

The expulsion of spirits from science, he argues, led to the 'purification' of the entire universe expelling all elements not capable of mechanistic explanation, and this notion of a 'purified' universe became built into the notion of the scientific enterprise. If we tie this in with Robert Young's arguments about the ideological orientation of the scientific paradigms which a society adopts [10], it is clear that what is needed is that the conceptual structure of science be reconstituted and a humanism established within its very centre, for it is inadequate merely to *humanize* science: there must be the creation of science as a *humanism*. In the Third World where science departments are not heavily encrusted by a tradition and where sciences are often just being established, such a vision has great and urgent relevance.

Any Third World philosopher who does not participate in the tasks of (i) liberating the study of Third World societies, economies and cultures from ana-

10 R Young, "Anthropology of Science" - BBC talk.

chronistic philosophical presuppositions and reconstituting it within a broad humanistic framework, (ii) creating science as a humanism, as a technology at one with the whole spirit of Man [11], (iii) a reconsideration of the whole phenomenon of Man and the development of an anthropology of the Spirit [12], any Third World philosopher not participating in these tasks is wasting his own and everybody else's time.

- 11 Skolimowski is aware that the essentially impersonal and manipulative ethos of natural science spills over into social relations, so that as he wrote, "What we need is not an objective science, but a compassionate one", *op. cit.*
- 12 An anthropology of the Spirit that would destroy the tearing apart of man from himself, that has epitomized both the West and its imitators in the Third World, and restore to man his essential unity, having as its purpose the increased awareness of what makes man fully human, and the exploration of the nature of man's fulfilment.

THE METAPHYSICS OF LSD

George Gretton

In the discussion of drug-effects there exists a hiatus: the heads/hippies/freaks, call them what you will, haven't as a rule had the benefit of an education in philosophy, and conversely, the philosophers are ignorant of the drug-experience. The psychologists have discussed the subject from their point of view, yet it is one that also cries out for philosophical interpretation; the hippies are constantly talking bad metaphysics in the attempt to make sense of their experience. And the LSD experience is certainly remarkable; feelings of solipsism, or that the subject himself does not exist, the sensation of stepping out of the usual continuums of space and time, are relatively common under strong doses of the drug. The acid experience used to be called "LSD intoxication", but this expression is seldom used today because there is really very little similarity with alcohol or hashish intoxication; the acid experience immediately impresses itself as being *sui generis*, at least under the aspect of being a drug. The psychotomimetics - LSD, mescaline, psilocybin etc. have less in common with other drugs than with madness and mysticism. This is expressed in a vague way in the proverb "acid isn't a drug; people who have taken it tend to feel that they have entered a reality that is in some way ontologically prior to ordinary reality, rather than simply a confused version of it. I myself can confirm this, and in this article I hope to make a few suggestions as to the lines along which these phenomena can be interpreted. In particular it strikes me that the work of Kant and, to a lesser extent, that of Wittgenstein, provide valuable suggestions. Much of the Critique of Pure Reason can be seen as an analysis of the structure of normal consciousness, and in undertaking this analysis Kant throws out ideas about what possible deviations from this norm would be like. Kant, it should be said, would not have used the word "possible" about such deviations. It has often been noticed that his use of the words "possible" and "necessary" does not strictly conform with the usual acceptance. The LSD experience can be regarded as empirical confirmation of at least one of these deviant states of consciousness.

interconnected (possible) consciousness, and so would not conform to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception." (C.P.R. - B195)

I cite this quotation at the beginning of my discussion because of the remarkable phrase that occurs in the middle of it - "a rhapsody of perceptions" - that is a disturbingly sharp hint at the LSD experience. "Experience" will be a "rhapsody of perceptions", Kant tells us, if we take away "the synthetic unity of appearances". I do not wish to get bogged down in Kantian terminology and the exegesis of it; fortunately this is not necessary, for the burden of Kant's argument in the area with which I am concerned is reasonably clear - this area being the relation between our experience of space and time to the categories of substance, causality and community, and between the synthesis of appearances and the unity of apperception.

"Clock time has very little meaning when one is under the influence of the drug", wrote one experimenter, R.H. Ward (*A Drug-Taker's Notes*, Gollancz, 1957), and elsewhere he expresses himself more strongly, speaking, for instance, of "the absence of time". This is not simply a question of time passing quickly or slowly, as we feel, in the ordinary way, when we are excited or bored. What is interesting (from a philosophical angle) is a much more basic phenomenon that sometimes takes place under large doses. It is the sensation of being "out of time". Experimenters, when they have returned to ordinary reality, seem unable to describe this experience in terms which make sense to the uninitiated, for they get caught up in unintelligible metaphysics, giving the appearance of self-contradiction; thus they claim to have been altogether "outside time", and yet agree that their experience did not cease to be successive in nature. What are we to make of this? Having myself been through this experience, it strikes me that it can be cogently fitted into a Kantian (or neo-Kantian) schema, and it is possible, through this schema, to relate it to other phenomena of the LSD experience.

Kant sometimes refers to space and time as "intuitions" and sometimes as "forms of intuition". This does not necessarily indicate a confusion. As Ewing says (*Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*):

"Experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, that is, on a synthesis according to concepts of an object of appearances in general. Apart from such synthesis it would not be knowledge, but a rhapsody of perceptions that would not fit into any context according to rules of a completely

"If space were merely our form of intuition, this would ensure that all our representations should be spatial; but it would not ensure that they should all be in one space, and so would not of itself give them any unity other than what is conferred by the possession in common of a universal spatiality."

The same applies, *pari passu*, to time, and hence one could say that under the conditions of acid consciousness time is no longer intuited (i.e. experienced as one representation into which other representations are to be fitted), though as a form of intuition it remains. Thus the time the disorganization of which is experienced under LSD is, I suggest, not the "nondiscursive" time of the Aesthetic, but the "discursive" time of the Analogies. (Both phrases from J. Hartnack, Kant's Theory of Knowledge.) "Discursive" time, that is to say, is time considered under the different aspects of succession, duration and simultaneity, the three "modes" which, in the Analogies, schematize the categories of causality, substance and community respectively. In my own experience it seems to have been the third of these that has suffered the most disruption, and the first of them the least. Kant argues for the validity of the category of community in the Third Analogy, where he says that unless two objects, neither of which is the cause of the other, in some way mutually determine each other, there can be no guarantee of their simultaneous coexistence:

"In so far as objects are to be represented as coexisting with each other, they must mutually determine their position in one time, and thereby constitute a whole." (C.P.R.-B261)

The disruption of the category of community under LSD allows a number of sorts of experiences; e.g., not only will two different objects have different histories, but these histories themselves may be in different time-continuums; thus the difficulty in correlating them is analogous to the attempted correlation of the times of events in two fictional stories, Tolkien and Hans Andersen for instance. Thus for the LSD experimenter to try to orientate himself by looking at his watch is rather like Bilbo Baggins asking directions of the Snow Queen. If all this sounds confused to the uninitiated reader, it is equally confusing for the experimenter, and if the former cannot *imagine* it, he can at least apprehend it intellectually, just as a logician can construct a multi-valued logic and yet have only a vague idea of what a world would be like that was no longer in conformity with the law of the excluded middle.

The experience of the objects in the manifold as temporally organized, and, furthermore, as organized in a single, unitary time, is a condition for the experience of them as subject to the categories. Indeed, this is how Kant goes about proving the validity of the categories. "Proof" is perhaps too strong a word; what Kant has really succeeded in showing is that the coherence of experience - which is also to say, the coherence of consciousness - is inseparable from these various factors and that they are themselves interconnected. R.P. Wolff observes:

"Instead of beginning with the Table of Categories and hunting for time determinations, what happens if we begin with time as the form for inner sense, and try to derive a Table of Categories by analyses of time-consciousness? The answer... is that we arrive at precisely the derived categories of relation! With this simple revision, the entire Analytic suddenly falls into a perfectly logical form. Omit the Metaphysical Deduction and how does Kant's argument run? First, a proof that the mere fact of the unity of consciousness implies the applicability to experience of certain *a priori* forms of synthesis (the Deduction): then, the addition to the argument of the fact that the consciousness has a temporal form (the Schematism): lastly, the deduction of the

particular forms of synthesis by an examination of the structure of the time-consciousness (the Analogies). Starting with the unity of consciousness, we arrive finally at the validity of the causal maxim" (Kant's Theory of Mental Activity).

Thus it is fair to say that the deduction is not wholly *a priori*. This should not upset the Kantian too much, for it in fact enables us to endorse the validity of the general Kantian-schema as an account of normal consciousness and normal experience by empirical evidence (the acid trip).

The organisation of the anifold has an intimate logical connection with the organization of consciousness. The disintegrative effects of LSD upon the apprehension of external objects are designated "derealization" by the psychologists, and similarly, ego-loss is characterized as "depersonalization". These psychological terms do not have a precisely defined sense, but in so far as they refer to deviations from perceptual and introspective norms I think that they can be given an adequate elucidation from a philosophical point of view: I have already attempted this in the case of "derealization", and the phenomena of "depersonalization" follow as a consequence. This article does not pretend, of course, to attempt a comprehensive account of these experiences. It may well be that, for psychological reasons, neurotic subjects are more susceptible to them; one psychiatrist, Janov (in The Primal Scream) has gone so far as to claim that in the normal, non-neurotic, subject, LSD will produce -either or not.

The LSD experience could be described as the actualization of empiricist metaphysics. Just as Hume failed to find adequate justification of our behalf in substance and cause, so he failed to find a *self*, and under LSD these logical difficulties may be concretely lived through. Hume did not go the whole hog - unlike Kant - and dare to point out the most extreme consequence of his system. Roughly, one can characterize the situation thus: if one says, of a spirit, that "esse est percipere", then, given the sort of perceptual atomism familiar to us from the empiricist philosophers, it should follow

that I could not identify my experience as *my* experience. As Kant points out, it is not clear why I should not have "as man- coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself". (C.P.R.-B134) Something very like this can be experienced under LSD. Identity cannot survive categorial chaos.

This is an area in which Wittgenstein showed great interest. In the Blue and Brown Books he observed that there are logical difficulties for the solipsist in attaching meaning to the word "my" - which is similar to what Kant has to say in the Transcendental Deduction. Wittgenstein follows these thoughts through when he wonders:

"Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar, die das diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist?" (Is a philosophy possible that is the exact opposite of solipsism?) (Philosophical Review, vol. 77 "Notes for lectures on 'private experience' and 'sense data', ed. Rhees.) - a suggestion which he clarifies a few pages later by saying:

"If the world is idea when it isn't any person's idea. (Solipsism stops short of saying this and says that it is *my* idea.)"

This is virtually the state under LSD when ego-loss occurs. Sidney Cohen (Drugs of Hallucination) describes it succinctly:

"Self-identity is completely lost, and the self and that which is outside the self fuse".

Peter Hacker has pointed out (American

Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.9, "Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of Verificationism?") that the crucial question to be answered, as both Kant and Wittgenstein realized, is what are the necessary conditions of criterionless or original (underived) self-ascription of experience?" That this "self-ascription" must be underived was clearly seen by both philosophers. Thus Kant in the Paralogisms shows that any objective account of the self as subject will be erroneous, since any coherent description must make use of the categories, and "pure apperception" is itself the ground of the categories. (How do I know that my soul is my soul?) Kant's refutation of the Cartesian doctrine of the mind as a single *res cogitans* is borne out by the LSD experience. Thus R.H. Ward wrote that under acid he discovered that "one's mind - one's feelings - one's self - are non-existent in any real sense." In calling the LSD experience a "model psychosis", this is largely what the psychologists are referring to - this collapse of introspective norms. Ward was stable enough not to descend too far into this chaos, but under LSD

schizophrenia can occur, when the unity of consciousness disappears. Thus schizophrenia - understood in its literal sense of a divided mind - can philosophically be described as a failure properly to synthesize the manifold. Because of the eclipse of the categories, the subject is no longer able to think of objects as outside him - not in the spatial sense, but in the sense of objects being *other* than oneself. This is a point that Kant implies in the Refutation of Idealism. "Das Gegenteil des Solipsismus" is now virtually achieved. The world is no longer separate from the experiencing subject (because such a division is dependent upon the categories), and yet the subject is no longer able to think of anything as "his".

These are, as the title states, no more than notes on a subject to which our ill-framed drug laws have brought a pernicious silence. My chief intention in writing is to bring the subject to the attention of serious philosophers.

This article is for Penny.

METAPHYSICS AND LSD: A REPLY

Jeff Mason

George Gretton's short article on philosophy and LSD at last brings out a kind of experience which is rarely analyzed, and certainly not in philosophy. Yet those who have tried the drug do, as Gretton says, try to explain their experiences in mystical or quasi-metaphysical language for it seems that no other sort of language will do. The LSD experience is so far the exception to our ordinary waking life, that it is hard, even for devotees, to find a way of expressing what the experience is like. The links between this experience and philosophy are not lacking, and I would like to add some reflections on the subject in addition to what Mr Gretton has had to say.

First of all, I would like to set out as I understand it the philosophical schema which Mr Gretton has set out for us to understand the LSD experience. There are two sides to this. On the one hand there is a characterization of the state, and on the other, the relevance of Kant and empiricism to this characterization. Secondly, I will make some objections, then add a few comments on other approaches.

The characterization of the LSD experience for Mr Gretton is marked by feelings of solipsism, loss of self, and sensations of being out of the normal continuum of time and space. As negative characterizations, I believe these to serve well enough. The phenomena of dissociation has long been noted as part of the peak of the LSD experience. In this state people feel that their egos die, that they are reborn, and that they have been in touch (on a sensuous level) with something eternal, which lies beyond or below the dust and dirt of this world. This is all right as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. I will come back to the characterization of the experience.

As a way of getting us to understand what this experience might be like, Mr Gretton asks us in effect to conceive of a Kantian universe in which the impossible has happened. That is, we have experience, but without certain conditions which are necessary to our normal consciousness, i.e. the categories of substance, causality, and community. If the categories no longer apply under the effects of LSD, then the synthetic unity of the manifold is not achieved, and we can then understand dissociation as the disintegration of the transcendental unity of apperception. Our experience becomes a Humean "bundle of perceptions", or *per impossibile* an impersonal solipsism.

The feeling of being 'out of time and space' is to be accounted for as part of the disruption brought about by the drug in our system of categories, or the ways we have of making our experience understandable as our experience.

The most interesting deviation, however, between waking consc. and peak LSD experience is not the difference it makes to spatial relations (they become more topological), but to temporal ones. Mr Gretton makes solid points about this. Clock time does cease to make sense. Yet there is a succession of changes which continues throughout the trip. There is the take-off, the peak experience (which tends to be more timeless than the other stages), and the re-entry. Each of these is culminated by self-reflection; e.g. the take off by the awareness sensori-overload, and then the realization of coming off the peak, and finally the awareness of the re-crystallisation of habits and responses marking the return to a normal, though perhaps altered, state. Time under the aspect of succession remains constitutive of experience under acid. Succession of experiences in time is as Mr Gretton says, the least disturbed aspect of the LSD experience as regards time. The difference is that under peak experience the periods of 'time' between changes are not recognized as such. It is as if all times were now, and each successive state were coterminous with the present, in such a way that the actual duration of successive states cannot be distinguished as shorter or longer, but only as *before* and *now*. To my mind the metaphysics most appropriate to this aspect of the acid experience is Whitehead's doctrine of 'actual occasions', each of which, though successive of one another, are complete in themselves, and all begin the same way, i.e. by prehending (apprehension without the 'ap') the totality of the antecedent universe. Thus at peak experience time begins and ends with each successive state, and there is no lead-in from one to another as segments of a continuous and uniform time sequence.

The second aspect of time, i.e. duration, is not explicitly dealt with by Gretton, and is placed as having only moderate distortion. The objects of perception under LSD while less stable than with normal perception, still endure. Even the stage of hallucination does not ordinarily introduce totally new objects but merely recognizes changes in the perceptual qualities of enduring objects.

So far I am in basic agreement with Gretton about the way time distortion enters into the acid experience, but turning to simultaneity, I'm not so sure. For Gretton, simultaneity, or co-existence in time comes under the most stress. In my experience simultaneity is enhanced rather than distorted. This may be a disagreement over words. If by simultaneous co-existence is meant a static collection of objects with identical temporal subscripts, then such categorization does indeed break down. But if what is simultaneous is conceived as whatever is part of a present moment, then the present moment expands to fill time, and is part of the heightened (non-reflexive) awareness brought about by the drug. That is, the drug has the effect of discovering the complexity of the present moment as simultaneous and co-existing (levels of consciousness).

This is most apparent upon appreciation of the vastly changed character of interpersonal relations in the sharing of the LSD experience. It is not as if, under normal circumstances a person takes acid alone, or in the company of a psychologist (let alone a philosopher). This is why I cannot accept the idea that, as Gretton says "The LSD experience could be described as the actualization of empiricist metaphysics." If this were true then all uses of LSD would be pathological of a 'model psychosis'. If we consider de-realization and depersonalization, then I think the empiricist metaphysics will do just fine. But there are other possibilities than these in the LSD experience.

The empiricist metaphysics implies a dissociated personality. For Hume there were, upon introspection, to be found only a bundle of perceptions in one's experience, though there is, strictly speaking, no one to whom the bundle of experiences can be ascribed, therefore ego loss, Schizophrenia, etc. This is because the individual in an empiricist metaphysics is cut off and isolated from the world and other persons by a wall of stimulation in the face of which he is completely passive and absorbed. The personality, or empirical ego, is crushed by the onslaught of sensorio-overload, and there is often fear of death in these moments, or of losing possession of oneself, which can emerge as a 'bum trip', suicidal depression, or various sorts of psychotic behavior. This is why acid is dangerous and can cause serious freakouts.

At this point it is necessary to leave traditional western empiricism, and use terminology and ideas from the east. One reaction to the dissociation on acid is fear of losing oneself, of losing one's personal identity. On the empiricist metaphysics, there is no personal identity, so there is no identity at all. But people do not always live with an empiricist metaphysics, and can thus sometimes find *impersonal identity* while peaking on acid (and without acid by years of work and discipline). Using overtly mystical language one can give varying conflicting reports on what such an impersonal identity would be like. I am not going to try to do this, but am instead going to give a kind of phenomenology of the situation. Suppose that one is an empiricist, and upon taking acid finds it all coming true. But rather than resisting the drug and freaking out, the empiricist lets go to the seeming dissolution of the order which ordinarily makes his life and experience intelligible to him. Lo and behold, chaos does not result, and there remains an order of experience even on acid, but the order is not possessed by someone, it is rather found amidst the breakdown of major categories and persists throughout. This is what can make it possible not to have a bum trip, fall into schizophrenia, psychosis etc. This is to say that the lack of personal identity does not necessarily render coherent experience random and chaotic. So one alternative to personal identity is impersonal identity.

Another factor which is ignored by considering the LSD experience as the actualization of empiricist metaphysics, is the phenomena of expanded communication between people sharing the experience. There are often reports of telepathy, or something approaching telepathy occurring between participants in a trip. This heightening of communication belies the empiricist

metaphysics again, for on the empiricist model the drug only induces a kind of solipsism, or isolation. If, as the empiricist doctrine goes, I am in immediate contact merely with my own sensations, but that normally we think we are in contact with an external world and other people because of some habit of mind, then acid would dissolve this illusion, and experience would be seen to be completely self-contained. This does in fact happen on acid given certain conditions, and especially if the person is hung-up in himself in one way or another. But the LSD experience can also give the lie to this picture, for it is possible under acid for communication to take place far in advance in subtlety and variation of levels of meaning than we are ordinarily capable of achieving.

If, as I have been saying, order can remain even under the full effects of LSD, and an identity is maintained which is not possessed by anyone, then given the possibilities of enhanced communication, something like personality remains as well. For in relating to others one's own nature asserts itself even under acid, though perhaps we can say that under ideal conditions, the personality which remains is somehow essential to the person having the experience, and not incidental, or delusive as if often the case in waking life. I will conclude by saying that these non-pathological manifestations of the LSD experience are as fully worthy of examination as are the more pathological ones.

The London Radical Philosophy Group are planning to produce and circulate an *Ideas Sheet* as a means for the informal exchange of ideas, comment and information. It will be published as often as there is sufficient material to fill an issue. There will be almost no editorial policy, except that contributions much over 5 pages of foolscap will be serialized. Contributions should be sent to Jeff Mason, 1 Harvard Court, Honeybourne Road, London N.W.6. If possible, they should be typed on foolscap Gestetner stencils; however, they will not necessarily be refused if they are not in that form. To subscribe to the *Ideas Sheet*, send to the above address 6 stamped and self-addressed envelopes.

Jonathan Ree (at Hendon Polytechnic) and Noel Parker (at 82 Felsham Road, London SW15 1DQ) are trying to organise a co-operative research project on the History of Philosophy, in the belief that it could have an important contribution to make to Radical Philosophy as a whole. We believe that the history of philosophy, because it is an area of study that contemporary British philosophy acknowledges but does badly, is a unique point of attack against present methods and teaching in general. Anyone interested in joining the project should contact one of us. We also hope that the project will be a focal point for a regular workshop on the subject.

It may be that people have papers and articles which, for one reason or another, are not suitable for publication in Radical Philosophy, but which they would nevertheless like to circulate in duplicated form. If you have such an article, please let us know and we will announce it here. Here is one for a start: Richard Norman has a paper entitled *Hegel's Conception of Philosophy in the 'Phenomenology of Mind'*, copies of which are available free on request; write to Richard Norman, Darwin College, University of Kent, Canterbury