HEGEL: PAST AND PRESENT


Anyone who has followed the remorseless expansion of the literature on Hegel over the last ten to fifteen years has good reason to wonder just how much there can be of interest still to be said. The diversity of the literature, as much as its sheer volume, is mesmerising. It is difficult, once one is drawn into its intricate web, to retain a sense of perspective on its wider philosophical or social meaning.

Each of these two books exemplifies the relative merits and demerits of a particular approach to Hegel’s work. On the one hand, we have in Dickey’s Hegel a detailed historical contextualisation and interpretation of the work of the young Hegel, replete with scholarly reference and disputation (there are 150 pages of notes alone, although frustratingly, no bibliography). It argues for a specific interpretive thesis, and much of its argument is taken with the establishment of its position in relation to the existing literature on the topic (‘the many errors past scholars have made in this vital area’). Hegel and Modern Philosophy, on the other hand, is a collection of essays on a variety of aspects of Hegel’s work which mainly forego detailed exegesis in favour of explorations of issues raised by his philosophy. They have been brought together, in the words of their editor, in order ‘to demonstrate the life and vitality of an Hegelian tradition and its influence upon those who are grappling with some of the issues that dominate contemporary philosophy’.

There are essays on, amongst other things, the contribution of the perspective of an historical phenomenology to social analysis (Bernard Cullen), Hegel and Feminism (Susan Easton, expanded from her piece in RP 38), Hegel and Wittgenstein on sense and meaning (David Lamb), Hegel and political economy (Chris Arthur), Hegel and Marx and the structure of a dialectical social science (separate pieces by Sean Sayers, Joe McCarney, and Michael George – the latter of which, despite the clarity of its exposition of Hegel, presents a rather idiosyncratic view of Marx), and Hegel and Religion (John Walker). It is the diversity of the interests in and perspectives on Hegel represented here that the editor is concerned to emphasise in his introduction, in opposition to the idea of any contemporary Hegelian ‘school’. Thus, whilst the primary aim of Dickey’s book lies in the new light it aims to throw on Hegel’s work through its painstaking uncovering of new historical material on the theological debates taking place within Wurttemberg towards the end of the 18th century; Lamb’s collection stands or falls on the credibility of the claim it makes to connect up Hegel’s work with contemporary philosophical concerns.

The main theoretical, as opposed to merely scholarly, issue raised by Dickey’s book is the appropriateness of its historical method to its stated aim of explaining the coherence of Hegel’s thought as a developmental sequence. More particularly, it raises the question of the adequacy of the kind of historical ‘contextualisation’ of theoretical texts advocated by Quentin Skinner, to the reading of such distinctly ‘philosophical’ works as Hegel’s. Dickey’s thesis is a strong one: namely, that the voluminous existing literature on the Young Hegel has failed to appreciate the full significance of the Protestant culture of ‘Old-Wurttemberg’ for an adequate understanding of Hegel’s earliest preoccupations and formative theoretical concerns. In particular, Dickey argues, there has been a consistent over-estimation of the influence on Hegel of the Germanic Greek literary ideal (something which is central to both Lukacs’s and Harris’s analyses), at the cost of an under-estimation of the extent to which Hegel’s early writings are structured by a distinctive conception of ‘civil piety’. Civil piety, according to Dickey, is Hegel’s ‘core concept’.

To establish this thesis, Dickey undertakes an impressively researched exposition of the religious and political culture of the ‘Old-Wurttemberg’ into which Hegel was born, situating its distinctive brand of ‘down-to-earth’ Pietism in relation to both the long history of Christian eschatology and the contemporary ‘Good Old Law’ school of political thought, in terms of which the Protestant ‘patriots’ of the Wurttemberg Estates conceived their resistance to their ruling Catholic Duke. He then offers a reading of Hegel’s early writings as ‘applied Christian theology’, drawing upon this exposition, which reinterprets Hegel’s central concepts within the terms of Protestant reformist thought. Finally, he provides an account of the crucial transition in Hegel’s thought leading up to the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), subsequent upon his ‘discovery’ of the
economy in the late 1790s, through which the concept of Sit­tlichkeit (ethical life) — which Dickey initially treats as virtually synonymous with the idea of civil piety — is transformed from an ethical ideal abstractly opposed to the existing world into a dialectically critical representation of the unity of objective experience. It is the complex ‘overlay’ of religious and economic perspectives which is involved in this process, Dickey argues, which is the ground of the distinctive structure not only of Hegel's social and political thought, but thereby, of his philosophy as a whole.

In the course of his analysis, Dickey is thus led to contest: (1) Lukács's and Kaufmann's attacks on 'theological' readings of Hegel's early writings; (2) Harris's emphasis on the importance of Hegel's reception of Kant (whose influence is effectively restricted by Dickey to that of a particular philosophical brand of Protestantism); (3) any reading of Hegel's development centred upon the reconstruction of the immanent logic of his move beyond Kant's, Fichte's and Schelling's successive reformulations of philosophical idealism. Dickey's whole approach, in fact, is premised upon a particularly strong conception of the difference between 'a philosophical explanation of the historical development of Hegel's thought and a historical explanation of his philosophy as a process of development'. It is the latter, he argues, which is required if Hegel's thought is to be rendered both accurately and intelligibly.

Dickey certainly provides as sophisticated a version of this kind of explanation as one is likely to find. He utilises the results of recent historical research into both late 18th-century German Protestantism and the Scottish Enlightenment in a way which consistently illuminates the intellectual context and sources of Hegel's thought. Whether this 'explains' Hegel's development in quite the way in which Dickey believes, however, is another matter. For his analyses of Hegel's actual texts are in general both brief and allusive. In particular, the Difference Essay (1801), arguably the crucial transitional text in the period with which Dickey is concerned — at least in terms of the philosophical structure of Hegel's thought — is hardly referred to at all. This is a consequence of its narrowly 'philosophical' concerns.

But this points to a problem about the scope of Dickey's methodology: namely, is it really necessary to counterpose 'historical' to 'philosophical' explanations in the way in which Dickey proposes? More specifically, is it sufficient to demonstrate structural homologies between a writer's argument and those constitutive of a contextual cultural tradition in order to locate the writer within that tradition, in the face of competing textual evidence? Personally, I remain unconvinced by the 'theological' element of Dickey's reading, for both methodological and specific textual reasons. Nonetheless, the book is an impressive achievement and a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature which, it must be said, has tended to become somewhat over-fixated on the most narrowly textual matters. The latter part of the book, on the concept of Sittlichkeit, is especially useful for its careful delineation of the changing form of the essentially practical thrust of Hegel's early thought at the point of its transformation into his mature, systematic conception.

For all their historical and scholarly detail, though, the ultimate value of works like Dickey's depends upon the enduring significance of Hegel's work as a stimulus and focus for contemporary philosophical debate. For while it is almost universally agreed among Hegel scholars that his work provides often decisive arguments against a variety of still influential philosophical positions — most notably, empiricism and Kantianism — it nonetheless remains the case that there are few, if any, actual 'Hegelians' around in anything like the sense in which Kantianism remains a pervasive philosophical force. With the exception of the theologically inclined, for example, one would be hard pressed to find a single proponent of absolute idealism amongst the growing ranks of Hegel devotees. Hegel, it is often said, remains central to the most fundamental issues in contemporary philosophy. Yet few who defend this centrality are prepared to defend the Hegelian system itself. The question thus arises as to what exactly is the place of Hegel's thought within contemporary philosophical debate? Dickey himself reserves judgement. 'It is not a question,' he insists, which 'a historically orientated study of Hegel can answer.' It is a question, though, which is posed quite sharply by the Lamb collection; not least because of the self-consiously modest way in which it is answered in its introduction.

Hegel's work, Lamb suggests, is best thought of as a general theoretical resource which may be deployed across the whole spectrum of contemporary philosophical research. It is of value not so much because of the exclusive character of its systematic claims, as because of the light these claims throw upon certain, specific contemporary philosophical problems and concerns. Such an approach is an appealing one. For it suggests that we can have our Hegel while nonetheless avoiding, or at least reserving judgement upon, Hegel's own (exclusive) ontological commitments. But is this really the case? And if it is, is there not something decidedly un-Hegelian about it? Does it, in fact, not involve the removal from Hegel's work of precisely that dimension which, for him at least, was central to all the rest? If so, what is the philosophical basis for such a move?
with a particular aspect of Marx's relation to Hegel. If there is a contemporary philosophical tradition which takes its cue from an appropriation of Hegel's work which is at once both critical and systematic, it is surely the Marxist tradition. Marx, as McCarney puts it, 'is a Hegelian for our time'. Marxism alone, it seems, offers the possibility of a genuinely Hegelian supercession of Hegelian philosophy itself.

The problem is that attitudes towards Hegel within the Marxist tradition have, historically, been as contradictory as anywhere else. Elements of 'Hegelianism' within Marx's work have on the one hand tended to be treated as idealist 'residues' fit only for the surgeon's knife, whilst on the other, they have been embraced with such passion that it has often been hard to see in what way it might be said that Marx moved decisively beyond Hegel, philosophically. Sayers and McCarney (rightly in my view) tend toward the latter of these two extremes. Yet each, I think, despite their explicit qualification of it, ultimately fails to distinguish himself sufficiently from it.

Their interpretations of the philosophical form of Marxism are rather different: scientific critique (Sayers) versus practically formative but non-'critical' dialectical explanation (McCarney). But the problems they face are at root similar. Both are faced with the problem of demonstrating just how that aspect of Hegel's work which they want to appropriate for Marxism is compatible with a materialist ontology of social being. The problem is particularly acutely posed by McCarney in what is far and away the most systematic and programmatic piece in the book. Here more than anywhere else a real sense is conveyed of the deeply problematic character of the Hegelian heritage, and thereby, of the depth of its continuing philosophical productivity. Hegel and Modern Philosophy is a welcome sign of the beginnings of a move beyond the recovery of Hegel's work to a critical examination of its place within contemporary thought.

Peter Osborne

**MYTHS, MODELS, AND FANTASIES**


Where do the right get their utopias from? It will be a lasting, if unintended, legacy of Margaret Thatcher that she prompts this question. Her ideology of 'forward to the past' blew the cover of conservatism in general. This was one of the sources of resentment of the 'wets' - their skillful creation of an ideology claiming not to be an ideology, with its rhetoric of common sense, the tried and tested, tradition, was not interrogated and its various utopias unmasked. These conservatives argued that the concept of conservative ideology was a contradiction in terms since conservatism was a natural disposition.

However, insofar as there is a contradiction here, it is for the exact opposite reason - the widespread absence of this disposition. Conservative ideology emerges to defend an order in crisis, one not naturally holding together, and therefore always arrives late, so to speak. It is only in this sense that we can say that conservative ideology is never the product of a conservative society - an aspect of the original sin doctrine conservatives tend not to dwell on. Thus it was at the end of the eighteenth century with the old order facing destruction that Burke's moment arrived.

It is ironic, given the deep-seated anti-Irish racism in Britain, though not particularly surprising, that a native of Ireland provided the British ruling class with a newly minted utopia. It took an outsider, and one with the immense dramatic and poetic talents of Burke, to fashion out of British history the fabrication of the divine ancestral constitution. This restructured the old liberal commonplace of a social contract into a contract binding present and future generations. In like manner he created a (literally) fabulous image of the French ancien régime. Tom Paine saw through Burke's eulogy to Marie Antoinette: 'He pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird.' Burke's genuine insights into historical structuring were buried beneath his ideological purposes.

The two books examined in this review deal with the creation of myth and fantasy. Each seeks to uncover the needs and desires at the base of these creations. Both are very aware of the importance of political and social crisis in this process. Although focussing on the emergence of right-wing ideology they point to the existence of a shared climate of assumptions which blighted left-wing ideology as well as nurturing the right. Bernal and Theweleit also spend much time looking at the human creators of these myths and the complex psychological and sociological influence on their production.

The subtitle of *Black Athena* reveals the purpose of the work. It is concerned with the 'Fabrication of Ancient Greece' since 1785 - the creation of an image of that society in the image of this society. Bernal argues that a variety of mainly external influences generated in scholarship and 'science' a model of the past appropriate to those influences. A notable feature of this model is that it involves a rejection of much evidence to the contrary - particularly the testimony of the very people under investigation - the ancient Greeks. In classical times the dominant Greek view was that they owed much of their civilisation to the Egyptians and the Phoenicians.

This Bernal terms the 'Ancient Model'. He shows that there is indeed evidence to support this ancient belief. The 'Ancient Model' was accepted into comparatively recent times and was reflected in the awe of Egyptian wisdom displayed in, for example, the occult veneration of Hermes Trismegistos (a version of Thoth, the Egyptian god of wisdom). Things began to change in the eighteenth century. The link between Freemasonry, which drew on Egyptian sources, and intellectual and political revolution provoked a reaction against Egypt. To this was added Eurocentric racism, in the wake of colonialism, which could not conceive of the European Greeks owing anything to African Egyptians. New linear 'progressivist' theories of history could also not conceive of earlier civilisations having a degree of superiority over later ones.
Out of this developed the nineteenth-century cult of the
divine Greeks, self-forming and perfect who had somehow
'transcended the laws of history and language'. Here we have
the roots of what Bernal calls the 'Aryan Model' – where the
Greeks are viewed as Northern Europeans in the sun (building
on the undoubted Indo-European infusions in Greek history).
This evolving model could fulfill a number of functions. The
ancient polic could serve as the centrepiece of a type of
counter-revolutionary utopianism – the conservative good life.
Even worse, however, was its role in the development of racist
ideology where the superior Aryan Greeks were counterposed
to the inferior black Egyptians and semitic Phoenicians.

Throughout all of this, Bernal insists, no distinction can be
drawn between popular stereotypes and 'objective' academic
accounts – each reinforced the shared mythology. Some did see
the utter

Egyptian and Phoenician influences) but also accepts the reality
deriving from the fact that the superiority of the Aryan Greeks was
counterposed to the inferior black Egyptians and semitic Phoenicians.

Bernal’s book is a powerful piece of work. It is the product
of many years work and combines a sharply argued thesis with
thorough scholarship. The complex issues of ancient language
and culture are baffling to the non-specialist and therefore
make it very difficult to assess the merits of the evidence
produced. Nonetheless it is possible to see the nature of the
models offered, and the reasons for their development, without
necessarily knowing where the balance of probability lies. The
work can therefore be read as a piece of critical sociology of
knowledge as much as an excursion into ancient history. The
polemical purpose of the book very occasionally errs on the
side of cranky paranoia. Thus while rightly stressing the resistance
of academia to novel and challenging ideas he speculates,
at one point, on whether a Dutch publisher was ‘discouraged’
(Bernal’s word) from printing an unorthodox PhD thesis.

Male Fantasies is a translation of volume 1 of a work
which first appeared in German in 1977. It is very difficult to
summarize the complexities of this remarkable work. Like Black Athena its focus is on the production of world views and,
also like Bernal’s work, is principally concerned with the myth-
making of the right. Theweleit’s starting point is a distinctive
group of men – the Freikorps (post-World War I irregulars who
helped suppress the German revolution and lay the foundations
for the rise of Hitler). The crisis thus generating these fantasies
was the sequence of events encompassing the collapse of the
Imperial Reich, the revolution and the Social-Democratic
Weimar Republic. He examines these men’s memoirs and let-
ters and the literature produced by and about them. His close
textual analysis reveals an important early finding – the utter
marginality, in these accounts, of the women they marry (most
graphically manifested in a failure to even mention their
names!).

This is the first clue, he argues, to an understanding of the
ugly fantasy world of these proto-fascists. Distorted images of
women abound in these men’s minds: the ‘White Nurse’, an-
gelic, aristocratic, pure and the ‘Red Nurse’, wicked, working-
class, lascivious. There is a recurring imagery of flooding, boil-
ing, lava, used in connection with the ‘Bolshevik Wave’ which
is seen as overwhelming Germany, but which also seems linked
to femininity, the female. Theweleit argues, on the basis of
Deleuze and Guattari rather than Freud, that there is a complex
interplay of fear and desire in all of this, with its roots in the
equally complex relationship between patriarchy and
capitalism. In a section entitled ‘Contamination of the Body’s
Peripheral Areas’ he examines his source’s reference to ‘dirt’,
‘through the body’ and ‘rain’, and contends that these reveal
both alarm at their own ‘base’ desires and impulses and mur-
derous anger at those who seem to flaunt these forbidden urges.
There is a deep anxiety about maintaining their integrity as
human beings. This can only be overcome by the cleansing,
hard security of violence against the shameless Reds.

If that stream reaches me, touches me, spills over me,
then I will dissolve, sink, explode with nausea, di-
sintegrate in fear, turn horrified into slime that will gum
me up, mire that will suffocate me, a pulp that will swal-
low me like quicksand. I’ll be in a state where everyth-
ing is the same, inextricably mixed together, and no one
will be able to tell what it is that’s flowing down there.
A demented inner scream – Heeelp! Who’s going to put
me back together, dry me out, and keep me dry? ... White mother! Come over here quickly with your rough
washcloths and your bony hands and rub me down!
Strict Father, give me your gun (if YOU can’t hold back
this flood any longer) and let me go hunting for all those
people who are letting it run out of themselves like
animals... I’m about to explode!

These men are frantically trying to destroy all that threatens
the possibility of a safe, erect, clean world.

This brief account can only scratch the surface of what is
a very fine piece of work. Like all bold theses there are parts
which do not convince, readings which seem rather far-fetched.
Psychological speculation is always somewhat of a trip to
Wonderland (Barbara Ehrenreich, after giving a few facts on
the Freikorps in her useful introduction, remarks ‘Hold on to
this information – it may provide you with an illusion of
security in what follows’. Persuasive however – this is a very
insightful book.

As the two books demonstrate right-wing utopianism finds
fertile soil in the dislocations of the modern world. Any
residual complacency should take a hard look at the recent
career of the Aids panic. Bernal’s Golden Ageism and
Theweleit’s genocidal fantasies are both to be seen in the crea-
tion of the ‘Gay Plague’ scare. The good old days of decency
can return once more if only these horrible people and their
nasty disease can be eradicated. Homosexuality should never
have been legalised, it serves them right, there is no such thing
as a free lunch, the wages of sin, etc., etc. Get rid of this, get
rid of that, one final push against the alien, against the un-
natural and decline can be overcome. Then the future will be
anchored in (captured and created by!) the present and its past.
The right is constantly confecting exclusive visions rooted in
mythic pasts but reflecting very real interests. Such rear-guard
utopianism is necessarily inattractive – the title, fortunately
(alas for these people), keeps on coming in (many on the US right,
for example, feel betrayed by Reagan!) The left should both
expose this appallingly dangerous process and develop alterna-
tive visions of the inclusive society which are solidly based in
existing progressive tendencies.

Vincent Geoghegan
BRAINWORK


This is a profoundly important book. It is especially important for all those philosophers who count themselves 'materialist' or 'radical'. Patricia Churchland, and her husband Paul, have for the last decade been defending the most sophisticated and radical form of what is known as 'eliminative materialism'. For those who espouse a materialist position on the mind-body question there is the major problem that mental terms do not, for a variety of reasons, appear to reduce to the physical. For some this is sufficient to discount the materialist view. Others think it possible to combine a materialist with a non-reductionist approach. The Churchlands defend a materialist and reductionist approach.

Patricia Churchland specifies what it is that will be reduced to the physical, that is the neuro-, sciences. It is not the commonplace discourse of mental terms by which we currently understand ourselves. This is 'folk psychology'. It is, Churchland argues, a theory and, as a theory, it is deeply inadequate. Indeed the pejorative adjective 'folk' is intended to lump commonsense psychology with such other anachronistic curiosities of human intellectual history as, for instance, 'folk physics'.

'Folk psychology' should be eliminated. In its place, Churchland maintains, we should develop a psychology that 'co-evolves' with the neurosciences. We can, as it were, come to understand the mind/brain from, scientifically speaking, both 'above' and 'below'. The 'co-evolution' of two sciences with a shared object of study has been a successful strategy in other areas, and eventually permitted the reduction of the 'higher' to the 'lower' sciences. Such will, she trusts, be the case with the sciences of the mind/brain. In sum, 'folk psychology' cannot indeed reduce to the physical sciences of the brain. But that is a reason not for trusting it, but rather for dispensing with it in favour of a theory of mind that is responsive to and will thus reduce in time to the neurological theories of the brain. It is, it should be added, not only 'folk psychology' that suffers in Churchland's account. Much of contemporary cognitive psychology and mainstream artificial intelligence share 'folk psychology's' radically mistaken conceptions of the mental and thus must be eliminated.

Patricia Churchland's book is not only a defence of a thesis but an extended attempt upon the project which that thesis prescribes as the proper business of philosophical psychology. In Part I she provides some 'elementary neuroscience', a marvellously detailed and yet accessible Beginner's Guide to the Brain; in Part II she outlines and criticises various non-reductionist theories of the mind in the context of an admirably lucid history of the philosophy of science. In her concluding Part III she essays some 'neurophilosophy' proper, showing that our deepened understanding of how the brain does actually go about its exceedingly complicated business must radically alter our conception of how the mind works. This is no mere fine-tuning of a theory. We cannot, for instance, go on believing that thinking consists of logical operations upon sentences once we properly appreciate the true nature of neural activity at the micro and macro levels.

'Radical philosophers' seem on the whole to be disinterested in the mind-body problem. Perhaps they resent Anglo-American philosophy's apparent restriction of 'materialism' to a view about beliefs and brain-cells. This is deeply unfortunate since 'radical philosophy' has been curiously happy to embrace 'materialist' theories which contain the most idealist and dualist conceptions of the human being. Materialism is certainly not just about brains, but it must at least be that much. Moreover, the materialism of the Churchlands is most accurately set within the context of their 'naturalising' approach to philosophy. They are the intellectual heirs of Quine, and want to reconstruct philosophy in its proper relation to the sciences.

The Churchlands' work should not be seen as narrowly concerned with the relationship of 'mind' and 'brain'. Their approach, informed as it is by a scientific appreciation of human beings, directly challenges the way we human beings ordinarily think about ourselves. To take one small but telling example. We have frequently been told that a 'Cartesian' conception of the person as the unified subject of conscious experience is threatened (or 'de-centred') by taking due measure of language, the unconscious or whatever. We may still nevertheless be talking about a non-physical 'subject' however 'de-centred'. Various neurological researches, ably summarised by Patricia Churchland, provide an empirically well-founded challenge to any notion of a unified subject. Indeed the 'de-centring' of the subject is as radical as can be conceived. Yet we are speaking of mind-brains and allowing our philosophy of the person to be informed by the developed science of the human being.

Patricia Churchland writes with an enviable style. Her familiarity with the material, her deep and informed commitment to a thesis and her passion to persuade are well served by her colloquial and direct approach; her historical summaries of philosophical positions and debates are amongst the best currently available.

In sum this is 'radical' philosophy at its very best. Informed by the most recent advances in knowledge, dogged in its defence of an unorthodox thesis and determinedly accessible to all, Patricia Churchland's book should not be ignored. We have for too long chosen to ignore or understate the fact that it is our brains that cognize. Understanding brains cannot but fundamentally determine our understanding of understanding. Or to quote Churchland's closing words: 'So it is that the brain investigates the brain, theorising about what brains do when they theorise, finding out what brains do when they find out, and being changed forever by the knowledge.'

Dave Archard
AFTER PHILOSOPHY?


There can be few spectacles so disquieting as a struggle over a corpse. The current struggle over the corpse of philosophy is no exception. Not least because of the doubts which remain in the minds of some of its participants that the victim is actually dead; or indeed, that it (he?, she?) is even mortal. Even the identity of the victim, in fact, remains in some doubt.

A questioning of the possibility of ‘philosophy’ has of course long been one of philosophy’s most persistent, if repressed, themes. Yet, as the editors of this useful new collection point out in their introduction, it would be a mistake simply to assimilate the current bout of questioning of the idea of philosophy to the recurrence of a single, age-old, sceptical problem. The object, methods, and most important of all, the practical implications of this kind of questioning have changed radically over the years. The rise of the modern sciences, firstly of nature and latterly of the human world, and in particular the study of language, have fundamentally altered the conception of reason in terms of which the philosophical enterprise has come to be defended. With these changes, the continuity of the enterprise has itself fallen into question. Critics and apologists have begun to share something of the same ground.

There has been a growing recognition over the last two decades, across a wide range of otherwise quite disparate philosophical opinion, that a turning point in the history of philosophy has been reached (or indeed, was reached some time ago); a growing recognition that certain ideas, of ‘reason’ and ‘truth’ for example, hitherto constitutive of the philosophical tradition, can no longer be sustained – at least in the form in which they have been held up until now. The question of the limits and possibilities of philosophy, and thereby of the character of possible justifications for cultural practices in general, has become the object of an increasingly international debate.

*After Philosophy* is a collection of pieces by major representatives of each of the three main national philosophical traditions which have contributed to this debate over the last twenty years: the French, German, and Anglo-American (or ‘analytical’) traditions. Its claim is to demonstrate both the diversity of approaches and perspectives and the essential similarity of concerns which characterise current philosophical debates around this issue. To this effect, it draws together pieces by Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Ricoeur; Gadamer, Habermas, Apel, and Blumenberg; Dummett, Davidson, Putnam, Taylor, MacIntyre, and Rorty. It organises them, however, not according to national tradition, but according to the structural similarity of the positions they adopt on the question of the future of philosophy.

The editors have thus been led to classify their chosen contributors into three main groups under the following headings: ‘The End of Philosophy’ (Rorty, Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida); ‘The Transformation of Philosophy (I): Systematic Proposals’ (Davidson, Dummett, Putnam, Apel, Habermas); and ‘The Transformation of Philosophy (II): Hermeneutics, Rhetoric, Narrative’ (Gadamer, Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Blumenberg, Taylor). The effect is both stimulating and instructive. For the arrangement shows the way in which the boundaries of philosophical dispute are currently being redrawn across their traditional national limits, while at the same time demonstrating the extent to which this is nonetheless occurring on the basis of the cross fertilisation, rather than the elimination, of these national traditions themselves. As such, it offers what is probably the most representative cross-section of material from the newly internationalised philosophical community currently available. (The only notable omission that immediately occurs to me is that of Richard Bernstein, who has probably done as much as anyone in contributing to the recent cross fertilisation of national philosophical particularisms. His inclusion, however, would have weighted the collection disproportionately in favour of its American contributors. The inclusion of Blumenberg, on the other hand, has the merit of drawing the attention of an Anglo-American readership to the work of a less well-known, although certainly no less significant, Continental figure.)

Of the pieces themselves, most are relatively readily available elsewhere; although MacIntyre’s interesting ‘Relativism, Power, and Philosophy’ has otherwise appeared only in the 1984 *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, whilst Habermas’ important ‘Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter’ is translated here for the first time. The one original piece is Taylor’s ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ – a useful critique of the facility of so much recent neo-Nietzschean thought. As I have already suggested, however, it is less the novelty of the material than its happy conjunction in one volume that gives the book its value. It will be particularly useful for teaching purposes, since each essay is prefaced by a brief resume of the author’s work as a whole.

As for the way in which the debate itself appears from the standpoint of the contributions assembled in the book, it is obviously not possible to offer anything more than the most cursory remarks here. Three things in particular, though, did strike me as I read through the collection. The first was the relative philosophical strength of the position sketched out by Derrida in *The Ends of Man*, in comparison with the pieces which accompany it which argue for a comparably radical break with the existing philosophical tradition (Rorty, Foucault, Lyotard). The second was the relative weakness of the positions advanced in favour of particular positive conceptions of a transformed philosophy, in comparison with the strength of the associated arguments deployed against the more apocalyptic, dismissive critiques of such a project. The third was the notable absence of a single distinctively Marxist contribution to the debate, despite the general acknowledgement of Marx alongside Nietzsche as co-inaugurator of the current phase of radical doubt over the possibility of an autonomous reason – a symptom perhaps of a wider failing on the part of the revival of Marxism in the late 1960s and early ’70s to address itself sufficiently systematically to the problem of the creative
development of Marx’s brief and often enigmatic remarks on the concept of philosophy.

The debate clearly has a long way yet to run, not least in terms of the clarification of its practical implications which is required if those differences between its protagonists which are, and which are not, of fundamental importance are to become sufficiently clear for further progress to be made. On the evidence assembled here, though, it seems likely that if we are to preside over the death of philosophy, it will be accompanying us to its own wake. In what guise remains to be seen.

Peter Osborne

BYE-BYE


Bobbio is a significant figure in European political thinking, so this translation of some of his more general recent statements on democracy is to be welcomed as an introduction to his work. A more sustained theoretical work, What is Socialism? (1976) is promised by Polity, who continue to impress with their string of translations of current Continental political theorists.

The Future of Democracy is an indicative work, though not an ‘important’ one. It is a collection of occasional lectures and articles, relatively informal and discursive in tone, and despite the promise of the title, open-ended in political prognosis. It is interesting, I think, in two main ways. First, it represents another contribution to the growing body of work which seeks theoretically and practically to reconcile a Left political stance with the climate of individualism which characterizes the modern epoch. Yet the process of democratization is likely to continue. It should not be seen as moving from ‘formal’ to ‘real’ democracy so much as from the narrow political sphere outwards to other areas of social life (consumption, welfare, workplaces, communities).

Bobbio’s reasoning here is persuasive up to a point, and he usefully refers to difficult questions about representation, the state and social constituencies which are likely to recur in any modern society claiming to be democratic. But the overall tone of this book is rather more affirmative of formal liberal democracy (the rule of law, fair and general representation) than it is of the bustling social pluralism which he sees as carrying democracy further into civil society. He is rather too quick to dismiss as logically impossible rather than practically difficult an expansion of more ‘directly’ democratic forms. And his assumptions that classical individualism is alive and well in contemporary ethical and political life can be seriously disputed. He dismisses without argument the prospect of a contemporary ‘functional’ representative nexus based on group identities, and does not seriously envisage the extent to which mixed media of democratic representation might emerge. In fact, his acceptance of pluralism jars a bit with his individualism, since the two work against each other in some key respects. Interestingly, Bobbio does not go into the feasibility or even the possible meaning of socialist democratic pluralism.

He is content to wrestle with the prospect that Rawls’ work holds the basis of an adequate resolution of the claims of equality, justice and liberty. This is, of course, a matter of some contention which Bobbio does not, in this text, add anything to. Bobbio’s reference points, and perhaps his limitations too, reflect the importance of the revival of readings of classical liberalism in Italy, a revival which has sent many prominent socialists and Marxists (notably Colletti) back to the moral drawing board. The second important feature of the book is therefore that it reflects the remarkable shift in Continental theorising away from organic and dialectical modes of thought towards Anglo-American styles and aspirations. It will be interesting to see how this dialogue progresses.

Gregor McLennan

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING


Many people react with incredulity when they hear that the Romans and the Greeks had no number ‘zero’ – how could they possibly have missed it? Similar puzzlement can attach to early medieval pictures – why couldn’t they see that they had the perspective all wrong? On the other hand we may feel strangely uneasy about changes occurring in our own symbol systems – few are bothered any more about the ‘reality’ of paper-money, but what about paying electronic ‘debts’ in Financial Futures? Brian Rotman’s book is a tapestry of delicate elaborations on a single beautiful idea, revealing isomorphisms between the changes which occur in these symbol systems. In so doing it offers a line of escape from Platonist realism.

If you probe practising mathematicians about what they are doing they nearly always fall back on a purely ‘formalist’ account – ‘I am just manipulating inscriptions on paper.’ It is not altogether clear why anyone should think this is important. Covertly, one suspects, all mathematicians are Platonists beneath – in imagination they explore uncharged, transcendent seas bringing back news of exotic discoveries which are at once stranger and more secure than anything an earth-bound scientist can achieve. This certainly is how we are taught to experience mathematics, but as David Bloor has pointed out the objective and absolute authority are socially constructed. Crypto-Platonists are revealed by the horror with which they react to any mention of the ‘sociology of mathematics’ and counterfeit the objectivity and certainty of mathematical ‘truth’.

Counting can occur without words or numerals: all that is needed is a ritual in which one points to different parts of the body in a rigid sequence as successive objects are ‘counted’. Repeated patterns implicitly define the ‘bases’ of different counting systems (most notably 5, 10, 12, 20 and 60). Despite attempts at decimal rationalisation remnants of other systems live on in common language and practice. The simplest way of tracking the process in writing is to represent each repeated act of counting by repetition of an inscription, e.g. ‘III’. This form of representation is essentially iconic, and this remains true even if compression is achieved by inventing special symbols to stand for clusters of particular sizes, as in the original forms of the Roman numerals. Such a system can perfectly well represent any number of things whatsoever. However if you count on (say) an abacus you may well find that some rows (say for the ‘Xs’) are blank.
Brian Rotman vividly brings out the difference between ignoring the blank row when writing down 'the number' and using a special symbol to show that the line is blank. In the latter case we aren't introducing another iconic sign - how would pointing to 'Nothing' differ from any kind of incomplete gesture, which simply failed to refer to anything at all? Instead we are introducing a meta-sign to stand for the absence of other signs (or if you prefer the fact that we don't perform the relevant act). One of the sources of resistance to 'zero' in Mediaeval Europe lies in what this implies for the whole idea of 'number'. (Another source of resistance, delightfully illustrated in this book, is the perplexity induced by talking about 'Nothing'.)

Once Zero, the meta-sign, is admitted into the family of number-signs then according to Brian Rotman it disrupts the iconic relationship between those signs and acts of counting. 'Zero' becomes the originating symbol of a notational system. We can then generate an infinitude of 'numbers' which could never be realised in human acts of counting. At one remove further, 'closure' of this system of signs is generated by the idea of the algebraic variable - a meta-sign which indicates the potential presence of any of the infinite variety of number-signs. These moves reflect the existence of 'one-who-counts'. If we elide our presence as the originators of the symbol-system then it will appear to represent a prior and independent reality - i.e. we will be well on the way to Platonism. In mathematics a programme of 'deconstruction' has definite philosophical appeal.

The fascinating richness of this book arises from the way exactly the same semiotic transformations are traced in other symbol systems. Thus in the visual arts we find iconic representation giving way to perspectival drawing in which the vanishing point plays a role analogous to zero in the number system. The vanishing point isn't an icon of any actual object, what it signifies is the presence of 'one-who-sees' and its function 'in' the picture is to organize the images in a way which essentially acknowledges the existence and location of the observer (or artist). Brian Rotman also finds an analogy to the introduction of the algebraic variable and the variety of potential acts of counting which it implies. This occurs in multi-perspectival drawing, where the elements of a picture are organized so as apparently to emphasize the way the scene appears to 'observers' who are represented in the picture.

The changes occurring in 'money' as a symbol system used to organize exchange follow a similar pattern. In a series of transformations we move from barter through precious metal as a medium of exchange, to coinage, personalised promissory notes, banknotes redeemable in specie, national paper money, and international electronic information. Sometimes people fear they aren't dealing with 'real' money and develop a fetish for gold or other Victorian valuables. This reflects a refusal to accept that money is simply a system of socially accepted signs used to organize certain kinds of transaction, without any transcendent warranty.

It is a striking fact that isomorphic transformations within different symbol systems should occur during the same historical period (firstly in classical Islamic civilization and then in Renaissance Europe). In terms of theoretical hierarchy the transformation in the number system appears to be the most fundamental, but it is probable that this was stimulated by the development of practices of accounting. However, it is not the purpose of this book to attempt a causal narrative, or to try to link the intrusion of 'one-who-signifies' to individualism in epistemology, religion, law and economic activity. Instead it attempts to show that there are isomorphic manoeuvres within the different codes and to show how the snares of rampant metaphysical realism can be evaded if we pick our way with deconstructive care.

It will, of course, occasion no surprise that if you insist that symbols can never be 'decoded' except in terms of other symbols then you will avoid metaphysical realism. What seems to me of particular interest is the way Brian Rotman shows how a hierarchy of meta-signs can become associated with a practical activity, and how this reflects awareness of the participation of ourselves and others in the activity. An unrestrained programme of 'deconstruction' would swallow itself, and the final pages of the book face this possibility of reflexive oblivion, in an echo of the final paragraphs of Hume's Enquiry and Wittgenstein's Tractatus! The text which frames 'zero', 'the vanishing point' and 'imaginary money' is (in the fashionable barbarism) undeconstructed. But surely this is necessary - the question which is important is whether what the author is saying is true. There is presumably no 'coding' to which deconstructive analysis cannot be applied, but necessarily any particular analysis will be embedded in a meta-level of discourse which the writer intends to be taken seriously. Brian Rotman seeks escape from the paradoxes of unrestrained deconstruction by ascending a ladder of meta-languages in the manner in which Tarski, following Russell, attempted to rescue the concept of 'truth'.

Jonathan Powers

STATE CLUSTERS


In this second volume (first published in hardback two years ago) of Giddens' projected three-volume critique we can see how some of the theoretical groundwork of the first volume works to analyse the political. There, registering both his commitment to exploring the ideal of socialism and his scepticism about historical materialism's teleology of history, Giddens developed his general 'theory of structuration' to show how social systems are made up of situated social practices which deploy various resources to shape the social structure around them. This had major implications for Historical Materialism: the place of 'allocative' (i.e. economic) resources under capitalism had to be seen as an historical exception rather than the crucial motor of all historical change; Marxism's nineteenth-century faith in the potentially neutral industrial state was misplaced; the 'authoritative' resources, marshalled in the state power that is an ineluctable feature of history thus far' had to be reckoned with in the analysis of all social forms, socialism included. This volume, then, is where Giddens looks into the state.

Giddens' book is organised around four institutional clusterings: capitalism, industrialism, centralised violence and surveillance. He tells a complex historical story. In the modern world the classes are not 'segmented' from one another. The state has had to provide the currency conditions, the separation of economic and political spheres, and the discipline for capitalism and subsequently industrialism under which the classes are brought into proximity. In doing so, it has enhanced its surveillance and organisation of society, fostered circulation of information and the 'textuality' of society at large, and monopolised organised violence (which is, on the other
Thus, modern states' areas of administration are also 'arenas of responding'. The interconnectedness of the clusters means that no state is completely immune from danger by being industrialised and chronically directed against rival states). The politics that all this sanctions, then, is a diverse one, with prospects of constraints and useful, if small-scale victories within each cluster. It is optimistic to a degree. Is it, however, soundly based? It relies heavily upon the idea of the reciprocity of government in integrated modern societies: 'government' only exists when there is a 'two-way' relation between the programmes of the ruling authorities and the 'behavioural input' from those who are governed. Does that not in turn rely upon the view, developed in Giddens' earlier works, of the power of 'situated social practices' over the structure within which they are conducted? In RP 43 Ian Craib criticised Giddens for blurring the distinctive statuses of social structures and social agency, thus giving all actions the same potential for impact upon the social structure. The reciprocity whereby a situated social practice may interact with the direction imposed by the structure of the state must be a prime example of this. In encouraging us to look more widely at the priorities for contestation in the structures that shape modern society, Giddens may have loosened too far our means of judging the resistance to be expected from the different structures.

Noel Parker

Mental Elements


In this book, Godelier offers interesting reflections on some of the key concepts of Marxism, and in doing so reflects a widespread tendency to see historical materialism as compatible with several claims usually considered to be anti-Marxist. Additionally, the arguments are excellently illustrated from the author's anthropological storehouse.

Godelier wants particularly to tackle the perennial issues surrounding the relationship between base and superstructure, and the conceptualisation of ideology. He maintains that it is only in capitalism that a separate economic base can be identified, and with respect to which other cultural and political features must be deemed superstructural. This heterodox view has often been asserted, sometimes by writers who are keen to say that there is no determinate social causality, at least in pre-capitalist societies. Godelier does not go that far, producing instead the clever formulation that the distinction between fundamental production relations and other social forms is one between functions and not of institutions. In this conception, it is no denial of historical materialism to say that (variously) kinship or religion or politics can serve as the dominant form in which relations of production are organized. He states that those social activities or ideologies which come to dominate a society can only do so if they also, 'among their other functions, determine access to resources and constitute the social form of appropriation of nature'. 'Superstructural' dominance, in this sense, is not after all something to counterpose to the centrality of the relations of production, for they are often one and the same thing.

This argument (like many in the book) is not really expanded and defended at sufficient length – though it is often repeated aphoristically. There will certainly be worries in some quarters about the functionalist cast of the argument. Godelier says that it is what institutions do, not what they are, that is important. Historians and others who tend to highlight the specificity of particular cultural forces and influences might want to raise criticisms about the explanatory value of functional propositions of this kind. Personally, I think functionalism has had a bad press recently.

The other problem Godelier wrestles with is how to integrate the mental and the material aspects of social relations without sliding into either vulgar materialism or a vision of pure discourse. Here the relevant catch-phrase is that 'there is an element of the mental in all (social) reality; which does not mean that everything in reality is mental' ('mental' in this sense should be taken in its broad sense of 'representational'). More specifically, this happy formulation allows Godelier to develop some propositions on ideology, which are not exactly original but are once again neatly encapsulated. He devises a four-fold division of the functions of representational constructs, from the very general sense that representations produce social meaning to the narrower legitimating role of ideas within particular structures of domination. He argues persuasively – though again to no definite conclusion – that 'ideology' cannot be so broad as to refer to every kind of 'making sense', but nor should it be restrictively defined as the illusions which cloak power relations and class interests.

A third running strand is that no regime can survive on pure coercion. True, they can survive on the threat or the potential for coercion, and in this context (along with British sociologists) Godelier allows that 'consent' can take an essen-
tially pragmatic form. However, he does insist that normative assent is often surprisingly widespread, and that a shared belief in reciprocal service between dominant and dominated lies at the heart of symbolic consensus. It is not clear whether Godelier holds this to be true tranhistorically, or whether he thinks that there must always be some material advantage involved if dominated groups are to accept their oppression. On neither point is the argument fully established: neither seems intuitively right. Here as elsewhere there are (for the non-specialist) fascinating examples drawn from anthropological literature showing that the exotic rituals and myths through which forms of dominance are secured are never mere exercises in delusion or rationalized subordination. They often involve (perceived) material benefit.

In this strand of discussion Godelier seems to me to under-emphasize the brute force which often lies behind the rituals of consent, but he does bring out the complex intertwining of symbolic and material modes. More generally, he has managed to concede some standard objections to vulgar Marxism — rejection of base superstructure, centrality of symbolic forms — whilst retaining a minimal but basic commitment to historical materialism in its classical sense. A more contentious issue, touched on at the end of the book, is whether the very term ‘class’ itself can be validly applied to pre-capitalist societies. Godelier thinks not, on the whole, but again sees no drastically upsetting consequences for historical materialism. Whatever the resolution to this question, Godelier’s thoughts always strike me as extremely valuable, representing a satisfying blend of theory and empirical detail, openness and orthodoxy.

Gregor McLellan


In this book Jeff Hearn attempts to construct a general theory of gender relations in contemporary societies. The central aim is to present gender relations as separate from but articulated with capitalist social relations, and this involves a deep and wide-ranging critique of the concepts of reproduction found in Capital. However, Hearn wishes to retain a concept of reproduction in which to ground his theory of patriarchy. Reproduction includes at least six different types of social practices: biological reproduction; the reproduction of labour power; ideological reproduction; the organisation of sexual practices through sexual reproduction; physical reproduction including violence and generative reproduction through practices of nurture and regeneration. These provide the material bases of patriarchy around which the class relations of patriarchy are constructed to form men who oppress and exploit women through the direct appropriation of ‘surplus human value’. This involves the appropriation by men of women’s various reproductive labour powers which may be accumulated by individual men. Since there is no recompense involved, patriarchy ultimately hinges on the potential or actual violence of men towards women.

I think there are two main problems with Hearn’s theory. The first is his account, or rather lack of it, of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy. This is simply not elaborated in any detail, although there is an interesting and potentially useful suggestion that patriarchal social categories such as ‘women’ and ‘men’ systematically obscure capitalist class relations, and that capitalist social categories such as labour systematically obscure patriarchal class relations. However, this implies a sort of functional ‘fit’ between capitalism and patriarchy, whereas there can in fact be considerable tension and contradiction between the two systems. Secondly, the account rests far too much on the concept of reproduction.

The second half of the book contains several practical, empirical and political essays applying the theoretical framework to professionalisation, the management of reproduction, and the politics of fatherhood and childcare. For me these chapters are the least satisfactory in the book. Specifically I think that Hearn over-generalises his concept of patriarchy by seeking to use it to explain hierarchies amongst men principally in the state.

Despite these criticisms I think The Gender of Oppression is an extremely valuable text, frequently provocative, and at times quite original.

Paul Bagguley

NEWS

Raymond Williams (1921-1988)

Raymond Williams’ writings in the late 1950s and 1960s offered a formulation of socialist ideas which shaped many people’s way of thinking, including my own, for probably a whole lifetime. The conception of the socialist project which he advanced as one of extending democracy made socialism seem a natural and logical culmination of British social traditions to which (at that point at least) it seemed important to feel oneself related. His identification of the crucial cultural dimensions of emancipation, rooted historically in Culture and Society, and developed as a social theory, as a history of various cultural institutions, and, in The Long Revolution, as a programme, spoke to the particular preoccupations of those then entering universities or other forms of education, yet not inclined to identify themselves with the dominant class culture. Raymond Williams’ writing had an astonishing reasonableness — I remember