REVIEWS

The Politics of Equality

Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983, £15 hb.
Raymond Plent, *Equality, Markets and the State*, Fabian Society, London, 1984, £1.50 pb.

American philosophers have in recent years made a number of major contributions to systematic political philosophy. Rawls and Nozick are outstanding examples. Walzer's book undoubtedly ranks with them, indeed in some ways it ranks above them. In particular, Walzer writes well. He is clear and precise, yet his precision does not, as with Rawls, take the form of a ponderous and meticulous qualifying of every statement. His style is powerful and incisive, far superior to Nozick's piling up of questions. In short, the book is a pleasure to read.

Walzer's aim is to present and defend a form of egalitarianism which is not open to the standard objections. He goes a good way towards accepting such objections, and, in particular, the objection that equality and liberty are incompatible. The book begins with an assertion of the impossibility of equality in the literal sense:

> ... we may dream of a society where power is shared, and everyone has exactly the same share. But we know that equality of that sort won't survive the first meeting of the new members. Someone will be elected chairman; someone will make a strong speech and persuade us all to follow his lead. By the end of the day we will have begun to sort one another out - that's what meetings are for. Living in a capitalist state, we may dream of a society where everyone has the same amount of money. But we know that money equally distributed at twelve noon of a Sunday will have been unequally redistributed before the week is out. Some people will save it, and others will invest it, and still others will spend it (and they will do so in different ways).
> (p. xi)

A regime devoted to equality in its literal sense would have to be authoritarian, ready to crush inequalities whenever they reasserted themselves, as they inevitably and constantly would.

If the equality to be defended is not literal equality, what is it? According to Walzer, the authentic impulse behind the struggle for equality is the attempt to create a society free from domination. What egalitarians object to is not that some people have power or wealth, but what they do with it - how they use it to exact deference, to keep others in thrall, to 'grind the faces of the poor'. We have to consider, then, how to counter such domination. In doing so, we have to recognise that

> the means of domination are differently constituted in different societies. Birth and blood, landed wealth, capital, education, divine grace, state power - all these have served at one time or another to enable some people to dominate others. Domination is always mediated by some set of social goods.
> (p. xiii)

This notion of distinct social goods is central to Walzer's positive account of equality. The version of equality which he defends is contrasted with 'simple equality', which he defines as the attempt to identify some dominant good or goods and redistribute them so that they are equally shared. Simple equality is the rejection of monopoly. But 'simple equality would require continued state intervention to break up or constrain incipient monopolies and to repress new forms of dominance' (p. 15). What we should aim at is not simple equality but complex equality - not the rejection of monopoly, but the rejection of dominance. There exists a diversity of social goods - security and welfare, money and commodities, official positions, work and leisure, education, recognition, political power, and so on. Each has its own appropriate sphere of distribution. But a particular social good becomes dominant when it encroaches on other spheres - when wealth can buy power or offices, for instance, or when economic life is dominated by the holders of political power or by an official bureaucracy. Complex equality, then, is the avoidance of dominance. It is the autonomy of the various distributive spheres. Instead of trying to distribute goods equally within each sphere, we should aim to prevent any one set of goods from dominating others.

Walzer claims that there are principles of distribution internal to each distributive sphere. Each social good carries its own social meaning with it; 'if we understand what it is, what it means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and for what reasons it ought to be distributed' (p. 9). Security and welfare are properly distributed according to need, offices are properly distributed to those who are qualified for them, and so on. But social meanings are not just specific to particular social goods, they are also specific to particular communities, they are historically and socially relative. Therefore to know how social goods are to be distributed we have to look at how they are understood within particular cultures. This largely determines the method adopted by Walzer in the book. Like his earlier book Just and Unjust Wars, it contains a wealth of historical examples. Indeed, 'examples' is hardly the right word, for they are not simply illustrations of a predetermined thesis. Instead, the argument of the book is essentially an appeal to the concrete practices and values of communities past and present. Thus there are marvellously rich and informative accounts of historical cases ranging from the welfare practices of mediaeval Jewish communities, and the examination system in imperial

China, to the Sunset Scavenger Company (a workers' co-operative which collects the garbage in San Francisco), and the town of Pullman, Illinois (a town founded and entirely owned by the American entrepreneur who introduced the Pullman car).

These accounts, and the insights which Walzer derives from them, are immensely impressive. I am not, however, entirely convinced by the theoretical structure which underpins them. My doubts can be summed up in the question: what has 'complex equality' - the autonomy of distributive spheres - got to do with equality? Walzer attempts to make the connection by assimilating 'dominance' to 'domination'. Is this, at bottom, anything more than a verbal ploy? By avoiding 'dominance', by keeping the distributive spheres distinct and putting money, political power, education, recognition and the rest each in their proper place, do we thereby avoid the 'domination' of some people by others? Walzer would, I am sure, claim that there is more than just a verbal link between 'dominance' and 'domination'. His argument would be, I think, that if a particular social good becomes dominant, those who own or exercise that good are thereby enabled to dominate others. There is some plausibility in this. Certainly it is one source of domination. People can use their wealth to buy power, or they can use their political power or their official position to intrude into other areas of people's lives. But that is only one form that domination can take, and I do not think that the elimination of 'dominance' would eliminate all domination. Surely there can be domination within a particular sphere (politics, or economic life, or education), a domination constituted by inequalities which come under Walzer's heading of 'monopoly' rather than 'dominance'.

Moreover, I am not sure that 'dominance' in Walzer's sense can be eliminated, or that it even makes sense to try to eliminate it. Can one really keep the various spheres separate from one another, politics from economic life from welfare provision from education? Don't they all, by their very nature, intrude on one another? And surely some kinds of social goods just are dominant, in their different ways. How can power not be dominant? There are excessive and intrusive uses of power, certainly, but even when not excessive, power is inescapably the exercise of power over other sorts of activities, economic or cultural or whatever. Walzer acknowledges that 'political power is always dominant' insofar as it maintains the boundaries between the different spheres (p. 15n). But it doesn't just do that, it also regulates activities within those spheres, to a greater or lesser degree. Again, how can great wealth, in its own way, not be dominant? One of Walzer's favourite examples of dominance is the use of wealth to buy political power. Since he writes in an American context, one can see why. But even if political life were scrupulously honest and free of corruption, and even if there were strict and narrow limits to the amount of money that could be spent by candidates for political office, great inequalities of wealth would still lead to the dominance of wealth over political power, for wealth doesn't just buy power - wealth is power. In a capitalist economy the ownership of wealth as capital carries with it the power to affect and control the lives of others. The owners of capital are able to make decisions which can counter or divert the policies of the nominal holders of political power. So if wealth is not to be dominant, there must be equality within the sphere of wealth.

Moreover, it seems to me that Walzer himself does sometimes covertly invoke a principle of equality to govern distribution within the various spheres. I am not convinced that he can sustain his claim that there are principles of distribution internal to particular spheres. Take the case of security and welfare. Walzer says that, historically, this has typically been seen as a matter for communal provision, and that 'once the community undertakes to provide some needed good, it must provide it to all the members who need it in proportion to their needs.' This is, he says, 'the inner logic, the social and moral logic of provision' (p. 75). The historical evidence which Walzer marshals is impressive, but it is not by itself an argument. In modern Western societies such as the United States and Britain there are many people who do not think that there should be communal provision for welfare, still less that it should be provision for all according to their needs. They are hardly likely to be convinced by the fact that other communities have thought differently. Take the case of health care, and the lack of a national health service in the United States. Walzer's treatment of this case is instructive.

> It might be argued ... that the refusal thus far to finance a national health service constitutes a political decision by the American people about the level of communal care (and about the relative importance of other goods): a minimal standard for everyone - namely, the standard of the urban clinics; and free enterprise beyond that. That would seem to me an inadequate standard, but it would not necessarily be an unjust decision. It is not, however, the decision the American people have made. The common appreciation of the importance of medical care has carried them well beyond that. In fact, federal, state, and local governments now subsidize different levels of care for different classes of citizens.... But the poor, the middle class, and the rich make an indefensible triage. So long as communal funds are spent, as they currently are, to finance research, build hospitals, and pay the fees of doctors in private practice, the services that these expenditures underwrite must be equally available to all citizens. (p. 90)

But this too is not the decision the American people have made. I am happy to agree with Walzer's advocacy of it, but I do not think that he can appeal to any decisive 'communal meaning' in defence of it. The argument must, I think, appeal to some more fundamental general principle of equality. If such a principle is presupposed, one can then argue that its proper application to the field of health care and welfare provision demands that all should be provided for according to their need. In that way, all can be brought as close as possible to an equal level of well-being. But I do not see how this can be presented as simply the internal logic of health care and welfare provision.

Consider another example, Walzer's discussion of 'hard work'. How is a community to decide which of its members should do the unpleasant and dangerous jobs? Simple equality in this sphere, says Walzer, would be the principle that everyone should do their share of such work. This however is not feasible as a universal solution. Walzer therefore considers a number of other possible measures, such as compensating hard work with extra money or leisure, or trying to make the work more rewarding, for example by changing the way in which it is organised. The suggestions are interesting and attractive, but they still leave the question: why should we want to deal with the problem of hard work in this way? Not, I think, because of any internal logic of 'hard work', but on the basis of a general principle of equality.

These, then, are examples of a principle of equality covertly operating within the distributive spheres. There is one case where Walzer's discussion certainly does not take this form - but then I am not sure on what grounds Walzer can call it egalitarian at all. This is his discussion of wealth, of money and commodities. He says:

> Given the right blocks, there is no such things as a maldistribution of consumer goods. It just doesn't matter, from the standpoint of complex equality, that you have a yacht and I don't, or that the sound system of her hi-fi set is greatly superior to his, or that we buy our rugs from Sears Roebuck and they get theirs from the Orient.... So long as yachts and hi-fi sets and rugs have only use value and individualized symbolic value, their unequal distribution doesn't matter. (pp. 107-8)

This is genuinely faithful to Walzer's explicit definition of 'complex equality'; but then why call it a form of equality

at all? Of course where one buys one's rugs seems a trivial matter, but the examples can be multiplied and expanded, and Walzer's approach seems to countenance vast disparities in people's wealth and therefore in the quality of their lives.

I would suggest, then, that complex equality should be seen not as an alternative to simple equality but as a refinement of it. Walzer often makes simple equality look untenable by identifying it with a crude uniform equality.

> ... This is simple equality in the sphere of leisure; we would fix the length of the working day by adding up hours of work and dividing by numbers of people.
> (p. 189)

Understood in this way, simple equality is of course too simple. But that is only to say that, starting from the general principle that all the members of the community should benefit equally from the activities of the community, we then have to work out in detail what this means for the different kinds of social goods. As I've indicated, it seems to me that for much of the time this is in practice what Walzer is doing, despite his own avowals. Complex equality then becomes not a mode of distribution which can be derived solely from the social meanings of specific social goods, but rather an application of simple equality to the specific character of specific goods. This is not how Walzer intends to use the notion of 'complex equality', but much of the book can be read in this way without loss.

There remain, indeed, important questions about the relations between the different distributive spheres. These cannot, however, be answered with an assertion of the need to keep the various spheres separate and autonomous. As I've said, this seems to me to be an impossibility. 'Dominance' is inescapable, and what one has to do is to understand which spheres are bound to be dominant, and in what ways. One will then be in a position to identify those basic spheres within which there must be equality, if the society as a whole is to be an egalitarian society. This means recognising, for example, as Walzer does, that a society of equality is not possible unless there is sufficient equality in education for everyone to be enabled to play an active part in the life of the community. As Walzer puts it, what is required is that 'everyone is taught the basic knowledge necessary for an active citizenship' (p. 206). But it then has to be recognised that effective equality in education will require a substantial degree of equality in the sphere of wealth; the latter sphere is bound to be dominant in relation to the former. And, in turn, equality of wealth will be impossible without equality of power, for though certain kinds of wealth themselves constitute power, power as such is dominant in relation to wealth. The problem of social equality is therefore, at bottom, the problem of the distribution of power. Walzer in effect recognises this. His discussion of power is the culmination of the book, and the chapter begins with the assertion that power

> is not simply one among the goods that men and women pursue; as state power, it is also the means by which all the different pursuits, including that of power itself, are regulated. It is the crucial agency of distributive justice; it guards the boundaries within which every social good is distributed and deployed.
> (p. 281)

The phrase about 'guarding the boundaries' is again too weak, but the rest of the passage embodies the crucial insight. The chapter on power provides a fine discussion of the need for a genuine rather than a merely nominal democracy, and of the form which this might take. And it is here, rather than in Walzer's more general theoretical structure, that the problem of the alleged conflict between equality and freedom has ultimately to be resolved - in the identifying of those institutional forms which will make for an equality of power, and will thereby both establish the egalitarian character of the society as a whole, and at the same time give people an effective control over their own lives and thus an effective freedom.

Insufficient emphasis on equality of power seems to me to be the weakness of Raymond Plant's Fabian Society pamphlet. In other respects it is an effective and well-argued piece. Writing in the wake of Labour's election defeat, Plant believes that it is necessary to present more forcefully and explicitly the socialist vision of society, and in particular to make the case for equality as a central element in that vision. In the present economic situation it is no longer possible to adopt what he calls the 'oblique' approach to greater equality, relying on economic growth to provide resources for increasing public spending on education and welfare and thereby diminishing the effects of inequality. It is necessary now to mount a more direct attack on inequalities, by developing egalitarian policies on the distribution of wealth through taxation and incomes. Indeed, he suggests that if structural unemployment is going to be a long-term fact of economic life, egalitarian values may become even more important to underpin policies of work-sharing and income/salary sharing. It is therefore necessary to formulate and defend a socialist theory of equality, and in particular to defend it against the market-based politics of the new right.

Plant mounts some effective arguments against this market-based neo-liberalism. He counters the claims that markets are the embodiment of free choice - continuous referenda, as David Owen calls them; unlike a genuine referendum, where each person has one vote, the 'votes' registered in the market are differentially weighted according to the wealth of the 'voter'. More fundamentally, markets limit people's opportunity to make large-scale choices

about the overall character of their society. 'It is very difficult on a very decentralised market basis to take rational strategic decisions which may be of great importance to the overall quality of our lives, and to make choices more important than the small decisions which are characteristic of the much vaunted freedom of choice of the market' (p. 11). Markets also tend to promote certain kinds of moral attitude - egoism rather than altruism, rational calculation of advantage rather than trust - so that, ironically, the active encouragement of a market mentality may actually undermine values which are themselves necessary for the effective operation of the market (p. 13).

Like Walzer, Plant deals especially with the accusation that the pursuit of equality is incompatible with personal freedom. Therefore he is concerned not just to make negative points against the so-called 'freedom of choice' of the market, but also to make the positive connections between equality and freedom. His principal claim is that the pursuit of equality should be seen as the means of securing for everyone the equal value of liberty.

> The liberal is interested in equal liberty; socialists are concerned with trying to secure the distribution of resources which will mean that liberty is of roughly equal value to all persons. The worth of lib-

erty to individuals is related to their capacities, opportunities and resources to advance the purposes which they happen to have. Those with greater income and wealth, fortunate family background etc. will, on the whole, be able to pursue those things for which we value liberty more effectively than the person who does not enjoy these benefits. It is because we value liberty for all that we are concerned to secure a greater equality in the worth of liberty.
(pp. 6-7)

Plant concedes, however, that the pursuit of economic equality may require greater use of state power, to regulate taxation and incomes. He acknowledges the attraction of decentralisation and the enthusiasm of some socialists for a community-based socialism and for institutions such as workers' cooperatives, but he argues that a decentralised economy will inevitably produce inequalities between autonomous enterprises in the same manner as a capitalist market economy. He then says:

However, a decentralist policy is perhaps most compatible with equality when we are considering power rather than income or wealth or other material resources. It seems axiomatic that if we are to secure greater equality in the exercise of power, decision-making has to be decentralised and shared on a broader basis. This is clearly true, and this form of equality is very important in securing the fair worth of liberty for the individual to decide to live his own life in his own way as far as possible. However, we should not be lured into thinking that power is independent of other forms of material inequality, so that it can be distributed more equally by decentralisation while leaving other inequalities in place. Wealth and income are very important political and industrial resources; it is naive to think that power can be decentralised and equalised without touching the broader framework of material inequality, which as I have argued may be very difficult to attack in a decentralised framework.
(pp. 15-16)
(The original text of the second sentence reads ' ... centralised and shared on a broader basis ...', but I assume that this is a misprint.)

I am not sure where this leaves us. The point about the interconnection between wealth and power is important (and I have suggested above that Walzer's theory hinders him from dealing satisfactorily with this). But it seems that, for Plant, we have to choose either to pursue greater equality of power through decentralisation and accept greater inequalities of wealth, or to aim at equalising power primarily by equalising wealth through centralised state power (and perhaps also allowing some decentralisation of other kinds of decision-making, by way of compensation). Plant himself then seems committed to the second option and therefore reconciled to the increase of state power. But we cannot, I think, leave the matter there. What follows, surely, is that an adequate egalitarian politics must take up the question of how to democratise state power. Plant's discussion, like Walzer's, thus leads us inescapably to the question of equality of power - to the recognition of its fundamental importance, and to the problem of what it would consist in. I do not, of course, pretend that this is an easy matter. Glib phrases about participatory democracy won't do the trick, but some hard thinking about participatory democracy is needed, for if egalitarians are to meet the challenge of the neo-liberals, and if it has to be accepted that equalities of wealth are impossible without greater centralised control of the economy, there is then no evading the question of how state power can be more broadly and equally shared.

What also has to be taken up is the question of economic power - the economic power which goes with ownership of the means of production. As I have stressed in discussing Walzer, if it is true that wealth is power, it is even more fundamentally true that the equalisation of wealth is impossible without the equalisation of power, and that means challenging the monopolisation of economic power constituted by private ownership of the means of production. I don't intend this merely as a wearisomely familiar reiteration of traditional socialist dogma. On the contrary, the rethinking of fundamental socialist values such as equality, which Plant calls for and which he and Walzer so impressively promote, should be the occasion to demonstrate that the traditional socialist preoccupation with ownership of the means of production is not just a dead dogma, but a living and necessary concern.

Richard Norman

Philosophy and Education

Patricia White, *Beyond Domination: An Essay in the Political Philosophy of Education*, RKP, £11.95 hb.
David E. Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning. Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy*, RKP, £11.95 hb.

Important issues are tackled in a lightweight fashion in these slim volumes. Both profess a radical perspective on questions affecting the philosophy of education. Patricia White tackles some of the issues raised by the theory or programme of participatory democracy, while David E. Cooper attempts to derive from Nietzsche and others a coherent concept of authenticity as the ideal of true education.

Beyond Domination is an exercise in abstract, and rather utopian, political theory. Starting from a radical libertarian definition of participatory democracy, Patricia White's limited aim is to outline certain of the aims, objectives and institutional mechanisms of an educational system necessary in a participatory democracy. She concentrates on questions of ownership, power (in the sense of decision-making and control) and the role of the headmaster. Somehow the process of education itself, the classroom situation, the teacher-pupil and adult-child relation, are overlooked or bypassed. The author argues for a politicising treatment of the topics such as justice, morality, fraternity and so on across the curriculum as if these topics could quite adequately be parcelled up and packaged, crib notes issued and healthy debate encouraged but without upsetting the asymmetry of teacher-pupil relations. It is simple enough to argue that in a participatory democracy not only all decisions, but all values and presuppositions would be open to discussion and debate. This leaves untouched the moral and political questions which participants in our real, and far from ideally-democratic educational institutions ask themselves. The book offers no solutions to the question of 'who will educate the educators?'.

David E. Cooper's book is well intentioned yet misguided. He makes a good many points with which the majority of RP readers would find sympathy: that 'authenticity' as an ideal is more than the 'autonomy' enshrined as the ideal of liberal educational theory, that it is not so much a value in itself as a preparedness or capacity to expose to radical questioning all values, and so on. But although Cooper distinguishes his own use of 'authenticity' from mere 'autonomy' on the one hand and from iconoclastic (Dadaist) or complacent (do your own thing) versions of 'authenticity' on the other, his own treatment remains vague and somewhat abstract. He derives from Nietzsche's writings common sense and critical ideals but without com-

ing to terms with the deep-seated tensions and ambiguities in Nietzsche's thinking.

Neither Nietzsche's neo-paganism nor the doctrine of eternal return feature in this book. Nietzsche's elitism, his cult of solitude, and the significance of his madness are played down and explained away as the result of ideas born before their time. For a book focusing on 'authenticity' Cooper pays scant attention to the existential dilemmas bequeathed by Nietzsche. A chapter on the relationship between society, technology and nature contains much of value but as with other parts of this study its relation to Nietzsche's thinking is rather tangential.

Nietzsche preserved in his later thinking all of the rage against tradition, against the establishment, against the world of the fathers. His awareness of the antinomies involved in the rapid cultural changes of modernity has hardly an echo in either of these books. Our citizenship of the world of our children and of the future cannot be as cheaply bought as the authors of these two essays would seem to imply.

Lloyd Spencer

Roland Barthes, *Selected Writings*, introduced by Susan Sontag, Fontana Pocket Readers, 1983, £4.95 pb.

Filling almost 500 pages, it must be said that this anthology of the writings of Ronald Barthes represents remarkably good value - at least on a pages per pound basis. It will inevitably be recommended to the many students who are being introduced by Barthes on a variety of courses. It will be a pity if anyone is put off buying the books from which these writings are drawn themselves, many of them already in paperback. Thirty pages from Writing Degree Zero, and from A Lover's Discourse, eleven each from The Pleasure of the Text and Roland Barthes hardly substitute for the pleasure of reading the works as wholes, even if they are wholes comprised of fragments. More satisfying are the many shorter pieces, drawn from Mythologies, the Critical Essays and similar collections. Susan Sontag's brilliant introductory essay is one of the best she has written. She argues that Barthes's de-personalising gestures (the 'death' of the author and so forth) are a function of that intensely personal relation to literature which has made of his life's work as a critic a kind of journal, a disguised and oblique form of autobiography. Bearing this out is the very early essay on Gide's Journal, published in English for the first time. Sadly Barthes's last, and most confessional, masterpiece, the Camera Lucida, is not represented here at all.

As it stands, this collection is an intelligent selection drawn from one of the most productive and consistent literary life-works of this century. It demonstrates that Barthes is least to be taken seriously where he denounces his past selves and draws over-distinct lines of demarcation between his latest and previous positions. The changes and shifts in Barthes's writings may appear to later generations as almost entirely superficial and he may come to be seen, like Baudelaire, as a writer who knew no development. Changes in taste, changes in fashion, new objects of inquiry so much to the fore in Barthes's writings reveal an underlying consistency in his personality. Throughout his life Barthes's intense love of language, his joy in writing, drew him into the kind of attention to literature which leads away from the pursuit of lines of development to an awareness of the multiplicity of possibilities present at any one moment. Barthes's metamorphoses were an application of existentialist ethics by which means he sought to keep himself free from the web of words which he himself had so elaborately spun. Barthes codified and encouraged a mode of reading, active, interested and analytic; a mode of reading which appropriates to itself many of the pleasures and perils of writing. Most especially, it is a mode of reading which pauses, constantly weighing words, the way a particularly meticulous writer might - pondering the precise significance of a particular fragment (a phrase, a word, a figure) measuring it against all those possibilities not yet closed off by that which has gone before. The pleasure Barthes derived from reading, a pleasure erotic in its intimacy and its capacity to excite and provoke, was anything but a surrender to literature. His heightened awareness of the thrill of the finest prose derived from a preparedness to give himself up to all the seductions of narrative, of rhetoric and of argumentation, while at the same time retaining a certain hesitancy, a distance - a coyness, if you like.

To treat Barthes as an authority inflicts great damage on his joyful science, and we have not yet begun to read his work in anything like the manner in which he approached his favourite authors. A collection such as this may however enable us to make a start.

Lloyd Spencer

Hegel Studies

Manfred Riedel, *Between Tradition and Revolution*, Cambridge University Press, 1984, £20 hb.

Riedel is a well-known Hegel specialist. The volume before us is a translation of his Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie originally published in 1969 (second edition 1972). However, one chapter is based on a lecture given in Oxford in 1978, and another has already appeared in English as the Z.A. Pelczynski collection Hegel's Political Philosophy (Cambridge 1971).

The chapters of the book are really separate papers. This leads to some overlap. The general theme is that Hegel inherits a tradition of political philosophy which he recasts in the light of the structures of modernity introduced by the French revolution. For example, the concept of civil society is loosened from its identification with civilised, or political, life, and identified with a depoliticised sphere of social action distinct from the state narrowly understood. Riedel claims that Hegel was the first to thematise modern civil society. Like J. Ritter, Riedel stresses Hegel's knowledge of political economy, and the incorporation of labour in his ontology and in his concept of civil society. (By the way, Ritter is now also in English: Hegel and the French Revolution, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1982.) Riedel brings to his close study of Hegel a thorough knowledge of the latter's sources in Aristotle and the natural law theorists.

The production of the book is not beyond criticism, for the translation is uncertain in places and there are too many bad misprints for a publisher of this standing. Nonetheless, this text is essential for libraries and serious students of Hegel's political philosophy.

Chris Arthur