Heidegger's 'Being and Time'

Roger Waterhouse

This is the second of three articles on Heidegger. The first traced Heidegger's early development. This second article analyses the argument of 'Being and Time'. The third will consider his later career and assess his philosophy as a whole.

'Being and Time' was published in February 1927. It appeared as the eighth volume of 'Phenomenological Yearbooks', a series which Husserl had established as part of his project in founding a phenomenological school. The book was dedicated to Husserl 'in friendship and admiration'. Its success was immediate: in no time at all it was a best seller, widely discussed amongst intellectuals of all persuasions. It was indicative that in the following year a new and purportedly radical philosophy journal was launched in Berlin with a special issue devoted to Heidegger's book (1). In it the young Herbert Marcuse hailed 'Being and Time' as the apogee of bourgeois philosophy (2).

To the audience which received Heidegger's work it seemed like a masterly synthesis which unified and transcended all that was most alive and urgent in contemporary German thinking. It teased out the core of truth in Spengler; it gave spine to Jaspers' Existenzphilosophie; it hauled Husserl's phenomenology out of the ivory tower and made it relevant to the here-and-now. It pulled out all that was best in the classics, in the scholastic tradition, and in the German Idealists of the last century. Above all, by giving a coherent philosophical account of the whole human being, it represented a new beginning, though one firmly based in tradition. After it, none of the humane sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) - from art history to psychology, from history to theology - could ever be the same again. And Natural Science had to be viewed in a totally new light.

Heidegger had been working on material for the book at least since 1920, when he had tackled the 'hermeneutic of factual existence' in his course on 'pure phenomenology' at Freiburg. He had clarified the project of giving a phenomenological account of the human individual in his unfinished review of Jaspers' book, and in the context of Marburg theology tried to articulate how this was related to the neglected Question of Being. So when late in 1925 the chance of a professorship came up, he hurriedly completed the manuscript and solicited Husserl's help in rushing it into print (3). Fifteen proof pages were not enough to convince selectors that Heidegger was of professorial calibre, but the job was done and a few months later the book appeared. Later, Husserl was to feel that he had been conned, and his titular editorship abused, since the book attempted to destroy all the basic tenets of phenomenology as he had constructed it.

The project

The introduction of 'Being and Time' attempts to explain and justify his project in the work. The Question of Being has been forgotten. The initial insights of Plato and Aristotle have been dissipated: we have come to think of Being as simply the aggregate of things, instead of their transcendent unity. In a sense we all 'understand' Being since we use the words 'is', 'am' etc: but in no way are we able to articulate what Being means. There is thus only one entity in which the meaning of Being can be disclosed - man. (By implication we must not look to things or natural science to discover it.) It is to our own being that we must look in order to discover the meaning of Being. Heidegger decides to use the term 'Dasein' (literally 'being-there') to refer to human being. There is a fundamental interrelationship between Being (Sein) and Dasein: a hermeneutic circle of meaning is involved (p28) (4).

But the Question of Being is also of the utmost concrete importance. Contemporary
The world is its horizon. Things appear, and Dasein is always related to things. Dasein's kind of self-understanding being, which we find ourselves: Dasein is a 'Being-in the World'. Not only do we have a self-understanding, but we already have an understanding of our own understanding of how we are. The world is a horizon within which we find ourselves: Dasein is a 'Being-in-the World'. Not only do we have a self-understanding, but we already have an understanding of things. An ontology of things is only possible through Dasein; so any attempt to base Dasein's being upon that of things is utterly misconceived. Being has an essential tendency to understanding which manifests itself through Dasein (p35).

What is missing from Heidegger's turgid academic prose is the gut of his concern about Being. Earlier I said that this concern becomes intelligible only on the basis of a quasi-religious experience: 'Being is something like 'the presence of God in all things', for a man who thinks that the term 'God' is theoretically unjustified. 'Being' expresses itself through all things, but 'appears' only to man because only man has the sort of understanding consciousness which can recognise Being. Therefore my being, as the means by which Being (Spirit) appears and achieves self-understanding, must be the starting point of the analysis of Being (§5). In a sense there is a triadic relationship: Being, which is unity, expresses itself through Dasein and through things. Dasein is always related to things: the world is its horizon. Things appear ('in their being') only to Dasein. Thus Dasein, as essentially a Being-in-the-World, in itself expresses the unity of Being.

From Heidegger's perspective, Husserl's concern with transcendental egos—chasing the essences of ideas in an endless search for certain knowledge—was, to coin a phrase, 'unreal'.

The method

The project having been described Heidegger needs to justify his method. He approaches this by way of a caveat. Because Dasein always confronts the World, it has a permanent tendency to understand itself in terms of things. We are Dasein, but we see ourselves through the medium of 'World', and so misunderstand ourselves. The method, Heidegger argues, must therefore allow Dasein to show itself as it is, not as our preconceived ideas (derived from 'science') would have us believe. What is needed, in other words, is a hermeneutic of everyday existence—a sensitive interpretation of the phenomena of ordinary experience. This interpretation will reveal temporality (our capacity for 'having time') as the fundamental structure of human existence. This gives rise to historicality, the ability of Dasein to have a past, and so understand itself through tradition. But in the present investigation tradition blocks our self-understanding because it has become the embodiment of the interpretation of Dasein as if it were a thing. This tradition, which is a false ontology, must be destroyed. Only thus can the possibility of authentic self-understanding, which was obscurely anticipated by the Greeks, be recovered (p47).

The method to be employed can only be phenomenology. In their conceptualization of 'phainomenon' as self-disclosure, and 'logos' as articulated understanding, the Greeks anticipated true phenomenological method, which is 'letting what is show itself through language'.

When Husserl had got through the etymological mystifications of these pages (49-63) the hairs on his neck must have stood out like needles. At the end of it he read: 'The following investigation would not (6) have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with
whose "Logical Investigations" phenomenology first emerged.... What is essential in (phenomenology) does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical "movement". Higher than actuality stands possibility. (pp62-63)
The 'possibility' turned out to be method. But not method as Husserl knew it. Where was the reduction to phenomena, the process of imaginative variation to establish the essences of ideas, the 'bracketing' of reality? And what of all the work Husserl had done in the 26 years since the 'Investigations' were published? Just ignored. In fact, Heidegger's argument is that reality cannot be bracketed - ontological commitment is there from the first; that ontology precedes epistemology both theoretically and practically; that phenomena do not appear on the surface of things but are hidden by everyday misinterpretations which must be destroyed. The implication is that Husserl's whole conception of philosophy is fundamentally wrong; that in fact Husserl's focussing upon consciousness presupposed a mind/matter dualism; that in other words Husserl too was victim of the false ontology which the tradition had handed down since Aristotle. Thus his philosophy (his positive doctrines rather than his method) were also ripe for destruction. For his other readers, however, Heidegger, as the recognised heir of the little published and less read Husserl, had glossed the meaning of phenomenology, and identified it with hermeneutics (pp61-62). Method disposed of, Heidegger explains that his whole treatise is to deal with the analysis of Dasein, the explication of time as the horizon of Being, and the destruction of the ontological tradition concentrating on Kant, Descartes and Aristotle. Only the first of these topics is dealt with in the published work. The other sections were never completed (7).

Note on terminology. Because Heidegger thinks that the whole of the western philosophical tradition since the Greeks has been corrupt (8), he deliberately avoids its terminology. He therefore has to construct a completely new terminology which often parallels the old, thus 'object' or 'ego' is replaced by 'Dasein', which is not said to be a 'consciousness' but to have 'mineness'; 'object' is replaced by 'presence-at-hand', etc. etc. In constructing new terminology he exploits ordinary German for all it is worth, because he believes that German, as the most 'spiritual' of modern languages, has truths buried within it (9). Unlike Husserl, for example, he is extremely precise in his use of terms. He needs to be because language, as properly used and understood, is the (self-) expression of Being.

The Analysis of Existence
We are the entities to be analysed (p67). In each case the Being of the entity is mine; that is, it is not like an object (or 'thing present-at-hand') with properties. It is potentiality. I can either seize the 'mineness' of my existence, and become authentic (10); or I can lose it in being inauthentic. We shall see that inauthenticity is motivated by the anguish which being authentic involves. Regarding myself as object-like is an essential part of inauthentic existence.

In analysing human existence, then, we are laying bare how man already understands himself to be. Existence is structured. Heidegger uses the term 'existentials' to describe these structures (11): they parallel 'categories' which apply only to things. So for example 'spatiality' is an existential; 'space' is a category.

Dasein is always already in the world, prior to philosophising or to any other theoretical investigation. The experience of Being-in-the-World is a unitary phenomenon. In thought, I can subsequently detach 'consciousness' from 'world', or consider 'world' without 'consciousness' - but only on the basis of that prior, lived unity. 'Being-in', then, is the first existential, or fundamental structure of Dasein. But my experience of Being-in-the-world is not like my experience of an object in a box. The World surrounds and envelops me, as an environment of which I am a part. To conceive of human being as a thing in the world of things is to attempt to stand outside the totality - which can never be done except in thought. It is to look upon my own existence as if it were not my own, i.e. to be inauthentic.

Dasein, however, is not just 'there' in the world. It is always related to it in a particular way; and what characterises all such particular ways of relating to the world is concern. I care about the way things are, I am interested in what will happen. So concern is another existential structure.

At this point (p87) Heidegger comes clean. He has been opposing 'being' to 'knowing'. 'Knowing', he claims, is founded upon already 'being' in the world (12). We do not encounter Dasein primarily as a knowable object, something other than ourselves. Rather, we are it. In all our practical activity we are concernedly engaged with things in a world which surrounds us. But the corrupt philosophical tradition misinterprets what we know in our lives to be true. We are portrayed as disinterested, 'pure' consciousnesses trying to know the world of objects, with which we are not essentially engaged. Praxis is treated as if it were a deficient mode of knowing; whereas in reality knowing is a mode of praxis, deficient in pretending to be disengaged. In short, ontology must precede epistemology.

Worldhood and the World
Not only are we already in the world, but things are too. They are not experienced...
as contextless objects: they emerge out of a totality. But experience of the World as totality is itself based on our capacity to have that experience - our 'Worldhood' is another 'existential' structure of Dasein.

Initially (or rather 'primordially') we encounter things in our practical activity (p97). They emerge out of an undifferentiated background in ways which are dependent upon what we are doing. Things are primarily tools or equipment: even things like earth and sky are experienced by the peasant as the 'equipment' of his work. It is only when things in some way negate our activities (the nail bends, the hammer is missing) that they stand out 'in themselves' as objects. Thus the encounter with things as objects which are just 'there' (things present-at-hand), is based upon a more fundamental practical involvement with things as tools (things ready-to-hand). Western epistemology falsely reverses this relationship.

In our practical activity the world is meaningful (and, of course, valuable): it is a totality of references which is structured by our work. Work moves towards the future, to a significant end-product which in its turn refers beyond itself. All work refers essentially to the other people with whom I share the world. The very structure of significance which all practical activity contains, collapses without the other people to whom it relates (pl00).

The world as an environment which surrounds me is spatial in character. But as I experience it at work it is not the neutral, three-dimensional space of scientific accounts. It has dimensions: but the first of these is the near-far dimension. I experience the bench in front of me as 'objective' space. My space has directions - but its directions are 'up', 'down', 'left', 'right', and not abstractions like 'north' and 'south'. Nor are my directions to be dismissed as 'subjective'. They could not belong to some ideally 'worldless' subject: as characteristics of my lived experience they predate any conceptualization of 'subject' and 'object' (p144) (13).

Other People

The world as I live and work in it, then, refers essentially to other people. In practice I do not encounter them as things with some 'soul substance' added, and certainly not as objects about whose conscious-ness I am fundamentally uncertain. I encounter them as others like myself, about whom I am concerned in a way quite different from my 'concern' with objects (p157). In inauthentic everyday existence this concern may take the 'deficient' form of 'indifference'. But this must always be contrasted with the possibility of genuinely 'being-together' (14).

Turning now to everyday existence we find that inauthenticity is the norm: that is, I conceive of others and of myself in an object-like fashion. The 'impersonal' mode of discourse: 'one doesn't do that', sums up this objectification of self: Dasein thinks of itself as if it were another. But this 'other' is no particular other person: it is an abstraction which prevents genuine encounter with others or, more importantly, with self. The particular other person is taken not as himself, but as the expression of this impersonal, abstracted 'norm'. Worse, I think of myself in terms of what 'one' does, thinks or says - which is essentially, an evasion of my responsibility for creating myself (15).

Yet the phenomena of everyday experience point the way to a more adequate understanding of Dasein, if only they are correctly interpreted. Mood has consistently been ignored or degraded in the intellectualization of Dasein in the Western tradition. But such feeling (which can never be avoided) is only the experience of my concernful relationship to the world. Moreover, I always have an understanding of myself as projected towards the future: I understand that in choosing this activity I am also making something of myself. And this understanding articulates itself in language which, as discourse, is a primordial structure of human existence (another existential). We are speaking of language as praxis, both utterance and hearing; and not of language as a closed, static system - a sort of object.

But the authentic articulation of self in genuine discourse is not what normally occurs. We chatter away (p211), more concerned with the cogency of our talking than the truth of what is being said. Our seeing is distorted. We look desperately for the novel, the trivial, the superficial: we have a curiosity which is idle. In consequence we end up relating to each other in ways which are fundamentally ambiguous: we cannot distinguish the genuine from the false.

In brief, everyday Dasein gets lost in a publicness which is characterized by objectification - aided and abetted by philosophy. This publicness is a running away from the authentic possibilities of self - an attempt to escape responsibility. The constant dashing around on the basis of what 'one does' is a desperate attempt to 'tranquilize' oneself into believing that one leads a full and active life. It is a 'falling into the world' (p291): in practice, Dasein experiences a self-alienation, and is driven to obsessiveness and fruitlessness (because ungrounded) self-dissection (16).
Anxiety, Death and Conscience

This flight from self does not work. When we attempt it, the result is anxiety. Unlike fear, anxiety is non-specific: what it really expresses is our concern about our whole Being. Symptomatically it is the experience of not being at home in the world: our anxiety permeates everything and drags us back from our lostness in the world of 'others'. It makes me realise that I am not just 'another' for myself: my existence is my own and I cannot live it as if I were not responsible for it. In this sense anxiety is positive: it indicates my possibility of being authentic, and of not running away from myself.

The foregoing account of how Dasein actually is has not really revealed it in its potentialities, nor as a coherent whole. What became clear in looking at everyday Dasein was that it was incomplete and avoiding its true possibilities. Practically activity is essentially oriented towards the future. In a sense, then, our Being-in-the-World is never complete before death. But, as we shall see, we can achieve wholeness before death; and death, of itself, does not necessarily complete Dasein's existence. The importance of Death, which is the negation of human existence, is that in coming to terms with it I have to consider my existence both as potentially complete, and as inalienably mind. I have to die for myself. In anything else others can stand in for me, or I can present myself as standing in for others. Not so in my dying. Death therefore individuates. The thought of death can be positive. If I now start living my life as what I am - namely, a being which is going to die, then I can conceive of a completeness which will qualitatively transform the here-and-now. I can no longer be content with my previous dissipation in false publicness. The result is liberation: freedom towards death (p311).

Conscience is what reveals to us the actual possibility of being authentic. Not guilt over this or that, but our very capacity to have a conscience. When conscience 'calls' to us, it is really our true self protesting at our lostness in the public world. Dasein, in its very being, is guilty, since it is permeated through and through with nothingness (p322) (17). It is not what it is, since it is thrown into a situation not of its own making: and it is what it is not, since it constantly projects itself towards unrealised future possibilities. Existential guilt is the 'not' at the heart of Dasein without which empirical guilt would not be possible (18). Conscience, in this positive sense, cannot be reduced to a set of impersonal rules, applicable to anyone.

Conscience, through my existential guilt, reveals both the nothingness at the heart of my being, and the possibility of facing this resolutely. I must therefore look forward to death ('anticipate' it) resolutely. This authentic anticipation can bring about a 'moment of vision' - a 'resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation' (p387) (19).

Temporality

My self-conception, which the individuating thought of death forces into focus as a potential unity, is based upon care. We saw care expressed in our concern with things in the work situation, and in our different concern with others in interpersonal encounters; but we see it revealed most starkly in our self-caring in the face of death. Thus caring is a fundamental structure of human existence (suppressed in the epistemological tradition) which unifies the temporality of Dasein. Primarily it refers to the future which I might become, but in assessing that it must take into account the past which I have been; and both future potentiality and past actuality are expressed through the things present to me now. (Future) possibilities, (past) actualities, and the presence of things before me now are structures of my (finite) temporality - the lived experience upon which any conception of 'time' as an infinite aspect of the world must be based.
This discovers for us the most fundamental of all the existential structures of Dasein - its temporality. Dasein is like a clearing in the 'forest' of Being which care illuminates. This light of concern falls on things and brings them to visibility in accordance with our purposive activity. Things are thus made present on the basis of a recollected past for the purpose of an intended future.

At this point (p409) Heidegger's sharp distinction between things experienced practically as tools (primordial), and things viewed theoretically as objects (secondary), begins to waver and crack. After all, he concedes, even the craftsman is not without a theoretical interpretation of his work; and even the theoretical scientist sometimes has to descend to the practicalities of doing experiments. So in a sense the world is transcendent to both the practical and the theoretical attitudes. Dasein certainly needs the world as its place in which to be: the 'there' of Being-there (Dasein). But without Dasein no world would appear. And only the horizons of Dasein's temporality can unify the world through its temporal ways of standing out. In face of a past, for the sake of a future which is Dasein's, the present takes on the character of an 'in order to'.

Historicality

Our account of Dasein's temporality is incomplete. Death we have considered, but not birth, and not what unifies everything between the two. The philosophical tradition looks to a 'self' as a sort of object which somehow has to aggregate a sequence of neutral 'now' experiences. My experience is not like that. My existence stretches itself out into the future, making its history. My historicality, which is based upon the temporality of my existence, is the foundation without the Geisteswissenschaften (the historical sciences of man) could never arise.

The 'historicality' of things derives from their being the artefacts left to us by Daseinen which have gone. And things understood in their primordial nature as tools, are historical in their very being. Dasein, in working out its concrete praxis, must constantly evaluate the heritage which is left to it in the everyday world. My individual fate cannot be isolated from the broader destiny of a people (Volk) - which is more than just the sum of its parts.

In returning authentically to history as something living I re-live it. The significance of authentic history is that it gives me models, on the basis of which I am able to appreciate my lostness in the public world. In doing so I am attempting to repeat in my own time the moment of vision vouchsafed to me in the great works of the past. Thus the study of history, if authentically undertaken, is the study of the recurrence of the possible. It was Dilthey's follower, Yorck, who recognised that if history was to be properly based on the historicality of individual Dasein a new ontology was necessary.

So, we arrive at last at the problem of time. Time is an elemental feature of the world which precedes any encounter with things either as tools or as objects. Language, in which understanding is articulated, is utterly permeated by temporal reference. Time is not thing-like. Prima- 

<references>
Waterhouse, R
Marcuse, H
Sartre, J P
Waterhouse, R

Bibliography

M Heidegger

Works listed in order of composition
1919-26 DMT 'Being and Time', Blackwell, 1962
1925-26 KPH 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics', Indiana UP, 1962
1929 RE 'The Essence of Reasons', Northwestern UP, 1969
1930 MM 'What is Metaphysics?', in EB & BW - see below
1930 IN 'On the Essence of Truth', in EB & BW - see below
1935 IM 'Introduction to Metaphysics', Doubleday Anchor, 1961
1936 OW A 'The Origin of a Work of Art', in BW & PLT - see below

Collections:
NW 'Basic Writings', Harper Row, 1977
EB 'Existence and Being' (ed. W Brock), Regnery, 1949
PLT 'Poetry, Language, Thought', Harper Row 1971

Other references

Husserl, E 'Ideas', Allen & Unwin, 1931
Marcuse, H 'A Contribution to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism', Telos Fall 1969, pp2-54
Sartre, J P 'Being and Nothingness', Methuen, 1969
Waterhouse, R 'A Critique of Authenticity', Radical Philosophy 21, 1970

34
Footnotes
1 Philosophische Hefte
2 See bibliography
3 The rushed completion is apparent in the text. The last two chapters are full of unfinished discussions, postpositions, and at one point four pages of barely digested quotation (ibid. 54).
4 Unattributed page references are to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of 'Being and Time', published by Blackwell.
5 I put the term 'Spirit' in brackets, not because Heidegger overtly equates Being with Spirit, but because the use of this word is undealt with in all the texts. See, for example, B&T, p480ff; IM, p47, etc.
6 The English translation has a misprint here.
7 It is clear that most of the material Heidegger had intended for the other sections was eventually published (e.g. B&T, ER, ET, WM, IM). What he never pursued was any systematic further study.
8 The rot set in with the Romans, who simply could not understand the subtlety of Greek thought and debased it by their translations into Latin (OWA, p23).
9 See IM, p47.
10 Heidegger exploits the German: my existence is necessarily my "own" (eigen); if I recognise it as such I become 'authentic' (eigenlebig).
11 He in fact uses the expression very loosely. It is extremely unclear how existentials are to be identified, how they are interrelated, and how they combine into some structural whole.
12 Ironically, he is taking Husserl's concept of a 'founded mode' (see the 'Logical Investigations') and turning it against him.
13 It should be clear by now that what Heidegger means by 'world' is essentially 'lived-world' - the Lebenswelt of Dilthey and latterly Husserl.
14 Heidegger is not envisaging reciprocal relationships. See an article in KP25.
15 Macquarrie and Robinson use the word 'they' to translate Heidegger's 'man' - the impersonal form of the verb. The deficiency of this translation is that 'they' specifically excludes me, while 'man' specifically includes me. Hence I have preferred to translate it as 'one'.
16 A reference to the then newly popular psycho-analysis, amongst other things.
17 Nichtigkeit: Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as 'nullity' (OWA, p50).
18 Cf. Sartre, 'Being and Nothingness', 1, Ch.1; also Husserl, 'Ideas', p109.
19 Note that Heidegger does not specify how this 'rupture' enables us to recognize possibilities.

REVIEWS

Male Fantasies: Capitalism - Sexism - Fascism


NOT: he made the earth subject to him because he could not have his mother (as Freud says), BUT: he returned to his mother because he was not allowed to use the earth productively. (Klaus Theweleit.)

Both parts of a new book on Fascism have been out in West Germany for over a year now and have been the subject of enthusiastic discussion second only to the response given to Rudolf Bahro's work. It is something we should know about in Britain. Klaus Theweleit, the author, belongs to the student movement generation of the late sixties and became known almost overnight when he published his thesis on male fantasies, on the psychology and sexual imagery of fascism. We have been asking those who say they understood all about Fascism (but who did not have the ability to defeat it) too many questions, and asking the Fascists themselves too few', says Theweleit. Unlike many a tome from the German Left, his ideas are guided less by programmatic theory than by pointed aphorisms, of which he has invented many, providing quotable quotes for his reviewers. The lack of theorising is very refreshing. Theweleit's thoughts have an urgency which has made people feel the need to come to terms with them. They have made a personal, and not just an intellectual, impact on those in Germany who, like Theweleit himself, need to understand their own fathers - all the little nazis of their parents' generation. He wants to understand Fascism through the Fascists. Perhaps he makes one common but questionable assumption right from the beginning, namely that they were all men.

The book consists of two volumes. They grew out of an essay on the white terror of anti-republican forces during the revolutionary struggles which took place in Germany between 1918 and 1920, the year of the Kapp Putsch. These were the German equivalent to the Black and Tans, being volunteer brigades formed from the remnants of the Wilheminian army. For the political destiny of the Weimar Republic it was crucial that these men were professional soldiers who were literally unemployed and looking for work, not just revenge, at a time when the Treaty of Versailles restricted the size of the German Army. What Theweleit is interested in is that their social position as professional soldiers was also their psycho-sexual character. They had been bred to live in an archetypally male world. Looking at the psyches of a number of officers from these brigades (the Freikorps) through biographies and novels they wrote themselves or which were written about them, Theweleit traces how completely they were blocked off from the reality of women, how they had to imagine women in one or another stereotype in order to perceive them at all. The figures he takes from the Freikorps include two men who later went entirely different ways: Rudolf Hoss joined the SA after his brigade was disbanded by law and his career ended with him running Auschwitz; at the other extreme, Martin Niemöller abandoned the military life to study theology and spent the years between 1937 and 1945 in concentration camps. Theweleit found clues for these careers in the archetypes of women which appear in their writings. His terms for them have entered the language of the Left in Germany to signify ways if viewing women. On the side of the Whites women appear as nurses, mothers and sisters devoid of sexual identity and personality; on the side of the Reds they are seen as castrating amazons and whores, whose sexual independence is synonymous with the political aggression of the enemy.