cling to the familiar. It is incumbent upon socialists, therefore, to demonstrate that rights (however conceived) will not be eroded in their projected community.

Tom Campbell makes a strong case for the need to give rights a socialist connotation. His principal argument, however, is suspect. His intention is to initiate a dialogue between right and left through the provision of a common political vocabulary. Once a measure of agreement has been reached about the meaning of contestable concepts, he believes, we shall be on the road to a peaceful resolution of political disagreements.

This is very cosy and rather silly. Social antagonisms, it appears, emanate from an inability to communicate. The philosopher, presumably is to perform a therapeutic function as he dispels linguistic muddles so that people may understand one another.

I'm reminded on these occasions of Engels' jibe at Feuerbach's philosophy of reconciliation:

But love! - yes, with Feuerbach love is everywhere and at all times the wonder-working god who should help to surmount all difficulties of practical life - and that in a society which is split into classes with diametrically opposite interests. At this point the last relic of its revolutionary character disappears from his philosophy, leaving only the old cant: Love one another - fall into each others arms regardless of distinctions of sex or estate - a universal orgy of reconciliation.

Surely the main reason why socialists should wish to render the concept of rights intelligible is that we already

tread the same linguistic terrain as our opponents. Competing images of society are constructed from a shared conceptual armoury. Socialists may lament this fact as evidence of the dominance of the dominant ideology; they may yearn for their own exclusive linguistic repertoire. But the political reality is otherwise. Social conflicts focus upon a continuous struggle to attribute different meanings to the common terms of political discourse. The popular appeal of Thatcherism is due, in no small measure, to the successful manipulation of words like liberty, justice and rights into the homespun, petit-bourgeois image of a nanny state which saps self-reliance. Socialists have no choice but to be conceptually agile: not to facilitate an anaemic philosophical dialogue which deprives concepts of their contradictory meanings; but in order to construct an image of socialism which is sufficiently compelling to persuade people to move towards a practical resolution of those social antagonisms in which conceptual disagreement is rooted.

The problem for socialists is to detach rights from the rhetoric of bourgeois individualism in which they evolved and are still largely embedded. Rights, in much current usage, sanction the private pursuit of individual ambition; they enshrine the claims of egoistic, acquisitive individuals who compete for scarce resources within a coercive legal framework. In normal usage, then, rights embody that separation of civil society from the state which socialism, according to Marx, will transcend.

Campbell's solution to the problem is first to attach a more precise meaning to rights than many socialists and non-socialists are inclined to do. Rights, properly understood, do not belong to the conceptual baggage by which social practices are morally approved or condemned. They should not be marshalled into vague demands for the social implementation of universal human needs; there are plenty of other concepts available for this task. Campbell opts, instead, for a stricter, more descriptive meaning in which rights refer to the discretionary and mandatory regulations of each particular community. Rights, on this juristic interpretation, become effective within the context of rule-governed behaviour (though the rules are not necessarily coercive). They are really individual interests (though not necessarily the interests of atomistic individuals) which social regulations are intended to safeguard and promote.

Campbell's attempt to clear the linguistic undergrowth from the concept of rights extends over several chapters of technical, and sometimes tortuous, argument. And, read in isolation from the rest of the book, his neutral definition offers small comfort for socialists who prefer their concepts sharpened for the political fray. Campbell, it seems, is so concerned to open the channels of discourse between ideological opponents that he fails to progress far beyond the rather sterile, legalistic definition of H.L.A. Hart and others. What, then, is the purpose of this sanitised version of an interpretation of rights which has not in the past been used for radical social criticism? Is Campbell, the consensus-minded philosopher, still writing within the confines of a bourgeois strait-jacket?

Campbell, in fact, puts his definition to very good use in the second part of the book which gives rights a specifically socialist content. He assumes that socialism, no less than capitalism, entails a network of the kind of rights stipulated by his formal definition. A socialist order, though devoid of fundamental antagonisms, would nevertheless be framed by authoritative rules designed to protect and foster individual concerns or interests. What distinguishes socialist rights are less their formal structure than the principles by which they are justified. Socialism is intended to satisfy human needs in abundance. It is this principle of need which, according to Campbell, shapes the content of socialist rights and gives them a distinctive flavour. For, within this normative canopy, rights would enable individual energies to be discharged into creative and co-operative activities rather than a destructive scramble for limited resources.

Flesh is added to the argument in three chapters which provide case studies of particular socialist rights: first is a stimulating chapter on the right to free expression. The need-principle dictates a participatory democracy in which individual fulfilment is maximised through an equal share in communal decision-making procedures. Freedom of expression is an essential democratic right. But, in contrast to liberal-democracy, the justificatory

principle of socialism entails various supplementary rights to make concrete the ideal of open communication: rules to ensure, for example, that everyone is both sufficiently educated and informed intelligently to discuss and promote communal goals.

Campbell also illustrates how the right to work is not only an indispensable socialist right (which it cannot be in a market economy) but assumes a specific economic and political content. For, by the principle of need, individuals should both engage in creative activity and help to determine the productive priorities of society. And, by the same principle, welfare rights would no longer be restricted to the basic requirements of socially deprived minorities; but would encompass the routine necessities of a worthwhile existence for everyone.

This is an original and provocative book which moves far beyond the often tedious debate as to whether liberal rights will be eliminated or preserved within socialism. My reservations stem from Campbell's desire to wear two hats: that of the respectable philosopher who seeks to forge a political consensus from conceptual clarification; and the committed socialist anxious to explore the prospective character of a more rational social structure than has hitherto prevailed. As academic therapist, he makes the usual elitist claims on behalf of his profession; and drives too firm a wedge between the form and content of rights. When he considers how social conflicts might be practically resolved, however, he constructs a model of socialism which is both plausible and palatable; and is prepared to concede a change in the form, as well as content, of rights. The insistence that rights must be distinguished from their justificatory principles at least prompts him to inspect, in unusually rich detail, the arrangements through which the concerns of multi-faceted social beings may be promoted. The book does demonstrate the sort of institutions required to transcend the dichotomy of civil and political society. Therein lies its great virtue.

**Bob Eccleshall**

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## After the Absolute

John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £25 hc

This is the first instalment of a projected two-volume study of the origins and development of Hegelianism in early 19th-century Germany. Whatever form its successor may take, this book is greatly superior to its English-language predecessors, for Toews avoids a teleological reduction of the development of Hegelianism to some form of successful resolution in Marxism, and is hence able to expand upon both the period and themes treated in, for example, W. Brazill's The Young Hegelians, G. Lichtheim's From Marx to Hegel, S. Hook's From Hegel to Marx, D. McLellan's The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. Toews also deftly and, I think, brilliantly deploys an enormous amount of historical investigation, an incisive sociological imagination, and a clear, compelling philosophical account to raise considerably the whole level of English-language scholarship in this field.

This is possible, firstly, simply because Toews tells us

far more in detail about Hegel's early followers than previous texts have done, and hence avoids in particular classifying all of the early Hegelians as 'old' and 'Right'. As a school, Hegelianism begins to emerge around 1816, though the classical age of Left Hegelianism lasted only from 1841 to 1844. Toews shows, however, that it is completely false to see the intervening years only in terms of a dogmatic or monolithically conservative or Right Hegelianism. In the last decade of this period, it is true, Hegel and his foremost followers became integrated into the ideological and educational systems of the Prussian state, and the principal focus of Hegelian philosophy was upon the historical emergence of the modern state as the ultimate form of ethical community. Yet many of Hegel's early students were also practical, 'liberalising' reformers, and when the Prussia of the reform era (under Stein, Hardenberg, and Humboldt) of 1807-19 gave way to political repression in 1819-20, many of Hegel's disciples were in fact also arrested.

Some Hegelians did of course successfully assimilate themselves to the new course of Prussia. But in opposition

to the romantic and increasingly reactionary nationalism of, for example, Schulze and Henning, there also emerged the far more critical notions of men like Eduard Gans and Heinrich Leo, whose unwillingness to construe existing laws as the absolute embodiment of actualised Reason produced, for example, a strong critique of bureaucratic government as a form of absolutism and epitome of the principle of hierarchy rather than the practice of Reason. Here, as elsewhere, early Hegelianism recognised in the doctrine of the identity of the rational and the real a critical tool as well as a bulwark of the status quo.

It is one of Toews' central contentions, too, that the dividing line between many more radical Hegelians and their more conservative fellow disciples often lay at the gates of the university, or between the ranks inside it. Those who succeeded in gaining permanent posts tended to view Hegelianism as a doctrine of positive cultural assimilation (and who has not wondered what Marx would have written had he succeeded to a lectureship as planned?), while those who became independent of the state educational system tended to become increasingly radicalised. This is not for Toews an all-encompassing explanation but rather a plausibly useful hypothesis which is supported by an account of the nature of the educational system and relations of state patronage, which is helpful in delineating the possibilities of personal as well as intellectual alienation for would-be professional philosophers and theologians.

It was during the 1830s, and particularly after the publication of Strauss's *Life of Jesus* in 1835, that fundamental divisions among the Hegelians began to emerge. Here Toews is most useful in emphasising the noncongruity between Right/Old and Left/Young Hegelians. Neither Gans nor F.W. Carové had been 'right' Hegelians, and the principal opponents of the Young Hegelians were not 'old', but rather men of the same generation, such as

Rosenkranz, Schaller and Erdmann. Nor did Carové, Richter, and Cieszkowsky (and the views of the latter on the relation of theory and practice are often seen as anticipating those of Marx) particularly welcome the newer Hegelians of the 1830s, for the latter tended not to wish to reconcile man and God, but rather to commence from a new 'humanist' starting point.

It is of course the origins of this humanism which has most concerned those seeking to understand the Young Hegelian connection with Marx, and if Toews makes no strikingly novel discoveries in this well-charted domain, both the generalities and details of his intellectual map nonetheless usefully refine previous versions. Even in the case of the best-known Young Hegelian (after Marx), Feuerbach, Toews is able to clarify differences between the humanisms of Bauer and Strauss, and thus to re-emphasise the novelty of a sensuous 'species-being' as it was conceived by Feuerbach.

The latter chapters on these subjects, however, clearly have the character of an *hors d'oeuvre* whose subsequent main course (the politically complex and hence less easily digested, if for most readers more appetising, Young Hegelianism of the 1840s) promises to be far more fulfilling. These chapters are thus disappointing if still useful. We are told far too little about the social and political background to the rise of the Left Hegelian party of 1840-41 (which Toews treats in an 'Epilogue'), and even in the two preceding chapters on Bauer and Feuerbach there is a sense of haste as well as of the (unspoken) presence of the hidden interlocutor from Trier. This book nonetheless largely delivers what it promises, and if its author can scarcely restrain his enthusiasm for further discussion, that is no great fault.

Gregory Claeys

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# NEWS

## Report From Radical Readers

Fifty readers responded to the questionnaire sent out with RP32, spread widely from Durban to Denver, from Nigeria to Nottingham. To all respondents we are most grateful (even to the Southampton reader who took *Radical Philosophy* to demonstrate 'that "radical philosophy" is a contradiction in terms'). The aim of the exercise was to provide not statistical information, but insights into the extent to which the magazine serves its readers' interests. In summarizing the response, therefore, in Manny Shinwell's evocative phrase, 'I shall be neither partial nor impartial.'

Several readers felt that some articles were not as clearly written as they might be:

'I still feel a number of the articles are too turgid and inaccessible.'

'Many of your contributors seem to prefer a style of writing that tends to hide the meaning they are trying to get across.'

'I avoid reading articles written in an impossible style.' This criticism is related to - or can be confused with - another problem of concern to several readers: whether the magazine is addressed to a broad educated readership or to philosophy specialists:

'There is a danger that the level of the articles and material presupposes a degree of familiarity which by implication excludes potential sympathisers.'

'Too much like much of what is already available in mainstream academic publishing.'

'I teach philosophy, political theory etc to extra-mural students but find that there are very few RP articles I can confidently recommend to them.'

Some readers noticed the tone, as well as the style and level, of articles:

'You are in great danger of becoming much too serious, much too (in the bad sense) academic.'

'There is much less humour than there used to be!'

There was also a gratifying warmth and encouragement from almost all respondents - often those whose criticisms were