

# The Call of Nature

## A Reply to Ted Benton and Tim Hayward

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Does the critical practice of the ecology movement require a theoretical ground? Ted Benton,<sup>1</sup> for one, seems to think that it does. In the Autumn 1992 issue of *Radical Philosophy* Tim Hayward argued that one could accept Benton's theory without being obliged to adopt the practical stance for which he was trying to argue. However, Hayward did not really address the issue of Benton's foundationalism. Here I want to pursue that problem a little further. Taking up Benton's project of trying to do justice to the claims recognised by the ecology movement, I will argue that we can do so only if we eschew Benton's foundationalism. To that end we can learn a lot, I will suggest, from the way in which Theodor Adorno tried to re-think the practical orientation of Critical Theory.

### Benton's Project

In his 1988 article in *Radical Philosophy* Benton clearly wants to speak for the Green movement; but he hesitates. As a social theorist he stands back, refraining from giving his own voice to the concerns of that movement. In general, he does not actually speak *for* the ecology movement; rather, he speaks *about* it. He does not write as if his work were itself a moment within ecosocialist critical practice. He begins as if he were merely a disinterested conduit for the concerns of others. Yet in one brief passage he conveys those concerns with a forcefulness which indicates that he would like to speak with his own voice: 'Ethical considerations must ... enter into our dealings with [animals]. It is evil to continue to treat them merely as instruments or resources to be exploited for specifically human purposes.'<sup>2</sup> Although Benton hesitates to speak directly for and with this movement, as a social theorist he feels called upon to justify its critical practice. He aims to identify justificatory grounds – grounds for arguing that the way in which we relate ourselves to nature is somehow wrong.

The project under interrogation is identified by Benton as a form of humanism, against which he tries to defend a certain sort of naturalism. He engages more specifically with the project of humanising nature which Marx affirmed in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. What matters here is not so much a particular set of practices as an underlying assumption about how other living beings acquire value for us – the assumption that other natural beings are valuable only insofar as they can be brought to serve human

ends. The importance of this project for Marx was that, by transforming the materials given to us in our environment, we develop and objectify our powers as human beings.

Benton voices his concerns about this humanist project as follows:

If we can be at home in the world, be properly, humanly, connected with the world only on the basis of a thorough-going transformation of it in line with our intentions, then what space is left for valuing nature in virtue of its *intrinsic* qualities? If we can 'see ourselves' in, or identify only with a world which *we* have created, then what is left of our status as *part* of nature? Nature, it seems, is an acceptable partner for humanity only insofar as it has been divested of all that otherness, insofar, in other words, as it has become, itself, human.<sup>3</sup>

Although this is the only occasion on which Benton explicitly refers to the *otherness* of nature, I want to concentrate upon it. For it is clearly this which Benton wants to do justice to. He aims to recognise forms of life with ends of their own, and with which social practices should respectfully work. What I want to argue is that if we confine ourselves to the theoretical attitude, we cannot make sense of the way in which the otherness of nature can be an issue for us.

The theory developed by Benton to argue that the otherness of nature should be an issue for us emphasises the identity of human and natural being. His immediate concern is to undermine a rigid and hierarchical distinction between humanity and animality. The argument tends towards, without elaborating, a critique of the autonomy of the intellect. The hierarchical distinction at issue may be said to be implied in the Kantian claim that, as thinking beings, we are – potentially at least – independent of our natural being. Here the intellect is assumed to be capable of a self-sufficiency which places it over and against nature. It is precisely this idea of the intellect as standing apart from and against its natural situation which Benton seeks to challenge.

But Benton does not address himself to the strong Kantian notion of the autonomy of the intellect. He turns instead to a much looser notion of the autonomy of culture with respect to nature. Here, the idea of 'culture', or the realm of the properly human, does not specifically refer to the sort of subjectivity with which Kant was concerned. It simply refers to distinctively human ways of doing things. Benton wants to argue that the latter are merely *ways* of doing

things which other animals also do.<sup>4</sup> So the naturalism Benton defends involves recalling 'the common core of "natural beinghood" which we share with other living creatures'.<sup>5</sup> One of the points he makes refers back to a Freudian notion of human drives as sublimations of pre-cultural instincts. Although these primary needs are transformed as the individual is integrated into a distinctively cultural life, individuals remain 'needy beings', and, in this respect at least, our predicament is identical with that of non-human 'needy beings'. Culture transforms, but does not annul, our natural predicament. Accordingly, culture remains within, and is not set apart from, nature.

Although this is a rather crude summary of Benton's position,<sup>6</sup> enough has been said for us to establish the sort of argument he is advancing. Having maintained that humanisation can be seen as a transformation of the way we do things which non-human animals also do, Benton's naturalism insists that we prioritise this continuity between the human and the animal. As he puts it, 'naturalism' involves regarding the continuity between humans and other animals 'as ontologically fundamental', assigning it 'priority for [the] purposes of understanding and explaining what humans are and how they act'.<sup>7</sup> This theory about the nature within culture is then proposed as a foundation for our practical concern about the fate of other (non-human) living beings.

Accepting the standards of validity which Benton sets himself, there is surely a problem with the brute assertion that we should accord priority to the continuity between humanity and non-human animality. A further problem with such an emphasis is that it risks forgetting that a highly reflective subjectivity is a condition for the possibility of our relationship to other living beings being the sort of ethical issue Benton wants it to be. Only as a result of the sort of subjectivity which appears to be the product and presupposition of a distinctively cultural form of life can the subject's relationship to nature become an ethical issue.

### Hayward's Response

Hayward is concerned to defend a form of humanism against Benton's naturalism. To do so he distinguishes between a Promethean humanism which aims to transcend natural limits – a humanism which sets itself against nature – and a more moderate humanism which is concerned to develop our distinctively human powers in such a way as to affirm our place within nature. He seeks to defend the latter, arguing for the autonomy of culture, as a realm of value, vis-à-vis nature.

Hayward's argument involves at least two claims, one epistemological, the other ontological. The epistemological claim is that the aims and values which guide our practices are only knowable through our lived experience, not via scientific knowledge. On Hayward's reading, Benton's argument assumes that our practice can be guided by a naturalistic account of the flourishing of ourselves and those other species with whom we live.<sup>8</sup> Scientific knowledge would be the most fundamental guide to our critical practice. There is a problem with the limitation of our knowledge to ends which are meaningful to subjects like ourselves, and a problem with the unscientific character of

this cognition. The relevant sort of knowing 'has an irreducibly subjective dimension'.<sup>9</sup> Hence, 'Knowledge related to flourishing ... can only be had of beings with whom some kind of intersubjective relation is possible'.<sup>10</sup>

The ontological claim is that 'one must recognise the irreducibility of values as humanly, culturally, created ends'.<sup>11</sup> Here the problem concerns not *how* we know, but *what* we know. In our knowledge of human flourishing our concerns are distinctively cultural. This ontological claim is the support for Hayward's humanism. Hayward is surely right to emphasise the cultural mediation of our 'Green' concerns. There is nothing straightforwardly natural about the Green movement.

I want to develop Hayward's point about the sort of knowledge which really can orientate our practice, in relation to which any scientific cognition can possess only a secondary significance. The problem with Hayward's account is that it does not appear relevant to the Green movement. He claims, for instance, that 'we can only know what flourishing means in the *human* case, since such knowledge depends on an intersubjective relation...'<sup>12</sup> He continues: 'Insofar as we can talk about flourishing in other species at all, it is only to the extent that we can draw an analogy with what flourishing means in the human case.'<sup>13</sup> When we read this in conjunction with the claim that values are culturally created, the notion that natural things could be an issue for us appears unintelligible. It sounds as if we are sealed up in our cultural world.

Arguably, the critical practice of the Green movement involves a recognition of something natural which calls into question our social practices. It seems to rely upon the idea that within our cultural world we can recognise something other than it which might call it into question. In a similar vein, Adorno spoke of our recollection of nature. As a recollection, this is the experience of an utterly cultural subject. Yet it is also an experience in which the other of that culture becomes an issue. Can we make sense of the sort of cognition involved here? And is it this which really orientates the Green movement and, in a sense, grounds it? These are the questions I shall pursue.

But first more needs to be said about Benton's assumption that the Green movement needs theoretical grounds. The problem is not simply that scientific cognition, or a theory of the natural substratum of human being, will not do the trick. The problem is that Benton's foundationalism involves a complicity with the very movement which he seeks to criticise.

### Benton's Complicity

The way in which Benton turns to theory obscures or marginalises the very concerns animating his writing. The theoretical attitude to which Benton gives priority is one in which we think *about* things in a disengaged manner, as opposed to thinking *for* things in a way which is engaged and claimed by them. It is governed by an ideal of communicability such that what is to be known must be communicable to a third person who can grasp the truth of what is claimed, independently of any reference to lived experience. As an empirical reference point, experience may

enter, but only as data – i.e., as something considered in abstraction from the ‘feel’ of the experience. What counts is that which can be publicly demonstrated by argument and experiment. Hence, in the attempt to think from the standpoint of the theorist, all affective and expressive moments get edited out as merely subjective. A gap – even an abyss – appears to open up between theory and practice, between facts and values other than the value of theoretical knowledge and possibly the efficient use of means. Our estimation of ends would always be contingent upon the ‘feel’ of the ways of life to which those ends belong. For the attitude which does not see beyond the theoretical constitution of objects, that estimation of ways of life cannot but seem merely subjective, and hence devoid of any cognitive significance.

When Benton adopts the standpoint of the social theorist he disengages himself from the very claims motivating his critical practice. In that practice natural things matter to him. But in his theory those things, as things which matter, disappear from view. Stepping back, the concern for natural things is lost and all that matters is the validity of the theory. We become more concerned about the cogency of our reasoning and less solicitous about things in the world. The way Benton turns to theory assumes that discursive knowledge is the only way in which truth can appear to us. But if the truth can only appear to us when we look at arguments with the cold eye of a theorist scrutinising claims to validity, then our ethical concerns about ‘things’ in the world which apparently call for a response cannot but seem void of any truth content. It is because we have defined truth as something accessible solely to discursive knowing that we are left with the idea that in our ethical concerns truth is simply not an issue.

Not only does Benton’s approach to theory – his method, if you like – fail to do justice to his substantive concerns, it also leaves him unwittingly affirming the very tradition which he should challenge. Given his original concern for the otherness of nature, and his suspicion of an identitarian comportment towards nature, he needs to see that there is a problem with the theoretical attitude itself. The way he turns to theory sustains the very identitarian comportment he wishes to call into question. Although his act of writing is surely motivated by his ‘Green’ concerns, the writing itself does not acknowledge the otherness of nature. It does not acknowledge its debt to nature, or openly respond to natural things.

This way of turning to theory belongs with the Enlightenment ideal of a purely active subject – i.e., one which would see moral value solely in doing what it considers justifiable to all other rational beings. The pursuit of rational grounds aims at, and is animated by, an ideal of autonomy whereby the thinking being assigns itself the imperative for practice. Discursive reason aims at an ideal of its own self-sufficiency. By assuming that we need discursively rational grounds for re-orientating our relationship to nature, we perpetuate the intellectual project which sets reason over and against nature. Unwittingly, it seems, Benton continues the very project he needs to call into question. In his concern for a theoretical ground for the Green movement he forgets that the project of totalising the claims of discursive reason

repeats at the level of theory the deafness to the claims of other living beings which we find, for example, in the practices of factory farming.

There is a long tradition, stretching back at least to Rousseau’s first Discourse (1750), which identifies the standpoint of the disengaged theorist as a crucial part of the problem when we become critical of contemporary social practice. Unfortunately, Benton would appear oblivious to the problem. He uncritically maintains the theoretical attitude which accompanies the unreflective objectification of nature, and he assumes that contemporary science possesses an epistemological privilege which such thinkers as Heidegger, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, and Adorno have sought to call into question.

### Critical Practice Reconsidered

Benton’s search for a theoretical ground refers us to the concept of nature in general. Here, thinking appears to be lost in a concern for its own constructs. By contrast, in our critical practice we are engaged by events in the world. Of course, we can make sense of that world only in terms of our concepts, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it is the world in its particularity with which we are concerned. In our thinking, we are engaged by, and we try to make sense of, that particularity. Our concepts are abstract, but we employ them for the sake of making better sense of the socially concrete and the particular. Our thinking is for the sake of something in the world, rather than that thinking being reflected back upon itself in a concern for the validity claim raised by an argument. In responding to the suffering chickens in the factory farm to which Benton refers, we are not looking for an argument. We take that suffering to be an ethical issue without thinking of it as a validity claim which should be discursively redeemable.


Benton needs to acknowledge that the impetus for his critical practice comes from just such a response to other living beings, and not from a set of propositions and maxims which the autonomous subject may be said to assign itself. In the case of the suffering chickens, the imperative to act comes not from our recognition of that suffering. From the standpoint of discursive reason, that recognition begs all the important questions, and so the response appears to be groundless. But in that response we find ourselves thinking from the standpoint of the other. We find ourselves called upon to recognise the other – the particular other – as an end in itself. It is only as thinking beings that we can respond in this way. But what we recognise in that response is not an argument – a discursively redeemable claim to validity – but the suffering of the chickens. Any argument emerges out of, and must refer back to, the recognition of that suffering.

This way of thinking about the ground of our critical practice appears to repeat some of Adorno’s ideas in *Negative Dialectics*. Adorno breaks with the earlier strategy of the Frankfurt School, which involved reading into history a movement towards the goal of a rational society. On the assumption that the goal was, in some sense, an objective possibility, Critical Theory was to orientate itself by it. With that orientation went a commitment to the claims of the

intellect, and to the notion that the power of thought could and should assert itself more decisively in the organisation of social life. In *Negative Dialectics* Adorno focuses upon the way in which a response to Auschwitz calls that utopian projection of the primacy of discursive reason into question. The response to Auschwitz orientates a critique of the claims of constitutive subjectivity.

Built into the concept of negativity with which Adorno works is the idea that Critical Theory is guided by particulars which call for a response, for a judgement, and for action. The emphasis is upon negating the suffering of particulars, and it is through that response that the positive orientation is acquired, not from some preconceived idea of a positive goal. The alternative approach would accord suffering a derivative significance, seeing it merely as an indication that reality does not yet correspond to the ideal which lies within it as its potential. Subverting this strand of Critical Theory, Adorno describes the goal of a rational society in the following way: 'The *telos* of such an organisation of society would be to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its members, and to negate the internal reflexive forms of that suffering.'<sup>14</sup>

Adorno insists that, in responding to suffering particulars, and 'seeing' a moral or ethical imperative in that response, it would be a mistake to look to discursive reason for justification. Talking of the imperative he recognises in his response to Auschwitz he says: 'Dealing discursively



with it would be an outrage, for the new imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum – bodily, because it is now the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed...'<sup>15</sup> To return to the case of the suffering chickens in the factory farm, it similarly involves our affections – at least the memory of our own physical pain. Without this moment of affection it is inconceivable that we would be moved even to think that there was something wrong about the way the chickens are being treated.

In his discussion of the previously quoted passage, Joseph McCarney has criticised Adorno's position as irrationalist.<sup>16</sup> He suggests that it would be acceptable to make the recognition of suffering fundamental to morality were one willing to represent this view as, in some measure, the product of, and a fit subject for, ratiocination, if only in order to register it as an ultimate commitment or basic postulate.<sup>17</sup> The contrast here is between developing a moral philosophy from the theoretical premise that suffering ought not to be, and a practical stance which ultimately relies upon the bodily sensation that suffering ought not to be. McCarney seems to be insisting that to maintain our integrity as rational agents we must ground our practical stance theoretically, rather than beginning from, and orienting ourselves by, our embodied experience of suffering.

To initiate a defence of Adorno against McCarney, we can question whether sense can be made of the identification of the imperative concerning suffering with a theoretical postulate. If we begin with the premise that suffering ought not to be, can we make sense of that without falling back upon our lived experience of suffering? McCarney's philosopher wants to make it look as if we can begin from a theoretical postulate – a principle which the intellect assigns itself. But in the case to hand it does not appear as if we can make sense of that principle except by reference to our embodied life. It is in our lived experience of suffering that we come to know that suffering ought not to be.<sup>18</sup> Any theoretical postulate is parasitic upon that experience, and so cannot be accorded the sort of priority assigned by McCarney.

Had McCarney followed Habermas in his endeavour to prioritize discursive reason, we would find a similar suppression of an engagement by particulars. If the recognition of claims to validity is foregrounded, it appears as if morality must be about recognising a *principle* of universality. But the communicative ethic cannot start from any such principle. Prior to the interrogation of claims to validity, there must be a recognition of other speaking subjects as subjects whose voices deserve to be heard. In practice, we must begin from this recognition of particular others. And it is that recognition which imparts sense to the principle; it is not the principle which gives sense to the practice. Doubtless McCarney would reply that, since we cannot count upon the automatic recognition of particular others, we must argue that there ought to be such a recognition, arguing from the principle to the necessity for the practice. But this, once again, risks obscuring the way in which the meaning of the recognition of the principle is only manifest in the practice of recognising particular others.

Recalling the response to the suffering chickens, it is

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clear that what we need to be able to say is that it involves a moral perception. The point McCarney makes against Adorno is that 'sympathy and indignation cannot be counted on as automatic responses to agony'.<sup>19</sup> Adorno does not assume that they are automatic responses. Nor does he need to make that assumption. All he needs to be able to say is that the absence of that response indicates a form of moral or ethical blindness. At the most general level, the blindness in question is a blindness to the viewpoint of the other. Ethics must be about a willingness to consider practical issues from the standpoints of others. A responsiveness to the suffering of others is one crucial way in which that openness to the viewpoints of particular others manifests itself. The 'rationality' of the response to the suffering other can be grasped in terms of the openness which makes an ethical relation possible, and which thereby opens up the practical space for an ethical discourse. The irrationality of the responses of the torturers to which McCarney refers needs to be seen in terms of the denial of the conditions for the possibility of any sort of ethical relation.

The openness to the standpoint of the other cannot be reduced to a merely instinctive reaction which remains within the unmediated circuit of nature. McCarney assumes that Adorno is relying upon such an instinct. But this would leave the individual locked up within the logic of his or her personal gratification, making the idea of an ethical relationship unintelligible. The child who enjoys pulling the tail of the cat acts impulsively, while the adult who looks on, concerned about the effect which this is having on the cat, is responding ethically. The child enjoys acting upon the cat from the outside, while the adult is concerned about the experience – the internal perspective – of the cat. That response relies upon the recollection of instinctual responses, but it is not itself an instinctual response. It involves an imaginative construction of the experience of the other. Although we may build up that experience of the other on the basis of our experiences, we do not thereby identify the other with ourselves. In responding to the suffering chickens we come to see the world of our practices from a standpoint which is not our own. We attain a deeper understanding of our world – our practices – by coming to see it from the standpoint of the other. Having paid a visit to the farm in question we may feel shocked, and come to see our social practices in a completely new light. Although this shock would not be possible without an implicit reference back to our own experiences, we are nevertheless drawn out of the selfhood from which we started.

The importance of this imaginative projection is that it grants us access to an intramundane standpoint from which we can evaluate our practices. In the case of factory farming it is the suffering of the chickens which calls our practice into question. We call those practices into question on the basis of our recognition of that suffering. It is the suffering that matters, and not the way in which those practices may be said to fail to acknowledge an ontology which emphasises our being a part of nature. Far from grounding the criticism of practices such as factory farming, Benton's ontology reads more like a retrospective rationalisation which itself presupposes a prior engagement with the suffering of other living beings.

In conclusion, it is worth differentiating this reading of an Adornian position from Hume's, since the former may appear to repeat some of the latter's critique of rationalism in ethics. To recall the arguments from Book III, Part I, section I of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume's aim was to argue against the notion that moral distinctions are derived from reason, as opposed to feeling. His initial argument is against the rationalist notion that morality is about acting upon principles. The point here is simply that principles alone can never motivate us to act, so we cannot make sense of the idea of acting upon principles alone.

However, even if principles or, more generally, reason, cannot be the sole basis for moral action, it could still be the case that reason draws the crucial distinctions which we recognise when we act morally. This would still presuppose an interest in following the dictates of reason, but reason would be left to do all the work of drawing the crucial distinctions. The overriding aim of Hume's argument is to deny that reason draws these distinctions. It is not simply that reason is the slave of the passions, but that reason does not grant us access to a realm of moral truths.

Hume considers a number of ways in which reason might be said to enable us to determine what is and what is not moral, the most important of which is the claim that we cannot infer a statement about moral value from any matter of fact. Although Hume makes a formal point about the logical gap between descriptive and prescriptive statements, the relevance of this logical point rests upon the denial that there is any moral facticity. The significance of the argument about grammatical differences depends upon whether or not we can make sense of the idea of moral facticity. Is morality about prescribing principles, expressing feelings of approval and disapproval, or is it not also – and perhaps more fundamentally – a matter of cognising something in the world?

Hume simply asserts that if we reflect upon our moral experience, we will be unable to make sense of the idea of a moral facticity. Morality is not about cognising something concerning the object, but about having certain feelings of moral approval or disapproval in relation to it. Facts about the object are one thing; moral values are another.

The force of Hume's assertion implicitly rests upon a scientific discourse which understands facts as descriptions of the world from the standpoint of a dispassionate observer. From this standpoint it appears as if our feelings are 'merely subjective'. This obscures the way in which our feelings can actually disclose the world – reality – to us. It obscures the way in which our feelings can have a cognitive significance.

Returning to the example of the battery hens, the point is that our moral response does not simply involve us expressing a moral disapproval of the treatment of the chickens, as Hume would have it. The moral – or rather, the ethical – response is one which 'sees' the suffering of the chickens. What is crucial is that we recognise this suffering. That suffering is not simply a 'fact' devoid of moral significance, which, when cognised, causes us to express a feeling of disapproval. The 'fact' is morally significant in itself since we cannot grasp suffering *as* suffering without believing

that it ought not to be. The link is not an abstractly conceptual one – not one we can argue about in terms of deduction of a prescriptive statement from a descriptive one. The link belongs to our more fundamental experience of suffering. The concept cannot be grasped without reference back to that experience. Our experience of suffering is an experience of something that ought not to be.

Again, although our recognition of the suffering of the other involves this reference back to our own feelings, that recognition cannot thereby be interpreted merely as an expression of our own feelings. More importantly, it is a recognition of the feelings of the other. Our empathetic projection discloses an ethically significant facticity: the suffering of the chickens, in this case. That disclosure is a cognitive achievement – something which is completely obscured by Hume's analysis of the situation into a cognition of a value-neutral fact, and a contingent response involving a feeling of disapproval.

Were our feelings of approval and disapproval not bound up with a cognition of the object of those feelings, why should we grant them any weight? Moreover, on the basis of our experience, we cannot make sense of the idea that feelings of disapproval and approval could be sustained without being bound up with a cognition of their object. The point here is the opposite of the one made by Hume when he argued that beliefs involve a propensity to believe. In the case of our moral feelings, these would surely wither were they really disconnected from a cognition of their object. Could we vigorously disapprove of factory farming if we did not believe that we had gained some insight into what factory farming involves? If we disapprove of factory farming, we do so because we have come to recognise – to cognise – something about it. Without that cognitive moment, our feelings of disapproval would either never arise in the first place, or they would wither, or, if they persisted, they would appear to be pathological.

To return to the case against Benton and McCarney, the point is that this cognitive moment is not theoretically grounded. We can make sense of the cognitive moment which endows the opposition to factory farming with its rationality without thinking of it as cognition of a theory about the natural limits of human social development, or a theory of the natural substratum of human social being. These theories are important in themselves, but the question under consideration concerns their importance as grounds for ecological critical practice. By focusing upon a case which does call for that critical practice, I have tried to argue that the latter does not rely upon theoretical grounds. The real issue is the suffering of the animals concerned; and we must not let our interest in developing theories about the situation of society in nature obscure the real ground – the insightful concern – of that critical practice.

## Notes

- 1 Ted Benton, 'Humanism = Speciesism? Marx on Humans and Animals', *Radical Philosophy* 50, Autumn 1988, pp. 4-16.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 As well as considering the nature within humanity, Benton

points out that a distinction which Marx assumed to be applicable only to human beings is applicable to non-human animals. According to Benton's reading, this is the distinction between merely subsisting and flourishing which is so important for Marx's ethical critique of the fate of labour under capitalism. As he puts it: 'Only if there was a difference between mere existence of animals at a level which minimally satisfies *human* utility, on the one hand, and thriving or well-being, on the other, can we distinguish between "inhumane" and "humane" ways of treating those animals whose conditions of life are dependent upon the exercise of our powers.' He presents this as a critique of 'Marx's contrast between the human and the animal [which] cuts away the ontological basis for ... a critical analysis of forms of suffering shared by both animals and humans who are caught up in the same causal network' (*Ibid.*, p. 11).

- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 8 Tim Hayward, 'Ecology and Human Emancipation', *Radical Philosophy* 62, Autumn 1992, p. 8.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 14 T. W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, pp. 203-4.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 365.
- 16 Joseph McCarney, 'What Makes Critical Theory Critical?', *Radical Philosophy* 42, Winter/Spring 1986, p. 14.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.*

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