Ethnicity and species

On the philosophy of the multi-ethnic state in Japanese imperialism

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It has been long forgotten, since Japan’s defeat and the loss of its empire, that during the Asia–Pacific war (1931–45) a large number of scholars, journalists and bureaucrats were eagerly engaged in academic and public discussions of racism and colonialism. In contrast to the overall poverty of the critique of racism and ethnic nationalism in postwar Japan, its copiousness during the imperial period is striking. While occupying a wide range of political stances, from the total irrelevance of ethnic differences within the Japanese nation (the Governor’s Office in Korea) to a national socialist insistence upon racial purity (Watsuji Tetsurô and Nishitani Keiji), Japanese intellectuals invariably admitted that the issues of racism and ethnicity must be publicly addressed. It is as if the Japanese expeditiously lost interest in the critique of racism as they adjusted themselves to the domestic reality of American occupation and the emerging international order of the Cold War in East Asia. Today, few either in Japan or in North America or Western Europe acknowledge the existence of widely circulated public doctrines in the 1930s and particularly in the early 1940s which claimed that neither scientific racism nor ethnic nationalism was licit in the polity of the Japanese Empire, and that the nation-state of Japan was explicitly created against the principle of ethnic nationalism (minzoku shugi). The myth of the mono-ethnic society or tan’itsu minozoku shakai no shinwa— that, ever since the pre-modern era, Japanese society has been ethnically homogeneous because it is made up mostly of a single ethnic group— is an integral part of this postwar amnesia.

This article presents an outline of a philosophical argument about ethnicity and subjectivity in what is often referred to as Logic of Species (Shu no ronri): a set of essays published in the early 1930s by Tanabe Hajime, a philosopher from Kyoto Imperial University who headed the Kyoto School of Philosophy after the retirement of his mentor and colleague, Nishida Kitarô. It is a summary of a longer, more detailed reading. Let me introduce a warning disclaimer: I deliberately avoid framing Tanabe’s texts in terms of a number of binary oppositions, such as the West versus the East, and Christian versus Buddhist/Confucian values, because I believe that, by appealing to these binary oppositions in order to foreground one’s involvement in the discussion of ethnicity, colonialism, racism and nationality as presented in texts of the ‘non-West’, one has been solicited to abide by the postwar collective amnesia about wartime Japan. Prejudices and projection mechanisms associated with these binary oppositions inhibit us from calling into question the comfort and security induced by what we wittingly or unwittingly agree to forget for the sake of postwar Japanese national solidarity and the Cold War international configuration.

Race, ethnicity and subjectivity

The variable through which the universalistic nation of multi-ethnic diversity is distinguished from the particularistic nation of mono-ethnic exclusivity is the concept of minzoku, translated sometimes as ‘nation’, sometimes as ‘ethnos’, ‘folk’, or even ‘race’. The myth of the mono-ethnic society cannot be sustained if this distinction between multi-ethnic and mono-ethnic nations is not established. In other words, of logical necessity, the myth must embrace an assumption that the unity of the ethnos/nation or minzoku must be not only countable but also accountable. In Japanese philosophical discourse of the 1920s and 1930s, which certainly did not take the myth of the mono-ethnic society for granted, the concept of the ethnos/nation or minzoku was far from self-evident. What was systematically discussed through Tanabe Hajime’s series of articles on social ontology, Logic of Species, was nothing other than the problematic nature of this concept of minzoku. The term species was called for because of the inherent ambiguity in such unities as
state, nation, ethnos, folk and race, unities without which we cannot comprehend the desires for identity in modern social formations.

Tanabe’s social ontology is significant because not only the aforementioned Kyoto School philosophers of world history – such as Kôsaka Masakazi, Kôyama Iwao and Suzuki Shigetaka – but also certain governmental policy-makers such as Murayama Michio, who were concerned with the management of the empire’s minority population,7 appropriated theoretical insights from Tanabe’s Logic of Species. Logic of Species must have been attractive to the Japanese intellectuals of the day because it offered a philosophically rigorous socio-political account of what might have appeared to be the multi-ethnic social reality of the Japanese Empire. Furthermore, it declared itself to be an ethic for the construction of a state embracing political, economic and cultural diversity, an ethic against ethnic nationalisms (minzokushugi) and separatism. What I find in Tanabe’s Logic of Species is the most consistent among the philosophical articulations, in the 1920s and 1930s, of an ethico-political thesis on which something like the idea of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere could be built.

However, let me issue two disclaimers here. First, Tanabe started publishing articles on the logic of species much earlier than the inauguration in 1940 by the Japanese government of the idea of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere. So neither can one argue that Tanabe conceived of Logic of Species particularly for the large-scale regional transnational polity, nor that the policies of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere were formulated according to the theoretical design found in Logic of Species. In this case, too, the relationship between philosophy and politics is over-determined and far from direct. Second, the vision of the multi-ethnic state one can discern in Logic of Species was neither the vision officially sanctioned by the government nor the consensus shared by the political and military leaders and bureaucrats. Reading Tanabe’s essays, we gain some understanding as to how some scholar-bureaucrats at imperial universities wanted to design Japanese imperialist policies, but arguments which guided Japanese imperial nationalism did not form a monolith: competing political stances and different debates refuse to be summarized in a single continuous narrative.

Probably the most direct link between the policies of the government and Tanabe’s philosophy can be found in an incident that took place at the Second Imperial University – that is, Kyoto Imperial University – on 19 May 1943. As chair of the philosophy department, Tanabe delivered a lecture entitled ‘Shi Sei’ (‘Death and Life’, or ‘Death in Life’), to an audience which included a large number of volunteer student soldiers who were about to depart for battle.8 In this infamous lecture, Tanabe unabashedly spoke as a passionate patriot, as an individualist committed to the state’s mission, and offered a philosophical justification, in an exceptionally lucid – for Tanabe, indeed – language, for why the people [kokumin] have to devote themselves to the country. Yet we should note that, even in this exemplarily jingoistic lecture, the individual’s devotion to the country is not limited to his participation in the concerted efforts to destroy the enemy and its facilities, and to the execution of his duty, even if it might result in the loss of his own life. ‘One’s devotion to the country’ is not merely the passive subjugation of the individual to the commands issued by the state.

At the time of emergency, of course, there should be no separation between the country and the individual. But we should at the same time acknowledge that the tendency for such separation exists even more strongly then. This is why [I claim the relationship between the individual and the state (= the country)] is dynamic. By removing separation, some could rather make profit for themselves in such a situation than sacrifice themselves to the country. In an extreme case, some may abhor the war and sympathize with the enemy countries. Knowing there are such facts, we cannot automatically presume that people always adhere to the state. As a matter of course, we must prevent separation from taking place, but, more importantly, we must aspire to create a situation where there is no need for separation, a situation where the state allows the individual to be fully himself and encourages him to act truly and righteously. As I mentioned above, the individual’s devotion to the state is premised on the absolute stance in which we can be with God. Returning from the absolute stance, we must act to make the state accord with the Way of God, and thereby prevent the state from deviating from truth and justice. We are called upon to destroy deception, untruthfulness and injustice within the state because these drive the nation to be alienated from the state and give rise to a separation between the nation and the state. But this cannot be accomplished unless one is determined to sacrifice oneself in this task just as one is in physical warfare. This is one’s duty which requires the anticipatory resolution towards one’s own death [kesshi].9

Operative here is Tanabe’s basic formula, to which I will later return, according to which a man (the individual, ko) is with God (the genus, rui) by opposing the species or shu (the state). Through devotion to the state and by risking his own life, a man acquires a right to
rebel against the state; what the individual aspires to realize even by staking his own life is not the factual content of the state's order or rule, but an idea whose validity goes beyond the existing state, and which, at least in principle, is true and just for entire humanity. This is why the individual’s act of devoting himself to the state must be understood to imply not only the movement of the individual’s identification with the state but also the movement of the individual’s act to pull the state toward some universal principle beyond the existing state. Thus, the idea that is true and just for entire humanity, or the dimension of the genus or rui, is indispensable in Tanabe’s justification of the self-sacrifice of the individual for the country. This is to say that, for Tanabe, the individual’s devotion to the country could possibly take the form of rebellion against the government at any time. It is in this sense that the individual’s devotion to the state can be called a duty whose execution requires anticipatory resolution towards one’s own death (kesshi no gimu).

Tanabe’s lecture ‘Death and Life’ was offered as the first in a series organized in order to deal with the anxiety over death felt by drafted or volunteer students who were about to go to war fronts. Many lectures, including Suzuki Shigetaka’s and Kōsaka Takaaki’s after Tanabe’s, attempted to give a meaning to the probable death of those students by linking their devotion to the world historical mission of the Japanese state. Yet Tanabe also suggested the possibility that, once having anticipatorily put oneself on the side of death, and thereby secured one’s loyalty to the country, one could in fact act to transform or even rebel against the existing state under the guidance of the universal idea whose validity is not confined to the existing state. I find it hard to imagine what could have been done in order to ‘act to make the state accord with the Way of God’ in 1943 when many Japanese intellectuals began to recognize the imminent defeat of the Japanese Empire. As though wittingly overlooking that his philosophical argument could easily be distorted or appropriated to serve unintended political interests, however, Tanabe Hajime presented rather naively a fundamental principle which should regulate the relationship of the individual to the state.

Insofar as the relationship between the state and the individual is seen from the viewpoint of the individual’s death, the lecture ‘Death and Life’ discloses a philosophical insight into the individual’s subjectivity and his participation in the state, an insight that was repeated, perhaps unwittingly, seventeen years later in 1960, by Maruyama Masao in his thesis on loyalty and rebellion after the Defeat. Here, it is important to stress that, in both Tanabe’s and Maruyama’s observation, either the individual’s identification with the state or rebellion against it would be inconceivable unless the nation-state for the individual is primarily and essentially something to which the individual chooses to belong. Let us keep in mind that the problem of loyalty and rebellion would dissipate were the individual thought to belong naturally – or in itself – to the country or to the ‘species’ in Tanabe’s terminology. Yet, from this, does it not follow that the species can be divided into natural and non-natural ones? What is at stake in Tanabe’s observations is that the individual is always able to posit an existing social grouping she belongs to as something not naturally inherent to her, as something for her choice. Her belonging to it is never her natural property.

Therefore, it is clearly stated that the individual belongs to a social grouping as a result of her wishing to belong to it and that the individual’s belonging to the nation, for instance, must be ‘mediated’ by her freedom. One can identify oneself with the country because freedom is available for one not to do so. Only by giving up the possibility of not identifying with or of separating oneself from the nation can one gain one’s belonging to it. So, in order to belong to it, one must choose to give up the possibility of not belonging to it. It is a closing that must be intentional. It is an investment in a negative form, and as a reward for this investment the individual gains the ground on which to justify her act which would otherwise appear reasonable, an act ‘to make the state accord with the Way of God, and thereby prevent the state from deviating from truth and justice’. The closing is a scheme to translate the fact of the individual’s belonging to a social grouping into a matter of choice, and the freedom of separating oneself from it must be granted in order for this scheme to operate. Needless to say, separation from the nation need not be physical. Subsequently, one cannot belong to the nation naturally or without ‘mediation’. This is to say that no body among the Japanese nation is, naturally and immediately, Japanese.

Underlying Tanabe’s emphatic stress on the individual’s freedom and negativity is a philosophical thesis that neither nation nor ethnos could possibly be conceptualized as a particularity within the generality of humanity; that the arborescent taxonomy of the Linnaean type, of the species and the genus, is not only utterly inadequate to but also politically and morally misleading for an understanding of how humans form their collectivities and thereby divide humanity into many ensembles. Yet, strangely enough, Tanabe con-
continued to base his argument on the concepts of the species and the genus.

Outside the discipline of formal logic to which the name Aristotle is attributed, the term ‘species’ is most often used in biological taxonomies as a median term in the series: individual (ko), species (shu), genus (rui). Individuals are always members of some class, just as individual humans are also members of the subset, species, of that genus, and each subset distinguishes itself by its specific difference from other subsets. Because of its association with biological taxonomy, which in essence preserves the dictates of classical logic, Tanabe Hajime has to establish, in the domains of knowledge of the social and historical, a new use of the term ‘species’ which clearly differs from its uses in the botanical and zoological sciences and natural history. In a sense, Tanabe introduced his concept of species in his social ontology in order to disqualify the validity of the old Linnaean classification in the domain of the social. And in so far as the category of race is associated with the discourse of Linnaean taxonomy and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century biology, it can be said that he introduced his concept of species in place of the racialized one. By no means, however, do I imply that Tanabe’s Logic of Species is therefore outside racism. Rather, it is with the acknowledgment of the fundamental inadequacy of the logical taxonomy of the species and the genus that Tanabe’s social ontology begins. Concurrently, let me note, the notion of the individual or kotai can no longer be conceived within the Linnaean classification, either. This is to say that the term kotai, which I have to translate into ‘the individual’ for the lack of a more appropriate word, cannot be directly equated to the individual as an indivisible unit of life.

In applying a term that is widely accepted in the classical taxonomies of creatures to inquiries into the social, however, there are two main dangers to be warded off by deliberately demarcating the concept of ‘species’ from the classical comprehension of the term. The first danger is an obvious one, in that the social sense of belonging to a group must never be confused with the biological and physiological facts of some creature belonging to a specific class.

Going back to the issue of the minzoku (nation, ethnos, folk or race). Let me redefine it with regard to the question of taxonomy in general. First of all the minzoku is not an immediate given unless it gains its reality through the individual: only when an individual belongs to it does the minzoku acquire its own reality. But how can we define an individual’s belonging to a specific minzoku? Does the belonging to a specific minzoku mean that the individual shares the habits and mores of other members of the same group? Does it mean the sharing of the same language, of the same tradition, of the same culture? Or does it imply that the individual is blood-related to other members, lives in the same region, or shares the same physiognomic features?

All these attempts to define the individual as belonging to a specific minzoku externally and objectively seem inadequate precisely because none of them meets the following criterion. In a social formation, the individual’s belonging to a group is an essential part of his self-awareness or jikaku, so that an individual can never be classified into a species unless he is aware of belonging to it. In other words, unless he identifies himself with a minzoku, he cannot be said to belong to it. Furthermore, this belonging is not a matter of epistemic consciousness but a mode of praxis in the social. ‘Self-awareness is not a lived experience (taiken); it is a mediation.’ Here, Tanabe uses the term ‘mediation’ in the Hegelian sense of Vermittlung of the subject’s self-othering with itself. In social ontology, what one is, is simultaneously what one ought to be. Therefore, for Tanabe Hajime, the logical must ultimately be the ethical. Accordingly his social ontology is called the logic of species, which is at the same time the ethics of species.

As Tanabe reiterates, self-awareness should, in the first place, not be problematized with regard to understanding (verstehen) but in the context of inference, which involves the shift from one utterance to another, from one speaking voice to another, so that self-awareness must necessarily be conceptualized dialectically and dialectically. In contrast, the biological taxonomy classifies an individual into a species without regard to the individual’s self-awareness. This is to say that a subject (or shukan) who classifies the individual in a biological taxonomy does not return to the very individual that is classified. The fact of the individual’s belonging to a species is established irrespective of its freedom, of the freedom for the individual to refuse to belong to it. In this conception of belonging which the supposition of a totemic community assumes, there is no inner relation between the individual and the species so that the individual does not exert any influence over the way the species is. In other words, the individual in this case is not a subject, or is without self-awareness, because of the lack of an inner split or negation which is an essential moment in mediation; this mode of belonging does not constitute a social praxis. Not being autonomous, the individual unwittingly would do what it is accustomed
to doing. It would simply obey given dictates, without being conscious of a gap between what ought to be and what is.\textsuperscript{15} For the individual, therefore, the species is not a reality but a transparent irrelevancy.

The second danger is also related to the individual's freedom. Tanabe has clearly to distance himself from such a conception of the species as follows:

The notion of moral or collective personality – in which 'personality' has proper analogical value – applies to the people as a whole in a genuine manner: because the people as a whole (a natural whole) are an ensemble of real individual persons and because their unity as a social whole derives from a common will to live together which originates in these real individual persons.

Accordingly, the notion of moral or collective personality applies in a genuine manner to the body politic, which is the organic whole, composed of the people.\textsuperscript{16}

In this typically corporatist comprehension of national community and the state, heterogeneity or discontinuity hardly exists between the 'real individual person' and 'the body politic'. An assembly of 'the people' is supposed to form some communion and constitutes itself as an organic whole. Tanabe emphatically distances himself from the corporatist conception of the social whole or of the species, and insists on an essentially discordant relation between the individual and the species. In this respect, Tanabe's social ontology from the outset assumes the undecidability inherent in modern subjectivity that is caused by the disappearance of the body politic in modern social formations.\textsuperscript{17} This undecidability is preserved – partially if not fully – in the term 'negativity' and, as we will see, it plays the central role in Tanabe's social ontology.

The individual does not belong to the species in the same way that a part is embraced by and absorbed into the whole. In the corporatist conception of the social, which is still under the spell of pre-dialectical and therefore pre-modern logic, Tanabe argues, the part and the whole are understood as a relationship between two terms which are continuous with one another – that is, the particular and the general.\textsuperscript{18} Here, I must hasten to add that the individual is not the general that is most particularized; it remains essentially heterogeneous.
to the opposition of the general and the particular. A human individual does not belong to a nation, for example, just as a cat belongs to the genus of cats or as a potato does to the class of tubers. By no means can the species be conceived of in an analogy to an organism or in terms of an analytical relation between two terms. So, how should we understand the state of affairs depicted in the statement ‘an individual belongs to a nation, an ethnus, a minzoku, and so forth, that is, a species’?

It is important to keep in mind that, in one phase leading to a further elaboration on the concept of the species, Tanabe refers to the discussion of totemic organization by Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl and gives high praise to their insight that the reign of a society over an individual must be understood according to the logical relationship of the general and the particular. Yet, the point most forcefully put forth by Tanabe is – contrary to Durkheim’s sociologization of Kantian ethics – that the individual’s belonging to the species cannot be characterized by its conformity to the totemic belief of a given group, whether that group is clannish, ethnic or national; it must be premised upon the negation of it. Tanabe’s critique of French anthropological approaches to totemism shows that the supposition of the totemic community in which an individual immediately accepts its maxims without being aware of its belonging actually makes it impossible for an individual to act morally. Only where there is freedom on the part of the individual to negate and disobey the imperatives imposed upon it by the totemic beliefs can it be said to belong to it. In other words, only as a subject can the individual be said to belong to the species. Therefore, for the individual to be in the species is to be mediated by its negativity, and what is misleading about the corporatist conception of the species lies in the fact that it overlooks and suppresses negativity, without which the species would be a matter of no significance for the individual. What entails the transfer of the term from the domains of knowledge on natural beings to those on the social is that the social would be inconceivable without taking human negativity into account. So, if modernity is defined in terms of the negativity inherent in the constitution of a subject, the domain of the social itself is of modernity; the very possibility of thinking about the social is already marked by modernity. Moreover, negativity could imply the discursive mediation of antagonism from the viewpoint of social practice, so the social would be incomprehensible once deprived of negativity and antagonism.

The individual, the species, the genus
Tanabe Hajime discerns two moments without which no relationship between the individual and the species can be thought, and outside of this relationship the recognition of one’s belonging to the species cannot ensue: the first moment is the individual’s factual participation in the given species, and the second is its negation of it. The first moment can be said to be that of facticity, whereas the second is that of negativity. Indeed, this very splitting of the moments is facilitated by negativity and a process of the subject’s self-othering with itself or mediation. At the same time, negativity opens up space not for a factual but for an active participation in the species. But, at this stage, that which the individual actively and wittingly decides to belong to does not remain the species as it used to be. For negativity and the first stage of mediation alter the nature of a social grouping in which one once was blindly and immediately placed.

Whereas, in immediacy, the individual would never constitute itself as a subject, it becomes a subject by returning to itself after reflecting upon and distancing itself from its immediate inheritance, through self-negation. Tanabe’s exposition of the self-negational contradictory and heterogeneous relation between the individual and the species is at the same time an attempt to construct a logic of social praxis by rearticulating the logical (not analytic but dialectical) relations among individuals, the species and the genus (ko, shu, rai) in terms of the Hegelian triality of individuality, particularity and universality. Yet, one must instantly note that, up to this stage of development, the individual has not returned to itself and that, therefore, mediation has not completed its circle.

The species is not an entity, like a human body, a tree or a book, and one cannot designate it unless one mistakes its representative, or symbol or schema for it (I will return to this point). In order to deal with the reality of the species, therefore, we must start with the process of thematization in which its reality is brought into awareness. One comes to an awareness of its existence by negating and calling into question what has been taken for granted in one’s own behaviour and customs. The thematization of the species is accompanied by a self-awareness on the part of the individual that it has been nurtured and cultivated in that substratum which it now wants to abandon. For the individual, the species is its own past and an other at the same time. In so far as it is a past from which the present is distinguished, the past is an other to and of the present. In this respect, the individual sheds its past and objectifies and distances itself from it.
as it recognizes the past as its own, it must subsume the species in itself. Accordingly, for the individual the species is constitutive of its facticity or thrownness (Geworfeneit), in Heideggerian terminology, in Dasein’s ‘projective existence’ (Entwurfn) into the future. The thematization of the species is intertwined with the self-transcending or ekstatic jikaku or self-awareness as geworfener Entwurf, which is a mode of social practice by which to project oneself into the future and to bring about something which does not exist yet, rather than a mere epistemic recognition.24

Thus, the reality of the species is an institutional reality par excellence. It manifests itself as an assemblage of the universals which regulate individuals’ behaviours, and can by no means be ascribed to the whims of an individual. It is a reservoir not of the individual but rather of collective habits. It is always of trans-personal and publicly habituated rules just like a language. Yet it is not ubiquitous or general in the sense of the genus that every member of humanity should be subsumed under the definition ‘homo sapiens’. It is at this stage that Tanabe introduces the concept of rui or the genus and thereby indicates how one’s belonging to the species inevitably leads to a participation in the genus of humanity.

Unlike the individual and the species, which possess reality in their respective senses, the genus is not a positive institutional reality. It follows that it is pointless to talk about the individual’s refusal or disobedience of the genus. If the genus is discussed in this manner, as if it constituted a positive institutional reality, it invariably suggests the absolutization of a particular species, of which ethnocentrism is the best example, and leads to denying the individual its negativity. In other words, the genus is not the positive reality one could revolt against or disobey. Rather it exists as something like a problematic. Nonetheless, it signifies an infinitely open society for the totality of humanity, the only society which encompasses every member of humanity. Yet

To dissolve [into the genus] particular societies which oppose one another is to neglect the concreteness of social being. It amounts to erasing the problems for social beings rather than solving them. History has proven how disrupting for the progress of humanity and how numbing to one’s conscience it is to entrust all to religion’s absolute affirmativeness.25

(History would prove this point again, in Tanabe’s own career in the late 1930s and 1940s. Can you think of a better example of ‘religion’s absolute affirmativeness’ than his lecture ‘Death and Life’?) The genus is an essential moment in mediation between the individual and the species. The genus is not the general that underlies a specific difference between one particular species and another as in Aristotelian logic. The genus is called for in the individual’s refusal and disobedience of the edicts of the given social institutions which have been internalized by individuals. The individual negates and deviates from the species by appealing to something higher than the rules whose validity is specific and limited.

If I lived in a community in which, for instance, the locality of my residence is predetermined by my racial status, I could either take such a state of affairs for granted or call it into question, thereby risking fragmenting and dividing the putative unity of that community. According to Tanabe, my belonging to that community becomes an issue for my self-awareness only when I act to disagree or disobey such a custom, thereby risking fragmentation and division of that community. In other words, I do not belong to that community naturally because of my birth or another innate accident, but only when I try to negate and change it will I begin to belong to it. Yet my belonging to it is potentially a divisive moment which might result in a schism in the putative coherence of the community. So, I would have to appeal to an authority beyond the dictates which are immediately sanctioned by that community in order to call that custom into question. I can act to change it only by introducing and adhering to an imperative, whose execution is impossible within the given dictates of that community, and the implementation of which will bring about something that does not exist as yet. Nevertheless, the imperative thus introduced cannot be my own; even if I am absolutely alone in my commitment to it, the imperative I volunteer to abide by must be collectively valid. I would have to postulate the principle of equality, which I believe to be not only higher than the dictates of the community but also acceptable by everyone in the world in principle.26 In the name of this principle, I would engage in an antagonistic relation with the members of the community who refuse to agree with the transformation of the community in this direction. This is a struggle in which one can be destroyed by the majority of the community or can destroy it. It can be a struggle of life or death. Yet, one has to postulate beyond this given community a collectivity for whom this principle of equality is a rule to live by. But, as we can realize instantly, this collectivity is not a positive reality because we cannot find any factually existent community of people which actually lives according to it anywhere in the world. Perhaps this is why Tanabe felt justified in using such
terms as God, for instance, in ‘Death and Life’ when he said ‘we must act to make the state accord with the Way of God, and thereby prevent the state from deviating from truth and justice.’

A collectivity defined by the dictate which one engages in to change the species does not exist positively; it is the genus. The genus is not a positively existing institutional reality; it exists in the individual’s struggle with the species. Furthermore, if each dictate positively demands a different collectivity, different dictates beyond any community could postulate different genera which could be the totality of humanity at the same time. In other words, the genus must be mediated by the individual’s negativity, but it cannot be a positive reality such as the species. The totality of humanity is inexpressible in any institutional form, and, consequently, often called God by Tanabe.

It is in relation to the genus that the individual is independent of the species.

Unlike the species it [the genus] does not directly oppose the individual; instead, it liberates the individual from the constraints of the species and lets it assume a free stance as an individual. Thereby the genus comes into being, mediated by the negativity of the individual’s relation to the species.

So the genus is neither a generalization of many species, nor an ideal representative of them. Simply, the genus is in the element not of generality but of universality. Again the term ‘genus’ betrays the conceptual economy of the particularity–generality framework which many of us take for granted. It is the absolute totality which is expressed in human historical action but which cannot be represented conceptually. For it is an idea. Tanabe agrees with Max Scheller in that the individual’s moral action expresses the eternal absolute and, therefore, that historical practice based upon the individual’s autonomous will can be understood as an action contributing itself teleologically toward the absolute totality. In this respect, too, we cannot think of the genus as commensurate with differences and commonnesses among species. The genus cannot be posited in the register of conceptual opposition or what Gilles Deleuze calls ‘differenciation.’ By virtue of the fact that the genus is radically heterogeneous with and negative to the species, every individual can be recognized as equal under the genus (equality only in the negative sense – that is, of the absence of a hierarchical ordering), irrespective of its factual belonging to a particular species. For this reason, the ultimate totality of humanity must be in the sense of being an absolute negativity.

Thus the individual returns to itself only when it also participates in the genus and distances itself from the species. But it does not follow that the individual would then cease to belong to the species. Negative mediation also transforms the species, so that the individual’s negativity indicates the basic mode of social practice by which to work on social reality. ‘Praxis [jissen] whereby the species is renewed puts the individual and the species in correlation.’ (The liberal notion of voting in a general election which allows the individual to participate in the process of transforming a social formation might fit this idea of praxis, but Tanabe does not specify it.) Accordingly, the sense of one’s belonging must be altered. Through social praxis, which is negative in regard to the given formation, the individual belongs to the species by actively transforming it, according to the dictates of universal humanity. Thus, only as a practical subject or jissen shutai can the individual belong to it. At the same time, though, the species which the practical subject works to transform cannot remain immediate.

Here, too, Tanabe recognizes two moments inherent in the mediation of self-negational contradiction, this time from the viewpoint of the species: one concerning the ethnic and factual constraints from which no individual can escape; and another which mediates both antagonisms among the individuals within the same species, and contradictions between the individual and the species. These two moments are explained in a variety of ways: for example, in reference to Tönnies’ distinction of Gemeinschaft (shutai kyōdō shakai) and Gesellschaft (koteki keiyaku shakai) and the Bergsonian opposition of the closed society and the open society. According to Tanabe, in this process a clear distinction is made possible between the substratum as that on which the individual is, and the subject which acts socially towards other individuals. But this distinction applies only within mediation. This is the point to be remembered in the following exposition.

In this regard, let me note the complexity of the term ‘subject’ or shutai as Tanabe adopts it here, since this term was used by many at that time in slightly different ways. In history, an individual acts to transform the given community by believing in the universality of a certain idea. Therefore, in so far as an individual’s action can be regarded as a historical practice (rekishiteki jissen) that embodies the conviction that its action will be justified not because it is an action based upon its particular whim but because it ought to be sanctioned by the genus – that is, the totality of humanity (which does not exist positively)
— it is also an action of that idea. Thus, an individual acts in history to constitute itself as a subject, but the same historical practice is the process in which the idea realizes itself as a Subject or Spirit. Therefore, in historical practice, the subject’s will to act is already and always the Subject’s will, just as ‘The labour of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labour of others.’

As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object; the whole becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.

Even if one is not sanctioned by anybody in the positive sense and has to act alone and in absolute isolation, as was the case with Jesus, historical practice is the action of the Subject whereby the individual returns to itself.

Thus the individual comes across the genus only when it cannot abide by the imperatives of a given species. In relation to the genus, the individual is singular and independent of the species as substratum in which it is supposed to be embraced. In other words, the individual is then alienated from the immediate community and stands alone. It is in this solitude that the individual is able to encounter the genus, and this insight is consistently emphasized throughout Tanabe’s writings. Thus Tanabe argues that his concepts of the individual, the species, and the genus correspond to the Holy Trinity, respectively, in the Holy Trinity. As an isolated singular abandoned by the Father, the individual is the Son. The individual as the Son encounters the genus as the Father precisely in the absence of the Father. And through the anticipatory resolution towards its own death – as we have already seen in Tanabe’s lecture ‘Death and Life’ – the individual can work to change the species.

Thus the reality which the individual obtains through negativity and historical practice is at the same time a species and a work as the Subject. Tanabe calls this reality the ‘kitai soku shutai’, or ‘substratum that is Subject’. Through the participation of the genus, a society – or an ethical substance in Hegelian terminology – which is called the minzoku kokka or nation-state emerges, and this society is not directly the species because it embodies the dictates of universal humanity. It is the synthesis of the individual’s factual belonging to a given community of customs and mores and its belonging to universal humanity. Therefore, the state in the nation-state in this formulation implies the moment of the agent as a Subject, while the nation in the nation-state means the unity of the work as a community which individuals create collectively by transforming the given social reality. Thus it was possible for Tanabe to argue:

‘To be a member of the state is the highest right [and obligation] for the individual.’ If the subject of this proposition simply means that any individual is born and dies within the state or that the life of the individual becomes possible only when it is incorporated into the variety of state organizations, the proposition would not be able to take the predicate ‘the highest right.’ That it is thus predicated should mean that the proposition does not state a mere [observable] fact but that it refers to the state of affairs which has to be realized by the individual’s will and action. In other words, it implies that, while the individual could will to refuse it, the individual is obliged to will and, following such a will, to promote the realization of such a state of affairs…. Therefore, membership in the state should not demand that the individual sacrifice all its freedom and autonomy for the sake of the unity of the species. On the contrary, the proposition would not make sense unless the state appropriates into itself individual freedom as its essential moment.

Therefore the view which equates the nation-state with one ethnic community cannot be accepted at all. Hence, Tanabe criticizes Hegel for his ethnocentrism: ‘Hegel never completely rid himself of the tendency to regard the State as the ethnic spirit of an ethnic community.’ The claim that to be a member of the state is the highest right and obligation for the individual would not be accepted unless the individual negates the ethicality (Sittlichkeit) of a specific community and actively endorses the morality (Moralität) for the individual to transcend the particularity of a specific community toward the universality of generic humanity. Absolute loyalty to the state can be legitimated only when the state is an actualization of the universalistic logic of mediation which goes beyond the ethnically specific and towards the state that grounds the individuality of the individual returning to itself through universality. One might suspect a complicity between universalistic nationalism and cosmopolitan individualism in Tanabe Hajime’s Logic of Species.

In place of a conclusion

As we have seen above, Tanabe’s Logic of Species was intended to refute and dissuade Minzoku-shugi or ethnic nationalism, which was perceived to be the most
immediate menace to Japanese imperial nationalism in the 1930s, by taking into account the historical conditions that drove people to ethnic nationalism and the social antagonisms that made ethnic nationalism so attractive to the people under colonial rule. If seen from the viewpoint of ethnic nationalism, Logic of Species would appear to comprise a series of meditations that attempt to undermine any political and philosophical discourse that would legitimize a particularistic rebellion against universalism in the name of which imperialism dominates. Tanabe’s argument is conspicuous for its almost obsessive emphasis on negativity and for its rather religious notion of universal humanity, which, one can sense, must have had a certain appeal to Marxist activists and other leftists, many of whom in fact supported ethnic nationalism and separatism in Japan’s annexed territories and who later had to undergo the traumatic experience of conversion or what is known as tenkō. On the other hand, as the term shu clearly indicates, he was also concerned with the particular historical and cultural conditions of the time. Given these cursory observations and the outline of his philosophical project, how should we understand the connections between his philosophy and nationalism?

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese Empire covered many overseas territories, including Hokkaidō, Taiwan, Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin, Manchuria, the Pacific Islands, and so forth. The population under the jurisdiction of the Japanese state could not be viewed as linguistically and culturally homogeneous by any account. Although I have serious doubts about the validity of the distinction between mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic societies, we may use the term ‘multi-ethnic’ in order to draw attention to the composition of the Japanese Empire at that time. It was simply impossible to assume a simple overlapping between the state and the ethnos or any ‘natural’ community, although those minorities in the Empire were rendered somewhat invisible. The state had to represent and incorporate a multitude of the populace which did not share any single national language or ethnic culture in so far as ‘language’ or ‘culture’ is understood to be a closed unity.

Tanabe never neglected this historical situation: his conception of the state in the nation-state reflected his awareness of it in the following:

The opposition of a species against another species necessarily contains a duality: it is the exclusionary relationship between plural species on the one hand, and the opposition of the individual to the species on the other hand. The state is the synthesis of the individual and the species. Therefore it must necessarily mediate the opposition between the conquering species and the conquered species and thereby sublate that opposition into a generic synthesis by recognizing the freedom of the members of the conquered species to a certain extent and by appropriating the former enemy. Thus, Tanabe seeks the historical origin of the state in the conquest of one species over another. ‘Though not related to the conquered through blood ties, the conquering species allows the conquered to survive, and unifies it into itself through the mediation of the shared land. Ethnic conflicts are mediated by the state’s recognition of a minority’s freedom just as it recognizes the individual’s freedom that facilitates collaborative economic activities among those opposing groups. Or, since the species could signify the social class, inter-specific conflict could be a class conflict. But this recognition must be limited; it is permitted only nanrakano teidon or to a certain extent because the ethical substance is also a political sphere where struggles cannot be absent.

It is evident that the species is not an ahistorical entity. It is a moment in mediation which goes on in world history. But the individual belonging to the conquered species can continue to negate a given social reality and work for its transformation. In this respect, it is not the immediate species but the state that provides the individual with opportunities for justice that is valid beyond the confines of a specific community. For the species, in so far as it is the ethical substance which is mediated by the genus – that is, kokateki minzoku or state nation – is always in a dialectical process in which it continues to split itself and appropriate other specific communities. But, by the same token, the existence of the state already implies that the society reigned over by the state consists of a plurality of specific communities. Unless there is ethnic or class conflict, the state would not be called for, so there the state would never be. Internal antagonism dialectically gives rise to the state just as the individual’s negativity invites the moment of universal humanity into the species. In the ambivalent hyphenation between the nation and the state, one thing is certain: there is no necessity for the state unless the nation is multi-specific (or multi-ethnic). Where there is no multiplicity of species in the state, that state cannot exist in the modern world. In order for the nation-state of Japan to exist, therefore, the Japanese nation must be multi-ethnic – though what is signified by multi-ethnicity in this instance is far from clear. A logical corollary of this insight, which
Tanabe Hajime would never have pronounced publicly, was that no modern nation-state could possibly exist except as a trace of colonial violence that necessarily gave rise to social antagonism among the species.

Since I have to omit a detailed examination of how Logic of Species could have served and justified Japanese colonial rule and total mobilization policies during the Asia–Pacific war, let me state the following in place of a conclusion to this article. When seen from the viewpoint of the minority population in the Empire who were mobilized for Japan's war efforts, Logic of Species was nothing but an endorsement of colonial violence. Because of its universalistic aspiration and the sense of national mission, it was exceptionally aggressive and violent. Just as it was one of the sources for the philosophy of world history, it also gave rise to the philosophy of world war.

Notes
3. In his Philosophy of Primordial Subjectivity (Kongenteki shutai-sei no tetsugaku), originally published in 1940, Nishitani Keiji stressed the purity of race and advocated the introduction of the Hitlerian spirit to Japan. Philosophy of Primordial Subjectivity is reproduced in Nishitani Keiji Chosakushu, Sobun-sha, Tokyo, 1995; or his Ethics II, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1942 (reprinted in Watsuji Zenshū, Vol. 11. See also Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On 'Japan' and Cultural Nationalism, chs 3 and 4, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1997, pp. 72–152.
5. See Oguma Eiji, Tan 'itsu minzoku shiinawa to kigen (The Origins of Monoethnic Myth), Shin'yō-sha, Tokyo, 1995; see also Tomiya Ichirō’s critique of Oguma. For a critical review of Oguma’s theoretical sloppiness, see my ‘Introduction’ to T. Iyotani, B. deBary and N. Sakai, eds, Nasonaritī no datsukōchiku (Deconstruction of Nationality), Shin'yōsha, Tokyo, 1996 (English translation forthcoming in Cornell East Asia Monographs Series).
6. The philosophy department at Kyoto Imperial University was recognized as one of the intellectual centres in Japan from the 1920s until the early 1940s. The department developed under the leadership of Nishida Kirō (1870–1945). In the 1910s, when Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), who taught philosophy of science and mathematics (Whitehead, Russell, Frege, modern mathematics, quantum mechanics, theory of relativity, in addition to Neo-Kantianism) at Tōhōku University, joined the faculty at Kyoto, the philosophy department began to attract many talented students, who would later form the leading intelligentsia of the Japanese public sphere in the 1920s and 1930s. They included Miki Kiyoshi, Tosaka Jun, Tsuchida Kyōsō, Nakai Masakazu and Hanada Kiyoiteru (Hanada was in the English department at Kyoto), Kuno Osamu and others. Included in the faculty were Tomonaga Sanjirō, Hatano Seichi, Watsuji Tetsurō (who taught at Kyoto for a short period of time, and moved to Tokyo Imperial University in 1934), Kuki Shūzō, Kōsaka Masaaki and Köyama Iwa. In the 1920s Nishida published a series of articles in which he began to conceptualize the notion of mu no basho (the place of nothingness). Around the same time, Tanabe became interested in the ontology of social being and began to write about Kant’s Third Critique, Bergson’s social philosophy, Hegelian dialectic in reference to modern mathematics, particularly Riemann geometry and Minkovsky’s theory of space and time.
7. Murayama Michio, Dai tôka Kenseitsu-ron, Shōkō Gyōsei-sha, Tokyo, 1943. Murayama was the secretary to the Governmental Planning Agency headed by Kishi Nobusuke, the Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojō Hideki cabinet (from 18 October 1941 until 18 October 1943) and then one of the ministers of the newly formed Ministry of the Great East Asia (from 18 October 1943 until 22 July 1944). From 1936, Kishi was de facto the chief administrator for the construction of Manchūkuo. After the defeat of Japan, Kishi was arrested as an A-class war criminal by the Allied Powers, but in 1948 he was released from prison; through the enthusiastic endorsement of the United States, he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ishibashi Tanzan cabinet (23 December 1956 until 25 February 1957), and then formed his own cabinets for two successive terms (25 February 1957 until 19 July 1960). He is known for his work as the political collaborator of United States policies in East Asia. Kishi’s case, as well as the case of the Kyoto School philosophers of world history, Kōsaka Masaaki, Köyama Iwa, Nishitani Keiji, and Suzuki Shigetaka, who wrote vehemently in support of the United States’ collective security policies in Asia during the 1950s and early 1960s, strongly suggest the continuity of prewar/wartime Japanese imperial nationalism and postwar American imperial nationalism.
8. Its outline was published in Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun (Kyoto Imperial University News) on 5 June 1943. See ‘Shi Sei’ (Death and Life), in Tanabe Hajime Zenshū, vol. 8, Chikuma Shobō, Tokyo, 1964.
11. The notion of the individual had undergone a theoretical revision with Tanabe’s mentor, Nishida Kirō. Normally, in Japanese philosophical discourse of the 1920s and 1930s, the term kobutsu or kotai is a translation of the individual, but the original’s sense of indivisibility or individuum is not necessarily emphasized. Nishida conceptualized kobutsu or singular-individual thing as that which is in a discontinuous relationship with any generality. For this reason, I translate his kobutsu into the individual-singular thing. Tanabe adopts the term kotai instead of Nishida’s kobutsu. Kotai is still closer to the individual, yet Tanabe is aware that kotai or individual is not a generality or the most particular of generality: it is discontinuous with any generality, so it cannot evade
being something like a singular point in mathematics.

12. For correlations between the concept of race and natural history, see Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, Gallimard, Paris, 1966, pp. 137–76; George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1978, pp. 1–34; Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, Routledge, London and New York, 1992. From the outset, Logic of Species is aware that the taxonomy of natural history is utterly irrelevant in the discussion of the social. In this sense, Tanabe was most interested in the destructive effects of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species with regard to the classical Linnaean taxonomy and Aristotelian logic of creatures. Tanabe attempted to conceptualize the species in the aftermath of Darwinian critique (see Kôyama Iwao’s testimony, in the monthly supplement to Tanabe Hajime Zenshû, July 1963, pp. 3–4). In this respect, Logic of Species is most critical of the classical and static notion of race which Darwin’s evolutionism effectively undermined. As goes without saying, it is hardly possible to dissociate the disintegration of the static taxonomy of creatures from the constant rearrangement of social relations by capitalism. There is no doubt that Logic of Species was a philosophical response to the development of Marxist scholarship on Japanese capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s. It is important to keep in mind that Japanese imperial nationalism too transformed itself in producing an argument to destroy the static concept of race. Yet, we must also remember that there is a racism with universalistic orientation which differentially reproduces a racial hierarchy by constantly rearranging static racial categories. It is from this perspective that racism in Logic of Species must be investigated, and as long as we continue to regard the Kyoto School philosophy as an ideology for particularistic ethnic nationalism, we will never be able to expose the racism inherent in it. For an attempt to analyse relationships between ‘race’ and colonialism from a dynamic viewpoint, see Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, Routledge, London and New York, 1995.


14. Tanabe insists that the essentially dialogical structure of inference haunts all logical argumentation: just as every enunciation is inevitably open to another enunciation, the proposition is intelligible only insofar as it is in relation to another proposition. What he pursues in the logic of species, therefore, must be located in the chain of inference and cannot be contained within a proposition or the synthetic unity of apperceptive predication. On the contrary, hermeneutics confines its investigation of understanding within a proposition, within a synthesis of predication, totally ignoring the inferential dimension of philosophical demonstration. From this observation, Tanabe concludes that hermeneutics (the zenith of which Tanabe found in his contemporary, Martin Heidegger) lacks the fundamental aspect of social praxis. Just as every proposition is open to another proposition in inference, the logic of species must be the logic of mediation in which an enunciation constitutes itself in relation and opposition to another. But, this process of mediation cannot be complete since every enunciation is always open to an additional enunciation. Hence, Tanabe argues that the logic of social praxis must be absolutely endless, and this absolutely endless nature of the logic of social praxis he called ‘absolute mediation’. In the sense that there cannot be a terminal point or an end to mediation, the logic of species must be the logic of absolute mediation. See ‘Shu no ronri to Sekai Zushiki’.

15. ‘We are born into a society where already many maxims regulate the will and action of the individual, so we regulate our own will and action according to the generally accepted maxims before we experience our action and its consequence.’ Hegel tetsugaku to ben-shôhô (Hegelian Philosophy and Dialectic), in Tanabe Hajime Zenshû, vol. 3, Chikuma Shobô, Tokyo, 1963 [1931], p. 214. However, Tanabe argues, following Kant, that those maxims cannot be moral maxims for the individual. Moral maxims are moral laws only for the autonomous subject who institutes these laws by itself (ibid. pp. 195–210).

16. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, p. 16 This corporatist notion of the body politic is inherently incompatible with the modern notion of equality: ‘Whatever may be said about it, Rousseau’s reference to a “moral and collective body composed of as many members as there are votes in the assembly, produced by the act of association that makes a people a people,” is not the revival but the antithesis of the corporatist idea of the corpus mysticum (theologians have never been fooled on this point). The “double relationship” under which the individuals contract also has the effect of forbidding the fusion of individuals in a whole, whether immediately or by the mediation of some “corporation.”’ Etienne Balibar, ‘Citizen Subject’, trans. James B. Swenson Jr, in Eduard Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy, eds, Who Comes After the Subject?, Routledge, New York and London, 1991, p. 52, italics in the original.


18. As to continuity and discontinuity, see Nishida Kitârô, ‘Sekai no jiko-doitsu to renzoku’ (The Self-identity of the World and Continuity), in Nishida Kitârô Zenshû, vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1965 [1935], pp. 7–106. Although Nishida Kitârô differentiates generality (ippan-sei) from universality (huhen-sei), Tanabe adopts Hegelian terminology which does not distinguish generality from universality. This is rather odd, as, being a philosopher of mathematics himself, Tanabe’s argument owes much to modern mathematics, particularly Riemann geometry – subsequently also to Neo-Kantians and Bergson who philosophically responded to the emergence of the notion of discontinuity and infinity in nineteenth-century mathematics – and the issues of singularity and universality with regard to discontinuity occupy central positions in his philosophy. So, I introduce the terms generality and universality here as they are distinguished from one another and conceptualized by Gilles Deleuze.


20. The most important aspect of totemic belief is that it consists of a set of generalities according to which members of a tribe are classified and determined as particulars. What is most clearly demonstrated by the example of the totemic belief is that the basic mode in which the social group such as the state rules its members is reducible to the logical relation of the general and the particular, a relation in which the general subsumes the particular under it. Ibid. pp. 53–56.


22. Alexander Kojève’s reading of Hegel, with its emphasis on negativity, is well known. Almost simultaneously in two places, Paris and Kyoto, Hegel was read in a characteristic way. For negativity and mediation in Hegel, see Alexander Kojève, ‘L’Idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel’, in Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Gallimard, Paris, 1947, pp. 529–75.


24. Ibid. pp. 11–18. Tanabe believes that Heidegger’s reading of Kant successfully captured the aspect of the individual’s indebtedness to the species as part of Dasein’s throwness. However, he claims, the Heideggerian Entwurf lacks in a practical aspect and essentially remains speculative, since Heidegger failed to recognize the spatiality of social practice. To overcome this shortcoming, Tanabe proposes to introduce the schema of the world. A similar critique of Heidegger was offered by Watsuji Tetsurô about Heidegger’s neglect of spatiality, but Watsuji’s reading, where the temporality of Dasein is completely eliminated, is no match for Tanabe’s in terms of rigour, and these two critiques of Heidegger’s Kant Book must not be confused. This explains why Watsuji’s static conception of the national community could legitimate postwar Japanese cultural nationalism successfully, whereas Tanabe’s social ontology was fast forgotten after the loss of the Japanese Empire in 1945.


26. Here we might note that Nishida Kitarô, for example, tried to introduce two different conceptions of universality: fuhon, in the sense of the universality of the Kantian idea, and ippansha, generality in the sense of the universality of the Kantian concept.


32. The most obvious case is Watsuji Tetsurô, who followed Tanabe’s argument in his Ethics to a great extent, but he deliberately eliminated negativity between the individual and the state, so that the state is positively immanent in the individual. In other words, the nation is continually the state without the mediation of the individual’s negativity. In this respect, in Watsuji’s Ethics, the state does not guarantee the individual’s right of refusal to accept the dictates of a given community. See Naoki Sakai, ‘Return to the West/Return to the East’, in Masao Miyoshi, ed., Boundary 2, vol. 18, no. 3, Fall 1991, pp. 157–90; also in Translation and Subjectivity.


37. Tanabe repeatedly referred to the Holy Trinity in order to explain schematically the relationship between the individual, the species and the genus. See, for instance, his ‘Kokka sonzai no ronri’ (The Logic of the State Being), in Tanabe Hajime Zenshû, vol. 7, pp. 42–4.


39. Hegel called this work ‘spiritual essence as ethical substance.’ See Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 264.


41. Ibid. p. 155.

42. One has to be extremely sensitive to the political function of an ethnic identity. The ethnic identity must not be essentialized or spatialized, but it is very important to note that, in certain contexts, it might be the only means to resist the imperialist manoeuvre. In this respect, we find the most rigorous critic of Tanabe’s logic of species in Takeuchi Yoshimi, who valued the significance of minzokushugi or ethnic nationalism as an indispensable means by which to resist imperialisms, but who endorsed it only as an inevitable moment in imperialist domination, a moment which would be utterly meaningless outside an imperialist hegemony although he could not totally avoid the essentialization of ethnic identity in ethnic nationalism. See Takeuchi Yoshimi, ‘Kindai towa nanika’ (What is Modernity?), in Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshû, vol. 4, Chikuma Shobô, Tokyo, 1980 [1948].

43. Tosaka Jun, for example, criticizes Nishida Kitarô’s philosophy as a typical form of bourgeois idealism. Yet his critique of Nishida seems to coincide with Tanabe’s critique of him in many respects. Tosaka was very sympathetic to Tanabe’s Logic of Species except for Tanabe’s emphasis on religions and, particularly, Christianity. See his Nihon ideologi-ron. For Tanabe’s political activities in the 1930s and early 1940s, see Lenaga Saburô, Tanabe Hajime no Shisô-teki Kenkyû, Hosei University Press, Tokyo, 1974.

44. ‘Shakai sonzai no ronri’, p. 160, my emphasis.

45. Ibid.