tions and then hacking away at the rest of the paper to fit it to the procrastinate bed thus constructed has not unnaturally led him astray.

Incidentally, I don't think Sayers' distinction between 'ordinary language philosophy' and 'theory' is really of much use as a touchstone for diagnosing what is reactionary about English-speaking philosophy at the present time. The trouble is that the aim of just 'describing' ordinary usage has been more talked about than put into practice. I'm not at all sure what Sayers means by 'theory', but if a theorist is anyone who dissents from the dictum that the sole task of philosophy is to describe the logic of ordinary usage, then not only am I a philosophical theorist but virtually every significant philosopher writing in English at the present time is a philosopher.

Certainly this is true, to take just one example, of Professor R.M. Hare, a philosopher whose views I do not altogether share, but whom I greatly respect; who seems to have become a regular aunt sally for some Radical Philosophers, largely on the strength of his article 'A School for Philosophers'. Hare's own work, it seems to me, wholly belies that article. It is indeed one of life's little ironies that a man who can assert, with every appearance of plausibility, that a philosophical doctrine must be procrustean and wholly non-reflective if it is to receive a serious hearing at Oxford should himself be the author of two long books of great technical difficulty and complexity which expound a very elaborate moral theory of the same general type as Kant's. Of course Hare claims inter alia that the theory he constructs is implicit in the everyday logic of 'ought' and other moral terms, but these claims themselves serve a theoretical function in protecting his doctrine against certain lines of attack, mainly having to do with the well-known problems about naturalism. The fact that Hare's methodological asides make him look a bit like Sayers' straw man should not blind us to the fact that the edifice which Hare's methodology helps to support is a 'logical edifice' in a quite traditional sense, and one which bears upon many traditional, and important, problems about morals. But perhaps Sayers has some other sense of 'theory' in mind which I simply don't understand.

In short, although I don't necessarily dissent from the claim that some of the views, and perhaps a lot of the views, characteristic of English-speaking philosophy at the moment are a some sense reactionary (I wouldn't accept the view that English-speaking philosophy is reactionary root-and-branch, but then 'English-speaking philosophy' seems to me to designate a very mixed bag of views [tendencies and not a single homogeneous entity], I cannot see that the ordinary language/theory distinction gets us any closer to discovering which, or why. I thought I was attacking rather than a reactionary view in my article. But that had better be left now to speak for itself to other readers.

Putting Morality in its Place

Few readers of Radical Philosophy (except perhaps spies acting on behalf of non-radical philosophy) are likely to disagree with Richard Norman's description of recent moral philosophy as 'inadequate', or with his insistence that those who practice it are really committed to a morality of liberalism. [See 'Moral philosophy without morality?' in Radical Philosophy 6, pp2-7] And the hopes he expresses for what moral- or rather ethical-philosophers ought to be doing ('articulating a workable set of ethical concepts in terms of which one could direct one's life and activity'), and the wish that academic philosophers would stop sneering at the suggestion that philosophy has something to do with questions about the meaning of life; these will find an enthu-

siastic audience in most of us too, certainly in me. What does not arouse such agreement or enthusiasm in me is the main body of the article. To be fair, Norman himself has doubts about the validity of what he says; and I basically, he wants to replace an ethics of 'morality', 'ought', 'duty' and 'virtue' by one whose basic concepts are ones like 'health', 'harmony', 'self-realisation', 'integrity' and so on. And it's this more positive section that gives me doubts.

To begin with, I don't like the company he keeps. The philosophers who have taken this sort of line in the past - who has they been? Plato, Aristotle, Bradley - are these the prophets of radicalism? Great men, undoubtedly, but not quote those we should normally expect to find lined up on the same side as Radical Philosophy. The same defectives, true, but only because they were conservatives. (It may be significant that when Norman briefly considers jettisoning the concept of 'virtues', it is Warnock he criticises. The same defectives, true, but only because they were conservatives.)

Still, perhaps that isn't really fair. The point isn't who else said something rather like what Norman says, it's what he says himself. Yet there are some funny things in that too. If we take the question 'What is it that screws up people's lives?' we are told, then, ultimately, the answer must be: not individual failings and weaknesses, nor corrupt and oppressive institutions. It's 'that' that bothers me. For its implication is that the un-screwed-up life is the life of the man who isn't the victim of corrupt and oppressive institutions. And that suggest the man who is their beneficiary - the aristocrat, the rentier, whom the institutions serve and who hasn't even got the troubles of an active company director. The natural inference from Norman's position is that this is the man who is to provide us with a model of the un-screwed-up-life, as far as we can int one: maybe the institutions even screw him up a little, but he's the nearest we can get. And surely he is not a good model; not for our lives here and now, anyway. Explicit praise of the aristocrat may suit Nietzsche, but hardly liberals, true, even if he does quote Nietzsche with approval.

Is he a good model for the future, then? Do we hope ultimately for a Utopia in which everyone is (more or less) like this aristocrat? That doesn't seem likely either. Even in Utopia people work; and, what is more, some of them will need to do the unpleasant or monotonous kinds of work. You can find it easier to fill up a very mixed bag of morning calls, if you are some that I suspect of having alienation built into them. It's not Utopia we need for a society of perfectly fulfilled citizens; it's Paradise.

But of course 'aristocrat' isn't a radical's description isn't Norman's ideal in the least, and I've had to admit it. In fact, the 'balanced' man in a corrupt society is as defective as anyone else; he is nicely adapted to the oppressive structures in my article. But that has better be left now to speak for itself to other readers.

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were not quite as extreme as Norman was in his...under no obligation to forego their own interests, but should
...does better?...centrate on the second-best. (Whether he was right or not is another matter; probably not.) Obviously, the more the Moral Man is aware of the defects in himself and his morality the better. If he recognises that there's a masochistic element in his altruism, or that the call of duty has been using his super-ego as a megaphone, and in all probability getting the message distorted in the process - why, his altruism will be the more rational for it, and his discrimination in listening to duty's voice the sharper.

So I'd like to reinstate morality, provided that it keeps its place. But if morality is only a second-best, what comes first? I've already said why I don't think an ethic of health or self-realization will do. There's another reason too: it is only negatively egalitarian. This is a defect it shares with liberalism. Neither of them really cares about others. Of course, individual liberals, even individual aristocrats, may do so; but that's an accident, so to speak. The liberal leaves people to their own life-styles - to the life-styles of 'men of action, dedicated artists, religious recluses or professional golfers' (and, presumably, to the 'megalopsuchos', one remembers, was slow to action with Norman is that I think he's filling the vacancy perceived to make sure he comes out on the winning side, and as high up on that side as he can manage.) It seems a funny situation in which radicalism would be confined to those least able to exercise it. Would not the deprived do better each of them to sacrifice his own interests, in part anyway, to those of his class, or even of humanity?

It is an odd thing that the biblical quotation echoed in the passage from The German Ideology, and also (I think) in a formula rejected earlier on in Norman's article ('one cannot love others unless one also loves oneself') isn't actually quoted in full anywhere in the article. Yet I should have thought that 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself'...would be a better basis for one than Norman's suggested egocentric ethics. It doesn't seem to ask for compulsive behaviour or external motivation (except that in its original context it is presented as an injunction from God). It doesn't insist on an artificial level of altruism; it gives the agents' own interests a place. But it is unquestionably egalitarian, and couldn't possibly be called merely liberal, nor aristocratic.

The problem is - and here we come back to agreeing with Norman once more - to sort out an ethical philosophy...Most ethical theories have set before their adherents some sort of an ideal. In some instances this was social (the Utilitarians' example) in others individualist (Plato; Kant, at times; Heidegger). It is a peculiarity of most contemporary British moral philosophy operates with - or than contemporary British moral philosophy operates with - or rather with (consider how weak and impoverished a word 'good' is by the time they've finished with it!) And here Norman is certainly right; and probably most of the concepts he suggests could find some place on 'my' list too, though their place might, like that of 'morality', be a subordinate one in many cases. (They might, for example, be needed when one tried to work out what loving one's neighbour - or oneself - amounted to in practice.)

Most ethical theories have set before their adherents some sort of an ideal. In some instances this was social (the Utilitarians' example) in others individualist (Plato; Kant, at times; Heidegger). It is a peculiarity of most contemporary British moral philosophy that it has no ideals at all; it is apt to leave the reader thinking 'Why should I bother to be moral?' It would never stir anyone to great deeds, even to great goodness; worse, it would discourage anyone who felt called to such, by its relentless interest in trivialities. My only quarrel with Norman is that I think he's filling the vacancy with a poor candidate: I want something that recognises my fellow men more; but the vacancy needs to be filled all right.