Nietzsche's Woman
The Poststructuralist Attempt To Do Away with Women
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Since Derrida's *Spurs*, Nietzsche has been posed as woman. With his recent *Postponements*, David Farrell Krell pushes Nietzsche further into Derrida's 'feminine operation'. Krell claims that Derrida and Nietzsche save real women from dogmatic philosophy by writing with 'the hand of woman':

> It is the male philosopher who believes in 'woman' and 'truth' alike, the male philosopher who, according to both Nietzsche and Derrida, proves credulous, dogmatic, and mistaken. Writing now with the other hand, as it were, both Nietzsche and Derrida record the plaint of women against 'the foolishness of the dogmatic philosopher'...

Does Krell see himself, then, writing with the 'other hand', the hand of woman? Male philosophers dressing up like woman in order to arouse their own masculine desires does nothing to save real women from dogmatic male philosophy. Rather, inversely, their 'operation' saves philosophy from real women. Why do women need to write philosophy, if men can do it for them? If men can write with the hand of woman, philosophy has no need for women. Feminist philosophy, then, also becomes the domain of men.

In addition, I am suspicious of the woman Nietzsche initiates/desires. I will argue that Nietzsche desires woman as mother. He fears woman as anything else. Moreover, Nietzsche does not desire to *become* woman, rather, he desires to *possess* woman. Nietzsche's desire, then, is not a feminine desire. It is not the desire of a woman. Rather, it is a masculine desire (the desire to possess through impregnation).

Reading Nietzsche's published writings, along with re-reading Krell's unpublished Nietzsche, I will attempt to answer the question which Krell raises, but cannot answer: Why is Nietzsche's transition to woman always postponed and agonizing? It is because Nietzsche desires woman as a man—his desire is masculine, not feminine—that he cannot become woman. The woman whom Nietzsche desires is an ideal, fetishized woman, never actualized, therefore, always frustrating. Nietzsche's 'transition', then, is always agonizing because not only can't he become woman but also he can't have woman.

I will argue that Nietzsche's agonizing desire can be read as the manifestation of an unresolved oedipal complex: Nietzsche's desire is to kill his philosophical fathers, whom he claims are impotent, and impregnate the 'womb of being', in order to give birth to the *Ubermensch*. Nietzsche does not want to be woman. Rather he wants to be man enough, 'hard enough', to impregnate which his fathers could not. He wants to take over their potency. Yet this desire brings with it the fear of punishment—the fear of castration.

Although both Derrida and Krell mention Oedipus, and Nietzsche's fascination with Oedipus in *The Birth of Tragedy*, neither sees the Oedipus in Nietzsche. Enamoured by Nietzsche's 'skirts', Krell skirts Nietzsche's Oedipus. It is Oedipus who can answer Krell's riddle 'why is woman always postponed?' Oedipus also answers Krell's further question 'what is the relationship between woman and death for Nietzsche?' The oedipal desire for woman as mother demands the death of the father. Nietzsche fears punishment for this murder. In addition the 'son', the *Ubermensch*, whom he hopes to sire as a result of his incestuous desire, demands his death as the father. The *Ubermensch* is beyond all philosophers, including Nietzsche.

As if Nietzsche's desire, masculine desire, is not already complex enough, he also suffers from performance anxiety. Perhaps he isn't man enough to impregnate the 'womb of being'. Perhaps, like his fathers, he is impotent. This complex desire, the oedipal desire, can be read in Nietzsche's published writings and even in Krell's *Postponements*.

Nietzsche is torn between identifying with the father (in this case the rationalist fathers of philosophy) while denying the mother, and affirming the mother (the feminine) in order to do away with the father (the masculine). This struggle, however, and the way in which Nietzsche approaches the struggle, are themselves masculine. Although the passages where Nietzsche attacks traditional science, reason, and truth, far outweigh the passages where he praises them, there are places where Nietzsche explicitly identifies himself with the traditional truth. For example, Nietzsche claims that:

> ...truths that are hard won, certain, enduring, and therefore still of consequence for all further knowledge are higher, to keep them is manly, and shows bravery, simplicity, restraint... Eventually, not only the individual, but all mankind will be elevated to this manliness, when men finally grow accustomed to the greater esteem for durable, lasting knowledge.

Here Nietzsche identifies with the eternal 'manly' truth and looks forward to the day when all of mankind is manly. Krell refers to several unpublished notes where Zarathustra tells others, or is told, to become hard, to become manly.

In addition to praising manliness, Nietzsche also explicitly degrades the feminine. The list of Nietzsche's disparaging remarks about women is long and familiar.

What is more interesting in Nietzsche's writings is his desire for women—the desire misidentified by Krell—and his
dissociation from the masculine tradition. However, even in these passages where Nietzsche praises/desires the feminine, it becomes clear that his desire is always a masculine desire.

What Krell does not see is that Nietzsche’s praise of the feminine is always articulated from the masculine stance. Therefore, even when he attempts to dissociate himself from his paternal predecessors, he does not succeed.

First, the struggle to overcome the tradition, to overthrow the fathers, can be read as a masculine oedipal struggle. Nietzsche wants to overthrow his predecessors in order to take their place and seize their power. He refutes their theories in order to put his theory of the will to power in their place.

For Nietzsche, the tradition must be overcome (überwindung). Even the self must be overcome (Selbstüberwindung). Nietzsche’s language is the language of the conqueror, a masculine image of the hero.

Other images which Nietzsche uses to criticize the truth of dogmatic male philosophy expose his alliance with that tradition. Nietzsche calls philosophy the will to truth as the impotence of the will to create. He criticizes the ‘masculine’ will to truth, but he does so in the name of masculine anxiety: the anxiety about impotence.

Nietzsche also refers to philosophy and religion as ‘castrated’: to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every effect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect.

Nietzsche claims that philosophers’ ‘emasculated’ leers wish to be called “contemplation”. Nietzsche criticizes the Christian treatment of sexual excitement, the consequence of which, he says, is:

... not only the loss of an organ but the emasculation of a man’s character—And the same applies to the moralist’s madness and demands, instead of the restraining of the passions, their extirpation. Its conclusion is always: only the castrated man is a good man.

For Nietzsche, detached objective truth is ‘castrated’ because it is ‘impotent’ to create and reproduce truth. With Christianity, this objective truth becomes a matter of value which emasculates (the changing subjective experience of) the body. The metaphors of castration, impotence, and emasculation are masculine metaphors which Nietzsche uses to critique the tradition. This is an example of Nietzsche’s tendency to usurp, rather than undermine, the paternal position. He desires creativity and procreation/reproduction which are free from the limitations of objective truth. He desires feminine truth. Yet his desire is a masculine desire. He desires the feminine in order to prove his potency, his manliness.

Nietzsche’s language of dissociation from the masculine tradition not only displays a fear of the loss of masculine potency, but also a fear of feminine potency. Nietzsche fears his desire for women. Like the ascetic priest, Nietzsche sublimes his sexual desire because it is dirty, ‘(sinful)’. Like the ascetic priest, the only purpose of feminine potency which Nietzsche will endorse is procreation: Only procreation is innocent; desire without procreation is sheer lechery. Nietzsche’s disgust with philosophy results from what he conceives of as its purely lecherous lust for life. Nietzsche desires the feminine as mother and denies, postpones, the feminine as lover.

Nietzsche repeatedly uses metaphors of biological reproduction—‘womb of being’, ‘mother eternally pregnant’, ‘procreative life’—to describe the Dionysian force. Nietzsche’s Dionysian type is the ‘eternally pregnant mother’. She affirms herself continually by reproducing. The biological metaphors which Nietzsche uses to describe the will to power are metaphors of reproduction, procreation, motherhood.

The mystical vision of Dionysus, that eternal life which flows indestructibly beneath the surface of phenomena, is figured as the ‘maternal womb of being’. Just as that Dionysian prophet Zarathustra cries out that the unexhausted procreative will of life is the will to power, so ‘a voice that rings authentic’ cries out, through Dionysian art and its tragic symbolism, ‘be like me, the original mother, who constantly creating, finds satisfaction in the turbulent flux of appearances.’

‘Everything about Woman,’ says Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, is a ‘riddle’ solved by ‘pregnancy’. Feminine love claims Nietzsche is ‘maternal love’. He desires maternal love, but he fears the purely feminine power which creates independently of man, without masculine fertilization.

Moreover, for Nietzsche, pregnancy implies chastity. He cannot seem to imagine pregnancy as the result of bodily lust. He claims that it is natural for philosophers and artists to be chaste since their creativity is a type of pregnancy. Obviously, Nietzsche believes that pregnant women must be chaste. Our consuming desire, says Nietzsche, is due to the loss of the ‘mythic womb’. Woman, for Nietzsche, is nothing other than this mythic womb (empty space). The ‘womb of being’, the origin of all force, is a myth, an origin which does not exist.

Woman is layer after layer of masks with no face behind them: ‘MASKS. There are women who have no inner life wherever one looks for it, being nothing but masks. She is a papier-maché balloon, an empty womb (until man impregnates her).

At this point Nietzsche exposes his frustrated desire for the eternally fecund woman, whom he admits does not exist. The womb of being, as it turns out, is a ‘mythic womb’, an empty womb. There is no woman; she is only masks.

Nietzsche, then, wants to use ‘woman’—his ideal of woman as eternal mother—as a means to give birth to the Übermensch. He wants, in a sense, to ‘artificially inseminate’ this lost ‘mythic womb’ with a potency his predecessors lacked. He longs for the womb where he can prove his virility to his emasculated fathers. Yet, he fears any real contact with women or sexual desire. Like the ascetic priest, he wants conception without the mess and desire of the body. Therefore, while on the one hand Nietzsche desires the body and wants to liberate the passions from the oppressive, masculine, philosophical tradition, on the other hand, he fears his own desire.

He fears the female body and the articulation of its desire. ‘Even now female voices are heard which—holy Aristophakes!’, exclaims Nietzsche, ‘are frightening: they threaten with medical explicitness what woman wants from man, first and last. Is it not in the worst taste when woman sets about becoming scientific in that way?’

What philosophers (including Nietzsche) desire and yet fear, says Nietzsche, is the ‘eternally feminine’. This fear is what causes the postponement of woman. Nietzsche fears the feminine power, just as he fears his own desire for that power.
He fears his incestuous desire which demands the death of the paternal tradition.

The woman embraced in Nietzsche's published writings is the mother. Perhaps the woman embraced only in his private notes is the lover.

It is the lover, the feminine sexual power, whom Nietzsche postpones out of fear. He fears even the sexual nature of desire for the mother. It is the sensuality, sexuality, of his desire which is postponed. This sensuality is forbidden by the paternal tradition especially when it originates in incestuous fantasies.

In Postponements, Krell does not distinguish between Nietzsche's desire for woman as mother and woman as lover. This is why he does not distinguish Nietzsche's desire for the eternally procreative mother and the sensual lover. He also does not distinguish between Nietzsche's desire to become woman and this desire to possess woman. He does not understand Nietzsche's postponement. The incestuousness of Nietzsche's desire, however, can be re-read into Krell's Nietzsche.

Krell begins his account of Nietzsche's postponements with the 'Plaint of Ariadne', which was originally 'The Travail of the Woman in Child birth.' Krell points out that 'The Travail of the Woman in Child birth', or the 'Plaint of Ariadne', shows up as 'The Magician' in the part IV of Zarathustra. Here, says Krell, the gender of the speech changes. Here Ariadne's plaint is appropriated by a charlatan wizard whose fakery is exposed by Zarathustra when he pummels the faker with a stick. The movements of Nietzsche's charlatan wizard are not so dissimilar from Nietzsche's own. Like the wizard who fakes Ariadne's lament, Nietzsche fakes woman's lament.

How, asks Krell, could anyone suggest that we take a stick to beautiful Ariadne? He uses this argument to show that the stick is punishment for fakery. Well, this may be so, but according to Nietzsche, even beautiful women want the stick: 'Good and bad women want a stick.'

Even when Ariadne's lament (the lament of the mother giving birth) is not appropriated by an old wizard, it is appropriated by Dionysus. In response to Ariadne's lament, Dionysus tells her that 'I am your labyrinth.' We are told that 'A labyrinth human being never seeks the truth, but—whatever he may try to tell us—always and only his Ariadne.' From this, Krell concludes that woman is labyrinth. Every human being, then, tells only his woman. Now Dionysus' response becomes an appropriation: he tells Ariadne: 'I am your labyrinth. I am your woman.' Dionysus, then, becomes the woman in woman, just as Krell's Nietzsche becomes the woman in woman.

Zarathustra's imperative—'become hard!'—addressed to Ariadne after her lament, takes on a new meaning. Ariadne must become hard for the sake of her woman, Dionysus, for the sake of the woman in woman.

Krell argues that the Dionysian Dithyramb, 'The Nightsong,' takes over the language of 'The Plaint of Ariadne.' Once again appropriating Ariadne's lament, Dionysus exposes his own desire for love, maternal love, when in 'The Nightsong' he longs to 'suck at breasts of light!' Although woman's lament is appropriated by Dionysus/Nietzsche, woman's desire is figured only always in terms of man's desire. Woman becomes hard only as a displaced man for the sake of his woman.

The second postponement diagnosed by Krell is Corinna, the mother of tragedy. (Notice that so far the women postponed are mothers.) We meet Corinna in Nietzsche's notes for the never written tragedy about Empedocles. Corinna, claims Krell, is a symbol of rebirth. Corinna dies and Empedocles restores her through the heat that remained around the middle of her body. Krell's suggestion that Corinna is the mother of tragedy and a symbol of rebirth already transforms Nietzsche's desire for her into an oedipal desire. Also it is through the heat in the middle of her body, the womb, which she is revived. Woman, for Nietzsche, lives only through the activation and reactivation of the womb. Nietzsche's woman needs man to give her life through her womb.

It is also important that Empedocles' restoration is not sexual. He does not desire Corinna except through her life-giving womb. Dionysus, on the other hand, is infatuated with Corinna, yet he runs away. So too, Nietzsche runs from his erotic desires unless they are transferred to desires for procreation.

It is interesting that 'Empedocles feels like a murderer, deserving of unending punishment; he hopes for a rebirth of penitential death.' He feels like a murderer although he's (literally) killed no one. Could his guilt be for his incestuous desire? The desire which demands the death of the father?

Krell's next postponement is Pana. Krell introduces Pana with a note from Nietzsche's plans for Zarathustra: 'I want to celebrate reproduction and death as a festival.' For Zarathustra, Pana represents both death and reproduction. Woman represents the life cycle: 'Woman as nature.' This woman is not just any woman, she is the mother.

Pana, as Zarathustra's woman, symbolizes both the birth of the Ubermensch and the death of Zarathustra. Once again Oedipus will solve the riddle of how woman is related to death. In all of the various plans for Zarathustra's death—the death always postponed—Zarathustra dies for the sake of his union with woman.

In part I, 'On Free Death', Zarathustra wants to die out of live for the earth in order to 'find rest in her who bore me.' He wants a reunion with the mother who bore him. He wants to climb back into the womb of the earth. Death is the ultimate union with the womb of being.

Krell argues that Zarathustra realizes that he must die in order for the Ubermensch to be born. Zarathustra wants children with eternity; he wants to father the Ubermensch. It is Zarathustra who must become hard for the sake of the Ubermensch. He must be man enough to impregnate the original mother, the eternally procreating womb of the earth. Yet Zarathustra realizes that, as the father, he must die so that his son can come into power.

This is why in all of the postponed plans for Zarathustra's death, it is his union with woman, the original mother, which demands his death. Or, he dies among children for the sake of the child who will result from his union with the original mother. He dies for the sake of his son, the Ubermensch.

Thus, Zarathustra/Nietzsche's union with woman is postponed for fear of death. Or perhaps he is afraid that he is not man enough to sire the Ubermensch.

The last of Krell's Postponements, Calina, displaces Medusa and re-places Ariadne. Although Krell had made several references to Medusa in his first three chapters, the first line of Calina's chapter is 'Medusa's chapter will have to wait.' Since Calina's chapter is the last in the book, it seems that Medusa's chapter will have to wait indefinitely. Perhaps she is Krell's own postponement. Why does he shy away from Medusa? Is Medusa Nietzsche's only woman who cannot be turned into mother? Is she the woman who would rather lose her head than succumb to man? The woman who cannot be possessed? Feminine creativity which does not depend on man's fertilization?

At one point Krell claims that he does not want Nietzsche's
destiny as his own.46 Yet only the hand of woman, the writing hand, he exclaims, can loosen the grip of that destiny.47 What is Nietzsche’s destiny which Krell wants to avoid? Writing with the hand of woman or postponing woman? In any case, it is Medusa who forces Krell’s hand. She is the feminine power still cut off from the writing hand. So instead of Medusa, we get Calina.

Calina stands in for Medusa as the woman who cannot be forced.50 While it might be true that Calina cannot be forced, I suspect that Calina is no woman (although not because she cannot be forced). Moreover, because ‘she’ cannot be forced, ‘she’ is to be feared.

We meet Calina in the plans for Zarathustra: ‘Calina, brown-red, everything too acrid nearby in high summer. Ghostly (my current danger)!51 First, in this note there is nothing to suggest that Calina is a woman. Calina sounds like a place, a desert. Especially given the next note: ‘Sipo Matador... Nothing there that would not poison, allure, gnaw, overthrow, transvalue.’52 Sipo Matador, says Krell, is identified in Beyond Good and Evil as a poisonous Javanese plant.53 Calina sounds like a desert full of tempting poisons.

If Calina is a woman, she is a desert, a barren womb. She is the greatest danger—the woman who cannot be possessed through pregnancy. Although alluring, she is not fertile. That is why she is a threat to Zarathustra’s manliness. How can he sire the Übermensch if the womb of being is barren?

Even this barren woman who cannot be possessed is safer than the fertile woman who will not be possessed. Calina’s independence from man is not her own doing. If she is emancipated, she is one of the emancipated women who Nietzsche claims lack the wherewithal to have children.54 Is the assumption that if these women were fertile, they wouldn’t be free? Only the ‘incomplete’ woman, Calina, can escape man’s force.55 The final postponement, Calina, to whom Krell gives thanks in his preface, is not the woman Krell takes her for.

Krell does not, however, claim to know Calina. ‘Somewhere,’ he says, ‘someone sees clearly and distinctly with Maenadic sharp sightedness—who or what Calina is ... We ourselves will be patient, trusting in science. We will not mislay our umbrella, will not lose our leg.’56 Here Krell, like Nietzsche, prefers to remain protected by the paternal umbrella ‘we’, by the paternal science, than risk ‘losing our leg’, the paternal leg. Looking once again through Oedipus, Krell’s association with the paternal scientific tradition, and fear of losing ‘our leg’, can be read as a castration fear. It is the fear of castration, of impotence, that drives Krell, along with Nietzsche, to return to the paternal identification. In fact, here Krell invokes the paternal tradition against Nietzsche, who for him poses as woman. Krell does not want Nietzsche’s destiny, that is, his identification with woman. Rather, Krell prefers to stay under the safety of the paternal umbrella, science. In a sense, then, out of fear of losing ‘our (paternal) leg’, Krell denies his connection to woman (Nietzsche).

Krell does not share Nietzsche’s desire for woman, yet he wants to maintain, revitalize, Nietzsche’s ‘other hand’, the hand of woman:

I do not want Nietzsche’s destiny as my own. Would prefer to lose him. Yet only the hand of woman, the writing hand, the hand back to which the trace of thread always leads us, can loosen the grip of that destiny. Gingerly.

Derrida believes that Nietzsche possesses such a hand, So do I. Must it wither?

Nietzsche, I argue, does not write with the hand of woman. To give Nietzsche woman’s writing hand, he exclaims, can loosen the grip of that destiny. Women’s writing, then, remains superfluous to the masculine tradition.

It is not, however, merely the political implications for real women writing philosophy which demand that we reject Krell’s thesis. The textual evidence also demands that we reject Krell’s thesis.

What we have learned about Nietzsche’s frustrated desire for woman is that the articulation of his desire, the motive behind his desire, the fear of his desire, and his desire itself, are all masculine. His desire, then, is merely a reflection of the patriarchal construction of man’s desire for woman.

Although Nietzsche figures his desire for the Dionysian language with feminine images (original mother, womb of being, eternally procreating, mythic womb, eternally feminine), he figures his rejection of traditional truth using masculine images (impotence, castration, emasculation). What becomes obvious is that Nietzsche’s motive for seeking the feminine, as well as abandoning the masculine, is the same: he wants power over both. Nietzsche wants to master the feminine; he wants to impregnate the womb of being in order to show up his impotent philosophical fathers.

Nietzsche explicitly associates images of the master with the Dionysian force, even as he identifies this force with the original mother. The original mother, as it turns out, is associated with masculine power. It becomes clear from his writings that Nietzsche is afraid of feminine power. He is afraid of the womb of being. Ultimately, Nietzsche sees the feminine power as a threat to his position of power—patriarchy’s traditional fear.

Nietzsche’s desire itself is masculine. His desire can be read as the result of an unresolved oedipal complex. Nietzsche wants to impregnate the original mother and kill the philosophical fathers. He wants to claim his fathers’ power over the ‘mythic womb of being’. Nietzsche wants to fill the womb of being in a way, he claims, that his castrated fathers cannot. He wants complete power of this elusive womb.

Nietzsche does not, as both Derrida and Krell suggest, want to become woman. Rather, Nietzsche wants to possess woman. Nietzsche does not, as both Derrida and Krell suggest, write with the hand of woman. Krell’s claim that he does can only serve to silence women.

First, if Nietzsche is woman, he is only woman as lustless mother. This fetishized ideal woman silences all other women, real women. Nietzsche fetishizes ‘woman’ by constructing this ideal of woman as eternally pregnant. Nietzsche’s construction of woman does not allow for differences among individual women. Moreover, it does not allow for women to express themselves in any way other than pregnancy. ‘Woman,’ in Nietzsche’s scenario, is expressed by articulating the inarticulate womb. This constraining construction of the voice of the ideal ‘woman’ suppresses the voices of real women who may have something else to articulate.

Second, if man can write as woman, then there is no need to read women’s writing. By exposing Nietzsche as a ‘fake woman’ we can begin, on a very limited level, to silence men
in order to suppress the voices of women, we open a space for
women to articulate themselves. Nietzsche’s fetishism of
woman, and Krell’s fetishism of Nietzsche as woman, should
be taken as limited examples of the pervasive and pernicious
patriarchal construction of woman.

‘Big books are big sins,’ says Krell, ‘but big books about
Nietzsche are a far more pernicious affair: they are breaches of
good taste, but the claim that a man (Nietzsche)
Nietzsche are a far more pernicious affair: they are breaches of
politically dangerous.

Notes

1 Jacques Derrida, Spurs/Eperons, The University of Chicago
2 David Farrell Krell, Postponements, Indiana University Press:
Bloomington, 1986, p. 10; see also p. 85.
3 Ibid., p. 85. Krell claims that ‘Derrida believes that Nietzsche
possesses such a hand [the hand of woman]. So do I.’ Does Krell
mean that ‘Derrida believes and So do I,’ or ‘Nietzsche possesses
such a hand and so do I?’
4 Ibid., p. 23.
5 Freud suggests that the oedipal complex is resolved both by iden­
tifying with the father and fearing the father. According to Freud,
it is castration by the father which the boys fears as punishment
for his incestuous desire.
6 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, see especially section 9.
7 See, e.g., Nietzsche, Dawn, sections 427, 550; Human all too
Human, sections 3, 244, 252, 257; The Will to Power, section
469.
8 Nietzsche, Human all too Human, section 3, p. 15, ‘On First and
Last Things’, trans. by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann,
University of Nebraska Press, 1984.
9 Krell, op. cit., Postponements, p. 24, 27, 58, 77. On page 64,
Krell quotes a note in which Zarathustra tells the cat maidens:
‘weep no more Pallid Dudul Be a man, Suleika!’
10 See e.g., Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, II, sections 63-77. Beyond
Good and Evil. Zarathustra, The Will to Power, Human all too
Human; ‘Wanderer and his Shadow’, section 16; ‘Woman and
Child’, sections 383-437; ‘Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions’,
sections 272, 273, 274, 276-283, 286, 292.
11 For passages in which Nietzsche praises war and conquering, see
Human all too Human, section 477; The Will to Power, sections
53, 125, 975; Beyond Good and Evil, section 200. Also in On the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues in favour of the master
morality.
12 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 585; see also On the
Genealogy of Morals, section 7.
13 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, III, section 12, p. 119,
in Kaufmann (ed. and trans.), The Portable Nietzsche, Viking
15 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 343, p. 207, Kaufmann and
17 Ibid., ‘On Immaculate Perception’.
18 For a critique of Nietzsche’s use of biological metaphors of
reproduction in order to describe the Dionysian force, see Ol­
liver, ‘Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writing’, Social Theory
19 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 16.
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part II, ‘On Self-Overcoming’.
21 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 16.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part I, ‘On Little Old and Young
Women’, in Kaufmann’s The Portable Nietzsche; see also On the
Genealogy of Morals, III, section 8.
23 Nietzsche, Human all too Human, ‘Woman and Child’, No. 392,
p. 197, Marion Faber (trans.); see also No. 421.
26 Nietzsche, Human all too Human, ‘Woman and Child’, section
405, p. 198, Marion Faber (trans.).
27 Beyond Good and Evil, III, section 232, p. 163, trans. by
28 The Case of Wagner, ‘A Musicians Problem’, section 3; see also
Beyond Good and Evil, author’s preface.
29 Krell, op. cit., p. 19.
30 Ibid., p. 15.
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ‘Epigrams and Interludes’, no.
does the Italian ‘Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone.’
32 Krell, op. cit., p. 19.
34 Ibid., p. 30.
36 Ibid., pp. 45-6. Krell also argues that Corinna becomes a symbol
of recurrence.
37 Ibid., pp. 45, 86.
38 Ibid., pp. 50, 86.
39 Ibid., p. 49.
40 Ibid., p. 54.
41 Ibid., pp. 45, 46. Here Krell quotes the notes for the tragedy on
Empedocles.
42 Ibid., p. 42.
43 Ibid., pp. 65, 54.
44 Ibid., p. 56.
45 Ibid., pp. 59, 64.
Education’: ‘In my children I want to make up for being the child
of my fathers.’ In Kaufmann’s The Portable Nietzsche, p. 233.
47 Ibid., p. 72.
48 Ibid., p. 85.
49 Ibid., p. 85.
50 Ibid., p. 84.
51 Ibid., p. 80.
52 Ibid., p. 79.
53 Ibid., p. 79.
54 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, section 5.
55 Krell, op. cit., pp. 25, 84.
56 Ibid., p. 81. Cf. p. 77 where Krell cites a note about dancing girls
who have ‘lost a leg’. The reference to the umbrella is, of course,
to Derrida’s Spurs. Derrida considers a note where Nietzsche
writes ‘I have forgotten my umbrella’ (Spurs, p. 123).
57 Ibid., p. 85.
58 Ibid., Preface, p. ix.