

# Anti-Oedipus – thirty years on

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I, for my own part, made a sort of move into politics around May 1968...

Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*

This title was suggested to me some months ago by my best enemy – or my best fiend, to paraphrase Werner Herzog – who also happens to be a very good friend: Alain Badiou. It was originally intended for a lecture I was to deliver under the auspices of the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Philosophy which Badiou recently set up at the École Normale Supérieure. The idea was to use the occasion to pursue our dispute – or *chicane*, to use a favourite expression of Badiou's – a dispute instigated by the publication in 1997 of his book *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*.

Let it be noted in passing, since I have been invited here under the sign of a *Radical Philosophy*,\* that this dispute prolonged a problematic which I had previously addressed in an intervention entitled *Of the Impossibility of Phenomenology: On Contemporary French Philosophy*, first published in 1994.<sup>1</sup> That intervention was directed at the institutional partition of the philosophical world into two blocs, phenomenological and analytic, and also sought to counter the repercussions of this division within France. In the book I showed that, ever since Husserl, this partition has been governed by an axiom of complementarity between the 'phenomenology' of the failure of logical formalism and the 'analysis' of the collapse of intentionality, in its theological reality as well as its philosophical impossibility. On this basis, let me suggest that a philosophical field *with a grip on the present* – in other words, *contemporary philosophy as an ontology of the present* – could be and must be thought starting from the idea of a maximal ontological tension between Deleuze and Badiou. In my view, Deleuze and Badiou constitute the extreme polarities of the contemporary domain of French philosophy, as the latter articulates its materialist necessity into singularities and multiplicities.

But we are indeed 'Thirty Years On' and a kind of fallout from a version of the contemporary 'made in Austria' (but not only, since it was also a question of the postmodern dictatorship of the curator), leading to my eviction from the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna (where I had taught since 1997), forced me to decline Badiou's generous invitation.

Badiou's invitation could not but engender a stark and cutting quarrel. As you know, in his book Badiou erects an image of Deleuze as a metaphysician of the One, whose essential *monotony – in itself indifferent to differences*, subtracted as it is from the 'inexhaustible variety of the concrete' and from the anarchic confusion of the world – can and indeed must lead us to dismiss the works coauthored with Félix Guattari, beginning with *Anti-Oedipus*. It is only after having carried out this operation that it will be possible, according to Badiou, to re-establish the truth of Deleuze-Thought against its ambient image, the image of Deleuze as the advocate of a liberation of the anarchic multiplicity of desires. But it is also, and inevitably, only once Deleuze has been reduced to the monotony of the One that one will be able to oppose this 'truth' to the *Nouvelle Alliance Deleuze–Guattari*, to paraphrase the original French title of Prigogine and Stengers's *Order Out of Chaos*.<sup>2</sup>

Badiou's operation cannot but pose a serious problem, on two levels whose difference is entirely relative.

First, at the level of Deleuze's trajectory, given that Deleuze himself presents his encounter with Guattari – in a horizon of life and thought opened up by May '68, what he called 'an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state'<sup>3</sup> – as the reality condition for the constitution of *his own* philosophy. (Hence the necessity of returning to what happens between *Logic of Sense*

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(1969) and *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) – which is what I will do all too briefly at the end of this article.)

Second, at the strictly speaking political level, whose essential ambiguity in Deleuze is condemned by Badiou. In Badiou's eyes, this ambiguity is corroborated by the fact that politics as such is not endowed by Deleuze with any kind of theoretical autonomy, thereby leading to the permanent threat of a spontaneous deviation or drift (*dérive*), embodied by what he dubs the '*anarcho-désirants*': what Lenin long ago branded with the name of 'leftism' and which tends to reduce Deleuze's declared vitalism to the last incarnation of Romanticism – in other words, into a natural mysticism of the vitalist expression of the world, as Badiou asserted in his review of *The Fold* from 1989.<sup>4</sup> But, in this case, it is the very unity of Deleuzian thought that finds itself gravely compromised after *Anti-Oedipus*, precisely to the extent that the latter was, as Deleuze remarked, 'from beginning to end a book of political philosophy'.<sup>5</sup>

What is more, it is hard to fathom how the biomachinic conception of desire in *Anti-Oedipus* – which depicts desire as coextensive with the lines of flight of the social domain – could ever translate anti-humanism into, as Badiou writes, 'the infinite and inhuman resource of the One', in which 'everything is always "already-there"'.<sup>6</sup> Unless, of course, we wish to argue that Deleuzian leftism was nothing but a pure opportunism and that 'Mitterrandism' revealed the underlying truth of this 'soft rebellion' – to speak like Guy Lardreau in his anti-Deleuzian pamphlet,<sup>7</sup> a text inspired through and through by Badiou's decisionism.

In an article replying to some objections that his book did not fail to provoke, Badiou makes the following remark: 'How is it that politics, for Deleuze, is not an autonomous form of thought, a singular section of chaos, unlike art, science and philosophy? This point alone testifies to our divergence, and everything could be seen to follow from it.'<sup>8</sup> In light of this remark, it might be interesting briefly to return to the dispute, taking our cue from the way it was prolonged by Badiou in the two books of politics that follow his *Deleuze*, books in which what is at stake is investing singularity qua operator of universalism; in other words, addressing the question: 'What precisely is a universal singularity that is valid for everyone?' These two books are *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* and *On Metapolitics* – a *metapolitics* of the dethronement of difference which is to be opposed to the *micropolitical* principle that presides over the question of 'becoming-revolutionary'

in Deleuze–Guattari following *Anti-Oedipus*. Having said that, it is imperative to remark straightaway that what Badiou's Paulinian allegiance rejects is precisely the anti-Oedipal affirmation of desiring production as *the social power of difference within a becoming-minoritarian*, as well as the manner in which this desiring production refuses, de jure and de facto, the principle of a separate sphere for politics. No wonder, then, that Badiou's *Saint Paul* advocates 'love' as that which militant faith is capable of, when the latter seeks to extricate itself from the 'living autonomy of desire'. By the same token, the theorem of the militant amounts to a subjective fidelity to the event of separation from the world, sustained by the universal communication of a subtractive foundation which can conceive of desire only as a Lack of the Law, in order to impose upon the subject, by way of a process of subjectivation, the universal grace of Signifier. Let us recall, in this regard, Saint Paul's famous pronouncement, from Romans 7 (7–23): 'I have known sin only through the Law.' Whence the following theorem: Lacanian psychoanalysis is the symptom of the refoundation of universalism, when philosophy puts itself under the metapolitical condition of creating the event of Nothing addressed to All.

What is of greatest importance here is less the predictable and stringent alternative vis-à-vis Deleuze and Deleuzo–Guattarianism (immediately collapsed into one another, as is only right, within the dispute) than the prescriptive character of this universalism of the Subject-of-Truth declared by Badiou *for all, and for everyone* who seeks the elimination of the *leftism of the party of desire* (to speak like Guy Lardreau, who is wholly faithful to the other party, the party, I quote, 'of lack, of the One, of knowledge, of war'<sup>9</sup>). I say 'prescriptive' because the universal is as such *the truth of the subject who declares the void of being* – from which Badiou knows how to draw *immanently* all the necessary consequences. After his *Deleuze*, it is no surprise that the militant objective of Badiou's *Saint Paul* is to unfold the logic of the break vis-à-vis the movement of vitalist affirmation by demonstrating *the inconsistency of becoming* with respect to *the excess of the Real over reality*. This can only be grasped via a Lacan who posits the Real in the predication of the no (*non*) and of the name (*nom*) as subject-intervention.

As the founder of the figure of the militant, 'Paul's unprecedented gesture is to subtract truth from the clutches of communitarianism'. How extraordinarily contemporary! By involving the *for all*, the break of universal singularity with regard to the *identitarian singularity* of a closed subset is bereft of an alterna-

tive, given *its* description of the present state of the ‘communitarianization’ of a public space fragmented into closed identities delivering so many new territories over to the market. Moreover, Badiou cannot write these lines without also inviting Deleuze to this wedding between capitalist logic and identitarian logic, a wedding whose stakes are precisely to refuse emancipatory reality to any kind of *becoming-minoritarian*, as Deleuze remarked – ‘exactly’, Badiou says, ‘capitalist deterritorialization needs a *constant* reterritorialization’. The exactitude to which Badiou refers is entirely nominal, and ultimately represents a complete misunderstanding of Deleuze, since the reterritorialization of capitalism is no longer practised upon this *absolute* form of deterritorialization without any assignable limit, whether external or internal, a form of deterritorialization that capitalism can only put to work by subjecting it to the expanded reproduction of its own immanent limits.

Furthermore, *becoming* is no longer related to flows of desire that flee, flows that cause the process of capitalist valorization itself to flee – for Badiou becoming turns out to be purely and simply the occasion for the ‘mercantile investments’ to which it gives rise. This ultimately leads Badiou to accept the point of view of Capital, fully aware that desire reduced to the primitive accumulation of identitarian reterritorializations under the name of ‘communitarianism’ is no longer Capitalism and Schizophrenia – it’s Capitalism and Paranoia. *The minoritarian is frozen into the identitarian*. As Badiou writes: ‘What *inexhaustible potential* [*devenir*] for mercantile investments in this upsurge – taking the form of communities demanding recognition and *so-called cultural singularities* – of

women, homosexuals, the disabled, Arabs!’<sup>10</sup> Recall that Deleuze and Guattari’s question is that of a political ontology of (‘almost imperceptible’) becomings which never cease to undo the sedimentation of identities (‘the primacy of lines of flight’) and to produce ‘strikes’, sudden variations that affect every system by not allowing it to become homogeneous, variations as unpredictable to the sociologist as they are to the militant. Thus, as Deleuze remarks in *Dialogues*, there also exists ‘a revolutionary-becoming which is not the same as the future of the revolution, and which does not necessarily happen through militants’.<sup>11</sup> This is because the constructions of the militant tend to cut themselves off from the ‘socio-cultural’ expressions of the world and from the propagation of the molecular becomings of real multiplicities. Or again: *Badiou contra Deleuze is Durkheim contra Tarde*. Except that the times have clearly changed, and the Deleuze resists better today than the Tarde did yesterday.<sup>12</sup>

Everything I’ve said up to now is intended less as an (excessively prolix) introduction to this article placed under the sign of a *Radical Philosophy*, than as a first *response* to the question: What has become of *Anti-Oedipus* today, thirty years after that ‘furious article’ published in the aftermath of ’68 by Badiou, under the combative title: ‘The Flow and the Party’ (‘Le flux et le parti’)?<sup>13</sup> In terms of the concerns it mobilizes on the intra-philosophical plane as well as on the non-philosophical one – with regard to the real multiplicities of the anti-capitalist movement and its collective assemblages (in their difference from political ‘organizations’, not least Badiou’s own *Organisation politique*) – everything points to the conclusion that *Anti-Oedipus* has *never stopped resisting, feeding*



on the very repression which it has never ceased to provoke. This is true on both levels, intra-philosophical and non-philosophical; two levels which are ultimately one, if the principle that presides over the writing of this book-flow is the one which was perfectly summed up by Michel Foucault in the Preface to the American edition, in a formula that bears a stunning affinity to the sensibility of Félix Guattari: ‘Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action’, in the desire that the ‘process of overturning the established order’ may deploy itself within political practice in an ever more intense way.<sup>14</sup>

Now, in the constant *vis-à-vis* Deleuze advocated by Badiou as the defining trait of his metapolitics, we clearly witness a return of the repressed – to wit, the return of the *Anti-Oedipus*, a text which he never stops countering with his own politics of Being and Event, after having purged politics from Deleuzian ‘philosophy’. But we also observe, inextricably, a total disavowal of the Deleuzo-Guattarian thesis concerning desire, the thesis that ‘*desire only exists when assembled or machined [machiné]*’ and that one cannot ‘grasp or conceive of a desire outside a determinate assemblage, on a plane which is not preexistent but which must itself be constructed’, in a process of liberation *which never unifies parts into a WHOLE*. Here we must quote the lines with which Deleuze introduces this statement. He writes: ‘it is objected that by releasing desire from lack and law, the only thing we have left to refer to is a state of nature, a desire which would be natural and spontaneous reality. We say quite the opposite: *desire only exists when assembled or machined.*’ Whence the conclusion that desire ‘*is constructivist, not at all spontaneist*’, and the following question: ‘How can the assemblage be refused the name it deserves, “desire”?’<sup>15</sup> (Allow me to recall that the concept of ‘desiring machines’ will turn into that of ‘assemblages’ pure and simple after the *Kafka* book, which can be regarded as a bridge between *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*). This is the key thesis of *Anti-Oedipus*, according to which there can be no Expression (of the play of the world) without the Construction of assemblages of desire or ‘desiring machines’, which free Life in the *processual (and non-totalizing)* identity between production and product. This identity is precisely opposed to:

1. The ‘natural mysticism’ initially denounced by Badiou under the name of Deleuze, ignoring the fact that Deleuze himself will only evoke a ‘plane of Nature’ to convey better the point that we are dealing with ‘a nature which must be con-

structed with all the fabrications of the plane of immanence’ (in other words, the irrelevance of the nature/artifice distinction undermines this naturalist expressionism).<sup>16</sup>

2. The ‘re-accentuated Platonism’ into which Badiou wishes to dissolve Deleuze by registering the production of differences under the heading of simulacra (in other words, a constructivism deprived of ontological reality).

Yet inversely, as well as reciprocally, and this time against the grain of the mathematical ontology of Badiou, which declares the indifference of truth to the flow of the world, Construction without Expression is *void* of any real becoming, of any *real-desire* whatsoever. So that if ‘the objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself’, ‘desiring production is one and the same thing as social production’<sup>17</sup> – by virtue of the biopolitical identity between Expression and Construction, an identity which gives body to the theory of machinic desire and the affirmation of a *universal contingency*, according to which: ‘In desiring machines everything functions at the same time, but amid hiatuses and ruptures, breakdowns and failures, stalling and short circuits, distances and fragmentations, within a sum that never succeeds in bringing its various parts together so as to form a whole.’<sup>18</sup>

This explains why *Anti-Oedipus* adamantly affirms that ‘we cannot accept the idealist category of “expression”’.<sup>19</sup> After all, production as process overflows its notion by relating to desire qua immanent principle – not the principle of a given/giver of flows which it would *naturally or spontaneously* express, but rather of a flow-cut system that desire *engineers*, in such a way that the cut implies what it cuts, as a *universal continuity expressed from an artificial ‘Nature’* towards *schizophrenic productivity*. Lacking this continuum, this *real* implication of the world singularized and *mechanically engineered* in each of its cuts–flows, the cut would count as a section (*découpe*), which is to say a separation (from ‘common’ reality),<sup>20</sup> in accordance with the principle of a post-existential *decision (decidere: to separate)* constantly put forward by the Lacanizing philosopher (the Real as the indifference of the pure event). As Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘It is not at all a question of the cut considered as a separation from reality’. With *Anti-Oedipus*, the ontological monism of Deleuzian biophilosophy becomes the biopolitical fact of the machinic system of cuts and flows, which relates the univocal plane of the living to desire as a ‘universal’ process of production. We thereby move from biophilosophical expressionism – such as it implies (after Spinoza) production qua affective



affirmation in immanence, and (with Bergson) the creative affirmation of the full differentiating reality of the virtual – to biopolitical constructivism, which allows one *in the present* to invest the created from the point of view of creation. It is this passage which makes it possible to understand Deleuze's assertion, in the interview on *Anti-Oedipus* (reprinted in *Negotiations*), according to which up to that point he had worked 'solely with concepts, rather timidly in fact. Félix had talked to me about what he was already calling "desiring machines"... So I myself thought he'd gone further than I had [*c'était lui qui était en avance sur moi*].'<sup>21</sup> In this phrase the *advance* of *Anti-Oedipus* is played out, the advance of a machinic ontology over the transcendental, as the latter is developed into a structuralism (of the kind that makes its appearance in *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*).<sup>22</sup> The machine will be defined on the basis of the cut–flow system which introduces production into desire by guaranteeing its real (and non-'symbolic') primacy qua immanent constitutive process.

Unparalleled, except perhaps by the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, it is the masterful opening chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* which links the philosophy of multiplicity – employed as a vital substantive that 'goes beyond the multiple just as much as the one' (contrary to the kind of reading which will be offered by Badiou) – to the politics of desiring production, a politics that can be understood as the anoedipal reality condition of philosophy, between capitalism and schizophrenia. This all comes down to 'schizophrenizing' philosophy by treating writing as the machinic expression of constitutive desire, an expression that carries the real to the point at which it is effectively produced in bodies that are both biological and collective, and imply the constitution of a field of immanence or 'body without organs' (BwO) defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, gradients, flows and so on. (The BwO is to be considered as the very body of desire, as its purest Expression, so absolutely inseparable from what it can do that it relates back to an unliveable power, a power which is as such the pre-condition of every real experience of desire, driven by the necessity of Constructions that cuts the BwO *in itself*.) Whence the 'generational' effect of this immense provocation – which no longer dissociates ontological production from the being of the micropolitical expression–construction of singularities – upon the way of thinking of a lifestyle from which the intellectual Left and the political Left and extreme Left have yet to recover.

The project laid out in *Anti-Oedipus* begins by subverting the Freudo-Marxism which was fashion-

able at the time, by confronting structuralism head on (lines of flight are primary qua process, contrary to structure conceived as the static genesis of the unconscious and the *socius*, and implying a complete determination of singular points), before moving on to criticize the philosophies of 'resistance' by establishing the biopolitical primacy of desire qua 'conjugation and dissociation of flows' against the Foucauldian thesis of a biopower whose *dispositifs* would in some sense be constitutive. (Coming first, as they do, 'lines of flight ... are not phenomena of resistance or counter-attack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization [*points de creation et de deterritorialisation*]').<sup>23</sup> Biopolitics is thereby affirmed as the infinite tension that affects a process of constitution which is launched against all the strata of organization that block becomings, which cause them to fall back on an anti-production that functions from the inside out (the psychoanalytic Oedipus, a State which turns into the Entrepreneurial State of the society of control) – and all this, not in the name of any kind of spontaneism or marginalism, but, *on the contrary*, by virtue of the dynamic of real multiplicities, as it is determined by the plane of immanence of desire qua social and intellectual power of production–creation. In this respect, and in accordance with the principle of a universal history revisited in 'Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men' (the longest chapter in *Anti-Oedipus*), it is legitimate 'to understand retrospectively all history in the light of capitalism';<sup>24</sup> a capitalism which does not put to work the decoded and deterritorialized flows it organizes and axiomatizes without, by the same token, liberating the forces of desire animating it, forces it must counteract by reintroducing the most merciless transcendence into the immanence of a person who has been rendered 'private' (which is to say 'deprived') in order to keep these forces in a bound state.

It follows that a fantastic death instinct always threatens to transform the Oedipal triangle – which invests the social reterritorialization of 'democratic' capitalism into an 'intimate' territoriality of the paranoid type – into a 'micro-fascism'. Whereas the investment of 'the transverse multiplicities that convey desire as a molecular phenomenon',<sup>25</sup> a phenomenon which constitutes the subjective-machinic essence of production, is affirmed in the *flight* and secession from the order of *representation*, which organizes representation into an exterior and an interior (into social reproduction and political representation, on the one hand, and infinite subjective representation, on the other). 'Leaving, fleeing, but by causing more flights'<sup>26</sup> through a pragmatics of collective assemblages which

overturns the apparatuses of blockage and control, imposing upon them schizzes that turn against capitalist anti-production and undermine the state's forms of sovereignty. The fact that this schizoid investment of the non-separated ensemble of the social field is tantamount to a reopening of historicity in the production of new, common modes of life, points to the caesura vis-à-vis any utopian communitarian project, and highlights the difference between the 'schizo' and 'becoming-revolutionary': a difference between 'the one who flees' and 'the one who knows how to make what he is fleeing flee'. For, as Deleuze–Guattari declare, 'the schizo is not revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process – in terms of which the schizo is merely the interruption, or the continuation in the void – is the potential for revolution.'<sup>27</sup> This is a potential which is



just as much anti-state as anti-party, as is obvious when *Anti-Oedipus* 'schizophrenizes' the Marx who was fascinated by the machinic economy of deterritorialized flows, when it overflows any 'structural' form of Marxism in order to instigate the flight of capitalist machinery on the basis of a *rupture of causality* which is also a *passage to the limit*, expressing the ontological event of the desire-that-produces (in) a *de-individualizing* subjective mutation. It is this reversal of power, tantamount to a reopening of the possible, which is invariably accompanied by a 'collective exile' ('desire is an exile', Deleuze–Guattari write)<sup>28</sup> that

takes place within the very time wherein one experiences the constitutive character of desiring production at the level of new social, intellectual and scientific forces, such as they define the machinic society of the General Intellect (to return to the key expression of the *Grundrisse*, in which is played out the 'Marxism' that Deleuze and Guattari lay claim to – as well as their convergence, on this point, with Negri).

These are so many elements whose acute resonance with the new cooperative spaces created by the anti-war and alternative-globalization multitudes, with becomings-minoritarian which proceed by 'inclusive disjunctions' without any resulting totality – leads us to affirm that the actuality of this work of political philosophy (and anti-philosophy), which refuses to propose any 'political program'<sup>29</sup> whatsoever, is today given in and by *the vitality and constructivist vitalism of the movement itself*. What is at stake is the collective perception and evaluation which are in a certain sense implied by Deleuze's 'cooperation' with Guattari. Couldn't we say that *Anti-Oedipus* effectively seals the moment in which Deleuzian biophilosophy becomes biopolitics, by shifting onto the plane of immanence the relative deterritorialization of capital in order to render it absolute and attain the critical point of the liberation of immanence in the here and now? In so doing, *Anti-Oedipus* would effectuate the juncture with this 'new people' which poses *in vivo* the expressionist–constructivist revolution of desire as the infinite movement of Constitution *in-the-making* against a Capital whose limit draws ever nearer. To put it in other words, it is *for* and *by* these new generations – to which Deleuze and Guattari never stopped referring in the interviews they gave at the time of the book's publication – that *Anti-Oedipus* determines, on the basis of the thesis of a constitutive desire, *the constitutive relationship of contemporary philosophy to non-philosophy*. That is what thirty years on and most often – how could it be otherwise? – by a kind of negative determination,<sup>30</sup> continues to be referred to as the *Pensée-68*, 1968-thought: because *it* instigates the becoming-non-philosopher of the philosopher, whereby non-philosophy becomes in the present 'the earth and people of philosophy';<sup>31</sup> because *it* imposes becoming as the concept deploying itself through the power of a 'milieu', wrenching history away from itself in order to create the new, rather than reproducing death on an ever more expanded scale.

Here lies the greatness of Deleuze, when he indicates the 'turn' of *Anti-Oedipus* as the moment of the constitution of a philosophy – his own constitution, caught up and freed by the New Alliance with Guattari

– which does not work through concepts alone, but moves beyond the pure form of the determinable ‘in thought’.

This is what the philosopher christened the *ridiculousness of the abstract thinker* in the *Logic of Sense*, when it was a matter of attaining ‘this politics, this complete and utter *guerilla*’ required by the schizoid irruption of the Body without Organs, which came to ‘tear the structuralist surface’ of the ‘psychoanalysis of sense’, thereby leading it to a ‘progressive and creative disorganization’ inscribed ‘in the physical presence of bodies’.<sup>32</sup>

That is what *Anti-Oedipus* tells us thirty years on: that we cannot oppose the Hyperstructuralism of a Badiou with any kind of ‘weak’ (*debole*) Post-structuralism making room for a spontaneous democracy of desire and its pop-philosophical flights of fancy – but rather with a Biopolitics of Multitudes whose socially constitutive character is the ontological fact that sustains the constructivism of desire. The latter prohibits, *in vivo*, any projection of these questions into a ‘philosophical eternity’ or into a ‘politics of Grace’ under the guidance of the militant.

Translated by Alberto Toscano

## Notes

1. Éric Alliez, *De l'impossibilité de la phénoménologie. Sur la philosophie française contemporaine*, Vrin, Paris, 1994.
2. I. Prigogine and I. Stenger, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature*, Bantam, Toronto, 1984.
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. M. Joughin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 171.
4. Alain Badiou, ‘Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*’, trans. T. Sowley, in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, ed. C.V. Boundas and D. Olkowski, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 51–69.
5. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 170.
6. Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. L. Burchill, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 12.
7. Guy Lardreau, *L'exercice différé de la philosophie. A l'occasion de Deleuze*, Verdier, Lagrasse, 1999.
8. Alain Badiou, ‘Un, multiple, multiplicité(s)’, *multitudes* 1, 2000, p. 196; translated as ‘One, Multiple, Multiplicities’, in *Theoretical Writings*, ed. R. Brassier and A. Toscano, Continuum, London, 2004.
9. Lardreau, *L'exercice différé de la philosophie*, p. 84.
10. Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. R. Brassier, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 2003, p. 10 (my emphasis).
11. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987, p. 2.
12. See Éric Alliez, ‘Tarde et le problème de la constitution’, preface to Gabriel Tarde, *Monadologie et sociologie*,

- Synthélabo, Paris, 1999; as well as the special dossier in *multitudes* 7, 2001.
13. In *La Situation actuelle sur le front de la philosophie*, Cahiers Yenan No. 4, ed. A. Badiou and S. Lazarus, Maspéro, Paris, 1977, pp. 24–41. See also the opening passages of Badiou’s *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*.
  14. Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’, in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Viking, New York, 1977, pp. xiv, xii; French text in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, pp. 134–5.
  15. *Dialogues*, pp. 96, 70. See also p. 103: ‘Desire is always assembled and fabricated [*machiné*], on a plane of immanence or composition which must itself be constructed at the same time as desire assembles and fabricates.’
  16. *Dialogues*, p. 98.
  17. *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 26–7, 30.
  18. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
  19. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
  20. Deleuze and Guattari write unequivocally that ‘these breaks should in no way be considered as a separation from reality’, *ibid.*, p. 36.
  21. *Negotiations*, p. 13.
  22. See Gilles Deleuze, ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism’, written in 1967 and published in 1972, in which Deleuze writes: ‘Structuralism cannot be separated from a new transcendental philosophy’; in Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles and New York, 2003, pp. 170–92.
  23. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Athlone, London, 1988, pp. 530–31, n39. See the letter that Deleuze sent to Foucault in 1977, published in 1994 under the title ‘Desire and Pleasure’ (now reprinted in *Foucault and his Interlocutors*, ed. A.I. Davidson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, pp. 187–8). In this text he writes: ‘if *dispositifs* of power are in some way constitutive, there can only be phenomena of “resistance” against them’. Deleuze will oppose to this the primacy of lines of flight which ‘imply no return to nature, they are points of deterritorialization in *agencements* of desire’.
  24. *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 140.
  25. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
  26. *Ibid.*, p. 315 (translation modified).
  27. *Ibid.*, p. 341 (translation modified).
  28. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
  29. This is the conclusion of *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 380.
  30. Let us not forget that one of the coauthors of the book *La Pensée 68* – Luc Ferry – is currently France’s Minister of National Education.
  31. This theme is developed in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchill, London, Verso, 1994, in the chapter entitled ‘Geophilosophy’.
  32. See Gilles Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, ed. C.V. Boundas, trans. M. Lester with C. Stivale, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, series 13 and 22. On the very singular status of *Logic of Sense* in Deleuze’s oeuvre, allow me to refer to my ‘The Body without Organs’ Condition, or, The Politics of Sensation’, in *Biographie der Organlosen Körper*, ed. É. Alliez and E. Samsonow, Turia + Kant, Vienna, 2003.