THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

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When the words physics, chemistry, medicine, or history are mentioned in a conversation, the participants usually have something very definite in mind. Should any difference of opinion arise, we could consult an encyclopaedia or accepted textbook or turn to one or more outstanding specialists in the field in question. The definition of any one of these sciences derives immediately from its place in present day society. Though these sciences may make the greatest advances in the future, though it is even conceivable that several of them, physics and chemistry for example, may some day be merged, no one is really interested in defining these concepts in any other way than by reference to the scientific activities now being carried on under such headings....

... The situation in philosophy is not the same as in other intellectual pursuits. No matter how many points of dispute there may be in those fields, at least the general line of their intellectual work is universally recognized. The prominent representatives more or less agree on subject matter and methods. In philosophy, however, refutation of one school by another usually involves complete rejection, the negation of the substance of its work as fundamentally false. This attitude is not shared by all schools, of course. A dialectical philosophy, for example, in keeping with its principles, will tend to extract the relative truths of the individual points of view and introduce them in its own comprehensive theory. Other philosophical doctrines, such as modern positivism, have less elastic principles, and they simply exclude from the realm of knowledge a very large part of the philosophical literature, especially the great systems of the past. In short, it cannot be taken for granted that anyone who uses the term "philosophy" shares with his audience more than a few very vague conceptions.

The individual sciences apply themselves to problems which must be treated because they arise out of the life process of present day society. Both the individual problems and their allotment to specific disciplines derive, in the last analysis, from the needs of mankind in its past and present forms or organization. This does not mean that every single scientific investigation satisfies some urgent need. Many scientific undertakings produced results that mankind could easily do without. Science is no exception to that misapplication of energy which we observe in every sphere of cultural life. The development of branches of science which have only a dubious practical value for the immediate present is, however, part of that expenditure of human labour which is one of the necessary conditions of scientific and technological progress. We should remember that certain branches of mathematics, which appeared to be mere playthings at first, later turned out to be extraordinarily useful.

Thus, though there are scientific undertakings which can lead to no immediate use, all of them have some potential applicability within the given social reality, remote and vague as it may be. By its very nature, the work of the scientist is capable of enriching life in its present form. His fields of activity are therefore largely marked out for him, and the attempts to alter the boundaries between the several domains of science, to develop new disciplines, as well as to continuously to differentiate and integrate them, are always guided by social need, whether consciously or not. This need is also operative, though indirectly, in the laboratories and lecture halls of the university, not to mention the chemical laboratories and statistical departments of large industrial enterprises and in the hospitals.

Philosophy has no such guide. Naturally, many desires play upon it; it is expected to find solutions for problems which the sciences either do not deal with or treat unsatisfactorily. But the practice of social life offers no criterion for philosophy; philosophy can point to no successes. Insofar as individual philosophers occasionally do offer something in this respect, it is a matter of services which are not specifically philosophical. We have, for example, the mathematical discoveries of Descartes and Leibniz, the psychological researches of Hume, the physical theories of Ernst Mach, and so forth. The opponents of philosophy also say that insofar as it has value, it is not philosophy but positive science. Everything else in philosophical systems is mere talk, they claim, occasionally stimulating, but usually boring and always useless. Philosophers, on the other hand, show a certain obstinate disregard for the verdict of the outside world. Ever since the trial of Socrates, it has been clear that they have a strained relationship with reality as it is, and especially with the community in which they live. The tension sometimes takes the form of open persecution; at other times merely failure to understand their language. They must live in hiding, physically or intellectually. Scientists, too, have come into conflict with the societies of their time. But here we must resume the distinction between the philosophical and the scientific elements of which we have already spoken, and reverse the picture, because the reasons for the persecution usually lay in the philosophical views of these thinkers, not in their scientific theories. Galileo's bitter persecutors among the Jesuits admitted that he would have been free to publish his heliocentric theory if he had placed it in the proper philosophical and theological context. Albertus Magnus himself discussed the heliocentric theory in his Summa, and he was never attacked for it. Furthermore, the conflict between scientists and society, at least in modern times, is not concerned with fundamentals but only with individual doctrines, not tolerated by this or that authority in one country at one time, tolerated and even celebrated in some other country at the same time or soon afterwards.

When it was said that the tension between philosophy and reality is fundamental, unlike the occasional difficulties against which science must struggle in social life, this referred to the tendency embodied in philosophy, not to put an end to thought, and to exercise particular control over all those factors of life which are generally held to be fixed, unconquerable forces or eternal laws. This was precisely the issue in the trial of Socrates. Against the demand for submission to the customs protected by superstitions and misconceiving tradition to the traditional
forms of life, Socrates asserted the principle that man should know what he does, and shape his own destiny. It is true that we dwell with him in the same reason and will. Today the conflicts in philosophy no longer appear as struggles over gods, but the situation of the world is no less critical. We should indeed be accepting the present situation if we were to maintain that reason and reality have been reconciled, and that man's autonomy was assured within this society. The original function of philosophy is still very relevant.

It may not be incorrect to suppose that these are the reasons why discussions within philosophy, and even discussions about philosophy are so much more radical and conciliatory than discussions in the sciences. Unlike any other pursuit, philosophy does not have a field of action marked out for it within the given order. This order of life, with its hierarchy, is itself a problem for philosophy. While science is still able to refer to given data which point the way for it, philosophy must fall back upon itself, upon its own theoretical activity. The determination of its object falls within its own program much more than is the case with the special sciences, even if they too are so deeply enmeshed with problems of theory and methodology. Our analysis also gives us an insight into the reason why philosophy has received so much more attention in European life than in America. The geographical expansion and historical development have made it possible for certain social conflicts, as it were, to flare up with clarity and sharply in Europe because of the existing relationships, to decline in significance in this continent under the strain of opening up the country and of performing the daily tasks. The basic problems of societal life found a temporary practical solution, and so the tensions which give rise to need for theoretical thought in specific historical situations, never became so important. In this country, theoretical thought usually lags far behind the determination and accumulation of facts. Whether that kind of activity still satisfies the demands which are justly made upon knowledge in this country too, is a problem which we do not have the time to discuss now.

It is true that the definitions of many modern authors, some of which have already been cited, hardly reveal any of the latter, although they are so deeply enmeshed with problems of theory and methodology. Many philosophers throw envious glances at their colleagues in other faculties who are much better off because they have a well marked field of work, whose fruitfulness for society cannot be questioned. These authors struggle to give rise to thought in specific historical situations, never became so important. In this country, theoretical thought usually lags far behind the determination and accumulation of facts. Whether that kind of activity still satisfies the demands which are justly made upon knowledge in this country too, is a problem which we do not have the time to discuss now.

With the philosophy of Descartes, for example, we must ask whether his notions corresponded to the aristocratic and Jesuit groups of the court, or to the noblesse de robe, or to the lower bourgeoisie and the merchant class. Every pattern of thought, whether philosophical or other cultural work, belongs to a specific social group, with which it originates and with whose existence it is bound up. Every pattern of thought is "ideology"!

There can be no doubt that there is some truth in this attitude. Many ideas prevalent today are reused to be mere illusions when we consider them from the point of view of their social basis. But it is not enough merely to correlate these ideas with some one social group, as that sociological school does. We must penetrate deeper and develop them out of the decisive historical processes from which the social groups themselves are to be explained. Let us take an example. In Descartes' philosophical, mechanistic thinking, particularly mathematics, plays an important part. We can even say that this whole philosophy is the universalization of mathematical thought. Of course, we can now try to find some group in society whose character is correlative with this viewpoint, and we shall probably find some such definite group in the society of Descartes' time. But a more complicated, yet more adequate, approach is to study the productive system of those days and to show how a member of the rising middle class, by force of his very activity in commerce and manufacture, was induced to make precise and abstract, more mechanistic way of thinking, particularly mathematics, plays an important part. We can even say that this whole philosophy is the universalization of mathematical thought. Of course, we can now try to find some group in society whose character is correlative with this viewpoint, and we shall probably find some such definite group in the society of Descartes' time. But a more complicated, yet more adequate, approach is to study the productive system of those days and to show how a member of the rising middle class, by force of his very activity in commerce and manufacture, was induced to make precise calculations if he wished to preserve and increase his power in the newly developed competitive market, and the same holds true of his agents, so to speak, in science and technology whose inventions and other scientific work played so large a part in the constant struggle between individuals, cities, and nations in the modern era. For all these subjects, the given approach to the world was its consideration in mathematical terms. Because this class, through the development of society, becomes characteristically the agent of the whole, the whole activity which we have called "ideology" was widely diffused far beyond the middle class itself. Sociology is not sufficient. We must have a comprehensive theory of history if we wish to avoid serious errors. Otherwise we run the risk of relating important philosophical theories to accidental, not every rate, not every group, and of misconstruing the significance of the specific group in the whole of society, and, therefore, of misconstruing the culture pattern in question. But this is not the chief objection. The stereotyped application of the concept of ideology to every pattern of thought is, in the last analysis, based on the notion that there is no philosophical truth, in fact no truth at all for humanity, and that all thought is "seinsgebunden".

Instead of rational organization of domestic and international relations, there was the rapid spread of certain portions of civilization at the expense of the whole. One stood to philosophy as he does to other systems of knowledge, with an enormous increase in instruments of destruction. These factors of security and prosperity become dubious if it is made the sole end of action. For Plato, philosophy meant the tendency to bring and maintain the various energies and branches of knowledge in a unity which would transform these partially destructive elements into productive ones in the fullest sense. This is the meaning of his demand that the philosophers should rule. It means lack of faith in the prevailing popular thought. Unlike the latter, reason never loses itself in a single idea, though that idea might be the correct one at any given moment. Reason exists in the whole system of ideas, in the progression from one idea to another, so that every idea is understood and applied in its true meaning, that is to say, in its meaning within the whole of knowledge. Only such thought is rational thought.

This dialectical conception has been applied to the concrete problems of life by the great philosophers; indeed, the rational organization of human existence is the real goal of their philosophies. Dialectical clarification and refinement of the conceptual world which we meet in every philosophy is the necessary condition for the unfolding of man's intellectual powers, and this idea lies at the basis of all of Western humanism.

Anyone who studies modern philosophy, not merely in the standard compendia, but through his own historical researches, will perceive the social problem to be a very decisive motive. I need only mention Hobbes and Spinoza. The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of Spinoza was the only major work which he published during his lifetime. With other thinkers, Leibniz and Kant for instance, a more penetrating analysis reveals the existence of social and historical categories in the foundations of the most abstract chapters of their works, their metaphysical and trans­


in fact it is a source of annoyance. Philosophy lacks criteria and compelling proofs. Investigation of facts is strenuous, too, but one at least knows what to go for. Many an assistant quietly identifies himself with the confusion and entanglements of his private and public life: he feels insecure and on dangerous ground. In our present division of labor, those problems are assigned to the philosopher or theologian. Or, man consoles himself with the thought that the more discursive and the more fundamentally everything is all right. In the past century of European history, it has been shown conclusively that, despite a semblance of security, man has not been able to arrange his life in accordance with his conceptions of humanity. There is a gulf between the ideas by which men judge their real and the social reality which they reproduce through their actions on the other hand. Because of this circumstance, all their conceptions and judgments are two-sided and falsified. Now man sees himself heading for disaster or already engulfed in it, and in many countries he is so paralyzed by approaching barbarism that he is almost completely unable to react and protect himself. He is the rabbit before the hungry stoat. There are times perhaps when one can get along without theory, but this deficiency lowers man and renders him helpless against force. The fact that theory may rise into the rarified atmosphere of a hollow and bloodless idealism or sink into tedium and empty phrasemongering, does not mean that these forms are its true forms. As far as tedium and banality are concerned, philosophy often finds its match in the so-called investigation of facts. Today, at any event, the whole historical dynamic has placed philosophy in the center of social actuality, and social actuality in the center of philosophy.

Attention should be drawn to a particularly important change which has taken place along these lines since classical antiquity. Plato held that Eros erodes the human soul, that it is necessary for knowledge with a moral or psychological state, Eros, which in principle may exist at every historical moment. For this reason, his proposed State appeared to him as an eternal ideal of reason, not bound up with any historical condition. The dialogue on the Laws, then, was a compromise, accepted as a preliminary step which did not affect the eternal ideal. Plato's State is an Utopia, like those projected at the beginning of the modern era and even in our own days. But Utopia is no longer the proper philosophic form for dealing with the problem of society. It has been recognized that the contradictions in thought cannot be resolved by purely theoretical reduction. That requires an historical development beyond which we cannot leap in thought. Knowledge is bound up not only with psychological and moral conditions, but also with social conditions. The enunciation and description of perfect political and social forms out of pure ideas is neither meaningful nor adequate.

Utopia as the crown of philosophic systems is therefore replaced by a scientific description of concrete relationships and tendencies, which can lead to an improvement of human life. Modern philosophy shares with the ancients their high opinion of the potentialities of the human race, their optimism over man's potential achievements. The proposition that man is by nature incapable of living a good life or of achieving the highest levels of social organization, has been rejected by the greatest thinkers. Let us recall Kant's famous remarks about Plato's Utopia: "The Platonic Republic has been supposed to be a striking example of purely imaginary perfection. It has become a byword, as something impossible to obtain in an ideal thinker only, and Bruckner thinks it ridiculous that Plato could have said that no prince could ever govern well, unless he participated in the ideas. We should do better, however, to follow up this thought and endeavour (where that excellent philosopher leaves us without his guidance) to place it in a clearer light by our own efforts, rather than to throw it aside as useless, under the miserable and very dangerous pretext of its impracticability... For nothing can be more misleading and more mischievous than the vulgar appeal to what is called adverse experience, which possibly might never have existed, if at the proper time institutions had been framed according to those ideas, and not according to crude concepts, which, because they were derived from experience only, have marred all good intentions," [2]

Since Plato, philosophy has never deserted the true idealism that it is possible to introduce reason among individuals and among nations. It has only discarded the false idealism that it is sufficient to set a perfect picture in man and then neglect the way in which it is to be attained. In modern times, loyalty to the highest ideas has been linked, in a world opposed to them, with the sober desire to know how these ideas can be realized on earth.

Before concluding, let us return once more to a misunderstanding which has already been mentioned. In philosophy, unlike business and politics, criticism does not mean the condemnation of a thing, grumbling about some measure or other, or mere negation and repudiation. Under certain conditions, criticism may actually take the destructive turn; there are examples in the Hellenistic age. By criticism, we mean that intellectual, and eventually practical, effort which is not satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions unhmingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to coordinate the individual sides of social life with each other and with the general ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them genetically, to distinguish the appearance from the essence, to examine the foundations of things, in short, really to know them. Hegel, the philosopher to whom we are most indebted in many respects, was so far removed from any querulous repudiation of specific conditions of Prussian life as to instruct his students in Berlin to inculcate the students with proper loyalty and to immunize them against political opposition. Hegel did his best in that direction, and declared the Prussian state to be the embodiment of the divine Idea on earth. But thought is a peculiar factor. To justify the Prussian state, Hegel had to teach man to overcome the one-sidedness and limitations of ordinary human understanding and to see the inter-relationship between all conceptual and real relations. Further, he had to teach man to construe human history in its complex and contradictory structure, to search out the idea of freedom in a world of strength, to know how these ideas can be realized on earth. The fact that Hegel thus had to train his students in theoretical thought, had highly equivocal consequences for the Prussian state. In the long run, Hegel's work did more serious harm to that reactionary institution than all the use the latter could derive from his formal glorification. Reason is a poor ally of reaction. A little less than ten years after Hegel's death (his chair remained unoccupied that long) the King appointed a successor to fight the "dragon's teeth of Hegelian pantheism", and the "arrogance and fanaticism of his school".

We cannot say that, in the history of philosophy, the thinkers who had the most progressive effect were those who found most to criticize or who were always on hand with so-called practical programs. These are not that simple. A philosophic doctrine has many sides, and each side may have the most diverse historical effects. Only in exceptional historical periods, such as the French Enlightenment, does philosophy itself become politics. In that period the word philosophy did not refer to minute scientific theories such as attacks on the Church hierarchy and on an inhuman judicial system. The removal of certain preconceptions was virtually equivalent to opening the gates of the
new world. Tradition and faith were two of the most powerful bulwarks of the old regime, and the philosophical attacks constituted an immediate historical action. Today, however, it is not a matter of eliminating a creed, for in the totalitarian states, where the boldest appeal is made to heroism and a lofty Weltanschauung, neither faith nor Weltanschauung rule, but only dull indifference and the apathy of the individual towards destiny and to what comes from above. Today

Is philosophy really necessary?
Edmund Burke

As almost any philosopher assigned the task of teaching the history of his subject is ready to admit, it is pointless simply to present the student with a chronological sequence of doctrines, with what a succession of celebrities taught of "held". Pointless because there is nothing the student can do with such doctrines in isolation except to digest them, correlate them with the problems they were designed to solve. Suppose, however, that the problems in question are those of determining whether we may not be dreaming all the time, or whether we can have any knowledge of the world except on the testimony of our sensations. It still will not be seen to be arguable that we are doing more than teaching him an esoteric game, which has no obvious connection with the major concerns of humanity, and of the which as intellectual exercise could arguably be realised equally well, and with a greater practical bonus, by a course in mathematics.

Clearly, the best way to meet the implied criticism here would be to demonstrate that the problems and solutions together have an important function in the general economy of human thought and activity in the period of history under discussion - or, better still, in any period. And doubtless we should be willing to accept the challenge of mastering the requisite history outside our own speciality. It remains, however, an open question to what extent we can demonstrate this if, say, the time-honoured texts prescribed for courses on "modern philosophy", Cartesian and post-Cartesian. We may be forced to admit that a substantial part of their content was superfluous to, or parasitic on, the development of scientific research; and that while there undoubtedly is something of the first importance for that development which can properly be called philosophy, our primary sources for its study lie elsewhere. But, if so, then so much the worse for our standard texts.

Consider one or two ways in which we might, in teaching our modern philosophy course, try to avoid creating an impression of misused ingenuity or fantasy. We might, for example, portray Descartes and his successors as deeply preoccupied with a problem of authority, i.e. of what is to count as sufficient grounds for accepting any statement as true. We could suggest obvious enough reasons why this problem should have had a particular urgency in seventeenth-century Europe (the conflicting claims of rival religious institutions, the accelerating development of natural science, the appeal of quasi-mathematical systems...). And we can go on to make the quite obvious connection with the major concerns of human activity which still leaves philosophy as something like the stance of an existentialist hero, surveying, from the vantage-point of disillusion, the earnest endeavours of those less conscious of their own arbitrariness, and their delight in acting, not the importance of their activity, but the self.

One might take up Professor Mundle's suggestion that one worthwhile task of philosophy, which he would apparently like us to resume, has traditionally been that of exploring, and mapping, alternative categorical systems. "The exploration of ways of relating categories to each other, of alternative categorical systems, has in the past been one of the main pursuits of metaphysics..." - the purpose of any such system being that "... it should apply to, fit and make sense of non-linguistic facts, which is currently known or believed about the world and ourselves". (i)

Both these suggestions may be interesting enough in themselves but, even if they serve to throw some light on what Descartes and his successors were actually doing, they scarcely suffice to vindicate its importance. To begin with, as the passage just quoted makes explicit, we are presenting philosophy as an activity which starts only when the serious business of research, of finding out about the world and our relations with it, has already yielded results in the form of ready-formulated statements and established facts. Given these, the philosopher then agonises, rather serenely, whether he would seem, over which of the statements he can conscientiously "accept", or elaborate alternative systems designed to "apply", in some sense not very clearly specified, to facts already discovered by someone else. And meanwhile, presumably, the development of natural science, and its interactions with the general life of the community in which it develops, continue unaffected - which still leaves philosophy very much in the position of an intellectual luxury, as activity dependent, as it were, on first-order enquiry, without contributing anything essential to it.

Characteristically, philosophies in this sense are exposed to the paradoxes of relativism. We might, for example, list a range of answers, actually adopted or merely possible, to the problem of authority. Suppose, then, someone asks naively: "Are we to tell which one is right?" We can only offer in reply, on the basis of research thorough relativistic thesis - very briefly, something like the following: To make a case for or against any proposed solution (e.g. on the grounds that its adoption would expose us to the risk of self-contradiction or subjectivism) is to accept as true whatever statements we propose to use as evidence in support of our case. But we don't accept these at random; in accepting them we have in effect already adopted, and are using, one solution. It follows that all enquirers (ourselves included, of course) must adopt at least one solution without any evidence whatsoever - though presumably we could trace causes of such adoptions, educational background etc. It follows also that if different enquirers or schools of enquiry adopt different solutions, they might assign truth-values among a given range of statements in ways different from each other but all equally correct.

Nonetheless, relativism requires an answer. The argument just outlined is not obviously fallacious, nor is its application in the history of philosophy inevitably unconvincing, even if some of its consequences are disturbingly paradoxical. (The historian of philosophy could sometimes be forgiven for taking something like the stance of an existentialist hero, surveying, from the vantage-point of disillusion, the earnest endeavours of those less conscious of their own arbitrariness, and their delight in acting, not the importance of their activity, but the self.