

New Racism . . . New Realism Two Sides of the Same Coin

Mark R. Duffield

Introduction

The *Guardian* recently reported that Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council, following research which showed that ethnic minorities did not receive their fair share of help from the social services department, has employed several Asians to act as unqualified social workers in an attempt to redress this imbalance. The reason given for this initiative was that the Asians concerned were held to 'know how cultural patterns can affect a person's behaviour' <1>. Since the people involved are professionally unqualified, it is implicit that this knowledge comes not from a formal education but from a more informal learning process. It is a knowledge which, presumably, is only gained by being an indigenous member of a given community and thus an integral part of its cultural life. Moreover, this culture, it would appear, is sufficiently different from that of the average social worker to render normal professional criteria inadequate.

The *Guardian* report, in these few paragraphs of newsprint, not only tells us that culture shapes behaviour, it also implies that knowledge itself is culture bound. Of course, these propositions are not new. There is a whole body of literature within social science that argues such points. The Bradford example, however, serves to introduce a number of ideas that I want to go on to connect to another set of ideas. Ideas which are far less benign than those just mentioned appear, at first glance, to be.

New Racism

In his stimulating and timely book, *The New Racism*, Martin Barker has argued for a freeing of the conception of racism from its conventional moorings in prejudice and the consequent ranking of races, nations, groups, and so forth in terms of assumed superiority and inferiority <2>. The reason, Barker claims, is that from the late 1960s the right wing of the Tory Party has been self-consciously developing a new conception of nationhood in which the re-theorisation of race as a non-hierarchical category has played a leading role. Thus, his call for a re-examination of the nature of racism arises not from purely academic grounds, but from the practical consideration that racism as an expression of prejudice has already been outmoded in the world of politics.

It is not that the ideological building blocks of this 'new racism' are in fact all new - some have a long pedigree - it is their integration and systematic elaboration over the last decade or so which marks a new departure.

Barker's methodology has been to piece together the relevant statements of such people as Powell, Sherman, White-law and Thatcher (to name the more well-known) in order to tease out the racial theory that underpins them and to demonstrate its logical and comprehensive character. Below, I will attempt to condense from Barker's extended analysis <3> the main features of new racism.

The starting point of the new racism is difference not hierarchy. It is held to be human nature to form groups based on similarity which then set themselves apart from other groups perceived as different. The cement which binds a group together is its shared way of life: its culture. It is by following a shared way of life that an individual obtains a sense of belonging and security. This shared culture, moreover, is the essence from which individuality is itself defined.

The sense of group solidarity which develops from a common way of life is of vital importance for society since it holds people together by giving them a collective purpose and shared volition. Without this sense of belonging, there would be no culture and, indeed, no nation since a nation is nothing more than a living expression of a people's traditions and way of life. From this perspective, an ideal nation is culturally homogeneous. The family, defined as the natural basis of all societies, is the link between the nation and the individual. It is the repository and transmitter of the culture and way of life of a nation.

What people feel about their culture is paramount. If people sense that their way of life is being threatened, since it is so central to their social and individual existence, it will arouse fear and hostility. Immigrants, because they have a different way of life, elicit this response. It does not matter whether peoples' fears are real or imaginary. The very fact that fears which are 'genuinely held' have been aroused is sufficient to cause disruption and thus threaten the national fabric.

'You do not need to think of yourself as superior - you do not even need to dislike or blame those who are so different from you - in order to say that the presence of these aliens constitutes a threat to our way of life.' <4>

The new racism does not have to rank races hierarchically. This can be left to the universally condemned National Front. All human beings are sufficiently biologically alike to form closed communities: this is a natural tendency. It is also natural to rise to the defence of that community when the future of its way of life is felt to be threatened. This is as true of the British as it is of Asians and West Indians. In this respect we are all the same. It is a reaction that is rooted in instinct and finds expression in the common sense

of a people. Because it is instinctive, the defence of a way of life is a non-rational and unreasoned process. Its inherent non-rationality however is not to say that it is bad. It is a natural reaction and one which, in the case of Britain, has served its people well enough over the centuries.

Because the formation and defence of separate cultures is instinctive, it shows the fallacy of the call for integration. People of separate cultures and following separate ways of life want to remain distinct. This is not because of mere familiarity or personal preference: it would be unnatural for them to want otherwise. Legislators and other 'do-gooders' who suggest otherwise are simply interfering with an instinctive process and their intellectual rationalizations invariably do more harm than good. The common sense wish of the people for a separate identity, moreover, is not only natural. It is also at the heart of the problem. The most convivial setting for individuals of different cultures is their own national homeland where their traditions and way of life can be enjoyed to the full. The presence of alien cultures in Britain not only threatens the British way of life and thus its national cohesiveness (through the genuinely held fears aroused) but means that immigrants themselves cannot develop their cultures in a complete and proper manner. Unavoidable hostility will check their every advance whilst threats to their own way of life will lead to inevitable internal tensions. This hostility and these tensions, as Powell has frequently told us, must eventually lead to a breakdown of social order unless the 'heroic measures' that he advocates are instigated.

I have summarised at some length what I understand to be the main aspects of what Barker calls the 'pseudo-biological culturalism' of new racism <5>. Barker's own analysis of it is much richer than my summary but I think I have said sufficient to indicate its shape and internal powers of extension and self-validation. In the last analysis, it is nothing if not an attempt to justify repatriation. Valuable as Barker's account is, I believe that a lot of its force is lost unless a number of other connections are made. This is necessary since Barker, in his book at least, tends to isolate new racism as a product of Toryism and right wing neo-social Darwinism. Thus, the ideological pedigree of new racism is traced from the philosophy of Hume to the striking affinity it has with the work of the contemporary sociobiologists.

At a political level, new racism and the redefinition of nationhood with which it is connected, that is, from being viewed pragmatically as an assemblage of competing interests to one which emphasises individual loyalty, is understood as a response of Toryism to the end of the post-war boom. Although this analysis is valid in itself, it misses important connections between new racism and other political and ideological changes that have been taking place. Perhaps this is best illustrated by Barker's portrayal of the Labour Party. The general impression given is of a party capitulating to or trailing behind a confident Tory right, not out of genuine agreement but more out of apathy borne of its lacking 'an alternative coherent conceptualisation' <6>. I am going to attempt to redefine this connection by placing the emergence of new racism within a different context, that of the shift of the consensus on the race issue from views based on assimilation to those based on integration.

The Road to Integration

From the late 1940s to the mid 1960s the general view on the race question was that the newly arrived immigrants would slowly become assimilated into the British way of life <7>. Leaving aside political and economic changes for the moment, it is clear that from the mid 1960s another view slowly began to gain ground. This was based upon the argument that assimilation was not taking place, nor was it likely to. The shift from assimilation to integration was based upon the linking of the prospect of good race relations with the need to restrict immigration. Whereas the

1962 Race Relations Act had attempted to regulate immigration by reference to the labour market, the Labour Party's 1965 White Paper represented a re-alignment of policy in this direction <8>. The unequal treatment of black people outside Britain was argued to be the precondition for the equal treatment of those inside.

On this contradictory foundation, assimilation was traded for integration based on cultural pluralism and the formal commitment to equal opportunity. However, if it is felt necessary to restrict the entry of people from certain countries for the national good, it follows that the extending of equal opportunity to the same people who are already in Britain may encounter certain 'problems'. As the commitment to integration has gained ground, these problems have usually been thought through in terms of the 'disadvantages' that immigrants, or at least, their way of life are felt to possess. Equal opportunity policy has usually been aimed at eliminating these perceived problems. Below, I will briefly examine current race relations training as an example. First, however, it is necessary to sketch in some of the institutional signposts that mark the road to integration.

In 1966, Roy Jenkins, in a speech to the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, gave his famous definition of integration as not being a 'flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' <9>. In the same year, the Race Relations Act made it illegal to discriminate in a place of public resort and saw the creation of the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission which superseded the NCCI. The RRB was charged with upholding the law whilst the CRC was to carry out an education and liaison role. The acceptance of an integrationalist ideology, however, did not happen uniformly. It spread, in fact, in an uneven manner.

By the end of the 1960s education had become the first public sphere in which a formal commitment (practical application is a different question) to cultural pluralism and the special measures deemed necessary to promote equal opportunity had been made <10>. The employment field was different. The 1963 Race Relations Act, which extended the law against discrimination to employment and housing, still contained a number of assimilationist assumptions. An important aim in employment, for example, was to disperse (the operational side of assimilation) black workers over a wider range of industries and jobs than those into which they had been concentrated. Apart from attempting to end discrimination at the gate, the Act, through the Racial Balance Clause, encouraged individual employers to disperse any concentration of black workers which had emerged in a particular department or shift.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s there were few departures in the field of industrial training for black workers. One major exception was language training for Asian workers <11>. This remained sporadic and experimental, however, until the formation of the Industrial Language Training Service in 1975 <12>. As the name implies, this unit has argued that the inability to communicate fully is the main disadvantage facing the Asian worker, a disadvantage held to give rise to a wide range of industrial problems. The previous year, the TUC issued its 'model clause' on equal opportunity with the intention of having it inserted in all appropriate agreements <13>. The 1976 Race Relations Act was the last step in the transition from assimilation to integration in employment. The Racial Balance Clause was abolished, the idea of unintended or institutional discrimination introduced, provisions for the training of black workers established and the Commission for Racial Equality set up.

The period between the mid 1950s and the mid 1970s represents a transition period in which the idea of cultural pluralism and equal opportunity gradually supplanted that of assimilation. With the transition complete, there has been a further expansion of what, during the late 1960s,

became known as the 'race relations industry'. This expansion, however, is different from that which took place after the 1966 Act. Since 1976, the formal race institutions (CRE and CRCs) have grown only slowly. Expansion has largely taken place through initially separate bodies becoming concerned with the race issue and the appearance of new educational and training initiatives, including training for whites, under a variety of institutional headings. Thus, the Manpower Services Commission <14> and the Department of Employment <15> have become involved.

The ILTS has, in addition to language training, enlarged its programme to include race relations instruction for whites in industry, local authorities and commerce <16>. Other training courses for whites have also emerged; the Workers Educational Authority and Open University, for example, producing courses and materials. Over the last few years, the TUC and individual trade unions have become increasingly involved in training for both black and white trade unionists <17>. Whilst these developments have been taking place, growing numbers of local authorities have begun to employ their own race relations advisors and officers.

These are just a few examples of the nature of the expansion of the race relations industry since the passage of the 1976 Act. Those official bodies, agencies and associations which constitute the basis of this growth can be termed the 'liberal establishment'. This not only includes the CRS and other statutory bodies, but also sections of the labour and trade union movements, various voluntary associations and parts of academia which, when taken together, represent the institutional commitment to cultural pluralism within a framework of equal opportunity. The aim of the liberal establishment is to promote better race relations through education, the ending of explicit and implicit discrimination and the amelioration of disadvantage.



New Realism

The ethos of the liberal establishment in confronting the failure of assimilation with the realities of cultural pluralism has been what I would like to call that of a 'new realism'. This has been precisely the spirit in which successive commentators have approached the problems of integration. Thus, Dilip Hiro greeted the fact that cultural pluralism had begun to be accepted during the latter half of the 1960s in the following words: 'Already there are signs that after years of myopia and fantasy-mongering, realism is steadily creeping into the sociological, administrative and political circles' <18>. In several other places, Hiro emphasises the 'realism' of cultural pluralism as against the 'fallacy' of assimilation <19>. The ideological basis of new realism, and that which holds sway in the liberal establishment, is culturalism. It is my contention that culturalism is the shared terrain which links the new realism of integration with the new racism of repatriation. It is not fortuitous that both emerged and were self-consciously elaborated at the same time. Unlike new racism, which has a pseudo-

biological underpinning, new realism does not depend, at least explicitly, on ideas of biological determinism. Indeed, it can even be seen as being opposed to such ideas <20>. Instead the culturalism of new realism depends upon environmental, sociological and psychological underpinning. Despite this apparent difference, however, the basic assumptions of new racism and new realism are strikingly similar.

In order to establish this congruence, and at the same time map out the dominant ideological trend within the liberal establishment, I want to explore the ideas of a few writers whom I believe are representative of the new realist position. The first point that I wish to make about new realism, and one which it shares with new racism, is that it offers a relatively static and normative analysis of society. The impression given is that a people's way of life or culture is a more or less fixed entity which, through the generations, continues to shape behaviour and perceptions.

An example of this is the culturalist analysis of the reasons for Asian immigration in terms of 'tradition'. Thus, Hiro's treatment of migration from the Punjab, which is typical of the genre, stresses the dynamic nature of Sikh culture resulting from the turbulent history of the area. This dynamism has meant that migration and military service are long-standing traditions and, when coupled with such factors as over-population and land scarcity, 'explains' Sikh emigration to Britain <21>. As can be seen, this form of analysis conveniently side-steps the need to consider the effects of colonisation. It is as if it had not occurred or that its impact was minimal. Whilst this is implicit in many culturalist analyses, Hiro makes the point explicitly. 'Britain left the social structure and culture of the Indian masses well alone' <22>. Here, I do not wish to question this amazing statement other than to mention that it is an example of the target at which the critics of culturalism have usually aimed. That is, that it does not examine the relations of power and exploitation within society but, indeed, serves to disguise them <23>. For the new realists, as for the new racists, a society is an amalgam of family ties, beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and so on.

Although I have said that the culturalist view of society is relatively static, it should be clearly stated that, rather than implying inertia, the rigidity involved is better understood as a live and active one: something which people themselves strive for. Hiro makes this point well when discussing Asian immigration. 'Unlike the West African slaves, there was no rupture of continuity, no annihilation of the past. The Indians carried their past with them and recreated the present in its image - ' <24>.

Below, I will return to the difference held to exist between West Indians and Asians in this statement. First, I wish to state the culturalist assumptions so far. That is, a cultural heritage unbroken by colonialism (the one exception being colonialism based upon slavery) actively recreates itself when transposed to a new environment. For Hiro, this re-creation is a result of the need for psychological security which immigrants feel <25>. From a more sociological perspective, one which emphasises instrumentality, Ballard and Ballard have argued that the 1950s were a transitional phase of Sikh settlement. During the 1960s, when families were being united, 'the Sikhs set about re-creating as many of the institutions of Punjabi society as possible' <26>. An example of this approach is Brooks and Singh's treatment of the role of English speaking middlemen amongst Indian foundry workers. The system of patronage and bribery which these men operated is understood as being 'the logical extension of cultural assumptions brought in from the migrants' country of origin' <27>.

An extreme version of this sociological approach can be found in Wallman's argument that even the choice of what jobs immigrants do is largely culturally determined <28>. At a demographic level, this recreation of a way of life after immigration is held to correspond to a return to racial endogamy. For new realism, the inter-racial liaisons which were common during the early days of immigration were, essentially, a consequence of the sexual imbalance in

the immigrant community. Once this began to equalise the incidence of inter-marriage began to decline in proportional terms. Hiro argues that this represents the wish to avoid social and psychological problems <29>, whilst Ballard and Ballard have claimed that with the Sikhs it was a positive desire to reconstruct the 'traditional' joint family <30>.

New realism, like new racism, regards it as a normal state of affairs for different peoples to maintain their separate ways of life and cultural identity. This assumption, for example, clearly underlies Dahya's analysis of Pakistani settlement <31>. For Hiro, the 'voluntary separation' that this involves 'is not, and need not, be underlined by rigid belief, on racial lines, in the philosophy of inferiority/superiority' <32>. As with new racism, the key word is difference not hierarchy.

It is the problem of promoting equality between cultures (and thus people) defined as different, and at the same time meeting this problem head-on, which invokes the reforming spirit of new realism. The conviction that cultural pluralism is normal arises directly from the culturalists' view of a way of life as something which actively re-creates itself. Since, however, the culturalists' view of society eschews questions of power and exploitation, it can only operationalise this claim by the use of a few relatively simple cultural stereotypes. These stereotypes are located in the distinction, indeed, opposition, between what is said to constitute West Indian and Asian culture.

A good starting point here is the early work of Banton. Writing in the mid-1950s, Banton distinguished between the various immigrant groups according to their degree of 'solidarity' or 'social cohesiveness'. This cohesion, he argues, is inversely related to 'the extent to which European influences have disrupted the culture of origin' <33>. On this basis, Banton regards Sikhs and Pakistanis as the most cohesive, whilst West Africans and West Indians are the least.

'Both West Africa and the West Indies were particularly susceptible to British influence, lacking the cultural counter weights of a developed but independent religion or sentiments of membership in an alternative large-scale political unit or culture.' <34>

For Banton, the lack of an indigenous culture and the compensating attachment to the 'mother country' provided the motivation for West Indian immigration and also furnished these immigrants with an assimilationist outlook. Having suffered the most disruption of all, it also explained the reputation of the West Indian for 'reacting the most strongly of all the immigrants to anything considered as a slight or insult' <35>. With regard to Asians, Banton found a 'striking contrast' between them and West Indians. Asians had suffered the least disruption to their culture, they had an independent religion, they made light of insults and had an instrumental attitude to employment since they would accept the worst jobs - jobs that even West Indians would not do <36>. Most of all, however, and unlike West Indians, Asians prefer to remain in their own groups and preserve their own cultural identity. 'The Pakistanis and Sikhs are examples of non-assimilating or accommodating as opposed to adapting groups' <37>. For Banton, the social cohesiveness of the various immigrant groups, itself an index of the desire to assimilate, was related to the extent to which their original cultures had been disrupted.

Writing at a much later date, Hiro has refined this thesis and developed more fully the opposition between Asian and West Indian cultures alluded to by Banton. I have already quoted Hiro to the effect that, like Banton, he regards colonialism as having had little or no effect on the Asian way of life. Hiro's refinement consists in isolating slavery as the main agent, indeed, the only agent of cultural disruption.

What is more, in line with modern culturalism, he clearly establishes the stereotypes of Asian and West Indian culture in relation to the family. For Hiro, the inherited way of life which acts to oppose West Indian and

Asian cultures can be understood as the consequences for the family of the anarchy of West Indian slavery on the one hand and the Asian agrarian idyll on the other. 'Nothing illustrates the effect of the past on the present better than the contemporary family structure and sexual mores among Afro-Caribbeans and Afro-Americans' <38>. Hiro analyses slavery in terms of its representing 'the total destruction of the conventional family system' <39>. Since, for new realists as well as new racists, the family is the basis of the social order, its destruction can only have drastic consequences. Hiro's description of the results for West Indians can be summed up in the creation of a pathological psychology. Thus, extreme individualism, repression of true feelings, circumlocution, self-depreciation, sudden changes of mood and truculence are just some of the deductions that Hiro makes from slavery's disruption of the way of life <40>.

Stripped of their own cultures, and thus being psychologically vulnerable, slaves were 'Anglicised' by having their masters' culture thrust upon them. This Anglicisation, however, did not extend as far as the family, the basis of cultural life. Following emancipation, Hiro goes on to argue, a system of cohabitation emerged with 'a more frequent change of partners than is the case with societies where legal marriage is the norm'. The result was the formation of a matriarchal family structure in which 'the woman has come to play the dual roles of mother and father' <41>.

We can compare this now with how Hiro treats the situation in Asia. 'Agrarian life revolves around seasons which determine the times for sowing seeds and harvesting crops' <42>. There is no disruption here, not even the colonial tax collector appears on the horizon. The conventional family is not destroyed, in fact, the very opposite would seem to happen. The family, as in the work of Ballard <43> and Khan <44>, is presented as the institutionalised form of the Asian way of life. 'Within religious and caste-delineation, life is communal and is institutionalised through the joint family system' <45>. Rather than being a matriarchal system, the Asian family is patriarchal and instead of a role ambiguity 'the role and function of father and mother are well defined' <46>. Instead of liaisons with a number of partners 'rural society in the Indian subcontinent is marked by a high degree of marital fidelity' <47>. Instead of developing extreme individualism, individualism 'as fostered by Western culture is almost unknown' <47>. Rather than truculence or exuberance, Asians are more likely to show 'deference' <49> or to be 'shy and withdrawn' <50>.

I think that it would be fair comment to say that for culturalism the problems with West Indians is their lack of culture which can lead to psychological disorders, whilst Asians have too much which often leads to intense social pressures on the individual. The latter, for example, defines precisely the manner in which Anwar <51> has tackled the emergence of an Asian second generation.

I mentioned the work of Banton in relation to cultural stereotyping, not only because he has gone on to develop an explicitly cultural pluralist position <52>, but also to indicate that the opposition between West Indian truculence and Asian conformity was established in the early days of immigration. In other words, this basic opposition pre-dates the present integrationist era and would seem to be a permanent part of post-war culturalism.

What is interesting, however, is that whilst this opposition has always been there, the new generation of culturalists have attached the opposition to different objects and, at the same time, have attempted to re-write history. Nowadays, for example, the conventional wisdom has it that the main problem with West Indian youth, due to their greater 'awareness', is that they not accept the treatment and conditions that their parents did: this explains the resulting truculence. What is amazing about this claim is that if its purveyors had even a passing acquaintance with the early literature - and I have quoted Banton to this effect - they would realise that the first generation did not passively

accept their treatment at all. The main concern then, as now, was to explain West Indian truculence and 'touchiness'.

What happens, of course, is that by an ideological slight of hand, culturalism suppresses the racial oppression and resistance which underlay this behaviour and, instead, caricatures, in what I believe to be a racist manner, the first generation as somehow 'dumb' in comparison to their newly 'aware' children. Culturalism, with its fixed and caricatured idea of a way of life, has the peculiar ability to be seemingly keeping abreast of events - even being innovative - yet, at the same time, is actually standing still.

The last point of convergence I wish to make between new realism and new racism concerns the question of 'genuinely held' fears. Hiro, again, is instructive on this point. Part of his enthusiasm for cultural pluralism stems from his belief that to leave the minorities well alone in the cultural and social fields would 'reassure those white Britons who, for good or evil, do not wish to see their culture or racial stock adulterated with the Afro-Asian' <53>. Hiro, above all, knows that such fears are unjustified, yet he would agree with the new racists that the very fact that they are held can lead to hostility. Hiro is, of course, giving a popular rendering of the 'genuine fear' argument. A more theorised version of this is to be found in Wallman's analysis of what constitutes 'ethnicity'. '... ethnicity is the process by which "their" difference is used to enhance the sense of "us" for purposes of organisation or identification' <54>. Ethnicity is about organising society and organising experience through the perception of differences. The establishment and maintenance of 'boundaries' is a central feature of this organisation. Boundaries, however, are not fixed, but vary with how 'them' and 'us' are defined.

The criteria of significant differences are always 'functions of context or situation'. The perception of difference is as much subjective as it is objective. It is objective when it pertains to identifiable traits or social characteristics and subjective when it stems from individual experience.

'Because a social boundary is about the organisation of society, no more and no less than it is about the organisation of experience, neither element has more or less reality than the other. Both the difference and the sense of difference count.'

<55>

The study of ethnicity is the study of how perceived differences, even if these differences are only subjective or 'sensed', are organised in an instrumental fashion to achieve certain goals. Ethnicity is about how cultural forms recreate and maintain themselves in changed circumstances.

Since what people 'feel' is important, ethnic identity, as with the new racist idea of the attachment to a way of life, resides essentially in an unreasoned sense of belonging.

'The structure is "felt": "We" of group X are not like the Y's ... "they" do not work, marry, interact with us, the X's, or in the way that X's do ... We feel them to be, know them to be, different from ourselves.'

<56>



Because what people 'sense' or 'feel' is as important as what they know, one would not be far wrong in describing ethnicity as the organisation and manipulation of 'genuine fears'. This is exactly the tone of Khan's analysis of the formation of a Pakistani identity in Britain <57>. Since ethnicity, in the last analysis, is unreasoned, it comes very close to, is even indistinguishable from, the new racist idea of instinctive belonging. Because they share this element of irrationality they are, in different ways, representative of an anti-intellectual tradition. I will return to this point below.

I have said enough to be able to draw together the convergences which link the new realism of the liberal establishment with the new racism of the Tory right. They are both founded upon a set of shared culturalist assumptions. For both, society is synonymous with a way of life or culture. This is of an enduring nature and has the power to recreate itself if circumstances change. Questions of exploitation, class and power are replaced by a focus on the family (or lack of it) as the main institutional form of a people's way of life. Although a people's adherence to their cultural identity is capable of being used instrumentally, this adherence is an unreasoned process. What people feel about themselves is as important as what they know.

Because cultures endure and recreate themselves, it is natural that cultural differences are maintained. It is not a question of one culture being better or worse than another: the main fact is that they are different. Cultural pluralism is the normal state of the world and, due to a contingent history, pluralism has come to characterise the once culturally homogeneous Britain. In such a situation assimilation will not take place but, to the contrary, differences will continue to persist.

As can be seen, the scope of the shared assumptions linking new realism with new racism is broad. In establishing the differences, which are fewer and more restricted, I would like to recall my earlier remarks about Barker, in his original formulation, tending to see new racism exclusively in relation to Toryism. A recent paper on the Scarman Report written jointly with Anne Beezer shows a movement away from this position and the establishment of other points of contact. In their examination of the Scarman Report, Beezer and Barker argue, as I have tried to suggest in relation to new realism, that it is based upon a set of culturalist premises shared with new racism. They go on to argue that, in the last analysis, the difference between Scarman and the new racists is that the former claims that 'differences can be resolved, and peace can be restored, given the will' <58>. This is the essence of the disagreement between new realism, for Scarman is nothing if not a member of the liberal establishment, and new racism.

For new racism, cultural differences persist because the defence of a way of life is a natural and instinctive reaction. Hostility to outsiders is inevitable and cannot, indeed, should not, be prevented. For new realism, on the other hand, cultural differences are maintained purely for psychological and social reasons: for the sense of security or practical help that a shared identity gives an individual. Hostility to outsiders is not a necessary part of maintaining a way of life. When this does occur it is the result of ignorance, misunderstanding or, at most, the defence of a sectional interest or competition for a scarce resource.

Hostility is not inevitable and, as Beezer and Barker have argued in relation to Scarman, can be prevented if the proper steps are taken. The basic difference between the two is on the position of xenophobia in the scheme of things. For the new racists it is primary and creative, whilst for the new realists it is secondary and derivative. In the final analysis, they are only at odds on the position of violence in the system. New realism and new racism are in fundamental agreement over the terms in which black people in Britain are to be discussed and their future decided. When two seemingly opposed sides in a power bloc share an agreed terrain in this manner, the result can be called 'hegemony'. The transition from assimilation to inte-

gration represents an important change in the nature of racial hegemony. New realism and new racism are oppositions rooted in the soil of culturalism: they are necessary reflections of each other.

Outlook

In this paper I have tried to argue that new realism and new racism are substantially the same thing. Although having earlier origins, they emerged together from the mid 1960s onwards as part of the transition from assimilation to integration. Although the only point of substantial difference between them is on the status of violence, it is sufficient to allow a hegemonic debate within the power bloc of the liberal and right establishment. As Beezer and Barker have argued in relation to the Scarman Report, however, the purchase which new racism has over the concepts and assumptions of new realism is far greater than that exercised by new realism over new racism. I believe that this is due to the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of culturalism in general.

Because they are oppositions within a shared terrain, I have tried in several places to illustrate the dialectical principle that under given conditions one pole of an opposition can be transformed into its opposite. In this case, new realism changed into new racism. This is of great significance since new realism, because of its shared assumptions and weaker position, already has its own demise, its own capitulation, inscribed within it. All that is needed is for 'proof' to be forthcoming that the presence of different cultures in Britain is leading to violence, then the road is clear for the desertion of the liberal establishment to the side of the opposition. The riots of 1981, the law and order campaign, and so on, are just the sort of 'proof' that is required. The shared assumptions on cultural difference and beliefs are already there to pave the way of new realism's capitulation.

A defeat for new realism under pressure of this nature would, of course, represent the collapse of the present racial hegemony. Why I believe that this is not an abstract proposition is that such a collapse is not without precedent in post-war Britain. The contemporary hegemony between new realism and new racism arose, in fact, out of the rubble of the one preceding it. During the assimilationist era, the basis of racial hegemony was different. Although culturalism was evident, from the early post-war years to around the mid 1960s the main focus was on material resources, not cultural difference. The agreed terrain on which left and right within the establishment discussed immigration was not from the perspective of the social relations involved but in terms of the quantity of such things as jobs, houses, schools and hospitals. The right called for control because these resources were said to be too few and immigration caused a further strain. The left did not dispute this overall approach to the question. Instead, they argued that the talk of control would not arise if these same resources were already present in the immigrant's country of origin. The real malefactor of the story was colonial exploitation which had left many people with no other option except emigration. Within Britain it was the duty of the government to provide all its citizens, regardless of colour, with adequate jobs, houses, and so on <59>.

The agreement over the centrality of resources meant that all that was needed for the left to capitulate to the right was 'proof' that immigration was indeed outstripping the welfare state's ability to provide. This collapse came in the mid 1960s when the labour movement, with equanimity, joined the call for immigrant control. Agreement on how the issue was to be discussed had marked out the transition in advance. This collapse also gave rise to the present hegemony based upon culturalism. Whereas the collapse of the previous racial hegemony produced a commitment to immigration control, the collapse of the present would leave no other option but to press for repatriation.

Footnotes

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- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 7 See S. Patterson, *Dark Strangers*, London, Tavistock, 1963.
- 8 J. Bourne, 'Cheerleaders and Ombudsmen: The Sociology of Race Relations in Britain', *Race and Class*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1980, pp. 335-36.
- 9 R. Jenkins, 'Speech to the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants', May 1966.
- 10 J. Solomos, 'Institutional Racism: Policies of Marginalisation in Education and Training', Mimeo, Research Unit on Ethnic Relations, University of Aston, n.d., pp. 8-10.
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- 12 T.C. Jupp, 'Language, Disadvantage and Ethnic Minorities', *ILT Occasional Paper*, 1981.
- 13 TUC, 'Race Relations at Work', May 1982.
- 14 See, for example, CRE/MSC, *Special Programmes, Special Needs: Ethnic Minorities and the Special Programmes for the Unemployed*, London, 1979.
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- 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 328, 330.
- 20 See R. Lewontin, S. Rose and L. Kamin, 'Bourgeois Ideology and the Origins of Biological Determinism', *Race and Class*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1982, pp. 10-15.
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- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 100.
- 23 Bourne, 1980, pp. 343-45.
- 24 Hiro, 1973, pp. 101-02.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 154-155.
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- 27 D. Brooke and K. Singh, 'Pivots and Presents: Asian Brokers in British Foundries', in S. Wallman (ed.), *Ethnicity at Work*, London, MacMillan, 1979, pp. 93-112. For an alternative view of Asian middlemen see: M.R. Duffield, 'Rationalisation and the Politics of Segregation: Indian Workers in the Foundry Industry, 1945-1962', Paper presented to the Conference on the History of Anglo-Saxon Racial Ideology, Birmingham, September 1982.
- 28 S. Wallman, 'Introduction: The Scope of Ethnicity', in Wallman (ed.), 1979, pp. 1-14.
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- 30 Ballard and Ballard, 1977, p. 36.
- 31 B. Dahya, 'The Nature of Pakistani Ethnicity in Industrial Cities in Britain', in A. Cohen (ed.), *Urban Ethnicity*, London, Tavistock, 1974, pp. 77-118.
- 32 Hiro, 1973, p. 325.
- 33 M. Banton, *The Coloured Quarter*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1955, p. 214.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 214.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74, 214-15.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
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- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 150.
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- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 51 M. Anwar, 'Between Two Cultures', A Study of Relationships Between Generations in the Asian Community in Britain, Commission for Racial Equality, 1978.
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- 59 See Duffield, 1982, pp. 25-27.