Hegel sees ... self-objectification in the form of self-alienation and self-estrangement as ... the final expression of human life which ... has attained its own essential nature.

(Marx 1844)

Introduction

The object of this paper is to reassess the relationship between Marx and Hegel as it is exemplified in Marx's 1844 manuscripts which include a brilliant series of jottings on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In particular I want to investigate the claim, first made by Lukács, that Marx's criticism of Hegel amounts to the charge that Hegel equates alienation with objectification [1]. I endorse this point of view but I explain that the matter is by no means as simple as it might appear. A subsidiary section of this paper will take up another common theme in the literature, namely the claim that the central site of the discussion of objectification, or of alienation, or of both, is Hegel's discussion of 'Lordship and Bondage', and that this discussion profoundly influenced Marx in his theory of alienation [2]. This latter claim I will argue is entirely groundless; the famous Master-Slave dialectic is of no importance to Marx, either in his praise of Hegel (which is considerable) or his criticism (which is damning).

Before we can assess the significance of these claims it is necessary to remind ourselves of how the various categories are introduced in the texts in question. I will first summarize the central section of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts - that on 'estranged labour'. After a recapitulation (very schematic) of Hegel's Phenomenology, I will then turn to the last section of the Manuscripts, in which Marx makes his assessment of Hegel's dialectic on the basis of it, and try to explain what I take to be Marx's meaning.

Along the way it will be necessary to give the results of certain philological investigations I was forced to take up.

Marx's Theory of Alienation

'Objectification' (Vergegenständlichung) is an important category for Marx because in and through its objectification in the world humanity comes to be what it essentially is. This process is, of course, for Marx, primarily a question of labour, of material production, and its result is a product. 'The product of labour' says Marx, 'is the objectification of labour.' [3] Through this process the labourer realizes his potential as a producer; but it is important to stress here (because we will have to come back to it when we make a comparison with Hegel) that this is possible because there exists external material with which to work. Marx says: 'the worker can create nothing without nature, with-
out the *sensuous external world.* [4] It is the material in which his labour realises itself and, in the absence of any distortion of the relationship, this modern wage-labourer is this mediation in which the unity of man with nature is established. 'It is therefore in his fashioning of the objective world that man really proves himself' says Marx. 'Through it nature appears as his work and his reality ... and he can therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself created.' [5]

However, this happy result is hardly the lot of this modern wage-labourer in the conditions dealt with by political economy - that is to say where labour is separated (through 'second order mediations' [6]) from its objective conditions of realisation (the material and the instruments of production) - the objectification of labour is accomplished through its alienation, and the outcome is the estrangement of the worker from his product, his work, and his world, that is, from the material basis of his existence and life-activity [7].

The wage-labourer is related to his labour-power as to an external object. He is forced to alienate it to the capitalist simply to maintain himself as a labourer. Hence the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working he does not feel himself; it is as if he were not working, and not at home when he is working. His labour is therefore not voluntary but forced, it is *forced labour*. In it he belongs not to himself but to another. [8]

Since, for Marx, human labour is the central determinant of human being (for 'as individuals express their life, so they are' [9]), the subjection of labour to the dictates of capital (an alien power labour itself sustains) adds up to nothing less than *self-estrangement*.

Overcoming estrangement through communism means the reappropriation of the ontological essence of humanity [10] which has constituted itself, through the mediation of private property, objectively as an external alien power. Marx stresses that this estrangement is, nevertheless, a *historically necessary stage* [11].

### Terminological Problems

It is necessary to say something about the terminology Marx employs when he speaks of alienation - for there are two words which are commonly rendered in translations by 'alienation': 'Entfremdung' (which is equivalent to the English 'estrangement' and is rendered as such in the two Marx translations to which references are given in this paper) and 'Entwusserung' (sometimes translated, by those who prefer 'alienation' for 'Entfremdung', as 'externalisation' - this last being understood as distinct from 'objectification' presumably).

In Lukács's masterly work *The Young Hegel*, the crucial last chapter is entitled "*Entwusserung* as the central philosophical concept of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*" [12]. Livingstone's English translation prefers 'externalization' for this term in spite of the fact that lukacs writes:

In themselves there is nothing novel about the terms 'Entwusserung' and 'Entfremdung'. They are simply German terms in the English word 'alienation'. This was used in works of economic theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer to the loss of an aboriginal freedom, the handing-over or alienation of freedom to the society which came into being as a result of a social contract. Philosophically, the term 'Entwusserung' was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Fichte for whom it meant both that the positing of an object implied an externalization or alienation of the subject and that the object was to be thought of as an 'externalized' act of reason. [13]

The important thing, as we shall see, is that Marx distinguishes objectification (Vergegenständlichung) from alienation (Entwusserung). The difference, broadly, is that, while 'Entwusserung' carries the sense of 'posed as objective', it also connotes relinquishment, such that an alienated objectivity is created from which the subject is estranged. (For further philological information, and a comparison of translations, see Note 14.)

### Hegel's 'Phenomenology'

Let us turn now to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The Phenomenology attempts to by-pass the dilemma of epistemology [15] by situating all the forms of consciousness, within which claims to knowledge are made, in a logical progression. Validity appears in this context, not as conformity to an external criterion, but as immanent in the phenomena of knowledge itself. In the Phenomenology the crucial problem is that of *objectivity*. However, this is a problem primarily because of the way Hegel construes the relationship of knowledge to its object; more particularly the problem is: how can consciousness claim to know its object when the latter is posited as other than it? As the phenomenological dialectic proceeds the solution emerges: consciousness becomes more and more aware that it is its own activity that constitutes the object as an object of knowledge. The very distinction between knowledge and its object is drawn from the point of view of consciousness and is hence to be construed as a distinction falling within consciousness itself [16]. So, if Hegel begins with a situation in which the knowing self takes it that what stands over against it is objectivity, he overcomes this opposition through showing that every higher shape of consciousness posits the form of knowledge, and the object as it is now known, as more adequate to each other. The upshot is Absolute Knowing - in which Knowing knows that what appears to it as its object is only itself.

Since the activity of consciousness itself in knowing becomes more and more prominent in the development, it is clear that *self-consciousness* becomes centrally involved in it. If the self is to make itself an object of consciousness, it can only do so (i.e. become known to itself as what it really is) through its own activity, its self-realization. Hence Hegel's discussion imperceptibly slides into terrain unknown to epistemology. The progress of critical reflection upon the adequacy of knowledge to its object becomes a progress in the history of *Geist* (spirit or mind). *Geist* learns what is truly is and its relationship to the world of objectivity, at the same time, and in exact proportion, as it becomes what it truly is through manifesting itself in objective form (in morality, in bourgeois life, in the state, in religion), and in so doing it eventually ends its estrangement from its world through identifying itself in it. The relationship of this history of 'true history' is an extremely difficult and controversial topic in Hegelian scholarship; nevertheless, it is clear from the wealth of obvious allusions that Hegel wishes us to bear this connection in mind. The last chapter, on Absolute Knowing, contains a compressed history of modern philosophy, for example.

In this way Hegel equates his own philosophy with fully-developed 'Absolute Knowledge' - knowledge as science. This knowledge comprehends that 'object-
Marx as remain of objective realities and to deny their independence... die Er-Innerung hat sie... the reconciliation philosophy affords whereby spirit... must return to our philological apparatus again, because the second time this term occurs in the final paragraph of the Phenomenology... characterizes as a recollection... to estrangement involves both the annulment and the preservation of alienation. Of great service to Hegel in this is his dialectical category of 'Aufhebung' (sublation). In his logic Hegel tells us that the sublated is the mediated - but in fact it is more specific than that. He points out that in ordinary language 'aufheben' means both to abolish, and to preserve, and that he intends to take advantage of this double meaning... [24]. In his criticism of Hegel, Marx comments on the 'peculiar role' [25] played by 'the act of sublating' throughout Hegel's system. Let us now turn to Marx.

**Marx's Assessment of Hegel**

Let us begin with Marx's praise of Hegel. It is rather complex:

The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle... is that Hegel perceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification [Vergegenständlichung] as loss of object [Entgegenständlichung], as alienation [Entwasserung] and as sublation [Aufhebung] of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives of objective man... as the result of his own labour... which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement...[26]

Let us consider first of all the principle of negativity. Marx is impressed by the dialectic of spirit's actualization of itself through positing itself in the form of objectivity as the negative of itself and then negating this negativity. Marx sees in this the hypostatization of the abstract reflection in philosophy of man's objectification through his own labour, which process, Marx concurs with Hegel, must pass through a phase of alienation. With regard to this last point, one should note particularly that he praises Hegel for grasping objectification as alienation. Since it is indeed the historical experience of mankind that that which is communicated in Hegel's greatness consists precisely in his granting it full recognition instead of ignoring it, and Marx gener-
ously credits Hegel with working out the elements of criticism of entire spheres, such as religion, the state, civil society, and so forth - even if in a mystified form [27].

One aspect of the mystified form of Hegel's presentation is the idealist character of his dialectic of negativity. In presenting this as the generating principle Hegel has discovered only the abstract speculative expression of the movement of history [28]. Marx says:

The inexhaustible, vital, sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectionalification is therefore reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an abstraction which is then given permanent form as such and conceived as activity itself. Since this so-called negativity is nothing more than the abstract empty form of that real living act, its content can only be created by abstraction from all content.

[29]

Since absolute negativity is the essential character of the activity of absolute spirit, Hegel's critical apparatus is quite unable to cope with the specific historical origins of capitalist alienation. In effect, he endorses the moment of estrangement as an ontological necessity, instead of grasping the negation of itself that labour brings forth for specific material reasons in the history of mankind's emergence [30] as subject to a radical abolition through a second negation (itself the outcome of particular historical conditions) [31]. Hegel has no solution to offer other than that pseudo-movement which preserves the realm of estrangement as a moment. As he puts it, spirit is 'at home in its otherness as such'. Simultaneously, spirit overcomes its estrangement from its world through knowing it as its own work, while preserving that world of estrangement in the immediacy of its otherness. Marx is pretty bitter about this neat trick:

So reason is at home in unreason as reason. Man who has understood that in law, politics, etc., he leads an alienated life, leads his true human life in this alienated life as such.... Therefore there can no longer be any question about a compromise on Hegel's part with religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle.

[32]

This false principle arises because, when Hegel presents the whole development as the 'labour' of spirit, he does not, of course, have in mind material labour (as might be thought by taking too literally Marx's praise quoted at the beginning of this section); he knows, Marx points out, only 'abstract mental labour' [33], that is - the philosophical reflection of real labour and real alienation.

Despite the wealth of content in the Phenomenology everything is treated under the form of consciousness or self-consciousness. This makes a big difference. It is entirely to be expected that a ... being ... endowed with objective, i.e. material, essential powers should of its essence have real natural objects, and that its self-alienation should lead to the position of a real objective world, but under the form of externality [Auserlichkeit], an overwhelming world not belonging to its essential being.

Marx goes on:

But it is equally clear that a self-consciousness, through its alienation, can posit only thingness [Dingheit], i.e. an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction, and not a real thing. [34] A natural being endowed with material powers works upon real objects and in its alienation produces in this process a real world of estrangement. But a self-consciousness, through its alienation, establishes 'thingness', an abstraction, a mere postulate of self-consciousness. It is clear that 'thingness' has no independent being and as a postulate of consciousness is at the mercy of a retraction by the self-consciousness that postulated it. Hence a change in attitude abolishes the consciousness of estrangement because estrangement itself is understood only as an attitude taken up by self-consciousness. This 'recollection', as Hegel calls it, leaves things as they are [35].

When ... Hegel conceives wealth, the power of the state, etc., as entities estranged from the being of man, he conceives them only in their thought, that is to say, as entities estranged by a change in attitude is, for Marx, the root of Hegel's 'merely apparent criticism' [37].

In the Phenomenology, therefore, despite the thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the fact that its criticism is genuine and often well ahead of its time, the uncritical positivism and equally uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works, the philosophical dissolution and restoration of the empirical world, is already to be found in latent form.... [38]

In Hegel's later works, like The Philosophy of Right, after he dismisses historical positivism with the injunction that everything must account for itself in the court of reason, his critical idealism restores everything to its original place, reconciles him to reality. This is 'the reconciliation which philosophy affords ...' he advertizes [39].

We have seen that Marx is prepared to give credit to Hegel for giving philosophical expression in his formula 'negation of the negation' to the historical movement of human labour in its self-alienation; but it is equally important to see the difference that Hegel's idealist problematic imposes with respect to the overcoming of estrangement. In Marx's 1844 manuscripts communism is presented as the negation of the negation but as such is burdened with its opposite, private property; socialism positively grounded on itself succeeds the communist revolution historically such that private property ceases to have any continuing effectivity [40]. Revolutionary practice reconstitutes reality by an objective reappropriation of the estranged object, thereby producing a new objectivity free of estrangement from its producers.
In Hegel the world of estrangement is posited as overcome, not through historical practice but through a philosophical reinterpretation of this world which can only result as the sublation of its otherness through the recognition of this otherness in spirit's own other, and its 

\[ \text{reconciliation} \] with private property, the state, religion, etc. Hegel uses his dialectical concepts of sublation and negation of the negation to have his cake and eat it.

**The Question of Objectivity**

What now becomes of objectivity? For Marx objectivity as such is unproblematical; it is only an objectivity established through reification, or pervaded by alienation, that requires supersession. As far as Hegel is concerned, Marx argues that Hegel interprets the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge to be that the object is comprehended only as an objectified self-consciousness, that it is therefore a matter for Hegel of sublating objectivity itself insofar as the relationship to objectivity on the part of a self-consciousness can only be to view it as an other than itself; thus, if spirit requires the sublation of a relationship of estrangement between self-consciousness and the objectivity posited as its other, in effect it requires the sublation of objectivity as such.

Marx then takes up the Feuerbachian theme that objectivity is an essential framework for the existence and activity of a natural being and, however much Hegel might go on about self-consciousness, man is a natural being, that is to say, an objective being.

An objective being acts objectively and it would not act objectively if objectivity were not an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by objects, because it is fundamentally nature. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being ... or that he can only express his life in real sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous and to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, nature and sense for a third person is one and the same thing.

[41]

Marx brings home his polemic against Hegel by arguing, in the light of this, that without objective relationships to objects outside itself a being has no objective existence; hence to construe the surmounting of estrangement as the sublation of objectivity implies the lack of objective being of consciousness itself, and a 'non-objective being is a non-being' [43].

It is clear that Marx takes objectivity to have reference to the realm of nature and he equates objectification with material labour. It follows for him that Hegel's idealism must therefore reduce objectivity to the abstraction 'thingness', the mere negative of consciousness posited as such within consciousness itself and therefore easily put in its place by a second negation occurring purely within consciousness. He argues that it follows that spirit is an equally non-objective being, and to become objective to itself it must become something other than spirit, i.e. through a movement of externalization self-alienation ensues, sublated by an inwardizing movement of self-consciousness through which spirit finds itself 'at home in its other-being as such', while preserving the objective forms of estrangement intact.

However, the matter is by no means so simple if objectivity and objectification are not taken in a materialist way. Just now, we quoted Marx on the proof of the objective being of man lying in his objective relationships. Hegel is capable of saying the same thing. He says: 'Existence as determinant being is in essence being for another' [44]. Furthermore, without thinking it necessary to give particular notice, Hegel introduces at the beginning of the section on self-consciousness, the assumption that two consciousnesses exist, for it is part of his argument that achievement of self-consciousness necessarily requires recognition by another self-consciousness.

Abstractly one might imagine that the universe consisted of a realm of spirits standing in objective relationships to one another such that, for example, it makes sense for Bishop Berkeley to posit that it is God who puts ideas into his mind (not his head of course).

As far as I can see, Hegel rejects this sort of notion of a world of finite spirits only, for two deep-seated methodological reasons (which are difficult to maintain at once). For one thing he rejects subjective idealism. He recognizes that a philosophical enterprise which is worth anything must do full justice to the world of objectivity as we know it, i.e. as nature, social structure, historical life, etc.; for the level is quite materialistically. Secondly he believes that philosophy must be an absolute science. All finite spirits and spiritual forms of life must be brought back to the infinite. Thus all determinate being must be grasped ultimately as the work of self-positing absolute spirit. Thus the human agents of spiritual progress in history are subsumed into Weltgeist as its representatives. It is a universal reason and purpose that is at work.

As I shall argue in a moment, Hegel recognizes that absolute spirit must become objective to itself if it is to actualize its idea. It is because there can be nothing outside such an absolute that there is a problem about this. Spirit requires another in which to find its being reflected, while at the same time requiring that there be nothing that is not it. Hence the ambivalence, in this absolute science, towards objectivity and objective relationships. (Incidentally, with respect to the dialectic of negativity, one can see here how the difference in content must make a difference to the general form of working of the dialectic when we stand it on its feet through grounding it materialistically. It is the irreducible distinction between man and the objective basis of his activity, however intermediated through labour and industry, that allows us to grasp the dialectic of human practice as historical and opened-ended. In Hegel, the unity of opposites collapses to an identity, pure self-distinction, as we have seen; this allows the negation of the negation to effect a closure and reduces historical time to an organon of absolute teleology.)

**Objectification and Alienation in Hegel**

We are now in a better position to assess the merits of Lukács's claim that Hegel equates alienation/estrangement and objectification, and that this is the burden of Marx's criticism [45]. The best statement of Marx's position I have found in the text is the following:

Hegel sees ... self-objectification [Selbsterkenntnis] in the form of self-alienation and self-estrangement [Selbseingegenstandscha] as the absolute, and hence final, expression of human life [menschliche Lebensausgestaltung] which ... has attained its own essential nature. [46]
(Marx recognizes, it should be noted, that self-estrangement, for Hegel, is not a fate to be avoided, or simply negated, but that it is necessary if human life is to attain its adequate expression.)

Accepting that Marx's commentary on Hegel's Phenomenology revolves around these concepts and their relationship, and we wish to assess its merit, we find ourselves with a problem: in not one line of one page of all the 765 pages of the Phenomenology does Hegel use the term 'objectification' [47]. It seems then that in providing an exegesis of the dictum 'Hegel equates alienation and objectification', the textual controls are indeterminate, to say the least. As should be abundantly obvious by now Marx does not objectify except as resulting in estrangement; hence the replacement of the category 'objectification' with estrangement as arising exclusively from objectification in general and not a particular historically conditioned mode of objectification. Consequently, instead of real historical solutions we can be provided with a displacement of the problem into general philosophical reflection issuing in a solution possibly nonexistent within philosophy.

This is perhaps a good place to recall that Hegel identifies with estrangement as arising exclusively from objectification in general and not a particular historically conditioned mode of objectification. Consequently, instead of real historical solutions we can be provided with a displacement of the problem into general philosophical reflection issuing in a solution possibly nonexistent within philosophy. This is perhaps a good place to recall that Hegel identifies with estrangement as arising exclusively from objectification in general and not a particular historically conditioned mode of objectification. Consequently, instead of real historical solutions we can be provided with a displacement of the problem into general philosophical reflection issuing in a solution possibly nonexistent within philosophy.

As should be abundantly obvious by now Marx does not mean to say that Hegel is opposed to objectification on the grounds that it leads to estrangement. Hegel certainly thinks that it does lead to estrangement; but this does not mean that he thinks spirit should rest content in itself and avoid the misfortune of estrangement from itself in its objectification, because he sees it as necessary to spirit's actualization of itself. One must understand the Phenomenology not merely as spirit's struggle to negate an alien objectivity, but also as the story of its gaining an objective existence - a story understood as such by spirit itself only in recollection when it achieves absolute knowledge - but a story whose meaning is understood by Hegel and ourselves (who 'look on') [51] this development precisely from that standpoint) from the outset.

The objective shapes given in consciousness as it moves towards self-consciousness and absolute knowing are to be understood as shapes of the existence of spirit itself and hence its positive achievement. This explains why Hegel says that alienation has a positive meaning for self-consciousness insofar as it posits itself as objective, and becomes being-for-itself. This explains also that, whether one looks at the Phenomenology or the Encyclopedia, one finds that Objective Spirit always occupies a higher place than Subjective Spirit. In both these systematic works the creation of a wealth of spiritual forms, e.g. the state, religion, etc., is seen as a positive achievement of spirit as well as entanglement.
The Alienation of Labour

The Alienation of Labour

Hegel sublates estrangement by declaring it nothing other than spirit's interior direment; it is necessary that this moment of estrangement be preserved as such because spirit does not inhabit an objective world, thus to become objective it must posit itself as such on its own account - which can be done only in and through its self-alienation. In order to know itself as what it is, spirit must express itself in a medium other than itself - hence it must posit itself in the form of otherness. This negation of itself is subsequently negated in its turn, when spirit recognizes itself in these objective shapes, but this cycle of negations is eternally necessary. Spirit can come to itself only as the negation of the negation. The Marxian can say correctly that Hegel sees self-objectification in the form of self-alienation as the final outcome. In this way, so far from being nullified, estrangement is absolutized, while at the same time no genuine objectification is achieved. In a famous passage in the 'Preface' Hegel says that everything turns on grasping 'Substance as Subject' [52] and he speaks of 'the life of God and divine cognition' as 'a disporting of love with itself' [53]. Spirit mediates itself with itself. In the movement of the Phenomenology we see spirit playing with itself, so to speak, not human objective natural intercourse with the rest of nature [54].

But one must stress once again that this idea is inadequate if it suggests that Hegel thinks spirit can retreat into the freedom of subjectivity 'for which otherness and estrangement, and the overcoming of estrangement, are not serious matters'; 'if it lacks', as he puts it, 'the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, the labour of the negative' [55]. Let us now turn to a group of misconceptions of Hegel, and of Marx's relationship to Hegel, associated with that particular section of the Phenomenology known as the Master-Slave.

The Master-Slave Dialectic

We have pointed out that Hegel does not actually use the term 'objectification'; and we have seen that for Marx it is identified fundamentally with material labour. Some people, therefore, look in the Phenomenology for a discussion of material labour which they want to use in connection with self-objectification, encouraged to do so insofar as Marx acknowledges that the great thing in the Phenomenology is that Hegel grasps man as the result of his own labour.

Often it is asserted in the secondary literature [56] that Marx was influenced in this judgement above all by the section of the Phenomenology on 'Lordship and Bondage' ('Herrschaft und Dienstaufgabe') - where there is indeed a discussion of the importance of material labour. Furthermore, the fact that this labour is in the service of another, and that this relationship is seen by Hegel as at the origin of social life, leads some commentators to make the more extravagant claim that in his theory of alienation Marx draws on this same section. Herbert Marcuse, for example, says:

In 1844, Marx sharpened the basic concepts of his own theory through a critical analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. He described the 'alienation' of labour in the terms of Hegel's discussion of master and servant. [57]

The only difficulty with these presuppositions of the secondary literature is that Marx never refers to this section of the Phenomenology - never mind giving it any importance! - when, in his 1844 manuscripts, he embarks on a 'critique of Hegel's dialectics'. He discusses the Phenomenology as a whole and draws attention more especially to its last chapter; he singles out three other sections for special praise; but not one of them is that on the master-servant dialectic [58].

Furthermore, after the above-mentioned praise of Hegel, Marx qualifies it by complaining that the only labour Hegel knew and recognized was abatiment labour' [59]. This remark seems to show that Marx has forgotten all about the servant's labour - which is material enough (although, as I hope to show, Hegel's interest in it is not!).

It is my view that the master-servant section is unimportant to Marx; but because such a fuss has been made of it I will provide an exegesis of it in the course of explaining why it is a misunderstanding to think either that it influenced Marx, or that it is the reason for his praise of Hegel, or that it is relevant to the charge he lays against him of equating alienation and objectification. This section occurs early in the Phenomenology at the point where consciousness is to turn into self-consciousness. Hegel believes that the self can become conscious of itself only in and through the mediation of another self-consciousness. For reasons which need not detain us here the first stable social relationship that emerges in Hegel's dialectical development of this topic is that of Lordship and Bondage. The master is acknowledged as such by his servant, and he achieves immediate satisfaction of his desires through goods and services provided by the servant's labour. The dialectic moves forward precisely through the servant, however, because 'through work ... the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is'. Work forms and shapes the thing; and through this formative activity the consciousness of the servant now, in the work outside it, acquires 'an element of permanence'; for it comes to see in the independent being of the object 'its own independence' [60]. The shape does not become something other than himself through being made external to him', says Hegel, 'for it is precisely this shape that is his pure being-for-self.' He concludes: 'through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realises that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to live only the life of a stranger [Fremder Sinn] that he acquires a sense of himself [eigener Sinn]' [61]. I shall examine some misconceptions related to these passages.

(a) Does Marx, as Marcuse claims, follow in his theory of alienation the terms of this master-servant relationship? These terms are superficially comparable in that both Hegel and Marx see work not merely in its utilitarian aspect but as a vehicle of self-realization; thus they see the servant rather than the master as the active force in the determination of existence. Both Hegel and Marx see that service to the master constitutes immediately an alien relation between the worker and his product, appropriated as it is by the lord of labour. Fundamental differences between Marx and Hegel become obvious when we notice that, whereas Marx holds that only a change in the mode of production recovers for the worker his sense of self and its fulfilment, Hegel thinks, not only
that the educative effect of work, even within an exploitative relation of production, is sufficient for the worker to manifest to himself his own 'meaning' in his production, but also that fear and service are necessary to the worker, that is to say, of the servant's becoming objective to himself [62]. Hegel's argument for this is rather strained, as we shall see, but I stress that this is a long way from Marx's critical perspective, even though Marx believes that for historical reasons objectification builds up initially a realm of estrangement [63]. Hegel could hardly be the source of Marx's criticism of the existing labour process, albeit that his dialectic too moves forward through the side of the worker. It is rather the case that Marx's empirical observations, his critique of political economy, and his socialist perspective, allow him to criticise Hegel's version of history [64].

Even more telling against Marcuse's interpretation is Marx's complaint that Hegel sees only the positive and not the negative side of labour in the existing conditions:

Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern political economy.... He sees only the positive and not the negative side of labour. Labour is man's coming to be for himself within alienation or as alienated man. [65]

That is to say, Hegel, in common with modern political economy, grasps labour as the essence of human development but neither of them sees how the specific form of labour in capitalist society is the negation of humanity, because, if one operates within the framework of an inability to transcend these conditions through a genuine historical negation of the negation, they become the horizon which blocks off the possibility of a critical standpoint. In fact, these conditions which twist and distort the objectification of man in and through labour, are endorsed as the necessary groundwork within which the coming to be of man for himself must occur. The world of estrangement is presented as labour's absolute self-expression.

(b) It is obvious from what is said in the 'Lordship and Bondage' section that immediately material labour is not, as such, a problem for Hegel, and this therefore refutes the vulgar assumption that it is because it is so that objectification i.e. material labour, involves (just because it is material) estrangement for him. For example Ernest Mandel says baldly that Hegel defines labour as alienating because labour is, by its nature, the externalizing (Verwussemung) of a human capacity, which means that man loses something that previously belonged to him.... [66].

In the 'Lordship and Bondage' section we see that Hegel views labour as a means whereby the servant recognizes himself in his work. It has for him this affirmative significance which makes it one step (although an early and subordinate one) in Geist's overcoming its estrangement from the world of objectivity. We have seen that even alienation has an affirmative character for Hegel (just because it is the only way in which he can conceive Geist's objectification as occurring), as Marx points out. It is true that in this section Hegel presents objectification through labour in the context of class oppression and subordination (in Geist's standing of an alternative mode of production, but this does not stop him (though perhaps it should have) from seeing labouring, even in the service of another, as affirming for the self of the labourer and as a gain rather than a loss of human capacity. (c) One can also see why it is tempting to look to this section for the reason Marx praises Hegel for having grasped man as the result of his own labour. Nevertheless, I deny that Marx meant literally that Hegel thought man the outcome of material labour, such as that of the servant, as Mandel, for instance, imagines. Mandel says baldly: 'Marx found it all the easier to reduce society and man to labour because Hegel had already denied labour as the essential core of human praxis' [67].

Let us look again at the 'Lordship and Bondage' dialectic. Hegel defines work as 'desire held in check' [68], that is to say, it involves putting a distance between the immediate impulses of self-will and formative activity grounded in objective perspective. If you like, it is really the master who is a slave because he sees objectification as occurring, i.e. the 'unaided feeling of self-satisfaction', that is to say, he is a slave to his appetites, but his satisfactions are 'only fleeting', lacking the permanence of objectivity [69]. The servant, on the other hand, in the work he creates, achieves mastery of his craft; it is he who rises to the level of universal human reason [70].

However, Hegel introduces the notion that 'fear and service' are necessary to induce the check to desire and to ensure that consciousness rises above self-centred goals to the freedom that comes from a consciousness of the 'universal power' of human creative activity [71]. Quite arbitrarily, apparently, Hegel assumes everyone must undergo breaking of self-will through alienation of the universal power before being capable of rational freedom [72]. So in Hegel, material labour appears only in the context of alienation and not as self-determined human fulfilment.

As he admits:

Servile obedience forms only the beginning of freedom, because that to which the natural individuality of self-consciousness subjects itself is not the truly universal rational will which is in and for itself, but the single, contingent will of another person. [73]

The reason why 'service' can be posited as necessary rather than as an obstacle becomes clear when we realize that Hegel is not primarily interested in the material realization of human powers effected in, for example, material labour. The advance achieved through the labour of servitude is supposed to be an advance in self-consciousness. This does not have much in common with Marx's interest in the realization of a material being in forming the material world, but it is of a piece with the project of Phenomenology as a whole. It is a spiritual odyssey, but it is quite clear that Hegel places such a high moment of material labour as is the case with overly 'Marxist' readings (Marcuse, Kojève). So far from being the crucial breakthrough in the realization of self-consciousness this moment of material labour is presented at an early stage in the development; it is a less 'concrete' moment for Hegel than later cultural achievements such as the state, art, religion and philosophy. This point follows naturally from the fact that Hegel's subject of activity is not a material objective being but Geist confronting various shapes that its consciousness takes on.

In this general framework the labour of servitude is a recuperating moment but because of Hegel's idealism labour cannot be given its Marxian value (and hence the alienation of the product is not a problem, only the subordination of the will to consciousness is a problem). Its value lies only in making self-consciousness objective to itself and for this the occurrence of labour under conditions of alienation is acceptable and even necessary. Thus in my view this is not a place where Hegel gives Marx a hint. Rather it is thoroughly obscurantist and just as much in need of a materialist transformation as the whole of the Phenomenology.

It is indeed my view that it was the whole of the
Phenomenology that influenced Marx, both positively and negatively. When Marx says Hegel grasps labour as the essence, he is not talking about what Hegel actually said, but about a derivative reading (albeit with the help of the work of Max Lahnmann) that is a fairly literal one. Moreover, the erasure of the content of 'Lordship and Bondage', as it is 'recollected' in the last chapter, in spite of the fact that Hegel shows a good deal more insight into the nature of material labour than any of his contemporaries it is not of particular significance to us, as it is better for Marx; rather spirit's activity is a generalized, and idealized, activity, most properly characterized as the abstract movement of logical forms, notwithstanding Hegel's insistence that the absolute comprehends, besides Logos, Nature and History as well.

Conclusion

Let us now sum up our results. Hegel's greatness as a philosopher is that he is sensitive to the complexities of the system of alienation in which we live, and, albeit in a mystified way, he understood it must be the result of the manner in which human self-objectification has been actualized. His misfortune is that he was unable to see the possibility of a historical reappropriation by man of his alienated powers. Instead the historically conditioned problem is interpreted by him as a general ontological problem of existence. Hence to posit the possibility of a solution, the fatal option for idealism was taken up, whereby the world of real objective estrangement was grasped only from the point of view of the consciousness of it as other than consciousness, i.e. objectivity, and hence a solution could be posited at that level insofar as reason could penetrate objectivity. In this way the positive achievement of history hidden within estrangement is equated with that estrangement itself. Objectification and alienation are one.

Hegel appears as a radical critic of all objectifying charges with being estrangement, but he avoids accepting uncritically both the genuine and refloated objectivities insofar as their character as objective is granted the necessity of a moment in spirit's self-positioning movement through its other, its estranged self. Insofar as Hegel accepts the necessity for the process of objectification he becomes uncritical of the sphere of estrangement brought to life within that development. In a way, it is precisely Hegel's inability to see historically alienated material labour as the root of all alienation that leads him to understand objectification as such as the problem requiring sublation, and ultimately to pass over the real estrangement of material labour.

The labour of servitude is a moment in overcoming the estrangement inherent in consciousness's opposition to objectivity, but because it is precisely objectivity that is perceived as a problem the importance of this moment of material labour is not that of Marxian objectification through productive work but as stimulating an advance in self-consciousness leading ultimately to the sublation of objectivity itself in Absolute Knowledge.

Hegel's radical critique of objectification and alienation are conceptually distinct, and are so distinguished brilliantly by Marx, Hegel cannot grasp this possibility, for it depends upon an historical potential beyond the limits of his bourgeois standpoint. Thus he collapses them together such that the necessity of spirit's odyssey of self-objectification becomes at the same time its self-estrangement, and sociological critique of society discerns only an impasse of the same kind as the point to the content hidden behind the forms of estrangement and pass off this insight as their sublation; but, as Marx mercilessly demonstrates, this still leaves real objective estrangement intact.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements to Phil Slater for showing me stimulating unpublished papers by him. Thanks, for useful comments on earlier drafts, to G. Savran, W. Eldred, R. Edgley; thanks also, for discussions to terminology, to T.B. Bottomore, I. Mészáros, and J. McCarey.

Reference to Marx's 1844 manuscripts are given in every case to the English translation in Early Writings (Penguin 1971), trans. and ed. by R. Livingstone, Phil. Bent. For comparison, and especially where we vary from 'EW', references may also be given to Marx, J.R. Schmitt, trans. from the 1844 Prose Manuscripts, vol. 1, (London, 1968); and to Marx-Engels Collected Works Volume 3 ('CWM') (London & Wishart, 1975).

1 It is stated baldly by Benton in the Glossary to his translation of Marx's Early Writings, p.517. For a look at Young Hegel (1858) English translation by R. Livingstone (London, 1975), p.551.

2 R. Marcus may have been the first to say this. See, for example, his Reason and Revolution (1964, 1954, 1944 edition), p.115, from which we quote later.

3 EW, p.324.

4 EW, p.326.

5 See also Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, p.521. It is a unity in struggle of course: see Marx's discussion in the German Ideology Part 1.


7 EW, pp.326 and 327.

8 Henry, p.514; EW, p.326; CWS, p.276.


10 EW, p.346.

11 EW, p.366.

12 It is hard for us now to realize how original Lukács was in raising the question - albeit with the benefit of Marx's 1844 Manuscript in front of his - as long ago as 1938. Walter Kaufmann points out that 'Hermann Goring' did not like 'Entfremdung' and 'Entwesung' in his four-volume Hegel-Leckim (1935-39), and Johannes Hoffmeister did not include them either in the index of his scholarly edition of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1962) or his ... 'Hermann Goring's Philosophische Voraussetzungen' (2nd edition, 1956).


15 As a matter of fact 'Entwesung' is a rather unusual German word. An illustration of this is that 'Entwesung' and 'Entfremdung' in his four-volume Hegel-Leckim (1935-39), and Johannes Hoffmeister did not include them either in the index of his scholarly edition of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1962) or his ... 'Hermann Goring's Philosophische Voraussetzungen' (2nd edition, 1956).

16 It seems to us that 'Entwesung' is more direct than 'Entfremdung' and in this sense is the more adequate word. In the section 'Externalization' Cassell's prefers a different - more usual - term, namely 'Enttussung'. For this reason it is not the purpose of this essay to determine a general principle; (2) expressing a given state of affairs; and (3) designating a process which leads to that state. When the accent is on estrangement the term 'Entwesung' (or terms like 'Vergegenstl!ndung'), whereas 'Entfrem­

17 'Entwesung' is used in a somewhat different sense. It is not a word that is being imposed by a hostile power of his own making, so that he defeats his own purpose. (p.313)

18 Here Mészáros not only equates 'externalization' and 'objectification' but 'Entwesung' and 'Vergegenstl!ndung' (contrary to his Lukácsian inter-
pretation of Marx) as if 'Entseherrung' were not used as a critical concept like 'Entfremdung', whereas, generally, as noted above, Mestrovic renders 'Entseherrung' as 'alienation'. I have taken up hereother the problem of these terms in Marx, and noted that the ambiguity of 'Entseherrung' should lead us to distinguish the moments: externalization, alienation, and estrangement. (See section 13, p.380.) 'Estrangement' and the dialectic of Labour and Property - Locke, Hegel, Marx'). A Table of translations is provided below. Here we will try to make translations uniform by rendering 'Entfremdung' as 'estrangement' and 'Entseherrung' as 'alienation' - but with reference to the latter the above discussion should be made in reverse (see p. 586). In Hegel's Phenomenology.

Translations

Entfremdung = Estrangement
Entseherrung = Alienation (or externalization)


Entfremdung = Estrangement
Entseherrung = Alienation

McLellan (N. A. (Hegels Early Years, Oxford, 1971)

Ged/Phenomenology = Alienation
Entfremdung = Externalization

Benton (N. A. (Hegels Early Years, Harmondsworth, Middx., 1974)

Entfremdung = Estrangement
Entseherrung = Alienation (or externalization)

Phenomenology, Introduction, para. 85. The text itself can actually be divided according to the point of view in question - see the Appendix to Introduction to the Reading of Hegel by A. Kojève (English translation, New York, 1969).

Phenomenology, para. 17.

Phenomenology, para. 19.

Note: the Igler version complains of German Ideology: 'Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as onanism and cow love.' (Marx-Engels Werke, pp.508, 515, 546.) As far as Hegel's account of Nature is concerned, Marx is trenchant on the translation from the Logic to the Phenomenology of Nature (as obscure as the introduction of 'matter' at the end of the Phenomenology).

The absolute idea - 'immanent to the moment of its ... other-thing, the conscious', the concept in which the terms of the above text is very variable and often refers to a bracketed alternative, e.g. 'relinquishes (externalizes)'.

14 An excellent exposition of this way of situating the Phenomenology is in Chapter 1 of Hegel's Phenomenology - A Philosophical Introduction (London, 1980) by Richard H. Vernon.


16 On this term see note 24.

17 On this term see note 24.


19 MMT, p.433; Phenomenology, para.808. See note (14) on terminology.

20 Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, pp.382. In a widely used edition of the 1844 manuscripts, the editor D. F. Norton says (para.195): 'It is clear why Mandel cites ... remarks are made in Hegel's Phenomenology ' ... etc.etc.'.

21 The slave through his active participation in the process of production ... has been able to transform himself into a human being. One understands why Marx wrote: 'The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the dialectics of negativity as the moving and producing principle - is once and for all that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process - that is, keeps the essence of work and comprehends ... man as the product of his own work.'

Richard Norman (On Hegel's Phenomenology) follows his discussion of the 'Master and Slave' 'turning point in the Phenomenon with the comment (p.55) Self-consciousness requires that he actively produces himself ... man as the product of his own work.'

Hegel: 'Entwurfs-ung'.

22 He grasps the essence of his own work. 'The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the dialectics of negativity as the moving and producing principle - is once and for all that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process ... that is, keeps the essence of work and comprehends ... man as the product of his own work.'

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Hegel: 'Entwurfs-ung'.

23 None of Hegel's manuscripts contains the word 'alienation'. It is possible that Marx uses 'cancel' himself.


25 See the footnote to 'Entfremdung'.

26 'Entfremdung' is 'sublate', which was 'taken over from' by Hegel (passively)

27 'Entfremdung' is Hegel's interest, rather than the phenomenological result. If estrangement were a bi-polar notion, for self-estrangement to occur there must be a prior parting with the self, i.e. an Entseherrung.

28 Phenomenology, Introduction, para. 85. The text itself can actually be divided according to the point of view in question - see the Appendix to Introduction to the Reading of Hegel by A. Kojève (English translation, New York, 1969).

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32 See the footnote to 'Entfremdung'.


34 See the footnote to 'Entfremdung'.

35 Hegel, 'Estrangement' and 'Entfremdung' occur in the same sentence on the 1844 manuscripts, the editor D. F. Norton says (para.195): 'It is clear why Mandel cites ... remarks are made in Hegel's Phenomenology ' ... etc.etc.'.

36 He grasps the essence of his own work. 'The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the dialectics of negativity as the moving and producing principle - is once and for all that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process ... that is, keeps the essence of work and comprehends ... man as the product of his own work.'

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What’s so Right about Adam Smith?

Noel Parker

One of Milton Friedman's colleagues in Chicago (George Stigler) said at a conference in Glasgow in 1976 to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the publication of The Wealth of Nations: 'I bring you greetings from Adam Smith, who is alive and well and living in Chicago' [1]. Thus the Right, 'New' and invigorated, claims proprietorial rights over the heritage of Adam Smith. Rumour has it for example that Sir Keith Joseph, on going to the Ministry for Industry, gave civil servants a reading list of monetarist texts plus The Wealth of Nations. Again, Milton Friedman's television series 'Free to Choose', which was broadcast in 1980 in the US and in Britain, and likewise the book that went with the series, began by proclaiming that America was the incarnation of two sets of ideas: those of Jefferson and those of Smith, and later credited the great ages of Britain and the US to the realisation of the true principles of Smith (35) [2]. Yet this heritage is not everything the Right would have us believe.

By simplifying him, the New Right claims to derive its broad political attitudes from Smith. If their descent from Smith is granted, the Right has two assets that make a powerful ideological weapon: simplicity combined with authority. But recent academic work on Smith reveals, in my view, how, as against the pseudo-Smithian simplicities of the Right, Smith belongs to a progressive tradition in which the thinking of the Left has a natural home. This essay is designed to undermine the force that the New Right derives from a parody of Smith's thought and the development of European thought in general, and some conceptual sleight of hand they perform in the process.

There are two themes that the Right sees in Smith's work. First, they see in it a classic account of the effectiveness of the market, as a means by which self-interested actions on the part of individuals allocate resources for maximum productivity and optimum distribution of wealth. Secondly, they find in it a scepticism about the outcome of social action in achieving its original goals. These two themes complement each other beautifully; if action is always ineffective we do not need to worry because the market will do a perfectly good job anyway. The Left is wrong-footed by the combination of these themes. It appears to oppose - hopelessly, romantically or viciously - a tide of self-interest which, since the advent of the market, has in any case become benign. You will notice that these two themes should have altogether different logical statuses - one is an analysis of a particular social reality, whereas the other is a cautionary principle to guide action or the investigation of social reality in general. The second is, then, much more likely to be valid at any time. As we shall see, the trick of the Right is to treat both as timelessly valid, in part by uniting them and transposing to the first the better claim of the second to be atemporal.

Smith does put forward these two positions, but not as one, and not on their own. Smith's approach is essentially historical, and his findings cannot be separated from the historical dimension of his description of them. If these themes of the Right are put back into that dimension, the story of the benign working of Smith's model would have to be re-examined for any given historical period, and political movements would be free to adapt to new historical circumstances with some hope (not, of course, certainty) of success. Smith, and the Left, then show up as the realists, and the New Right position as pseudo-Smithian, a vicious circle of idealism and scepticism.

I shall first draw together the general lessons of Smith's approach in his work, which do not, in my view, favour the Right at all. Then I will explore the New Right position and its use of Smith more thoroughly. Finally, I shall comment on some philosophical distinctions which are confused to shore up...