In RP34, two articles appeared dealing with the relation between language and sexism: Alison Assiter's critique of Dale Spender's Man Made Language and a dialogue between Mike Shortland and John Fauvel on the subject of sexism and linguistic reform. Although these articles were not explicitly connected (except by proximity and subject matter) I suggest that it is revealing to read them as a single discussion. It is revealing because all three authors have in common certain assumptions and ways of looking at language which are fundamental to current feminist linguistic theory; and it seems to me that those assumptions and approaches are misguided enough to call for serious comment in the pages of Radical Philosophy.

Before embarking on a critique, however, let me briefly summarise what I take to be the main points made in the RP34 articles.

First, Assiter on Spender. Assiter criticised Spender for asserting that women and men have different and irreconcilable meanings for linguistic expressions. She argues that on one hand this is simple minded, ignoring crucial theoretical distinctions like those between sense and reference, or the meaning of an utterance and its force; while on the other hand it is politically damaging because it leads inevitably to a separatist stalemate in which women and men inhabit separate worlds, unable to communicate and thus unable to change. For Assiter the notion of separate meanings and separate worlds is dangerously essentialist, as is the associated contention that all uses of language by men are inherently oppressive. This claim is especially pernicious because in lumping all usages together as equally sexist, it obscures the iniquity of language that is really sexist (by which Assiter means so-called 'he/man' language). This really sexist language, in Assiter's opinion, is damaging to women.

At this point, Shortland and Fauvel take over with a discussion that focuses on whether 'really sexist language' of the he/man variety is a suitable case for reformist treatment. The discussion is rather inconclusive, but in the course of it, linguistic reform (embodied here in the proposals of Miller and Swift 1980 (1)) is disparaged with a veritable hatchet-potch of objections, for instance that reform constitutes an attack on the language, that it only disguises women's 'real' (i.e. extralinguistic) disadvantage, that it produces inaccuracy and obscurity, interferes with freedom of expression and so on.

I propose to argue that underlying all this we have several unquestioned but problematic assumptions about language, what its functions in society are and how the meanings it conveys arise. It should be emphasised from the outset, however, that failure to engage with these problems is not peculiar to Assiter et al. On the contrary, the reason why the gap is important is that it afflicts practically all present day linguistics and philosophy of language. We can hardly blame feminists for taking certain ideas on board, then, but I believe that until they deconstruct the view of language their theories presuppose, they will never understand the connection between language and oppression.

Let us now proceed to the underlying assumptions and misconceptions I am talking about. Basically, there are two connected problems which merit discussion: one concerning the status of meaning, and the other having to do with the relation between language and reality.

1 Meaning

The most serious flaw in the Assiter/Shortland/Fauvel discussion is the conventional view of meaning espoused by all three of them. For to assert or presuppose, as they all do, that some expressions are definitively sexist while others are not (cf. Assiter, who says that 'supposing the phenomenon of sexism is ubiquitous makes it more difficult to see where sexism in language really operates') is to conceptualise meaning as a fixed essence, determinable in principle and determinate in fact.

This notion is of course central to linguistic theory, the main aim of which is to discover the correspondences of form and meaning that constitute 'a language'. When this enterprise turns out to be difficult in practice, linguists resort to the sort of abstraction Assiter accuses Spender of ignoring: langue/parole distinctions, which allow the analyst to posit an underlying set of correspondences even if people's behaviour offers little empirical support for them, and illocutionary force, by invoking which the analyst is able to separate what the speaker intends from what her uttered sentence means qua sentence (as well as reifying what the speaker intends, a point to which I shall return).

Abstractions like these are products of desperation. Somewhere, somehow, the linguist must isolate a fixed code of form/meaning correspondences as her object of study. Because if no such set code existed, how could we transcend interactional anarchy and communicate? What would differentiate a rational speaker from Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty?

This is of course a crucial question, but anyone who confronts it must be wary of the term 'communication'. For it is clear that orthodox linguistics has pre-empted the definition of communication, and has done so in a manner that might seem remarkable if it were not so ingrained in West-
ern thought. The model of communication assumed by lin-
guistics and philosophy alike is the one expounded by John
Locke (2) through language we transfer ideas from one
mind to another - that is to say, we engage in telen­
tation (3). This hypothesis is preserved intact from Saussure
the generativists, and once you are committed to it,
there is no alternative but to treat languages as fixed
codes of form/meaning correspondences internalised by
every speaker. Nothing less could guarantee the perfect
understanding which is normative in the linguist's model.
"But when we learn a language, we generally learn it
on its own terms, particularly those working on the data of conversation, have found it
impossible either to crack the fixed code or to keep faith
with the telenotation hypothesis of meaning and under­
standing. Perfect comprehension and indeed, broad agree­
ment on what any utterance means is conspicuous by its
absence in study after study (4). Thus many of us have
come to believe that the orthodox paradigm is inadequate.

The same belief was forcibly expressed in 1929 by the
Soviet linguist V.N. Volosinov, and has since been reiter­
ated by Julia Kristeva (5). Both these writers point out
that all meaning is in the end contextual, and that it is
impossible in principle to determine once and for all the
meaning of any expression. Determinacy either of form or
of meaning is a myth, shored up by the pointless abstrac­
tions of structural linguistics.

It is precisely at this point that any critique of Dale
Spender ought to start. Spender holds that all language is
sexist because the meaning of every expression has been
fixed exclusively by men (women's meanings are a potential
rather than an actual category for Spender). In saying this,
however, Spender entirely ignores the contextuality of
meaning and its ultimate indeterminacy (which makes it
impossible for any group to fix meaning or to exercise
monolithic control over it). She is forced to posit a 'big
bang' type theory of the origin of language, with each gen­
eration of speakers as passive inheritors of the tradition,
or else an omnipresent conspiracy of men working to retain
their semantic monopoly.

Given what we know of child language acquisition and
of normal interaction, these two ideas are implausible to
say the least. All language users construct their own mean­
ings and are endlessly creative in their interpretations of
what others say: the price they pay for such flexibility,
however, is imperfect communication. Alienation from
language in Spender's terms, the feeling either that others
do not understand you or that your experience is not ade­
quately expressed in words, is not just part of the feminine
condition but an inescapable part of being human.

If we take it that no expression has a meaning inde­
pendent of its linguistic and non-linguistic context, we can
plausibly explain the sexism of language by saying that all
speech events in patriarchal cultures have as part of their
context the power relation that holds between women and
men (and indeed many other political factors as well). This
varied and heterogeneous context is what makes expres­
sions and utterances liable to sexist interpretation. Notice,
though, that the sexism we are talking about cannot be
reduced to speaker intentions: if we assume a non-tele­
mental, non-fixed code model, there is no way of
believing that you know what a speaker's intentions are (the
rock on which Searle founders, as Strawson has pointed out
(6)). Ultimately it is the hearer in each situation who
produces a meaning.

This is not to say that the hearer is not constrained,
since obviously she is. But this is not a function of lan­
guage alone; rather it depends on a whole cluster of cultur­
ally approved ways of making sense of the world. As far as
language is concerned, a particularly important role is
played by authoritarian, prescriptive institutions that regu­
late our use and our understanding of language. An example
of such an institution is the dictionary, which fosters the
illusion of determinate meaning and is thus able to inflict
particular definitions with authority. When Shortland writes
of his respect for 'the English language' it is these his­
orically produced and ruling-class sponsored institutions he
has in mind: for except insofar as languages are institu­
tionalised, they cannot be said to exist outside their indi­
vidual users.

Assiter is right, then, to criticise the Whorfianism of
Man Made Language. Spender has ignored the contextuality
and indeterminacy of meaning to produce an account of
Orwellian thought-control via malespeak which is patently
false. But Assiter's own criticisms fall into the same error,
because in claiming that some expressions are sexist and
others are not, in wanting to emphasise the fixity of refer­
ence and restrict sexism to force (whether or not defined
by speaker intentions) she too ignores context and asserts
that any expression has at least some irreducible core of
meaning.

2 Language and Reality

The second major problem in the RP discussion is connec­
ted with this essentialist and decontextualised notion of
meaning. It concerns the relation of language and reality, a
central issue for those who believe in sexist and non-sexist
language as well as for out-and-out determinists like
Spender.

Spender's view of language and reality (and here she
is at one with the influential neo-Saussurean tendency) is a
simple one: language determines reality. Reformists like
Miller and Swift, whose proposals are discussed by
Shortland and Fauvel, have just the opposite view: they
believe that language exists to represent states of affairs
accurately. What is wrong with sexist language is that it
distorts reality - generic he, for instance, conceals the
existence of women. Therefore we must embark on reform
if only for the sake of clarity and accuracy. For Miller and
Swift, reality should determine language and not the other
way about. If language is not playing its subordinate, super­
structural role properly, language must be made to pull its
socks up.

A lot of sexist expressions are presented by Miller
and Swift as matters of historical accident. Thus man used
to mean a person of either sex, and gradually narrowed
to refer exclusively to males. Conventional usage has not
changed to accommodate this narrowing, and thus it is
ambiguous and distorting. The use of words like spaceman
and craftsman persuades English speakers that these groups
consist only of males; if we all said astronaut and artisan,
the problem would disappear.
Or would it? When we look at certain registers of language (newspapers, for instance) something rather odd emerges. Even the most casual glance at a newspaper reveals usages like the following:

FOURTEEN SURVIVORS, THREE OF THEM WOMEN ... A MAN ... WENT BERSERK WITH A MACHETE AND MURDERED HIS NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOUR'S WIFE.

It seems that neighbour and survivor are being used as if they were intrinsically male in reference, even though the words themselves have no overt gender marking and are thus not on a par with spaceman and craftsman. It appears that, far from glorifying in the accuracy and clarity potential of neutral items like neighbour, some language users are perversely using these items to falsify reality.

This must look bizarre to Miller and Swift, who believe that the real function of language is to represent actual states of affairs truthfully and accurately. If however one takes it that this is not the real function of language - that language is the product and vehicle of its ideological and political context - we can see what is going on, and we can draw the obvious conclusion that it is wholly idle to hive off a small area of usage (like he/man language), to label this and only this sexist, and to believe in any completely neutral alternative either actual or potential. It is obviously idle, too, to criticise feminist linguistic reforms in the way that Shortland does, by arguing that non-sexist language does not produce any gain in accuracy, if accuracy is not what language is all about.

Footnotes

2 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
3 I take this term from Roy Harris' book The Language Myth (Duckworth, 1981). Harris claims that linguistics is supported by two fallacies, the representational fallacy of what communication is, and the fixed code fallacy of how it is achieved.
4 Cf. especially Marga Kreckel, Shared Knowledge and Communicative Acts in Natural Discourse, 1981.
5 V.V. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 1929.

Apart from their criticisms of it, Shortland and Fauevel seem curiously undecided as to whether non-sexist language makes any political difference (Assiter would presumably support its use, since she comes to the conclusion that sexist language is positively damaging). But once again, the entire discussion is locked into a framework dictated by false premises, for within the authors' problematic the reformist's rationale can only be deterministic (change language and you change the world) or else accuracy (change language and you reflect reality better).

So it is perhaps worth pointing out in conclusion that the demand for institutional and individual changes in usage may be seen as progressive for different reasons. Specifically, to make demands around language calls into question the stability and transparency of meaning so many of us take for granted. It undermines our fundamentally conservative desire to see language as a fixed point in the otherwise ungraspable flux of experience. And this in turn makes us less likely to swallow other people's definitions at any level.

Ultimately, the way language is used does make a difference. As Trevor Pateman points out, '... the change in outward practice constitutes a restructuring of at least one aspect of one social relationship.... Every act reproduces or subverts a social institution' (7). There is nothing trivial, therefore, about developing a politics of language. But if we are to produce a truly radical linguistic theory and practice, we must question the orthodox paradigm, rejecting absolutely its rigid, authoritarian and inadequate conception of what human language is and how it works.

The view presented above of meaning, context etc. is in the general framework provided by Harris.

In her article on Dale Spender's book Man Made Language, Alison Assiter offers some major criticisms of Spender's thesis on language which, she says, must not be understood as making any concession 'to the opposition that there is no sexist bias in language at all'. Whilst agreeing with her that Spender's ideas on language need to be questioned, I think her alternative account of sexist bias in language does provide the space for just such 'concessions to the opposition' that she is at pains to avoid.

Assiter identifies two propositions made by Spender which she thinks are particularly problematic. The first proposition is that language 'constructs reality', the second that this language and, hence, the resulting reality are both 'man made'. Assiter argues that Spender's general conception of language is ambiguous because (a) it does not contain a clear theorisation of meaning and (b) it overrides crucial linguistic distinctions that have been made between sense and reference (Frege), or signifier and signified (Saussure). She illustrates the confusion which results from Spender's relativistic thesis by using the example of the word 'table'. Assiter suggests that if Spender's thesis about language in general, and man made language in particular, is correct then, using Frege's distinction between sense and reference, we would have to accept that the sense and reference of the term table was originally set by men so that women, when using that term, are speaking what is, in effect, a borrowed language. Assiter points to a further ambiguity in Spender namely, the idea that, besides there being a 'male' language and 'male' reality, there are also 'women's' meanings and a 'woman's' reality. Applying this to 'table', we get into the absurd situation of accepting that there is a 'masculine' and a 'feminine' sense of table and even possibly male and female referents - thus 'male' and 'female' tables.

According to Assiter, the way around this difficulty is to propose the weaker thesis that men originally did determine 'spatial' of linguistic refers (perhaps that tables are sturdy, strong things), but they do not necessarily continue to do so. Again, Assiter uses an analogy to illustrate this weaker thesis of 'man made' language. If language is com-

More on Man Made Language

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pared to a house, then the architects who designed it were male and, in this sense, language can legitimately be called 'man made'. However, the architect no longer owns the house, although his design may have influenced (skewed) the convenience it has for subsequent owners/users. But all men today cannot be held to blame for the design problems and biases of the original architects unless, of course, they consciously support the same architectural philosophy. The act of referring to something — and then, the connotative level - the social associations and evaluations of that thing. In other words, there is a staged process of attributing meaning within semiotics which is very close to the kind of distinctions that Assiter draws upon in her criticisms of Spender. Assiter argues that Spender simply ignores the difference between the locutionary act and the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts performed in making a 'locutionary act'. Language is not just 'language forms a crucial part of our overall social practice, or 'practical consciousness' as Marx expressed it. This is the case, then language is never finished or completed, but is in a continual state of flux as it responds to changing social practices and shifts in power relations. This active role of language is indicated by linguistic evidence provided by Spender, evidence which Assiter acknowledges to be 'formidable' in its support of a close connection between language and sexism. One such example is the dramatic shift in the meaning of words like 'biddy', 'slut', 'tart' and 'whore', all of which were once non-gender based, but are now confined almost entirely to one or other form of derogation of female sexuality. This historical shift in the 'meaning' of these terms can be explained in a way that would throw doubt not only on Spender's view of language as constructing 'reality', but also on Assiter's arguments that we must distinguish between linguistic system (langue) and the particular usage of language (parole), if we are to arrive at a philosophically sound understanding of sexism in language.

If we take the example of the shift in the meaning of the word 'whore', one needs to ask why it is that it once referred to a 'lover of either sex', and how was it that, given the existence of sexual inequalities at the time of its usage, such sexual descriptions were available to either sex. Were there other terms, now lost, which were derogatory to female sexuality, or is that what we see, historically, is not an uninterrupted line of sexual inequality, but changing types of inequality - sexism, not sexism? There is historical evidence to suggest that women did achieve a significant degree of independence in the 18th century, which was then systematically eroded as capitalist forms of production increased. There is also - in my view - the necessity for different forms of family control. If this is the case, then both Spender's thesis of the necessary connection between men in power and the semantic derogation, and Assiter's countering of this by proposing a distinction between languages as a system and language use, become problematic. Spender's rather unilinear thesis of male power leading to 'male' language has to be further refined by asking which men, from which social class and with what particular social intentions being paramount. The fact that a word such as 'whore' can shift its referent so completely must surely indicate that language does not have some basic, sedimented core of meaning, as Assiter's arguments imply, but is continually changing in line with changing social purposes.

Assiter provides an alternative explanation to that of Spender's concerning the grammatical ruling introduced by the infamous Mr Kirby who, when compiling the O.E.D. in the 18th century, decreed that the 'male gender is more comprehensive than the female and, thus, the pronoun 'he' should include both males and females. Assiter contends that the sexism in language engendered by this ruling should be understood as the unintentional consequence of a more general attempt 'to abbreviate the language'. Although the effect of this change is sexist, Assiter argues that 'it is ludicrous to suppose that an entire grammar book could ever used such language intended to (subjugate the female sex) by his use of it'. I think Mr Kirby's reformulation of the rules can be explained in a way that neither reduces sexism, weakly, to an unintended consequence of a more general (reasonable) rule, nor makes it part and parcel of an overarching, historically non-specific male conspiracy. Could it not equally well be the case that the change in ruling was a small, but important, part of a larger proposal about the relative power of women vis-à-vis men? Just as 'the Falklands spirit' is much as an ideological proposal, intending to shape our responses to the nation as it then was, with the sign 'democracy' a clearly agreed-upon denotative level, but only competing connotations. We might, however, hypothesise situations which might allow 'democracy' to have more denotive force than it presently does. It could happen where either there was a near complete and totalitarian imposition of linguistic referents (in practice highly unlikely since there would always exist some 'underground' alternative to the official referent), or where the present social divisions had been overcome such that democracy was a living (socialist) practice, not a future ideal or a current rationalisation, as is the case now. My argument is that for language to have an agreed locutionary force or denotive referent, social and historical changes are paramount; agreement over meaning is not an intrinsic feature of the linguistic sign.

The conception of language implied by Assiter's use of the analogy with architecture is also problematic. It tends to reinforce a conception of language as a system, a completed edifice which may then only be subject to tinkering and minor alterations at the margin, altering the position of dining rooms here, breaking down the odd partition, there. What such a viewpoint ignores is the way in which language forms a crucial part of our overall social practice, or 'practical consciousness' as Marx expressed it. If this is the case, then language is never finished or completed, but is in a continual state of flux as it responds to changing social practices and shifting power relations. This active role of language is indicated by linguistic evidence provided by Spender, evidence which Assiter acknowledges to be 'formidable' in its support of a close connection.
untidy, but also that it has politically damaging consequences for women. Assiter points to the relativist implications of Spender's thesis that language 'constructs reality', which carries with it the further implication that there are, therefore, 'male' and 'female' realities. Of this, Assiter states -

This is damaging for women, I believe, for the following reason: if husband and wife can neither understand nor communicate with one another, then the wife cannot present criticisms of the husband's use of language which he can come to accept. She and he will continue, whatever she says, to occupy their respective universes: he his, she hers. She cannot begin to enter his, nor he hers.

Although I agree with Assiter that the relativism of Spender's thesis is politically damaging, my reasons for this differ from hers. To illustrate this disagreement, I'd like to make some substitutions to Assiter's example of the husband and wife, because I think this will help to pinpoint some of the worries I have about her general argument about language. Instead of using a lack of communication between husband and wife, we might reasonably substitute a manager and shop steward, since one could also argue that discourse between these would also be based on unequal power relations. In this case, then, the way in which conditions set - if manager and shop steward can neither understand nor communicate with one another, then the shop steward cannot present criticisms of the manager's use of language which he can come to accept. They will continue, whatever either one of them says, to occupy their respective universes...

Clearly if manager and shop steward spoke, literally, different languages, they would require the use of an interpreter, but I think this is not the point of Assiter's criticism of Spender's relativism. She reveals the argument by my substitution. I take it that Assiter's additional use of language in this context is to argue that, of course, they speak the same language in the sense that there is a common set of linguistic referents, but these carry differing illocutionary or perlocutionary force for the manager and shop steward. I would counter this by arguing that, although the words spoken by manager and shop steward (in my example) are the same, there is no single and clear set of referents, so that even if the manager understood the words spoken by the shop steward, the wider political and social referents of those words might well denote not different 'realities', but a single 'contested' reality and, thus, no amount of linguistic clarification would, of itself, be any avail. Again, to use an example, let us suppose that the manager and shop steward were discussing the issue of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay'. It is likely that what they would be disputing is the referent of the term 'fair', with the shop steward suggesting that this should involve less hours, include reasonable rest breaks, and so on, whilst the manager would be referring to such things as the return on profit of labour, efficiency and speed of production, etc. The word 'fair' in this case does not have a clear and unambiguous referent, but is the site of dispute and struggle. One could easily make a similar kind of argument in relation to the husband and wife example provided by Assiter in which the substance of their communication (or lack of it) was his continual reference to her 'inadequate management of the family budget'. Their point of dispute will be what constitutes 'adequate' management, and this may not be resolved by better lines of communication, even though he agrees not to describe this as 'a feminine foible'.

Assiter's distinction between locutionary identity and perlocutionary or illocutionary differences, with only the latter carrying the sexist bias, seems to have an equally dangerous implication that apart from varying usages of language, there is an agreed upon set of verbal signs. I have argued that language is not nearly as immutable as that and can, not simply carry sexist bias, but propose and promote it precisely because the meanings of verbal signs are constructed by political and social practices. Where there are stable linguistic referents, this is because those social and political practices have found some form of resolution.

2 Spender's Relativism: the easy language of multiple realities

The relativism that Assiter rightly criticises in Spender's work is most clearly evident in the chapter 'Language and Reality', in Man Made Language. In that chapter, Spender refers to the sociology of knowledge of Berger and Luckman in support of her ideas on gender and language: she states that 'when there are a sexist language and sexist theories culturally available, the observation of reality is also likely to be sexist'. Spender's reliance on a sociology of knowledge that elsewhere has been strongly criticised for its politically conservative implications is, to say the least, somewhat paradoxical (1). Spender's dependence on such a relativistic theory of language leads her to make some really confusing and contradictory arguments. She states that 'it could be said that out of nowhere we invented sexism, we created arbitrary and appropriate categories of male-as-norm and female-as-deviant' - a theory of sexist language she categorically rejects, only to come up with a theory which is remarkably similar except that the culprit is not gender-indeterminate, but male. On page 142, she elaborates her view:

I would reiterate that it has been the dominant group - in this case males - who have created the world, invented categories, constructed sexism and its justification and developed a language trap which is in their interest.

But this is not a different theorisation of language, it is exactly the same one, only this time identifying half the population as having unproblematically 'invented' categories, language, language, language, language...

The theory also depends on a tautologous explanation of male power, which seems to be that males are powerful because they are males. These arguments, as do most forms of philosophical and sociological relativism, veer between a biological determinism (an even more politically dangerous theory for feminists, but one which Spender gets very close to in her talk of 'male' and 'female' realities) and an ahistorical phenomenology, veering between a biological determinism and a historical phenomenology, between the conditions of oppression, and the possibilities of liberation are limited by the historical conditions that we inherit from our predecessors. It is this sense of history as an active social force that is missing from Spender's work and which, I think, should have been the focus of Assiter's criticisms.

I wholeheartedly concur with Assiter's rejection of the male/female 'apartheid' that is implied by Spender's notion of separate male and female 'realities'. Spender sees this as not just an unfortunate consequence of male power, but something that feminists should value. She counterposes the concept of 'multidimensional reality', emerging from the women's movement, to that of male 'multidimensional reality', which she also refers to as 'tunnel vision'. Her political justification for this is worth quoting; she says that

Multiple reality is a necessary condition of the experience of all individuals as equally valuable and viable. Only within a multidimensional framework is it possible for the analysis and explanation of everyone to avoid the pitfalls of being rejected, of being classified as wrong. (p.103)

Taken out of the context of a consideration of the different approaches to and understandings of the relationship between women and childrearing that Spender uses to justify this view, the above statement becomes either meaningless or wrong. Would we want to say, for example, that the 'experience' of the white South African under apartheid is as 'valuable and viable' as that of the oppressed, black
South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites? The easy language of South African? Would we accept, in the case of South Africa, that separatism is a possible 'solution' to the oppression of blacks by whites! Does not enter. All too often the oppressor holds a duplicate set of keys and the lease on the building as well.

Assiter's objection to separatism, on the grounds that it may well be the first staging post to either the use of force or the elimination of men (as S.C.U.M. proposed), misses the point in my view. A (violent) form of separatism is to be rejected, not only because it is damaging for women or nasty to men, but because it is a non-viable, collective political strategy. Of course, some women may exclude men from most of their personal lives, but they cannot avoid the effects of sexist practices in their public lives. In the provision of nursery places, in primary, secondary and tertiary education, in availability of work, in the negotiation of wage levels and, indeed, in all ways in which a politics based on gender intersects and feeds upon a politics based on class, then feminists, both men and women, have no option other than to contest and oppose the one, unequal 'reality'.

In the final paragraphs of her article, Assiter argues that, whilst a conspiratorial view of man made language is to be rejected, the evidence cited by Spender and others does support the view that language can 'reinforce' power relations between the sexes. This reinforcement is, she says, part of an ideological discourse which is powerful, precisely because it works to disguise those power relations. The semantic derogation of woman and the sexualisation of terms used to describe women suggests that sexism in language is much more thoroughgoing than mere 'reinforcement'. I would argue that language can and has been used to propose and initiate sexual inequalities, just as the reporting of the recent Falklands debacle tried to mobilise a jingoistic attitude on the part of the 'British people'. Ideology does not always work behind people's backs. If Spender's thesis on language is to be rejected, as I think it must, then it must be replaced by one that inserts the struggle over language into the forefront of sexual politics and does not confine it to some rearguard skirmish.

Footnote

1 See Jean Grimshaw's article 'Socialisation and the Self: Critique of Berger and Goffman', in RPP - Summer 1980.