hence participant in civilization. This is what people who try their damnedest to upset the perceptively biting of these cynics, these nasty cultural applecart. ought to have borne in mind what eventually became of Duchamp, Picabia and Dali once the spectators had recovered from the initial surprise. The quickest way of dealing with the artistic outlaw is to extend the limits of legality so he is no longer outlaw, but an integrated - hence 'respectable' - participant in civilization. This is what happened in the case of the above artists. The Neo-Dadaists found it harder than ever to provoke serious thought rather than to allow the spectator the reassurance of complacent admiration. Jean Tinguely resorted to auto-destructive, constructions set to blow themselves up. ('Art disturbs; science reassures'. - Georges Braque). Certainly shows a flair for the theatrical, but then, so does blowing up a factory chimney. (But damnit all - is it art? our Victorian counterpart would have asked.) The train of thought which underlines Yves Klein's 'Ritual' betrays a more profound criticism. But Klein's work is far from being free from that rhetoric so characteristic of Neo-Dadaism; but with Klein - in the 'Ritual' above all - the rhetoric is never gratuitous.

My objective in this paper is to sketch in the general form of the Occult. The Occult order, as I understand it, is the object of those techniques and doctrines, interpretative schemes and ritual procedures, which we commonly group together under the rubric of Magico-Religious behaviour. I wish to understand how it is that the Occult comes into being as an integral element in human affairs, and how ritual action, by grasping the Occult can claim, for its adherents, a measure of control over the contingencies which surround men in the course of their daily lives. It is assumed here that Magico-Religious behaviour is devoid of material efficacy, at least of the kind ascribed to it by its practitioners. Though I would not dispute the proposition that ritual can have beneficial consequences, psychologically, therapeutically or socially, this does not seem to me to alter the basic fact that ritual cannot be interpreted in terms of a rational means/ends schema.

1 Magic, science and art

It hardly needs saying that the question of devising a satisfactory theoretical perspective for viewing Magico-Religious behaviour has been a perennial subject of dispute, not only among Anthropologists. For an outsider observer, particularly for a participant in the secular, disenchanted, rationalistic ethos most characteristic of the West, there has always been something positively scandalous about the fascination and repelless of the occult. Perhaps they are committed to the doctrines that he makes it his business to expound: but at the same time he is loath to deny or minimise the intrinsic vigour and force of the exotic ideas which he has been at such pains to record, especially when seen in the light of their original social context. Hence the attractions of the theories of religion such as those propounded by Horton and Beattie, both of whom, in different ways, offer apologies for the occult, by nurturing the idea that it is possible to go further than either in developing theoretical ideas which will allow us to understand magic and religion. One such idea is that of the occult itself, which I will discuss in detail later. But as a general point I would argue that analogies, however persuasive, cannot mask an irreducible quality which attaches to magico-religious behaviour per se, (which I would identify as its preoccupation with the occult), and that comparisons with other forms of thought or behaviour, be they science or art or any other, cannot tell us what this specific, irreducible quality is.

Magic as science

Let me commence by discussing Horton's impressive attempt to de-mystify the occult aspects of primitive world view by drawing an extended analogy between what appear to be mystical ideas (the gods, heroes and water-spirits of Kalabari cosmology), and the abstract explanatory concepts employed by western science. Horton thinks that religion and magic are interpretative theories about the order of nature. He calls them 'proto-science'. The following quotation summarises his views:
The really significant aspiration behind a great deal of African religious thought is the most obvious one, i.e. the attempt to explain and influence the workings of one's everyday world by discovering constant patterns which underlie the change and flux of everyday experience.

[Horton, 1964]

These 'constant principles' are notionally other than the Gods, heroes, and spirits, whose properties, functions, and activities now in confusion, are in recognition, share the chaotic pattern of existence. In fact, the same way, it is argued, explanatory notions like gravitation, velocity, inertia, and the rest, make possible a causal interpretation of nature of the kind which underlies the other sciences. One can only stand back and admire the concreteness and similarity of this scheme, which, to be sure, must contain an element of truth. At the same time, it certainly seems to have put his finger on a grave defect in it when he remarks that it is one thing to predict and control nature (on the nature, nature's will, etc.) by aligning one's force with it and making it itself obey the same law, while it is quite another to seek to influence it by treating it as an extension of the human order. According to Seattle, only science (i.e. Western science) can turn the former, while the magician only pretends to do the latter. [Seattle, 1966: 65]

This objection, apparently so grave in its consequences for Horton's theory, can be made to some degree of its force if, as I shall attempt to show, what counts as 'nature' for the kind of 'magico-religious' explanatory theory considered by Horton is not the same as the 'nature' which is the object of Western science. In fact, Horton's theory can only be buttressed if one makes this particular reservation, namely, that Horton's proto-science, and developed Western science, though both seeking relations to their internal structure, do not have an object in common. It seems to me that Horton is in danger of restating a too rigid separation between 'nature' (that which has to be explained) and 'interpretative ideas' (by means of which the interpretation is achieved). Horton sees nature as a fully constituted object, independent of the ideas which are brought to bear on it. But is this the case? My own view is that anybody's ideas on 'nature' is likely to be heavily theory-incongruous. I would deny that nature is constituted as an object of what we would consider scientific explanations, except by science itself.

Horton's approach implies, I think, that 'nature' can be considered a neutral background upon which primitive and scientific interpretative theories may be projected indifferently. If the results are different, as they admit they are, then this is a consequence of the different ideasystems being employed in either case. My own view, on the other hand, does not involve the idea of nature as an ideal, to which competing theories may or may not approximate. Nature, here, is only another word for 'reality' and we have come to realise that the perception of 'reality' involves a process of definition, rather than simple recognition. Reality is socially defined in terms of what is 'relevant' in the socially-conditioned experience of an ego. If occult forces, magic, or witchcraft are relevant as part of a given actor's experience, then they are real for him. But this entails the recognition on our part, that no such definition of reality (or 'nature') is independent of the interpretative ideas that are brought to bear on it. Within the plethora of potentially cognisable phenomena, culturally determined structures of relevance determine what is, and what is not, taken as 'reality' or 'nature' for ego. Relative to any particular set of interpretative ideas, the structure of relevance is determined within the plethora of cognisable phenomena undergo profound shifts. An Jonas a neutral object, nature is constrained by the kind of questions a given set of interpretative ideas asks, and can answer. Consequently, the kind of religious or metaphysical thinking considered by Horton, which he calls proto-science, may indeed be true, but we should not think that its object, that which it seeks to explain and understand, is the same as for Western science. For in resting certain kinds of problems for solution, it provides a variant nature of the reality with which it has to deal. And if Thomas Kuhn is to be believed, this is no less true of Western science. Hence my assertion that science and religion have no object in common.

I now illustrate this with a brief reference to my own fieldwork material gathered in Umedas, a village in the West District of New Guinea (Naginali). The instance I have in mind is Umedas ideas about the weather, in particular what causes the brief but violent tropical storms which blow up in certain seasons of the year, bringing all activities to an abrupt halt, and sometimes causing serious damage to the villagers' rather flimsily-constructed houses. Such an action to nervousness is believed to be brought about by the aggressive feelings (wars) of older men, either as the result of sexual frustration, lack of hunting success, or occasionally the death or illness of a kinsman.

I think this can stand as a fair example of what Horton might mean by a proto-scientific theory, which attributes an underlying social causation to a natural phenomenon, meteorological in this case. In the basis of Horton's theory, one might summarise the situation thus, in question-and-answer form:

Q: What causes rain and storms?
A: The rain comes from frustrated men.

But though this might seem a natural enough way of relating causative things, it is a gross simplification that Horton attributes to the magic of frustrated men. In the Umedas, there is not the way in which the problem presents itself to the Umedas mind, that it is, rather, in the following form:

Q: Whose magic causes the rain to fall?
A: Old so-and-so's.

That is, what is 'interpreted' by the theory is not so much the physical fact of the small (which is simply an index of something else) as the moral condition of certain members of the society. As the theory, such as it is, does not decide between the competing hypothesis (a) that the small is the outcome of natural forces versus (b) that it is the outcome of assumed magical acts. The truth of (b) is definitional, for the Umedas a storm is a moral fact with a physical aspect, not a natural phenomenon at all. It can be pictured as a kind of dial or meter, whose deviation allows the Umeda to read off the prevailing coefficient of frustration. This brings into play a completely different set of relevances than those appropriate to scientific meteorology. For Umedas, the weather is not simply an external fact, an independent phenomenon to be explained. It is, rather, an external fact whose accessibility allows it to be used as an index of something else, less tangible or potent, i.e. the moral condition of the society. For the coefficient of frustration. On such lines as these, I would argue that primitive theory-building and western science relate to different conceptual universes: the criteria of relevance being quite different in either case. The Umedas theory does not compete with an alternative theory of physical causation (a) because for the Umeda, the weather is relevant primarily as an index of, say, economic or social facts, whereas form and meaning, the structures of relevance are an external reality sui generis, and (b) because,
despite the use of 'abstract' theoretical concepts such as 'connection' etc and mathematical symbolisms, meteorology ultimately rests on the notion of physical causation in a world of material bodies, while the corresponding Umeda theory says nothing at all about physical mechanisms of causation.

Later in this paper, I shall argue that theories such as the Umeda theory of the weather are based, not on causal relations at all, but on accidental synchronicity-relations. This modification of the theory allows one to continue to see primitive cosmological systems, as Horton does, as postulating 'constant principles underlying the flux of everyday experience' - without obscuring the essentially occult nature of the constructs employed.

Magic as art

In expressing only qualified approval of Horton's views, I have in certain respects only echoed critical points made earlier by Beattie in the course of his controversy with this writer. Like Beattie, I am inclined to think that Horton rather overlots the similarities between primitive thought systems and modern science, incurring the danger of traducing the forper, and of depriving the latter of all distinctive meaning. At the same time, the grounds of my criticisms are slightly different, and I would criticise Beattie himself for almost the same reasons, namely, that he, too, avoids the crucial question of the nature of the occult realities, with which primitive thought systems purport to deal.

It seems to me that Beattie's account breaks off just as this point is reached. Like Beattie, I am inclined to think that ritual action is symbolic action, and I wholeheartedly concur with his sturdy defence of the Anthropologist's right (not to say obligation) to assay an interpretation of sequences of ritual behaviour, even when this means reconstructing symbolic contents of behaviour which may be unconscious, or never verbalised, as far as the actors themselves are concerned. Where my difficulties begin are with Beattie's contention that 'expressiveness' (whatever that may be) is the source of the imputed instrumental efficacy of ritual action. [Beattie, 1966:65-9]

Here Beattie follows Malinowsky closely, whom he quotes as saying:

'Words are not only means of expression but efficient modes of action: [they] mean so far as they act, and have a power of their own.' [Beattie, 1966:69]

Admittedly, Malinowsky is here speaking only of the child's use of language, but Beattie thinks he would have the Master's concurrence in generalising the idea to cover all acts of magical expression. (In this, I am sure he is correct: Malinowsky's famous Appendix to Ogden and Richards' 'The Meaning of Meaning' and the book itself, point strongly in this direction.) Beattie summarises his eventual position as follows:

What I am asserting, then, is that fundamentally ritual's efficacy is thought to lie in its very expressiveness. [Ibid]

I suspect, somehow, from the tone of this pronouncement, that Beattie himself is conscious that this is, in a sense, a somewhat paradoxical conclusion to have reached. What is puzzling is the precise force of the term 'expression' and its relation to the notion of instrumentality, or physical efficacy. Beattie's starting point, in his discussion of ritual, is the normal usage which opposes 'instrumental' (physically efficacious) behaviour to 'expressive' (symbolic or communicative) behaviour. Ritual is placed firmly in the class of expressive (hence, non-instrumental) behaviour. This behaviour, or this aspect of behaviour is A and not -B. But, at the same time, we are invited to think of ritual behaviour as instrumental (B) by virtue of being expressive (A), so, A and B. Here there is a contradiction in logic, but it would clearly be unfair to say that this contradiction has its origin in Beattie's own thought: it is one he attributes to the reactionaries of ritual, a pathetic fallacy, if you like, which makes the ritual attitude possible.

II. Magic as art

Having commenced, as I said earlier, by differing an analogy for ritualism, magic, etc, which stresses the symbolic, dramatic, and aesthetic aspects of such behaviour, Beattie is at length forced to rest his case on a conception of ritual efficacy couched in terms of the discharge of surplus emotive energy in surrogate action, and even on what he calls 'the conceptions of make-believe'. Such conception may be, indeed, all that the ritual musician ever attains to, but it is surely less than he seeks. However much one may agree with Beattie that...
all other forms of behaviour, i.e. its orientation towards the occult. If we do this ritual be-
comes, in a sense, both more rational and more
technical in relation to the particular world-
construction which it signifies. In short, it becomes
sensitively, less likely to be seen, misleadingly, as
a fuzzy analogue to the rational/technical manip-
ulations which take place within the world-
construction of western science-based rationality,
which is dominated by causal modes of thinking.

2 The occult construction of the world

The remainder of this paper is devoted to sketch-
ing the world-construction, which, in my view,
corresponds to primitive cosmological and magical
systems.

The idea of the occult

But first it is necessary to say something about
the concept of the occult, which has not, it seems,
given a precise sense. The importance of this
concept was brought home to me by a paper con-
tributed by Professor Fortes to the Royal Society
Symposium on 'Religious Influences and Logical Technique in Divinatory Ritual'. Because
this paper is probably less well known than many
more recent writings on the subject of ritual,
may be as well to outline what I take to be
Fortes' main theoretical point.

Fortes' paper opens with some critical remarks
aimed at Leach's blanket definition of ritual as
the 'communicative aspect of behaviour'. Fortes
proposes to restrict 'ritual' to situations in
which sequences of behaviour are directed towards
what he calls the 'occult' realm, as opposed to
the realm of the 'patent':

The occult can only be known about by its
effects, by its apparently arbitrary interve-
nions in routine existence, whereas things
patent can be known in the last resort by
sensory experience. What is more, things
patent fall into place, or are believed to
do so, in conformity with the regularities
of material, causal, relations, as understood
by a particular cultural community,... They
are not amenable to discussion by technical
means. The occult powers, forces, relations,
agencies and so forth are not believed to
behave in conformity with material, causal
relations, or to be predictable or amenable
to technical operations. They respond only
to ritual action. [Fortes, 1966:41]

Occult forces, we are given to understand, are
manifested in what non-primitive societies class-
ify as luck, chance, or coincidence, including
such grave, but chance-dominated occurrences as
Birth, Health, Sickness, and so forth. Fortes
argues that ritual is a technique for, as he puts
it, 'prehending the occult':

We see that ritual prehends the occult not by
exposing it (as science does with the laws of
nature) ... but by disguising it and bringing
it into the realm of the patent. [Ibid.]

This statement has a splendidly lan
dary quality about it, and much of what I wish to say is
contained in it. Nonetheless, it is necessary to
enter some comments on Fortes' notion of the
occult realm. Fortes' notion of the 'prehending occult' is
what is this hidden order of reality to which ritual
thought seeks access? And how is it that through
having access to this hidden order of reality the
instrumental ends of the actors are served?

First of all, it is essential to note that the
occult realm is not simply synonomous with the
'supernatural beings' of the Tylorian minimum
definition of religion.

Fortes argues that the distinction between the
'supernatural' and 'natural' sphere is an arti-
ficial one in the context of primitive cultures.
The occult, in Fortes' scheme, is simply those
aspects of a hitherto hidden reality which seem
simultaneously, less likely to be seen, misleadingly, as
explaining it (as science does with the laws of
nature) and bringing it into the realm of the patent. [Ibid.]

This statement has a splendidly lapidary qua-
...
Likewise the occult sources of good and bad fortune in hunting and war, and the images of death, the sorcerer, the cannibal monster and drowning lover. These, to use the very opposite language of Jaspers' Philosophy, are 'ciphers of the transcendent', representations, which always remain internal to the culture, and to the world-construct which it posits, but which seem to point beyond it, revealing and concealing at the same time the sources of contingency, the dark blue of the night sky, which seems to open up the heavens for our inspection, but in which the totality of the universe is forever lost.

The point I am trying to express is a difficult one, and I shall elucidate it further in due course. Let me retrace my steps for the present to the Fortesian conception of the occult. Fortes sees at first sight to wish to define the occult or rather, the manifestations thereof, to specifically odd, fortuitous, apparently capricious occurrences, as opposed to regular, normal, phenomena. It is the apparently fortuitous which invites explanation in terms of the occult, while the normal round of events requires no such explanation. I think this impression would be misleading, since Fortes himself shows that events which are seen as the product of occult causes are nevertheless very or unlikely in a statistical sense (i.e., in the sense that tossing a coin and having it come up heads ten times in a row is an unlikely event). Death, he says, is not a fortuitous event at all. I think this means that no significant event in human life and activity is without its occult aspects. Fortes mentions birth, death, sickness, social conflict - all entirely normal events in the experience of the community, if not in the experience of the individual. I would add to the list such things as success or otherwise in productive activities, hunting or gardening, in love affairs and in negociations over marriage, in political life, warfare, and so on. Similarly with natural phenomena such as the seasonal cycle, the migrations of birds and other animals - all perfectly normal phenomena in themselves (in fact, extraordinarily regular, are not the less occult for that. To encounter the occult one need not seek egregiously odd or unnatural circumstances, strange coincidences, or the like. It lies all about us. But what is it, really? Evidently, it is not what happens, but how, when, where, and to whom it happens which will motivate a diagnosis in terms of the occult. The occult manifests itself in the relation between the acting and suffering individual and the totality of objectively normal natural events and social processes wherein he is enmeshed. But these events and processes are not 'occult' in themselves, for the occult (as we said) is that which by its nature is not to be known or experienced, whereas the events, in their coming to pass, are directly experienced. One has then to say that the occult is the modality of events which Transcends, or lies beyond, the horizon of possible awareness. The Occult order, one could say, is the order of events which are not happen-ending, but this order is nowhere and nothing; nothing in the world corresponds to it - it has no determinate formal or in the sense that the world given in here-and-now perception has determinate formal form. At the same time, it is clear that human being in the world consists precisely in the carrying-over of elements of a factual world continually reeding into the neutral of aspects into a yet-to-be-realised, not yet factual world towards which every project of action is oriented. We may by no means maintain an astatic attitude towards this open and still unburned futurity; for the necessary truth is that in some guise, however indeterminate at present, the future will be actualised, will become the stage upon which our projects and those of others unknown to us will be played out - which lends it a kind of virtual substantiality or honorary presentness. Perceived social reality is indeed set within the frame provided by such purely virtual projections of futurity (i.e., the future grasped as the future-perfect - as what will have been the case when our projects have been realised, our expectations met) on the one hand, and on the other the images of irrecoverable pastness. Yet there seems to be no discontinuity between the perceived and tangible situation, in all its concrescence, and the frame of virtual experiences in which it is set; there is a continuity of substance within a larger whole. It almost seems (and here, perhaps, is the great illusion) as if ordinary mundane perception was no more than an arbitrary and partial perspective on this larger totality. My thesis is that the occult arises as a particular way of conceptualising the relation between consciousness and this larger totality. We have to imagine the totality of potential events as in some sense pre-existing and surviving, their actualisation in experience, and of being accessible to consciousness as such. But here is the basic difficulty, since accessibil­ity, the purpose of the occult doctrine which 'semanticises' the perceptual world can break down the otherwise impenetrable barrier, allowing access to the imagined totality of which the perceived world is only a fragment. Occult thinking is founded on the proposition that the relation between experience and the totality of the cosmos can be mediated by signs. Apperception

In understanding how this comes about, I find the Husserlian idea of 'apperceptive coupling' (as expounded by Alfred Schutz) useful. The semi­ntisation of the world is not a decisive revolution in thought, a leap into the absolute. On the contrary, it is only a development of far more primitive occult metaphysical possibilities. By apperception Husserl refers to the effect whereby an object within the phenomenal field of ego is ineluctably coupled with a sequence of constructs (which are the outcome of the experient's previous acquaintance with the object in question, and his acquaintance with objects in general) which allow him to articulate the object in his phenomenology with the rest of his relevant experience, i.e., with what I have elsewhere called his construction of the world. Thus, I do not interpret the room in which I am situated as an isolated segment of space, though that is all that my present perception reveals to me. My perceptual synthesis does not restrict itself to the four walls, the ceiling, and the floor that I can actually see. Instead I understand the space in which the room is situated as extending in three dimensions, dimensions that I can fill in on the basis of my previous acquaintance with the building, the kind of furniture it contains, the kind of activities which are carried out in it: and if I happen to have no relevant experience, then I will fill in with something vaguely typical. The possibility that I cannot be certain that the world simply ends at the boundaries of my perceptual field: my act of perceiving the room as a construction, the kind of construction I make of it, depends on the facts of my construction of the world. The process of perception hence involves the coupling together of the object given in here-and-now perception, with the typifications which it is said to 'apperceive'. Thus the four walls of the room apperceive, or give me a virtual perception of, a sequence of typifications which include: an upstairs and downstairs, a building, a townscape with more buildings, streets and squares, with
people passing by, traffic, policemen, pigeons etc. ... Or, if I am an Umeda, and I glance at the graceful heads of the coconut palms, swaying above the tangled undergrowth, they present to me the presence of invisible houses, surrounding a cleared very mysterious. But I think it allows us to place Fortes' theory of the occult in its proper context. Fortes' distinction between 'things patent' and 'things hidden, or occult' is, in my view, a special case of the far more general phenomenon of appresentative coupling. Any act of perception can be seen as involving a 'patent' aspect - the aspect of the object given me in here-and-now perception, and a 'hidden' aspect, which is given me via appresentative coupling, which I fill in for myself in the course of articulating the object to the rest of my experience. In the simple case where there is nothing distinctly occult about the 'hidden' aspect of the object, if one takes more complex instances of appresentation, the extent to which anticipated experience can be checked against actual experience decreases progressively, until the point is reached where no direct confirmation or disconfirmation is possible. For instance the physiognomy and behavior of another person presents to me, their inner feelings and attitudes, but I have no access to these inner feelings and attitudes except via appresentation, since I can never experience them directly. At this point of perception is semantised; the objective world ceases to be perceived as a collection of objects, whose relevance to the subject is simple character as objects, becomes instead a system of signs. A sign is not an object whose relevance for the perceiving subject lies in what it is, but in what it represents.

The perception of meaning is built into the mechanism of perception itself. A continuum unites the simple perception of objects, with their appresentative 'fringes' and the perception of signs and symbols whose function is to express their meanings. As one proceeds along this continuum the perceptible object becomes progressively less relevant as an object in its own right, and progressively more relevant as the vehicle of appresented experience which is not spatial-temporally accessible to the perceiving subject.

The use of symbols in active ritual

Having briefly sketched in this idea, the question which now has to be asked is how ritual fits into the scheme. Fortes describes ritual as the means whereby the occult is 'disguised' and brought into the realm of the patent. The occult has been acquired already with the imagined totality of contingent events and process, of which actual perception only affords us a partial glimpse, which encompasses the thinking and perceiving subject. Ritual is to be understood as a device which prefigures this occult contingency of the world in patterns of appresentative reference. But why does Fortes find it necessary to say that ritual 'disguises' the occult in bringing it into the realm of the patent? Why does ritual thought display such a penchant for crooked 'knight's moves' in approaching its object? Here I adopt a rather different tack from Fortes', whose approach is strongly influenced by psycho-analysis, and in particular the psychoanalytic concept of repression. Fortes thinks that the latent symbolic content of ritual, concerning, as it does, deep-seated, unconscious, and potentially unmanageable emotional forces and instinctual drives, has to be disguised in oblique symbolic language before it can become public. Ritual symbolism, like dream symbolism, reflects the operation of censorship [Fortes, 1966:213] As against this, I would be more inclined to emphasise the logical, rather than the affective, basis of oblique symbolisation in ritual. Ritual is orientated towards the occult, and the occult, as I have stressed all along, is by nature incapable of direct representation, since it does not correspond to anything in the world. I would readily concede that one of the most fundamental aspects of the occult is, precisely, that which is internal to man's own personality: the hidden springs of action and desire, love and hate, which seem to lead back to a dark and autonomous region of the spirit, inaccessible to ordinary self-consciousness. But I would claim that direct representation of these forces is not even a theoretical possibility, since they have no place in the world of objects. Hence the sole possibility remaining is oblique expression, in more or less inadequate symbolism.

Indeed, the austerity of the ritual gesture often seems to emphasise, rather than hide, the inadequacy of the representation it gives to the occult. A stone is the sun, a fragment of wood is the tree of the world ... the insignificance of ritual objects, as objects, only serves to underline their role as mediators between experience and contingencies which transcend experience.

If it is conceded that, via appresentative reference, objects in the world can be perceived as indirect representations of a totality of potential events which transcend immediate awareness, then it is also relatively easy to see how 'passive' forms of ritual such as augury and divination function as ritual means of grasping non-objective future and past contingencies through their pre- and post-figurations in objectively present ritual objects and gestures. But it is much harder to see how 'active' ritual, i.e., ritual which does not simply interpret the world but which seeks actively to transform it, is possible. Divinations leave the world as it is, and only seek to bring its secret history into the light of day. But Fortes does not go on to consider the many types of ritual which do not accept the world of intransigent fact simply as a given, but which seek actively to transform it, by taking up the symbols

Disneyland

"Hey, Regis! It's a fat little worm I've caught!"

"How dreadful! Those kittens aren't prepared for this..."

A new ideology, the ideology of fascism, is trying to impose itself in Chile. It began with the burning of books, with the following of walls to cover the paintings the people had done; expressing their feelings; it continued by forcing young men to cut their 'long' hair, forbidding women to wear trousers, and making them compulsory for civil servants.

The crusade in the defence of 'occidental and Christian values', ... as the

"Congratulations, mamma! I've been told a nice moral too!"

"Do away! Don't you realize we aren't scarecrows."
of the occult contingencies which govern the world, manipulating them and seeking thereby to condition, symbolically, a desired outcome.

It is here that the disparity between the symbolic means and material ends of ritual is most glaring. Even if one accepts the truth of the Malinowsky/Beattie thesis that 'words' or symbolic action in general derive a practical potential, from their use in social contexts, so becoming vehicles of real power, it would also be true that in a universe in which the magical power of words was taken for granted, the concept of 'symbolisation' or 'symbolic action' would take on a completely different force than would be the case in a universe where no such intrinsic efficacy was attributed to them — precisely because, in such a universe it is no longer possible to say of any action that it is (only) symbolic. A universe in which it is possible to synthesise events actively through the manipulation of symbols is one structured, or articulated part to part, in a way which gives an extra dimension to the notion of 'symbol' which is simply not present if the universe is thought of as a flux of contingent events which symbols can only reflect and interpret.

What is at issue is a reversal of the normal relationship which articulates events, phenomena, qualities and so forth, each to each, in such a way that magical operations become legitimate, and indeed logical within a scheme of pre-established harmony. This concept, which I have borrowed, with certain modifications, from the writings of Jung, is the concept of synchronicity.

Jung has defined synchronicity as an 'acausal connecting principle' which manifests itself as a 'psychic relativity of space and time'. It is a property that the universe seems to show of arranging events in the external world in a way which is intrinsically most improbable but, from the standpoint of a particular ego, uniquely meaningful. However, these are just phrases, and perhaps the best way to gain an insight into the concept is to look briefly at one of Jung's examples. Jung relates that at one time he was treating a woman patient who,

... at a critical moment, had a dream in which she was given a golden scarab. While she was telling me this dream ... I heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping. I turned round, and saw a flying insect knocking against the wall, and caught the creature as it flew in. It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab that one finds at our latitudes, a scarab-shaped beetle, the common rose chafer (Cetonia Aurata) which, contrary to its usual habits, had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at this particular moment... [Jung: 1972: 31]

Jung believes that it is necessary to appeal to an acausal connecting principle to account for significant coincidences, such as this one, whose true degree of improbability is perhaps rather difficult to assess. He also seeks to apply much of synchronicity to explain things as pre-occupation, E.S.P. experiments, astrological predictions which prove amazingly accurate and other seemingly 'unlikely' but nonetheless widely-attested phenomena. Jung thinks of synchronistic happenings as being triggered off by the emergence (under suitable psychic conditions) of archetypal contents into the conscious mind. These archetypes are, so to speak, eternal verities — to become conscious of them is to become conscious of a system of pre-established truth about the world. Thus, according to Jung, the scarab-beetle coincidence is to be explained as follows. The woman, by dreaming of the archetypical scarab (which existed all along in her unconscious and also in the Jungian collective unconscious), had foreknowledge of the recounts of the dream on the following day, and the actual appearance of the rose chafer, a future event which was accessible to the eternal present of the dream. It is not necessary to be sidetracked at this point into assessing the evidence for and against the paranormal phenomena discussed by Jung, such as his attempt to demonstrate the relevance of astrological predictions by a statistical study of marriage choices, or his account of the famous or

inner articulation of the magical universe; the relationship which articulates events, phenomena, qualities and so forth, each to each, in such a way that magical operations become legitimate, and indeed logical within a scheme of pre-established harmony. This concept, which I have borrowed, with certain modifications, from the writings of Jung, is the concept of synchronicity.
Synchronicity and causality

I think that it would be mistaken to set up synchronicity as a competitor to causality. If synchronicity is no more than what Jung says it is, namely, a subjectively meaningful conjunction of events, my belief is that this leaves the principle of universal causality precisely where it is (unchallenged) and it is still necessary to seek for causal explanations of paranormal phenomena such asextrasensory perception, psychokinesis, and the like. If synchronicity is an acausal connecting principle, it cannot, a fortiori, cause anything to be in any way different from what it would be if it did not operate. Jung denies that his concept of synchronicity is transcendental, but I do not see any escape from the dilemma: either synchronicity is transcendental, a second order of truth about events which are themselves grounded in the soil of causality, or it must intervene in causal sequences of events and is hence not acausal at all, but a new and recondite form of causation. But I would prefer to leave these possibilities aside, for they are not our immediate concern. Even granting, as I would be inclined to do, the universal nature of causality, it would remain true that the same external pattern of events could be interpreted synchronistically. And this, I think, is the main point. It may be helpful to clarify the relation between the postulated connecting principle (synchronicity) and causality by means of a diagram. Synchronistic relations can be imagined as lying at right angles to the axis of causality as shown in Diagram 1, such that two events A and B may well be causally related through a common antecedent C, on Diagram 2 - but this is not part of the structure of relevance being brought to bear on them while they are being interpreted synchronistically. Every synchronistic event, we may assume, has a cause; but this is not relevant from the point of view of world-construct. For C, A and B do not represent their causal origin, but only their synchronistic relation.

On the relation between synchronicty and causality Jung writes:

The causality principle asserts that the connection between cause and effect is a necessary one. The synchronicity principle asserts that the terms of a meaningful coincidence are connected by simultaneity and meaning... beside the relation between cause and effect there is another factor in nature which expresses itself in the arrangement of events and appears to us as meaning. [Jung, 1972: 95]

Now it seems to me that the improbability, on a causal hypothesis, of the events, or arrangements of events, on which Jung lays such emphasis, tends to obscure the real significance of the idea of synchronicity. Events which are themselves in no way improbable may be interpreted, subjectively, as connected 'by simultaneity and meaning'.

The stress which both Jung (in his discussion of synchronicity) and Forte (in his discussion of the occult) lay on the likelihood of events seems to me no more than a by-product of their own, western, thought-categories, and an irrelevant one at that. Because our own explanations of phenomena are overwhelmingly cast in a causal mould, only in the interstices of an otherwise universal causality would it seem that there was anything left to explain. But it is not necessary to see things in this light. What I am postulating, as a correlate to magical or ritual thought, is a world-construct within which events are objectively speaking quite normal and causally-explicable (such as births, death, marriage, productive activities, the seasonal cycle, and so forth) - are grasped as synchronistic phenomena, i.e., as complexes of meaning.

Diagram 1

\[ \text{Causality} \]

Diagram 2

\[ \text{Diagram 1} \]

\[ \text{Diagram 2} \]
in the ensuing months. While the birds mentioned
in the chants are actually tabooed as food.

This brief example allows one to perceive
clearly the strategy of synchronistic thought.
One does not need to delve deeply into the world-
wide mantic significance of birds to appreciate
the fact that the movements of birds, so apparently
arbitrary and at the same time so astonishingly
regular, are here being grasped as one term in a
twofold synchronistic relation with the mares
dropping their foals. But the significance of the
birds in this instance is not simply mantic or
divinatory: their synchronistic relation with the
mares is here invoked actively, in order to induce
the latter to drop their foals - which is the real,
though only implicit objective of the ceremony.

The existence of much synchronistic relations,
conceived as being part of the inner articulation
of the world, permits the manipulation of trans-
cendent contingencies which lie outside the sphere
of ordinary manipulations. But how is this
achieved?

My suggestion, essentially, is that through
conceiving the world, or grasping its fundamental
organizing principle, as complexes of synchronicity
relations, external contingency is made relative to
the synthesising activity of the mind. This
'synthesising activity of the mind' is, itself, the
process of appresentation, or meaning-giving. Thus
is made possible the inversion of the ordinary rela-
tion between the symbol and the world, of which I
spoke earlier, so that the world reflects the
symbol rather than the symbol reflecting the world.
Let me attempt to make this more precise.

It will be recalled that Jung calls synchronistic
ity a 'psychic relativity of space and time'. My
suggestion is that having grasped the world as an
articulate whole of synchronistically related
events, external contingency comes to be perceived
as symmetrical with the synthesising activity of
the mind, by a kind of mirror effect. Diagram 3
is an attempt to show this in action.

On Diagram 3 the shaded curve demarcates the
realm of the patent from the occult or transcendent
sphere. Within the patent sphere events A and B
(involving mares and birds, respectively) are,
from the standpoint of world-construction O
linked by the synchronicity relation AB, forming the
triangular relation AOB. The AB relation can
only be related via the appresentative activity of O.
A and B meanwhile lie on separate causal
pathways (P-Q and X-Y) which are either unknown,
or not relevant as far as O is concerned. What is
relevant to O is the precise spatial or temporal dis-
position of events in general, including events
A and B (and particularly A) - relative to O's
vital interests.

But this disposition of events is largely
governed by an external contingency which lies
outside the patent sphere. The possible disposi-
tions of events relative to O's interests trans-
cends his world-construction. No resort may be
made to causal thinking because the causal path-
yways, even if they are recognised at all, only
lead back into the transcendent sphere, parallel
lines which do not meet. It is in this context
that the triangular relation AB, hitherto con-
fined to the patent sphere, begins to take on its
occult significance. For whereas the causal path-
ways X-Y and P-Q never converge on each other or
on point O, and are not relative to O, this is not
the case with the synchronicity relation AB, which
is in effect constituted by O. The final step in
the analysis is therefore to see how the constitut-
ive activity of O is given its transcendent or
occult interpretation. Let me recall here what I
said earlier about the occult sphere - that it is,
in effect, a kind of virtual space whose inner
limit or negative contour is determined by the
outer limit of a given world-construction: that
is, for any given world construction it is what
lies beyond knowing, perceiving, understanding,
and meaning. Because this inchoate external
contingent realm is by definition inaccessible
for O, it must follow that O can only grasp it in
the guise of images, or reflections of patent.

That is, non-transcendental phenomena. For O,
the occult or transcendent can only be found as
an image or cipher of something untranslatable in
itself, and the image or cipher can only exist
within, and not beyond, the boundaries of the
patent sphere. Consequently (returning to Diagram
3), we may accurately represent the patent sphere
as bounded from the transcendent sphere by a
reflecting surface - so that the external skeleton
of the world construct takes on the aspect of a
hall of mirrors - a surface which endlessly
reflects back what takes place within the space
it encloses but which has the property of seeming
to allow access to a virtual space which lies
beyond the untransgressable boundaries of the
world-construct.

If this description is accurate, then it is
possible to see how the synchronicity relation AB
in the patent sphere is reflected in the occult
sphere by a second triangle O' O'B' (cf. Diagram 3)
- which is a reflection in virtual, transcendent
space of the constitutive activities of the mind,
I.e., of its original appresentative synthesis
of the AB relation. And what is more, because the
transcendent sphere can only reflect back the
contents and inner articulation of the patent
sphere, there comes to be any phenomenological
contrast between the two - each contains and ex-
hausts the other. The world construct O, as the
reflected image of itself (O') in transcendent
space, becomes no longer the constitutive principle
of the inner articulation of the patent sphere,
but the constitutive principle which articulates
external contingency.

3Conclusion: zero transcendence

The argument has now reached its final stage.
According to my analysis Magical or Ritual thought
has its origin in the reflection in the transcendent-
ontological sphere of the constitutive activities of mind. I began with the idea of the occult, the domain of virtual, inaccessible, but crucially important contingencies which seems to enfold the patent sphere, the sphere of actual existence, actual experience, actual manipulation. I then introduced the notion of appreciation. Through appreciative coupling the thinking subject has access to potential perceptions and potential experiences which more or less definitively transcend the domain of his actual here-and-now perception. Leaving the domain of actual or potential perception and experience behind, appreciation articulates this experience within a framework of constructs or typifications; the world is 'semantised' and understood in terms of complexes of meaning. Thus the subject fills in the meaningful articulation of his world. Next, we must clarify the relation between the idea of appreciation, which, in primitive or elaborated form, is a feature of all perceptual and cognitive activity, including symbolic thought, and the idea of synchronicity which is more specifically occult in its implications. Appreciation is a relation between a thing and an idea, between the meaningful object and the meaning it bears for the perceiving subject. Synchronicity is more complex than this, for it is a relation between things (or, as it is more convenient to call them, events) which is established by their common participation in a subjectively grasped scheme of meanings; that is, their co-occurrence presents a scheme of pre-established harmony which manifests itself in the arrangement of events. In synchronicity, the subjective process of establishing meaningful relations between events in the world is reflected as a quasi-objective form as an organizing principle revealed in events themselves. Hence the idea of synchronicity allows us to understand how events in the external world come to be seen as being articulated, one to another by virtue of the constitutive or meaning-giving activities of mind. In objectivised form, as synchronicity-relations, the organising activities of mind are reflected back, as images of a transcendent order. And by invoking synchronicity relations, by weaving them into patterns of symbolic action, magical thought seeks both access to, and control over, the hidden contingencies which govern human life.

But in conclusion I would like to re-emphasise the point made earlier that the real world within which magic strives to attain its concrete ends, and the pseudo-world, the reflected or virtual world towards which it turns in its search for the sources of contingency are indeed one and the same. And it is this, in the last resort, that is the undoing of magic—not that it flies from the world, but that it mirrors it with too much fidelity. Magical thought can only reflect the world, and cannot change it, because it cannot escape the obscurate world of things. Outside the boundaries of the world construct there is really nothing at all. Transcendence is zero transcendence, a field of empty possibility corresponding to nothing. Having postulated transcendence as something which exists beyond the boundaries of the world-construct, an external contingency which seems almost tangible, but which is really nothing and nowhere, magical thought is reduced by the images it makes of something that by definition cannot be represented. In attempting to make forays into this transcendental domain, magical thought only encounters its own reflections, endlessly ambigu- rated in looking-class space. And in identifying its own constitutive activities as the constitutive principle of external contingency, magical thought crystallises to the very contingency it seeks to transcend. As the hidden hand behind the totality of what there is, magical thought is inelegantly bound to accommodate itself to every new turn of events. And, in order to claim its victories it must subject itself to the discipline of the contingent fact, a discipline which has its origin in the very claim magic makes to control contingency.