Marx was well aware of the burden of class determinations which tend to subsume the individuals under their own logic; from his early writings to the Grundrisse and Capital he never stopped defining the task of emancipation as belonging to the social individual. Equally, he insisted on the necessity of the formation of a socialist mass consciousness as the inescapable requirement for activating the vast majority of individuals in their collective enterprise of self-emancipation. Since he always maintained the primacy of social practice as the "Übergreifendes Moment" in the dialectic of theory and practice, he could have no use whatsoever for abstract philosophical principles like the Hegelian Identity of Subject and Object to accomplish the work of actual history in an a priori fashion. Instead, he put the emphasis firmly on the maturation of certain objective conditions without which the "solo song of the proletarian revolution", no matter how conscious, could only become "a swan song in all peasant societies" [1] - that is to say, in by far the greater part of the world.

Thus, the two vital considerations of a genuine socialist transformation just mentioned - which focussed on the necessary emancipation of social individuals from the constraints of their own class as a prerequisite to the construction of the "new historic form" on a truly mass basis - were clearly identified by Marx from the outset. Nor did he imagine that, no matter how radical, political measures alone could solve the immense problems confronting "the social revolution of the nineteenth century" [2]. On the contrary, he insisted on the necessity of a fundamental structural transformation of society in its entirety.

Equally, he defined the conditions of the social revolution in inherently international terms in The German Ideology [3], and the revolutions of 1848-49, together with their painful aftermath, could only strengthen his belief that "Europe has taken on a form that makes every fresh proletarian upheaval in France directly coincide with a world war. The new French revolution would have to leave its national soil forthwith and conquer the European terrain, on which alone the social revolution of the nineteenth century can be accomplished" [4]. According to this perspective, there could be no "socialism in one country", let alone in an isolated and encircled peasant society in which the proletarian revolution had to face Marx's dilemma about its "solo song" being turned by socio-historical constraints into a "swan song".

Marx formulated his basic principles with regard to the conditions of a socialist transformation well before the burden of historical experience had deeply affected the political movement of the proletariat: first through the accommodations of German Social Democracy, and then through the formation of the Leninist vanguard party after Marx's death. Understandably, therefore, the far-reaching implications of such developments had to remain beyond Marx's horizon, although the radical scepticism of his "dixi et salvavi animam meam" at the end of his Critique of the Gotha Programme bears witness to the feeling of unease with which he greeted the newly emerging trends of working class involvement in the political arena.

In another respect, towards the end of his life - in a carefully drafted correspondence with Vera Zasulich - Marx addressed himself to the specific problems of peasant societies, concerning their potentialities for socialist development. However, he did not spell out in great detail his conclusions, nor did he modify his earlier strategic views as to the historical mandate of the proletarian revolution and its transitional state-formations: the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The possibilities of a much longer drawn-out development appeared on the margin of Marx's thought, formulated as a major dilemma - implying a great many unknown factors, with all their necessary theoretical consequences - in a letter to Engels:

The historic task of bourgeois society is the establishment of the world market, at least in its basic outlines, and a mode of production that rests on its basis. Since the world is round, it seems that this has been accomplished with the colonization of California and Australia and with the annexation of China and Japan. For us the difficult question is this: the revolution on the Continent is imminent and its character will be at once socialist; will it not be necessarily crushed in this little corner of the world, since on a much larger terrain the development of bourgeois society is still in its ascendancy [5].

In the same letter Marx also made it clear that the collapse of bourgeois society in the foreseeable future was only a hope, and by no means a certainty: "One cannot deny, bourgeois society lives its second 16th Century which, I hope, will take it into the grave, just as the first one brought it into life." The world situation had to be characterized like this precisely because of what Marx underlined as the undeniable ascendancy of capital on that "much larger terrain" which necessarily put the European "little corner of the world" into perspective.

As we can see, then, some key elements of a very different assessment of the coming socialist revolution appeared in Marx's thought after the 1848-49 uprisings, and they continued to surface in various contexts up to the end of his life. Such elements did not question the necessity of the socialist revolution, but they had far-reaching implications for its time scale and potential modality of unfolding. For it made a big difference where and under what kind of class relations the socialist revolution broke out and had to attempt the radical restructuring of the given social metabolism, under the more or less heavily constraining degree of development.
(or underdevelopment) of the inherited production forces. The feasible socio-political forms of transition would necessarily affect the possibility of a truly self-determined integration of individuals within the framework of conscious collective action, and thus their emancipation from blindly superimposed class determinations, as foreshadowed by the Marxian perspective of the emerging communist mass consciousness.

In this sense, the failure of the socialist revolution to break through in the European "little corner of the world" - while its success was meant to block the development of the bourgeois order on the incomparably larger terrain of the rest of the world - carried some weighty implications for the maturation of capital's inner contradictions. Since the establishment of the anticipated new social order was said to be possible only as the "act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously", on the basis of the "universal development of the productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with them", the possibility of developing capital's productive outlets everywhere where bourgeois society was still in its ascendancy was synonymous with the possibility of displacing capital's inner contradictions, for the duration of the selfsame historical ascendancy. Until, that is, "world intercourse" as a whole would become saturated by the dynamics of capital's inexorable self-expansion so as to bring the whole process to a halt through an ever-deepening structural crisis of the "universally developed productive forces", on a truly global scale.

Naturally, Marx could not be primarily concerned with elaborating the manifold implications of this long-term perspective which he hoped - and explicitly said so - that "the second 16th Century of bourgeois society" would take the capitalist order into its grave, as a result of the successful socialist revolutions of the proletariat in the advanced European countries. Thus, the briefly identified elements of such a perspective had to be confined to the margin of his conception, appearing there from time to time as somewhat isolated insights, but never fully integrated into his theory as a whole. Nevertheless, the very fact that such vital constituents of the alternative perspective appeared on the margin of Marx's thought at the initial phase of the growing European imperial drive which gave a new lease of life to capital, indicates that subsequent developments did not represent a radical departure from - or, as his adversaries argue, a refutation of - the Marxian theory, but the realization of some objective potentialities of development inherent in the complex socio-historical factors of the age and already visible, at least to some extent, in Marx's life-time.

The gaps in Marx

As we all know today, bourgeois society was not taken to its grave by its second 16th century and by the social revolutions of the 20th, let alone by those of the 19th. The successful exploitation by capital of the gigantic potential outlets of its global ascendency in the peasant and underdeveloped societies presented the forces aspiring to socialist revolution with a new challenge. For while the "dominant peoples" - the main beneficiaries of capital's renewed expansion and imperial domination - were held back by their vested interests from pursuing the road towards a socialist transformation, new types of contradiction appeared on the "periphery" and at the "weakest links" of the increasingly interdependent and saturated global system. At the same time, the eruption of revolutions on the underdeveloped periphery, and the successful consolidation of their (no matter how limited and problematical[6] results, put the question of the transition to socialism on the historical agenda in a hostile global context. That is, when even the most tentative first steps in the direction of the originally envisaged perspective of the state's "withering away" could not be seriously contemplated for a moment, in view of the prevailing relation of forces heavily dominated by the capitalist "dominant peoples" [7]. Thus, taking "hindsight" into account, the gaps in Marx's own approach to our problem may be described as follows:

(1) The problems of the transition to socialism were never discussed by Marx in any detail, apart from some brief general references to the major contrast between the "lower" and "higher" phases of the future society in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, dictated by the latter's polemical context.

Admittedly the issue itself, with all its bewildering practical dimensions, was by no means an acute historical challenge in Marx's life-time, given capital's newly won vitality on the ground of its imperialist expansion. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Marx contemplated the possibility that the "dominant peoples" might not move "all at once and simultaneously" in the direction of a socialist transformation, such consideration carried with it some weighty implications for future developments, especially with regard to the likely changes in the legal and political superstructure and their necessary impact on the material processes of society in general. For the fundamental requirement of any socialist metabolism assert themselves in very different ways under substantially different political circumstances, notwithstanding the primacy of the material base - "in the last analysis" - in the overall structure of determinations and interchanges. This is why assessing the true significance and specific inertia of the international division of labour vis-a-vis the societies of transition is inseparable from confronting the problems of the state in its global setting. (Clearly, the book Marx originally planned, but never even began, on the state reciprocally integrated with the international relations of production and exchange, pinpoints a crucial missing dimension of Marx's undertaking.)

This factor is all the more important once the internal and international political parameters of the social metabolism (which are vital even under the most favourable circumstances) appear historically articulated as a set of antagonistic inter-state relations, in the aftermath of a socialist revolution at the "weakest link" of the imperialist chain. Given such conditions, the inertial force of politics - defined as acting in response to the moves of a hostile outside world, under the banner of a besieged, hence greatly strengthened state - becomes overpowering.

(2) The historical unfolding of the contradiction between social production and private appropriation was amenable to an alternative reading: one very different from that offered by Marx. As Paul Mattick rightly stressed: "For Marx, capitalism was private-property capitalism, and where it seemed to lose its strictly private-enterprise nature as in state-industries, and even in the joint stock companies, he saw it as a partial abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production; a sign of the decay of the capitalist system"[8]. In reality, however, a great variety of "hybrid" combinations - all possible permutations of the mystifying "mixed economy" - are thoroughly compatible with the continued survival (even temporary revitalisation) of private capitalism, not to mention the ultimate limits of capital as such. Indeed, the fairly large-scale "nationalization" of bankrupt industries which we have experienced in capitalist countries - frequently followed by the profitable practice of de-nationalization in due course after the imposition, that is, of the necessary political/economic changes (with regard to trade union power, for instance) - represents a way of extending the manipulative rationality of the capitalist system.

In all such developments, conscious collective self-activity of individuals does not advance one single step nearer to realization, since the control of the
fundamental social/economic processes remains radically divorced from and opposed to the - far from associated - producers. The industry-wide - even trans-national (misnamed as "multi-national") - integration of the production process does not make the producers any more "associated producers" than they were in capitalist industrial enterprises of a more limited scale. For what really decides the issue is the successful transfer - from capital to the producers - of the effective control of the various units of production, whatever their size. And that is equivalent to a genuine socialization of the process of production in all its essential characteristics, well beyond the immediate problem of ownership, as opposed to its remote hierarchical management through "statalization" and "nationalisation", - or, for that matter, through its growing transnational integration. In other words, the issue at stake is primarily political/social, requiring in the first place a qualitative political change for its realization; and the latter is by no means necessarily helped (but may, on the contrary, be actually hindered) by the unfolding of capital's centralization and concentration as an economic necessity - so hopefully evaluated by Marx. For in the face of the massive power of capital's increasing concentration and centralisation, the countervailing political force of labour must be on an equally large scale if it is to have any chance of success against its adversary.

(3) Marx's optimistic evaluation of the Paris Commune as "a Revolution not against this or that ... form of State Power [but] a Revolution against the State itself" [9] was coupled with an equally optimistic characterization of the Bonapartist Second Empire as 'the last expression of that state power", the "last possible form of [bourgeois] class rule" and the "last triumph" of a State separate from and independent of society [10].

This view was in marked contrast to his own way of linking in the same work political superstructures to determine "social bodies" which sustain them, talking about the "withering away" of certain social bodies which make the continued existence of their political superstructures a historical anachronism [11]. Also, in another passage he stressed that the social soil that corresponds to the "superstructure of a centralized statepower" is the "systematic and hierarchic division of labour", thereby indicating the strongest possible reciprocal determination and mutual support between the two [12].

The problem is, though, that the obvious and highly disturbing implications of such remarks undermine Marx's hopeful expectations about the "last possible form" of state power separate from and independent of society. For, so long as the social soil of the systematic and hierarchic division of labour exists - and indeed successfully renews and strengthens itself in conjunction with the ongoing transformation of the relevant social bodies of "civil society" on an ever-extending scale, in the direction of an ultimate global integration - a corresponding restructuring of state-forms in the interest of continued class rule (both internally and at the level of inter-state relations) cannot be denied to the established system. Accordingly, even today we are still very far from the "last form" of the capitalist state and its class rule, let alone at the time when Marx wrote the lines just quoted from his defence of the Commune.

(4) The other side of the question of the state's continued domination of society and refusal to "wither away" concerns the proletariat. For a working-class revolution - as Marx saw the Commune [13] - is only on a long-term historical scale ipso facto also a revolution "against the State itself" (i.e. against the state as such); it is not so in terms of the really feasible impact of its inescapable immediate objectives. Such a limitation is not simply the consequence of an isolated revolution and its ensuing "encirclement"; although, of course, the latter has a great deal to do with it in the sense that the "harmonious national and international coordination" [14] of social intercourse anticipated by Marx cannot be even dreamed about under such circumstances. Nevertheless, the historical delay in attacking the foundations of the state as such arises primarily from the very nature of the task itself: to create the political form in which to work out the economic emancipation of labour," [15] so that "free and associated labour" should assume the form of "united co-operative societies" in order "to regulate national production upon a common plan" [16].

Thus, in Marx's conception, the objective and subjective requirements of a socialist transformation - the full emancipation of labour from the prevailing social division of labour - stipulate a political form (the proletarian state) under which the advocated transition from the old to the new society should be accomplished, while this transitional state itself is called upon to act simultaneously as both master and servant of the long-drawn-out process of emancipation [17]. Such a state is said to have no interest of its own to defend, despite its unquestionably strategic function - as the specific political form of the necessary "national coordination" of social life - in the division of labour whose-continued is unavoidable (even if progressively diminishing) for the whole period of radical restructuring. There seems to be no contradiction in asking the new political form to work out the economic emancipation of labour, since the working class is said to be in complete control of the political process in a social framework in which the interest of those who directly control the transitional state machinery and that of society as a whole fully coincide.

To be sure, Marx is well aware of the fact that the changes required for superseding the inherited division of labour can only be produced by a high degree of technological process of transformation. Indeed, he insists that the working class "will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men" [18]. Yet he has to resort to equivocation in order to reconcile the contradiction between the fact that the task of "transforming circumstances and men" is far from accomplished, and the assumption that the communist consciousness of the working class is already given.

Communist consciousness was defined in The German Ideology as "the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution" [19]. At the same time it was also stated that "Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary" [20].

The same ideas appear in the evaluation of the Commune, but this time ascribing to the working class in the present "the full consciousness of their historic mission" [21]. Furthermore, it is also claimed that the working class possess a practical determination to act in accordance with that consciousness - as well as the ability to do so without state-interference, "in self-working and self-governing communes" [22]. Thus,
beginning each sentence with: "the working class know", or "they know" [23]. Marx is able to turn some vital historical imperatives (whose realization depends on the full articulation of "communist consciousness on a mass scale") into the "affirmatives" of already developed and effectively self-asserting social forces.

Similarly, in The German Ideology Marx stated that "Communism is for us not ... an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself" [24]. Now the same idea is put forward in a significantly modified form, saying that: "They [the working class] have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant" [25]. The problem is not whether or not one should call the enterprise of "setting free the elements of the new society" an "ideal to realize". What matters in the present context is the shift from "for us" - or from "for the Communists" in some other writings [26] - to the working class as a whole, postulating, even if in an ambiguous form, the accomplished actualization of that communist mass consciousness whose production was presented in The German Ideology as a challenging historical task for the future.

This treatment of working class consciousness is inextricably linked to Marx's reflections on proletarian political power. Indeed, we find a similar equivocation in refusing to call the proletarian state a state, describing it, instead, as "the political form of social emancipation" [27] and as "the Communal form of political organization" [28]. In praising the fact that under the Commune "the state-functions [were] reduced to a few functions for general national purposes" [29], there is no hint that an extreme state of emergency (as the Paris Commune of necessity had to be) cannot be the model of the future development of the proletarian state and of its complex internal and international functions under normal circumstances. If the working class has the historic mission to work out through the "new political form" the full emancipation of labour, and thus the emancipation of society as a whole from the social tyranny of the inherited division of labour, how could a task of such magnitude, intricacy, and long time-scale be carried out on the basis of the reduction of the state-functions to a simplified absolute minimum when, at the same time, one has to achieve also that "harmonious national and international coordination" of production and distribution - obviously representing a problem of the highest complexity of which Marx spoke?

To be sure, the ultimate "withering away" of the state is inconceivable without a progressive reduction and simplification of its tasks and a transfer to the "self-working and self-governing" social body. To suggest, however, that this process of reduction and simplification at the political level can be accomplished by immediately substituting for the state as such an unproblematical "new political form", whereafter difficulties remain only with regard to economically emancipating society from the division of labour, is to make ideal shortcuts to the future. In fact, the social soil of the "systematic and hierarchic division of labour" is inseparable from the "superstructure of a centralized statepower", even if not of the capitalist type. In reality the state can only be laboriously "dismantled" (in the process of the political "de-alienation" and "communalization" of society) to the extent to which the inherited social division of labour itself is correspondingly changed, and thus the social metabolism as a whole is effectively restructured.

The perspective of such shortcuts - understandable in the context of the defence of the Paris Commune - brings with it also the negative characterization of working class consciousness which we have just seen. Since the required social change is acknowledged to extend over a long historical process of confrontations and struggles, the power of "communist consciousness on a mass scale" acquires particular importance in the Marxian conception.

For, in virtue of its determination as mass consciousness, it protects the socialist forces involved in the struggle from internal divisions and from the establishment of new hierarchies, in contrast to Bakunin's elitist vision of the rule of society after the conquest of power by the self-appointed few who claim to know better. Accordingly, if there is an identity of purpose among the vast majority of the population - an identity which, under the prevailing circumstances, only the working class's "full consciousness of its historic mission and heroic resolve to act up to it" [30] can produce - in that case the state immediately becomes a fully controlled transitional "political form" and a mere means to emancipatory action, since the difference between the rulers and the governed disappears by definition. This is why Marx can retort to Bakunin's question - "The Germans number nearly 40 million. Will, for example, all 40 million be members of the government?" - with an emphatic "Certainly, for the thing begins with the self-government of the commune" [31].

Another important aspect of communist mass consciousness in this perspective is that it can bridge the gap that separates the present conditions of hardship from the "new historic form" aimed at. For through its orienting force it can guarantee the general direction of development that must be sustained, and minimize the danger of relapses and reversals under the pressure of the difficulties encountered. Indeed, under the historically premature conditions of the advocated "social revolution" - when capitalism is acknowledged by Marx to be in its ascendancy on by far the greater part of the planet - only the stipulated communist mass consciousness can bridge this great historical gap and provide the desired guarantee for maintaining the impetus of the necessary struggle.

(5) The final and most complex issue to consider here concerns Marx's evaluation of the working class's position in the existing division of labour. It is closely connected with his views on the post-revolutionary "political form", with major implications for the development of class consciousness and for the articulation of socialist political strategies. To anticipate the main point: in the Marxian perspective the fragmentation of the working class is greatly underestimated and the necessary political consequences of such fragmentation (and stratification) remain largely unexplored. The accent is on the proletariat constituting the "universal class"; a
characterization eminently suitable to underline the qualitative change from the old to the "new historic form", but full of ambiguities and question marks as regards the practical constraints of the immediate future.

This is entirely remarkable since Marx insisted in The German Ideology that "The division of labour implies from the outside the division of the conditions of labour, of tools and materials, and thus the fragmentation of accumulated capital among different owners, and thus, also, the fragmentation between capital and labour, and the different forms of property itself. The more the division of labour develops and accumulation grows, the further fragmentation develops. Labour itself can only exist on the premise of this fragmentation" [32].

However, Marx never spells out what might be the consequences of labour existing "on the premise of the fragmentation" engendered by the capitalistic division of labour. On the contrary, a natural progression is stipulated from occasional and partial to permanent and comprehensive trade unionism, in accordance with the development of production on a world scale: Combination has not ceased for an instant to go forward and grow with the development and growth of modern industry. It has now reached such a stage, that the competition which combination has developed in any country clearly marks the rank it occupies in the hierarchy of the world market. England, whose industry has attained the highest degree of development, has the biggest and best organised combination of all [33].

At the same time it is also suggested that there is an irresistible movement from the defence of limited economic group-interests to the politically conscious assertion of the interests of universal emancipation [34], accomplished by the united proletarian "class for itself" through the abolition of all classes and through its own self-abolition [35].

Significantly, Marx's early idea that the proletariat is "victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite" [36] is restated, again and again, throughout his life. For example, this is how Marx answers Bakunin's question, "What is meant by the proletariat transformed into the ruling class?" in 1874: It means that the proletariat, instead of fighting individually against the economically privileged classes, has gained sufficient strength and is sufficiently well organised to employ general means of compulsion in its struggle against these classes. It can, however, use only economic means designed to abolish its own productive trait of wage-earner, and hence to abolish itself as a class. Its complete victory is consequently also the end of its domination, since its class character has disappeared [37].

There is no hint in Marx that in addition to the fragmentation "between capital and labour", etc., one must also face the fragmentation within labour itself as a major problem for the proletariat both before and after the conquist of political power. The process of emancipation in the aftermath of the revolution is conceived as an essentially economic problem (as we have seen on several occasions, including the last quoted passage). The proletariat's ability to act as a united force is predicated as a matter of course, in sharp contrast to the peasantry.

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse... In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear... as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes.... The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself [38].

The problem is, however, that a great deal of what Marx says here about the peasantry is equally valid for the working class itself. Indeed, the united action and role of the latter cannot be taken for granted without first confronting the difficult "premise of fragmentation" within the prevailing division of labour. For while the proletariat has the potentiality to overcome its own fragmentation and subordinate position in the existing division of labour, the actualization of this potentiality depends on the maturation of both the objective conditions, including some major developments in the political organization and conscious collective self-determination of the individuals who constitute the class of "freely associated producers". Thus, to suggest that the "degree of combination of any particular country directly corresponds to "the rank which it occupies in the hierarchy of the world market" [39], is to turn a historical requirement into a necessary attainment. Equally, to anticipate the global trade unionization and political articulation of the united working class, it is impossible to disagree with the proposition that the proletariat is "victorious only by abolishing itself". Also, considering the position of labour in maintaining the normal functioning of the social metabolism, it is impossible to disagree with Marx that the proletariat, on the one hand, "cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the condition of its existence" [39], and on the other hand, "it cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation" [40]. However, saying this we only define the necessary conditions of a succession of social revolution but not the specific way in which this apparently vicious circle (making the victory of the particular enterprise depend on the successful solution of the problems of the whole, and vice versa) can and will be broken.

The vicious circle in question is not a conceptual one. Rather, it is the suffocating practical circularity of the prevailing social division of labour. For the latter assigns to labour itself the key role in sustaining the social metabolism, structurally constraining labour thereby with regard to its feasible margin of emancipatory and self-emancipatory action. This is why the Marxian conclusion is inescapable: the proletariat is "victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite", and labour's self-emancipation can only be accomplished to the extent to which society as a whole is emancipated. Thus the issue at stake concerns simultaneously both the division of labour as such, and the position of the proletariat (or labour) within it. In other words, the question is how to break the stranglehold of the social division of labour over labour, without jeopardizing at the same time the vital functions of the social metabolism itself.
Inevitably, in a question of such magnitude and complexity the subjective and objective, as well as the political and socio-economic aspects, are inextricably intertwined. Subjectively, only labour itself can accomplish the task in question "for itself", which stipulates the necessary development of working class consciousness. On the other hand, without demonstrating the objective determinations which actually propel the development of totalizing - as opposed to partial and narrowly self-interested - class consciousness, the necessity of the latter is only postulated, instead of being established as a social force adequate to its "historic task". Furthermore, while the political confrontation of labour with the capitalist state formation is the necessary point of departure (for which the appropriate institutional form must be found), it can be no more than a point of departure. For the fundamental issue is the transcendence of the inherited social division of labour, which is conceivable only on the basis of the radical restructuring of the whole socio-economic framework. Paradoxically, however, the latter implies that full political control of society remains for the duration of the entire process of restructuring. The various constituents of the social whole - including labour - must accommodate themselves to the available margin of action, under the guidance of the new "political form". Only the latter is in a position to supervise the overall process, although it was supposed to constitute merely the point of departure of the ongoing socialist transformation.

This is where we can clearly see perhaps the most acute of Marx's theoretical difficulties. He cannot really acknowledge labour's fragmentation and stratification, because that would greatly complicate, indeed ultimately undermine, his conception of the transitional "political form". For if the objective partial interests of the various groups of workers - inevitably arising on the basis of labour's structural fragmentation - are asserted in the form of conflicting claims, in that case the "common interest" defended and imposed by the new "political form" is not as self-evident as it would appear on the assumption of united labour. Such an assumption unjustifiably casts aside the earlier recognised "premise of labour's fragmentation".

Thus, to give full weight to the necessary fragmentation of labour under the conditions of the inherited division of labour means, at the same time, to acknowledge the space left wide open for the exercise of traditional state functions for a whole historical epoch; that is to say, for as long as the fragmentation of labour is not effectively superseded - in material as well as in ideological and political terms - through the actual "abolition" (Aufhebung/transcendence.radical restructuring) of the social division of labour. Naturally, this means that whatever might be the proletarian state's function in its external relations, internally it cannot be simply the defence of the proletariat against the former ruling class. Rather, the primary internal function of the proletarian state - after a relatively short period of time - is arbitration over a multiplicity of complicated, even contradictory, partial interests, on the basis of the continued social division of labour. This is why the proletariat can - and under such conditions must - "turn its dictatorship against itself", rather than because it fails to live up to the ideal expectations of some categorical moral imperative. (Lukacs suggests this in "The Role of Morality in Communist Production").

Marx's theoretical difficulties are only in part due to his original linkage of the "universal class" to "the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being" [41]. He is, in fact, anxious to establish the world-historical role and task which the "socialist writers ascribe to the ... fully-formed proletariat" [42] on the basis of an objective socio-historical necessity. This is why he insists that what decides the issue "is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do" [43]. However, in postulating the unfolding of a fully adequate proletarian class consciousness, in the face of the premature character of the social revolution under the conditions of capital's global ascendancy, he is forced to claim that "a large part of the English and French proletariat is already conscious of its historic task and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity" [44]. Thus, he tends to anticipate a much less problematical course of events - just as he did in projecting a global trade unionization and corresponding political militancy - than the available historical evidence would actually support.

**The future of labour**

The consequence of all this is that, on the one hand, a number of paradoxical and rather ambiguous propositions fill the gap between the prevailing state of affairs and the long-term historical anticipations, and that, on the other hand, some important characteristics of working class existence cannot be given their full weight in the Marxian perspective. In the first category it is enough to think of statements like "the proletariat is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite", which is both incontestable in terms of its ultimate implications but full of riddles with regard to the necessary steps that must be taken towards its realization by the potentially "universal and self-transcending" proletariat. As to the second category, historical development provides examples too abundant to need much discussion, from the "social chauvinism" of working class parties during the First World War, to the "integration" of the American working class, and to the exploitative relationship of the Western working classes in general to the "Third World".

It is, therefore, very problematical to assert that "With labour emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute" [45]. For such assertion merely stipulates that emancipation implies the universal sharing of work by all members of society, without defining at the same time the meaning of "productive work" and, more important perhaps, ignoring an issue of utmost gravity with regard to the fragmentation and internal division of labour: the necessarily and precipitously growing scarcity of labour-opportunities within the framework of capitalistical technological development.

The only context in which Marx addresses himself to this problem concerns the inherent inadequacy of capitalistical accountancy to find outlets for the irresponsibly growing productive potentiality of labour. He describes a process of development on the basis of "large scale industry" - treating it, in fact, rather ambiguously since it could never come about before a radical break with capital's constraining framework is effectively accomplished - as a result of which:
Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself. The worker steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body - it is, in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. At this point, Marx emphasizes again the irreconcilable contradictions involved in the developments he is concerned with, and concludes his line of reasoning with a number of powerful imperatives:

The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value must cease to be the measure of use value. The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. Forces of production and social relations - two different sides of the development of the social individual - appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky high. The difficulty is that, so long as the capitalistic determinations remain in control of society, labour - even if ideally it must - simply cannot cease to be the well-spring of wealth, nor labour time its measure. Equally, under such conditions, exchange value cannot cease to be the measure of use value, nor can we simply postulate that in virtue of the ideal implications of these relations - which turn the capitalist system into a historical, but by no means immediately visible and materially felt, anachronism - the mode of production based on exchange value actually breaks down. Thus, as long as capital can find new outlets for expansion over the vast terrain of its global ascendance, the non-realizability of the social individual remains only a latent contradiction of this society, instead of blowing its narrow foundations sky high.

If, therefore, we consider the historically identifiable unfolding of capital's inherent tendency for the drastic reduction of necessary labour time, without postulating, ipso facto, the breakdown of the capitalist system (even if such breakdown is conceptually implied by the long-term and full articulation of this tendency), in that case it becomes clear that we have to face here a major negative force that sustains capital for a long time, rather than offering any comfort to labour in the foreseeable future. For the tendency in question in its immediate impact can only further divide and fragment labour, turning its various sections against one another, instead of positively contributing to the global "unification" and homogenization of labour anticipated in the Marxian perspective.

The division of labour
The fragmentation and hierarchical division of labour appears under the following main aspects, corresponding to significantly different objective divisions of interests:

1. within any particular group or section of labour;
2. among different groups of workers belonging to the same national community;
3. between nationally different bodies of labour opposed to one another in the context of international capitalist competition, from the smallest to the most comprehensive scale, including the potential collision of interests in the form of wars;
4. the labour force of the advanced capitalist countries - the relative beneficiaries of the global capitalist division of labour - as opposed to the differentially far more exploited labour force of the "Third World";
5. labour in employment, as separated from and opposed to the objectively different - and politically/organisationally in general unarticulated - interests of the "unwaged" and unemployed, including the ever-multiplying victims of the "second industrial revolution".

The reason why such fragmentation and division of interests within labour itself matters so much is because it carries with it - both before and after the revolution - an inescapable reliance on the state, although in theory the latter is supposed to be the most obvious immediate target of the socialist revolution. Indeed, the bourgeois state finds its support among various groups of labour primarily on the ground of the "protection" it provides in legally sustaining and safeguarding the objectively established framework of division of labour. It is enough to recall the great variety of measures adopted by the state in this respect, from minimum wage and social security legislation to erecting protective tariffs and other national barriers, and from internally balancing the relation of forces against "excesses", to embarking on international enterprises which secure the greatest advantage to the national ruling class, delivering at the same time some relative advantage also to the national labour force.

Naturally, the bourgeois state can perform its "protective" function on behalf of the fragmented and divided groups of labour only to the extent to which the exercise of that function objectively corresponds to the interests of the ruling class as a whole. This condition happens to be, of course, also the basis upon which the state can overrule various fractional interests on its own side of the more or less latent social confrontation. Also, it cannot be stressed enough, we are not talking here about some negligible degree of shared interests, especially in the advanced capitalist countries. For
precisely in view of the social division of labour that originates, reproduces and constantly reinforces labour's own fragmentation and internal division, labour itself has a major vested interest in continued social stability - (hence the pursuit of the "line of least resistance") - as the vital condition of its self-realisation. Thus, under normal circumstances, internally divided and fragmented labour is at the mercy not only of the ruling class and its state, but also of the objective requirements of the prevailing social division of labour. Hence we see paradoxic and problematical manifestations of the interests which labour happens to share with its adversary within the compass of the materially and institutionally enforced (and to a large extent self-enforcing) social metabolism. Only at times of quite elemental crises - when the continued functioning of the fundamental social metabolism itself is called into question, in the midst of a massive economic collapse, or as a result of the bourgeois state's dramatic disintegration in the aftermath of a lost war, etc. - can labour temporarily extricate itself from these paralyzing constraints.

It is under the circumstances of such elemental structural crises that labour can successfully assert itself. claims to being the only feasible hegemonic alternative to the established order in all its dimensions, from the basic material conditions of life to the most intricate political and ideological aspects of social interchange. The all-important question of submitting the state itself to labour's effective control, too, can only arise under the selfsame circumstances of a hegemonic crisis (i.e., the crisis of bourgeois hegemony). However, while labour can successfully overthrow the bourgeois state and take over the control of the crucial political regulators of the social metabolism, thereby initiating the necessary process of radical restructuring, the "workers' state" cannot conceivably abolish the inherited social division of labour, except insofar as it directly concerns the ownership of the means of production. Nor can the "new political form" simply abolish the fragmentation and internal division experienced by labour linked to, and embedded in, the inherited productive instruments and practices of society. For the required changes in question involve the whole process of reconstituting itself, with all its objective and subjective constraints which escape the power of direct political intervention to a significant degree.

**The post-revolutionary state**

This is where we can see the disconcerting "new circularity" between the postrevolutionary "civil society" and its division of labour on the one hand, and the proletarian state on the other. For the various sections of fragmented and internally divided labour need the protection of the state, for a long time after the revolution, not only against the former ruling classes but also against one another as situated within the framework of the still prevailing social division of labour. Thus, paradoxically, they call into being and maintain in existence for the duration of the whole process of radical restructuring a strong executive over against themselves. This situation is not entirely unlike that of the French peasantry in its subjection to its own state-form under Napoleon le Petit as a result of its fragmentation, since the latter enabled the Bonapartist executive power to subordinate society to itself, in Marx's analysis.

At the same time, to complete the new vicious circle between the postrevolutionary civil society and its state, the latter is not merely the manifestation of the continuing division of labour but also the hierarchical apex of its system of decision making. Accordingly, it has a strong interest of its own to retain, indefinitely, the firmest possible grip over the ongoing process of transformation as a whole, thereby reinforcing, rather than undermining, the established social division of labour of which - in virtue of its strategic role - the postrevolutionary state itself happens to constitute the most privileged dimension. (Here, again, we can see that the much disputed issue of "bureaucratic privileges" is not simply a matter of the personnel involved but, above all, that of the retention of objectively "privileged" - i.e., strategically vital - functions by the state in the overall social metabolism. The continued exercise of these, strategically privileged, functions by a separate body is bound to find in its turn its subjective equivalent on the plane of the "bureaucratised state divisions too, in the absence of some alternative form of social control one based on ever-increasing and truly active mass-involvement.)

The subordination of postrevolutionary civil society to the "new political form" of a powerful executive in the early phases of transition is, thus, first and foremost the consequence of labour's own fragmentation and internal division as "signed and sealed" by the inherited division of labour. This may be aggravated, of course, by some specific characteristics of structural underdevelopment - including so-called "Asiatic backwardness" - on account of a particularly unfavourable relative position of a country's aggregate labour force in the international division of labour. However, the point to stress is that, in view of the objective and institutional constraints of its restructuring, the politically "top-heavy" conditions of development apply everywhere, even in the economically most advanced countries, with the longest historical tradition of liberal democracy. For the circumstances of more favourable economic developments and liberal democratic traditions, no matter how advantageous in some respects, do not eliminate the overwhelming negative determinant of labour's fragmentation and internal division. Consequently, on their own they do not support the anticipations of some theoreticians of the New Left, as well as of some leading politicians of the Labour Left, who see in them some sort of a priori historical guarantee with regard to the prospects of a democratic socialist transformation in advanced capitalist countries.

Furthermore, in accordance with the inherent necessities of transformations which cannot avoid attacking the foundations of the capitalist market economy, the liberal democratic measures that paradoxically arise out of the absolute material tyranny of the market, with no Court of Appeal, must be replaced by new types of political/administrative regulators, extending also over formerly "unregulated" areas of social interaction. And in this respect it is of little comfort that the liberal democratic framework of relatively "unregulated" regulation is feasible and affordable only because of the immense material discriminatory power of the capitalist market which minimizes the need for direct (political) interference with the everyday life of individuals under normal circumstances. For the fact remains that the socially necessary removal of the - no matter how blind and anarchistic - self-regulatory levers of liberal "market-
democracy" creates an institutional vacuum at the political level. Consequently, also in this respect, the less the postrevolutionary civil society succeeds in institutionally articulating and safeguarding the objective interests of its various groups on a truly co-operative basis, the greater the power of the state executive and its scope for the imposition of a - Stalin type - "political autonomy".

Understandably, therefore (but by no means without some heavy "irony of history") in the aftermath of the Stalinist abuse of power, theories of "market socialism" appear, illusorily suggesting that it is possible to secure socialist democracy by reinstating the self-regulatory mechanisms of a modified capitalist market under "state supervision". Even if we disregard the incompatibilities necessarily involved in this course of action - tendencies towards the inadmissible wholesale restoration of capitalism on the one hand, and the reassertion of authoritarian political counter-measures to prevent the successful consummation of those tendencies, on the other, the trouble with these theories is that nothing is really solved by the creation of such "partially controlled markets". Strategies of this kind can, at best, only postpone the all-important issue of radical restructuring which is far from being only, or even primarily, an "economically just" or "feasible" process. Redirection could be stylistically formulated within the narrowly "efficiency-orientated" parameters of the idealised market. Curiously, the advocates of "market socialism" seem to forget that the necessity of the socialist transformation itself arises in the first place out of the inevitable crisis of the socio-economic order that brings to perfection and universal domination a structure of "living contradictions": the self-regulatory market which they now want to rescue and use as the secure foundation of democratic socialist developments.

Socialist consciousness

Thus perhaps the greatest difficulty for socialist theory is this: how to envisage the transcendence of labour's fragmentation and internal division without reducing the problems at stake to some direct appeal to an idealised class consciousness, advocating "unity" as the desirable solution while neglecting the objective material basis of the existing fragmentation, inherent in the continued division of labour.

As we have seen, Marx did not indulge in a direct appeal to an idealised proletarian class consciousness, except in the polemical context imposed on him by the need to defend the Paris Commune against a hostile press. Nevertheless, he firmly expected the emergence of what he called "communist mass consciousness" - coupled with a fully adequate institutional articulation in the form of a global trade-unionism and corresponding political militancy - through the historical development of the capitalist social order, under the impact of the inexorable unfolding of the productive potentials as well as contradictions of that social order. Yet, it is not only thanks to the benefit of hindsight that we can see, today, that such expectations were rather problematical. In fact, some of the ambiguities of Marx's own analyses already pointed in the same direction, as we have seen above.

To conclude then: given the helping hand in displacing its contradictions which capital receives from the fragmenting and divisive impact of "uneven development" and of the international division of labour, in their inseparability from the differential rate of exploitation of labour, some of the conditions for the socialization of production and the ensuing unification of labour anticipated by Marx are most unlikely to materialise within the confines and structural constraints of the capitalist social order itself.

Naturally, this does not decrease the importance of a socialist mass consciousness. On the contrary, it puts the vital socio-historical process of such conscious mass itself even more into relief. For the full realization of the socialist project is inconceivable without a successfully integrated and "totalizing" (though, of course, not unmediated) conscious management of their problems by the associated producers, in a globally interconnected setting which is "unconsciously" [48] brought into being in the first place by the development of capitalism itself.

But, precisely for the latter reason, one can realistically appeal to the increasing importance of a totalizing social consciousness only by calling at the same time for the necessary material conditions - aimed at transcending the given fragmentation of labour - through which the development of this consciousness first becomes possible. And since labour's fragmentation cannot be eliminated by the capitalist "socialization of production", neither can it readily be transcended - in view of the deeply embedded material structures of the inherited global division of labour. For a long time after the socialist political revolution, the necessary material mediations in question, characterized by a vital capacity for bringing about a progressive reduction in the constraining role of the inherited material determinations, must remain the regulative framework of social life for the entire historical epoch of transition.

Notes

[2] The term used by Marx to characterize the tasks of the socialist revolution from 1831 onwards, sharply contrasting the "social revolution" with the narrowly political horizons of the revolutions of the past.
[3] "Empiricism, communism is only possible as the act of dominant peoples 'all at once' and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with them." MEW, Vol. II, p. 73.
[6] We should recall Lenin's repeated complaints about the paralyzing impact of "Asiatic backwardness" on postrevolutionary developments.
[7] This is how Lenin tried to reorient the revolution of "backward Russia" - contrasted with the potentialities of the "advanced countries of Western Europe" - into the original perspectives:

"It would be erroneous to lose sight of the fact that, soon after the victory of the Revolution in at least one of the advanced countries, a sharp change will probably come about: Russia will cease to be the model and will once again become a backward country, the example of which is a class society and socialist sense." (Lenin, Collected Works, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1960ff, Vol. 31, p. 21).

To be sure, the relation of forces has significantly changed since Lenin wrote these lines. Nevertheless, the still unrealized proletarian revolution "in at least one of the advanced countries" continues to maintain the "historical dislocation" with regard to the radical transformation and ultimate "withering off" of the state as well as the potentialities of "conscious collective totalization" - i.e., the self-determined comprehensive integration and conscious collective action of the social individuals - implicit in the developments anticipated by Marx.

[8] Paul Mattick, Critique of Marquis: One-Dimensional Man in Class Society, Merlin Press, London, 1972, p. 61. While one cannot value highly enough the genuinely Marxian perspective of Mattick's work - maintained over a period of many years, with single-minded determination and consistency, under the conditions of an almost complete isolation in the United States - the point Mattick has to make is where summarily characterizes the various postcapitalist societies as "state capitalist" formations.

[13] The Commune "was essentially a working-class government". Ibid., p. 72.
[14] Ibid., p. 72.
[16] Ibid., p. 73.
[17] "... to serve as a lever for uptoing the economic foundations upon which rests the existence of classes" (Ibid., p. 72), and "to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour" (Ibid., p. 73).
[18] Ibid.
[22] Ibid, p. 171.
[23] "The working class know that they have to pass through different phases of class-struggle. They know that the superseding of the economic conditions of the slavery of labour by the conditions of free and associated labour can only be the progressive work of time, ... that they require not only a change of distribution, but a new organisation of production, or rather the delivery (setting free) of the social forms of production in present organised labour (engendered by present industry) of the slaveries of slavery, of their present class character, and their harmonious national and international coordination. They know that this work of regeneration will be again and again delayed and impeded by the resistance of vested interests and class egoism. They know that the present 'spontaneous action of the natural laws of capital and landed property' - can only be superseded by "the spontaneous action of the laws of the social economy of free and associated labour" by a long process of development of new conditions.... But they know at the same time that great strides may be made at once through the Communal forms of political organisation and that the time has come to begin that movement for themselves and mankind." Ibid, p. 172-73.

[26] In the Communist Manifesto, for instance.
[27] The Civil War in France, p. 171.
[29] Ibid, p. 171.
[34] See Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, MECW, Vol. 6, pp. 206-212.
[39] For us, in hindsight, it is enough to think of the United States to see how problematical Marx's stipulative generalization is. The "development and growth of modern industry" and the advancement of the International division of labour which, according to the Marxian formula, should have brought with it the highest degree of "combinations" and a correspondingly high level of organised and fully conscious political militancy, failed to achieve the anticipated results. To explain the actual trend of industrial developments - often described as the "integration of the working class" - together with the possibility of its reversal, it is obviously necessary to introduce a number of important qualifying conditions which do not appear at all in Marx's original framework of assessment.